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35 One important issue seems to be that whereas the functional approach to international law-making has always been central, the EC/EU is unique because it amasses such a number of functional powers, since the normal form of delegation to such institutions has been to delegate to a great variety of mainly technical organizations with very limited goals, and generally without much direct political input. See Detter, Ingrid, Law Making of International Organisations (1965); See also Klabbers, Jan, International Institutional Law (2001).Google Scholar

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40 Steinberger, supra note 17, at 1331–1332. It also seems noticeable that the FCC has consistently regarded implicit or conventional constitutional changes in the EC/EU as changes in the German domestic constitutional order, insofar institutions that are competent to take measures binding on German authorities and citizens. In that sense, the FCC has continued with a relatively substantive conception of what the constitution includes. However, the extensive understanding of constitutions can create a problem in that too many norms are understood as constitutionalized, i.e. that they might be misinterpreted as more stable than they actually are.Google Scholar

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54 One of the interesting aspects of that seems also to be that since the FCC has largely relied on that kind of categorizations is of course also that it has simultaneously used such categorizations as a way to assess the proportionality of limitations of rights, which if nothing else shows that the protection of fundamental rights in general has a tendency to mix various forms of categorizations and more discretionary forms of judicial reasoning.Google Scholar

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65 In the Maria Pupino case, the ECJ held that a framework decision on the standing of victims of crime in the criminal procedure was directly applicable also in states that had not incorporated the provisions of the framework decision in their national legislation. The reason for that was partly the ECJ regards framework decisions to be structurally similar to directives and that they might thus be interpreted as having a similar “indirect direct effect”. Framework decisions are structurally to directives in the way they are drafted and in the way the legal basis for them in the TEU is framed similarly to the legal basis of directives in EC-law, i.e. they are to be effective with respect to their objective but the Member states are free to pursue that objective however they see fit. A more reasonable interpretation of the structural difference between EC-law and EU-law in the second and third pillar would be to see the latter as a response by the Member states to the ECJ's tendency to make all legislative instruments of the EC directly effective. If the Member states had wished to make framework decisions directly effective, they could have been incorporated in EC-law, rather than being created within a different institutional structure. In relation to that, the decision of the ECJ seems very problematic as it is a quite radical attempt to “supranationalize” the intergovernmental parts of the EU. Case C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, 2005 E.C.R. I-5285.Google Scholar

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