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⁹ Failure to state reasons is also one of the few possible grounds for annulment in the ICSID system (Art. 52(1)(e) ICSID-Convention). See further Art. 41 Rules of Procedure of the European Nuclear Energy Tribunal (5 September 1965). See also Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen 283 (1929); Kriele, Martin, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung 167–71 (1976).Google Scholar

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¹³ Although it is, at least empirically seen, a necessary element. Some important lawmaking decisions are supported by very little reasoning, for example the introduction of the erga-omnes rule by the ICJ, see Niels Petersen, Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice – Factors of Success, in this issue.Google Scholar

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¹⁶ Id. (“Further development of the law transgresses these boundaries if it changes clearly recognisable statutory decisions which may even be explicitly documented in the wording (of the Treaties), or creates new provisions without sufficient connection to legislative statements. This is above all not permissible where case-law makes fundamental policy decisions over and above individual cases or as a result of the further development of the law causes structural shifts to occur in the system of the sharing of constitutional power and influence.”).Google Scholar

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¹²¹ The answer was an easy one because the NGO had tried to base its claim on Art. 34 ICJ-Statute, whose relevant paragraph 3 is shaped to fit public international organizations. Therefore, the simple conclusion that the NGO is not a public international organization sufficed. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Article 34, in: Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary, 545, 548 (Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat & Karin Oellers-Frahm eds, 2006); Lindblom, Anna-Karin, Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law 303 (2005); Valencia-Ospina, Eduardo, Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Court of Justice, in: Civil society, international courts and compliance bodies, 277 (Tullio Treves, Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, Attila Tanzi, Alessandro Fodella, Cesare Pitea & Chiara Ragni eds, 2005).Google Scholar

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¹²³ Lindblom (note 121).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, 7.Google Scholar

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¹²⁷ Howse, Robert, Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy, 9 European Law Journal 496 (2003); Mavroidis, Petros C., Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, in: European Integration and International Co-ordination. Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 317 (Armin von Bogdandy, Yves Mény & Petros C. Mavroidis eds, 2002); McRae (note 114), 2.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para. 106. The EC-Asbestos Case was also of great importance, see especially WTO Appellate Body Communication, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/9, 8 November 2000; and Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council Held on 22 November 2000, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/60, 23 January 2001.Google Scholar

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¹³⁰ NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Recommendation on Non-disputing Party Participation, 7 October 2004.Google Scholar

¹³¹ OECD, Transparency and Third Party Participation (note 110).Google Scholar

¹³² Art. 37(2) Arbitration Rules. Cf. Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, 22 October 2004.Google Scholar

¹³³ See Benvenisti & Downs (note 44) (sharpening the understanding of how powerful states and sectoral interests strategically use international judicial institutions).Google Scholar

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