Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Jiri Zemanek, Professor at Charles University, Prague, asks what conclusions may be drawn from the current state of acceptance of the European Union (EU) law doctrine by the constitutional courts of the new Member States for their performance in the agenda of preliminary rulings. What can they learn from the experience of the old Member States? Should they follow the practice of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court), which referred its first question in 1999, four years after its accession, and later repeated it several times? Or should they follow the most active Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle? Should Hungary follow the practice of the Italian Constitutional Court, Lithuania, France, Spain, or Germany? Having reviewed the case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the scholarly analysis in search of the “missing links,” this study wishes to contribute to the diverse range of ideas concerning European “rule of law” integration and constitutional court contributions to it.
1 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court], July 14, 2014, Erkenntnisse und Beschlüsse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes [VfSlg] No. 145/2010 (Austria).Google Scholar
2 Zedenek, Jiri, The Constitutional Courts in the New Member States and the Uniform Application of European Law; Giuseppe Martinico, Preliminary Reference and Constitutional Courts: Are You in the Mood for Dialogue?, Tilburg Institute for Comparative and Transnational Law Working Paper (TICOM) 1 (2009).Google Scholar
3 See articles in Part Four of this Special Issue. Google Scholar
4 In this article, I will use the terms “Community law” and “EU law” according to their chronology. I use the term EU law for general assessments as well.Google Scholar
5 For more information about this, see Európai Közjog és politika [European Public Law and Policy] 775-89 (Tamás Kende &Tamás Szűcs eds., 2006).Google Scholar
6 It is disputed whether constitutional amendment was an ultimate necessity for accession. See, e.g., László Kecskés, Az EU-Csatlakozás magyar alkotmányjogi problémái [Constitutional Law Issues of Hungary's Accession to the EU], 51 Magyar Tudomány 1081-82 (2006).Google Scholar
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8 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] AK.2012.11.22 (Hung.). The Constitutional court, conducting an abstract interpretation procedure, determined what treaties may fall within the scope of Section E of the Fundamental Law.Google Scholar
9 Of the courts of the Member States joining the Union in 2004, only one reference from Malta in 2012 (C–221/09., AJD Tuna, 2011 E.C.R. I–01655) claimed the invalidity of an EU regulation. In this case the CJEU could not identify any points where invalidity could occur. See Réka Somssich, Előzetes döntéshozatali eljárások a számok tükrében—a 2004 óta csatlakozott országok bíróságai által kezdeményezett előzetes döntéshozatali eljárások 10 évvel a csatlakozás után [The Practice of Referring Cases in Member States Joining the Union in 2004 in the Last 10 Years], in A magyar bírósági gyakorlat az előzetes döntéshozatali eljárások kezdeményezésének tükrében 31, 42 (András Osztovits ed., 2014).Google Scholar
10 Id. at 33. It is also found at the webpage of the Curia (the supreme court of Hungary).Google Scholar
11 For the latest analyses of all relevant decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court in English, see Fazekas, Flora, EU Law and Hungarian Constitutional Court, in European Union Law in Hungary: Institutions, Processes and the Law 32–73 (Márton Varju & Ernő Várnay eds., 2014). I will on many occasions use these short analyses in chapter B to highlight the essence of relevant jurisprudence.Google Scholar
12 For a summary, see Vörös, Imre, Csoportkép Laokoonnal: A magyar jog és az Alkotmánybíróság vívódása az európai joggal [Laocoon Group Photo: The Hungarian Law and Constitutional Adjudication in the Light of European Law] 95–111 (2012).Google Scholar
13 Prior to the accession the Constitutional Court analyzed the possibility of limiting sovereignty in the following decisions. See AB AK.1999.11.26; AB AK.2011.2.28; AB AK.2001.1154; AB AK 1998.6.25.Google Scholar
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16 AB AK 2012.8.22.Google Scholar
17 Translated by the author.Google Scholar
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19 For the elevated importance of the competence of constitutional courts to refer a case to the CJEU, see Martinico, supra note 2, at 4–6.Google Scholar
20 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court.Google Scholar
21 Available at www.mkab.hu/statisztika/2014.Google Scholar
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28 The Court referred to Case C–166/73, Rheinmühlen, 1974 E.C.R. 33.Google Scholar
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31 See Fazekas, supra note 14, at 75.Google Scholar
32 Dissenting opinion of Judge Laszló Kiss, I Chapter.Google Scholar
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38 See Fazekas, supra note 11, at 59.Google Scholar
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40 Section IV.2.5 of the Decision.Google Scholar
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42 It is worth mentioning that no other constitutional court asked for a preliminary ruling in the case of assessing the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty.Google Scholar
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44 The official translation is found at the homepage of the Constitutional Court, available at http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0022_2012.pdf.Google Scholar
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58 Id. at 432.Google Scholar
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60 Most cases are connected with the effectiveness of the decision-making process and fair procedure and fair treatment from the officer's side. Zsófia Varga, Az alapjogi Charta a magyar bíróságok előtt. The Charter of Fundamental Rights before the Hungarian Courts] 68 Jogtudományi Közlöny 553-62 (2013)Google Scholar
61 Somssich, supra note 9, at 31.Google Scholar
62 Fazekas, supra note 14, at 349.Google Scholar