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Much Ado about Amsterdam: CDU-CSU Politics, Länder Influence and EU Treaty Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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“Not a year goes by without some fresh blueprint being drawn up and fed into the continuing debate. Each succeeding blueprint can be likened to the way in which some artists go over their work again and again, gradually building up a deep richness to the emerging picture.”
“Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that happens it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will show through a woman's dress, a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea. That is called pentimento because the painter ‘repented,’ changed his mind. Perhaps it would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and then seeing again.”
The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the legal and political dimensions of treaty reform in the European Union (EU). It raises a conceptual issue by addressing the conditions under which Chancellor Kohl yielded to an increase in sub-national influence and the extent to which Länder (Federal State) politicians were able to exercise that influence to determine the outcome in a key area during the Amsterdam European Council, 16–18 June 1997. (3) The initial section highlights a political and legal analysis of German politics and European treaty reform during the 1996 process. The second section explores emerging asymmetrical specificity on the German political and institutional landscape post-Maastricht. The closing section offers an explanation of the results in qualified majority voting (QMV) for the treaty provisions on freedom, security and justice at Amsterdam, and the implications for our understanding of treaty reform in the Union.
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- Copyright © 2001 by German Law Journal GbR
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