Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
The general assumption in the West is that there still is an inherent difference between persons and things. This divide informs how “the human” and human subjectivity are constructed as distinct from all others. Recently, the distinction has been challenged in posthumanist theory, where it has been argued that the divide between human and nonhuman agents—or rather, bodies—is always an effect of a differential set of powers. For this reason, the boundaries between human and nonhuman are always in flux. As posthumanist theorists have argued, this change in boundaries may be specifically visualized in relation to digital technology. Today, such technologies obfuscate the boundaries between persons and things, and the extensive utilization of smartphones, social media, and online search engines are just three common examples.
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