1 AWACS/Somalia Case, BVerfGE 90, 286; other aspects of the case pertained to the deployment of German soldiers to Somalia.Google Scholar

2 For a general assessment of the legal, historical and political issues see Georg Nolte, Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability, in Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law 231 (Ku, Charlotte & Jacobson, Harold K. eds., 2003).Google Scholar

3 BVerfGE 90, 286, 389.Google Scholar

4 BVerfGE 90, 286, 383–384; on this decision see Georg Nolte, Bundeswehreinsätze in kollektiven Sicherheitssystemen – Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Juli 1994, 54 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 652, 673 (1994).Google Scholar

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6 BVerfGE 68, 1, 89, 106; BVerfGE 104, 151, 207; see Paulus, Andreas L., Quo vadis Democratic Control? The Afghanistan Decision of the Bundestag and the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the NATO Strategic Concept Case, 3 German Law Journal (GLJ), No. 1 (2002); Markus, Rau, NATO's New Strategic Concept and the German Federal Government's Authority in the Sphere of Foreign Affairs: The Decision of the German Constitutional Court of 22 November 2001, 44 German Yearbook of International Law 544 (2001).Google Scholar

7 BVerfGE 90, 286, 387.Google Scholar

8 See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Bundeswehr als globaler Sicherheitsdienstleister? Grenzen der Zustimmungsfähigkeit von bewaffneten Streitkräfteeinsätzen, in Frieden in Freiheit - Peace in liberty - Paix en liberté. Festschrift fur Michael Bothe zum 70. Geburtstag 81 (Fischer-Lescano, Andreas et al. eds., 2008).Google Scholar

9 New Strategic Concept Case - BVerfGE 104, 151.Google Scholar

10 Tornado Case - BVerfGE 118, 244.Google Scholar

11 See, Gordon Brown, Constitutional Reform Statement of 3 July 2007, available at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page12274, last accessed, 20 November 2008.Google Scholar

12 See, in this sense Damrosch, Lori F., The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers, in Democratic Accountability, supra, note 2, 39, 59.Google Scholar

13 AWACS/Turkey Case - BVerfG, 2 BvE 1/03, Decision of 7 May 2008; Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 770 (2008); 35 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 312 (2008); Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2018 (2008); not yet reported in the official collection.Google Scholar

14 See, e.g., Herdegen, Matthias, Informalisierung und Entparlamentarisierung politischer Entscheidungen als Gefährdungen der Verfassung?, 62 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer 7 (2003); see also von Bogdandy, Armin, Parlamentarismus in Europa - eine Verfallsoder Erfolgsgeschichte?, 130 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 445 (2005); see also the speech of Judge Papier which triggered this discussion: Hans-Jürgen Papier, Reform an Haupt und Gliedern. Eine Rede gegen die Selbstentmachtung des Parlaments, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 8 (31 January 2003).Google Scholar

55 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, UNTS, Vol. 34, 243; UNTS, Vol. 126, 350; UNTS, Vol. 243, 308 (ratified through to present by 26 Member States).Google Scholar

16 Statement of NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (20 March 2003), available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/03/mil-030320-usia01.htm, last accessed, 7 August 2008.Google Scholar

17 Statement of the German Chancellor Mr. Gerhard Schröder, in: Protocol 15/34, Preliminary version, 2727.Google Scholar

18 BVerfGE 108, 34; an English translation of this decision is available at: http://www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/qs20030325_2bvq001803en.html, last accessed, 15 September 2008.Google Scholar

19 Id., para. 28.Google Scholar

20 Id., para. 39.Google Scholar

21 Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz - ParlBG), 1 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 775 (2005).Google Scholar

22 For an overview on the Parliamentary Participation Act, 2005 see Dieter Wiefelspütz, Das Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz vom 18.3.2005, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 496 (2005).Google Scholar

23 See, supra, note 21 at art. 2: “If the circumstances indicate that the armed forces may be engaged in armed operations, the military deployment has to be approved by the legislature.”Google Scholar

24 AWACS/Turkey Case, supra, note 13, para. 57.Google Scholar

25 Id., paras. 59.Google Scholar

26 ld., para. 78.Google Scholar

27 ld., para. 79.Google Scholar

28 ld., para. 82.Google Scholar

29 Id., para. 85.Google Scholar

30 Id., para. 90.Google Scholar

31 Id., para. 70; see also BVerfGE 104, 151, 208. This emphasis of the compensatory effect was a departure from the Court's earlier reasoning in BVerfGE 89, 155: see Volker Röben, Der Einsatz der Streitkräfte nach dem Grundgesetz, 63 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 585, 594 (2003).Google Scholar

32 BVerfGE 118, 244.Google Scholar

33 See, e.g., Prantl, Heribert, Das Karlsruher Trostpflaster, Süddeutsche Zeitung 4 (8 May 2008), available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/921/173406/, last accessed, 20 November 2008.Google Scholar

34 One can think here of subsequent practice and subsequent agreement as modes of treaty interpretation, see the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Art. 31(3)(a), UNTS, Vol. 1155, 331 (ratified by 108 Member States).Google Scholar

35 BVerfGE 118, 244, 270.Google Scholar

36 AWACS/Turkey Case, supra, note 13, paras. 63–70.Google Scholar

37 The Court dealt with these issues only on a very limited basis. It examined whether the six Tornado surveillance jets that Germany deployed to Afghanistan would pass on information to OEF. On the basis of evidence supplied by the Federal Armed Forces, it came to the conclusion that this was generally not the case. Furthermore, it noted the recurrent call of the UN Security Council on ISAF and OEF to cooperate.Google Scholar

38 For a concise overview see Andreas L. Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: Hegemony or Pluralism?, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 691 (2004).Google Scholar

39 On the Turkish position see the coverage in the New York Times, Section A, Column 1, 11 (5 March 2003), Section A, Column 1, 15 (19 March 2003); for a brief legal assessment, see Olivier Corten, Le droit contre la guerre 280 (2008).Google Scholar

40 Corten, supra note 39, 287.Google Scholar

41 The factual assessment is difficult in this regard: see AWACS/Turkey Case, supra, note 13, para. 17, on the one hand, and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Konstitutiver Parlamentsvorbehalt: Wann ist ein AWACS-Einsatz ein “Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte”?, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1474, 1476 (2003) on the other. See also, War in the Gulf: Turkish Troops Enter Northern Iraq, The Guardian 2 (22 March 2003), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/22/iraq.turkey, last accessed, 20 November 2008.Google Scholar

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43 The complexity of this question is evidenced by the response of Professor Bothe to it who wrote that it would be difficult to give a negative answer, yet he would be inclined to do so. He then mentioned the example of the Tanker War in the Iran-Iraq Conflict of 1980–1988 in which the US never accepted a right of Iran to exercise self-defence against Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait which supported Iraq in the conflict. Bothe, who was a counsel for Iran in the Oil Platforms Case, mentions that Iran ultimately did not rely on such a right in the ICJ proceedings; see Bothe, Michael, Der Irak-Krieg und das völkerrechtliche Gewaltverbot, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts 255, 268 (2003).Google Scholar

44 The primacy of the UN Charter is not only guaranteed by its Article 103 but also emphasized by Article 1 of the NATO Treaty.Google Scholar

45 See, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, supra, note 41, 1475–1476.Google Scholar

46 See, SC Res. 1368 of 20 December 2001 and subsequent resolutions.Google Scholar

47 Burkiczak, Christian M., AWACS II - In dubio pro Bundestag, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 752, 754 (2008); see also, Epping, Volker, Die Evakuierung Deutscher Staatsbürger im Ausland als neues Kapitel der Bundeswehrgeschichte ohne rechtliche Grundlage? Der Tirana-Einsatz der Bundeswehr auf dem rechtlichen Prüfstand, 124 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 423, 455 (1999).Google Scholar

48 See, Schröder, Florian, Anmerkung, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 778, 779 (2008).Google Scholar

49 BVerfGE 89, 286, 387.Google Scholar

50 On the concept of immediacy see Markus Rau, Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr. Was bringt das Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz?, 44 Archiv des Völkerrechts 93, 105 (2006); Klein, Hans-Hugo, Rechtsfragen des Parlamentsvorbehalts für Einsätze der Bundeswehr, in Recht im Pluralismus - FS für Walter Schmitt Glaeser zum 70. Geburtstag 262 (Horn, Hans-Dieter, ed., 2003).Google Scholar

51 AWACS/Turkey Case, supra, note 13, para. 58.Google Scholar

52 See, for a variation of this theme, HCJ 769/02, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of Israel et al., Judgment of 11 December 2006, para. 61 (Opinion by President (Emeritus) A. Barak).Google Scholar

53 See also, Paulus, Andreas L. & Vashakmadze, Mindia, Parliamentary Control over the Use of Armed Forces Against Terrorism - In Defence of the Separation of Powers, 38 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 113, 159 (2007).Google Scholar