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2 ICISS 2001: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, Ottawa: 11. An argument for an extended notion of the “responsibility to protect” was made by Moon with regard to the refusal of the authoritarian regime in Burma to let humanitarian aid into the country after the cyclone catastrophe.Google Scholar

3 Doyle, Michael W.: The new interventionism, in: Pogge, Thomas W., GLOBAL JUSTICE (2001), 228.Google Scholar

4 See, among others, Georg Meggle, ETHICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS (2001); J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (2003).Google Scholar

5 Doyle (note 2).Google Scholar

6 Mary Kaldor, NEW AND OLD WARS (2000) 257.Google Scholar

7 Deen K.Chatterjee and Don E.Scheid, Introduction, in, Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Chatterjee/Scheid, 2003), 1–21.Google Scholar

8 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (1999).Google Scholar

9 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993). The original position – briefly said - provides that citizens’ representatives preside over principles of fairness that determine the “basic structure” of society, and that they do this with an impartiality deriving from the fact that they possesses only limited knowledge about prospective social position.Google Scholar

10 RAWLS (note 8), 65.Google Scholar

11 RAWLS (note 8), 37.Google Scholar

12 RAWLS (note 8), 65.Google Scholar

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14 Jürgen Habermas, Kants Idee des ewigen Friedens -aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren, in: DIE EINBEZIEHUNG DES ANDEREN, (1996).Google Scholar

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16 Habermas (note 15), 328.Google Scholar

17 Habermas (note 15), 328.Google Scholar

18 Habermas, THE KANTIAN PROJECT AND THE DIVIDED WEST, 139. HABERMAS (note 15), 328.Google Scholar

19 This was Habermas’ suggestion in Habermas (note 13), supra note 12 at 218.Google Scholar

20 See also the very good introduction of Ciaran Cronin Habermas (note 18), Editor's Preface, vii-xxi at ix.Google Scholar

21 See especially The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION. POLITICAL ESSAYS, (2001) 110–111.Google Scholar

22 Habermas (note 18), 136.Google Scholar

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26 RAWLS (note 8), 35.Google Scholar

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28 As far as I know, it was Guillermo O'Donnell who first introduced the notion of “defective democracy”. He, however, uses this adjective when addressing societies with fair and free political competition but with weak or intermittent horizontal accountability. See O'Donnell 1993, On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems. A Latin American View with Glance at Some Post-Communist Countries, 21 WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 1355 (1993).Google Scholar

29 RAWLS (note 8), 92, note 2.Google Scholar

30 RAWLS (note 8), 106, note 2.Google Scholar

31 RAWLS (note 8), 90, note 1, and 93, note 6.Google Scholar

32 For a better understanding of how Rawls deals with the “outlaw” states', it is helpful to recall the characteristics of liberal and decent hierarchical peoples. To put it briefly, liberal peoples are internally united through a constitutional government, a shared cultural elements like language, historical consciousness and political culture. To the outside they act “reasonably,” which means that they “offer fair terms of cooperation” to other peoples (See Rawls (note 7), 25) - presuming that they are committed to those principles themselves. “Decent hierarchical” societies differ from liberal peoples in that governmental institutions may be influenced by “comprehensive doctrines,” such as religious faiths and political equality only exists in a formal sense: it does not apply to individuals, but rather to groups or castes that should be represented in the political and legal systems [See Rawls (note 7), 64). To the outside decent hierarchical societies are non-aggressive, which is a major difference from the ‘outlaw regimes’ (which I will describe in a moment).Google Scholar

33 See the helpful taxonomy in Rawls’ theory. Please see for this Henry Shue, Rawls and the Outlaws, 1(3) POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY&ECONOMICS, 307, 308 (2002). RAWLS (note 7): Peoples: 23–7. A. liberal (23-5); B. Decent (4,59-60, 63–7); Societies (neither Peoples nor States): A. Burdened (5,63,90,106);B. Benevolent Absolutism (63,92); States, usually ‘outlaw states': A. Expansionist as well as internally repressive (90); B. Non-expanionist but internally repressive (90 note 1, 93–4 note 6)Google Scholar

34 RAWLS (note 7), 90, footnote 2.Google Scholar

35 For this diagnosis also Shue (note 31).Google Scholar

36 RAWLS (note 8), 93, note 2.Google Scholar

37 RAWLS (note 8), 90, note 2.Google Scholar

38 RAWLS (note 8), 93, note 6.Google Scholar

39 Darrell Moellendorf, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE, 15 (2004).Google Scholar

40 For this argument Habermas (note 13), 219; and with reference to Günther, Klaus, Habermas (note 13), 235. See also Giovanna Borradori, Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas, in PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR, 39 (2003).Google Scholar

41 Habermas (note 18), 35.Google Scholar

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44 The High-level Panel, however, mentions also a tight link between poverty and civil wars, Id., 15.Google Scholar

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49 Habermas (note 18), 143.Google Scholar

50 For the differentiation between national, transnational and supranational in Habermas's theory see page 7 of this article.Google Scholar

51 Habermas (note 15), 335.Google Scholar

52 Thomas Pogge, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (2002).Google Scholar

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56 Waldron, Jeremy, Liberal Rights, 212 (1993).Google Scholar

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58 Lafont (note 57), 22.Google Scholar

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60 Rainer Forst, DAS RECHT AUF RECHTFERTIGUNG, (2007).Google Scholar

61 Jürgen Habermas, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, (1996).Google Scholar

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