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“Post” As Justification: International Law and Democracy-Building after Iraq

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Outi Korhonen

Extract

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The “post”-phase of a conflict has become the justification for both the possible action and the inaction of the Western states. It is not so much any longer that we would be averse to war in any circumstances, as the non-use of force principle in its absolute sense would require. Again, after a good fifty years of the UN and its raison d'etre – the guardianship of peace – we seem to have arrived at an era where ideological contestation no more has the deterrent effect that it did during the Cold War and, consequently, there are cases of the use of force that are accepted and even regarded as just as long as they are quick. When looking back at the NATO bombings of FRY in 1999 as the response to atrocities in Kosovo many are able to accept that ‘though illegal they were legitimate’ in some sense. This is the conclusion irrespective of whether one, at the time, was for action or inaction. Such a ‘condoning condemnation’ has become the popular middle road as so many other paradoxes in world politics. Through the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq the paradox has gained in strength. Although there is quite strong and unequivocal opposition to the wars and a condemnation for their illegality, the political elite of the West seems to be quick in forgetting scruples and taking a keen interest in the “post”-management of the targets, i.e. the states that are about to be or already have been ‘bombed into the stone age’ or into shambles in any case. There is a general rush to the “post”-phase; both in the sense that the tacit requirement for the condoning condemnation is that the action be quick – the use of force should be very limited in time – and, secondly, in the sense that already before the bombs fall (or during) the major reconstruction plans and projects are dealt. This article outlines some points of critique that could be launched at the phase when the majority cannot be bothered to re-analyze the wrongs committed ex ante.

Type
European & International Law
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 4 , Issue 7 , 01 July 2003 , pp. 709 - 723
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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2 See my previous publications on post-conflict administrations. Korhonen, Outi & Gras, Jutta, International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations (Helsinki 2001); Korhonen, Outi, International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations, 13 Leiden J. Int'l L. 495 – 529 (2001)Google Scholar

3 For instance, it was announced in the news June 2, 2003 that Italy as a coalition member was awarded the charge of the cultural treasures of Iraq during the US-led administration of the country.Google Scholar

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27 As a conclusion of my studies on the international administrations from the nineteenth century until to date, I find that the earlier administrations (esp. under the League of Nations) sought to determine better the question of sovereignty, unlike the modern mandates. See Korhonen & Gras (supra), at 150Google Scholar

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