¹ See M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann, Preface to The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, i, at v (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds., 2006); A. Harding & E. Örücü, Preface to Comparative Law in the 21^st Century, i, at vii et seq. (A. Harding & E. Örücü eds., 2002).Google Scholar

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⁴ See S. Beale & A. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 89, 126 et seq. (2005) (describing some European Transnational Proposals).Google Scholar

⁵ See infra Part I.2.Google Scholar

⁶ See Jansen, N., Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 305, 306 (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds., 2006).Google Scholar

⁷ See Frankenberg, G., Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411, 416 et seq. (1985); P. Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 52 (1996). This also might have been a reason for its continuing neglect, already diagnosed. See Gutteridge, Harold Cooke, Comparative Law—An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research (1946) (diagnosing the continuing neglect).Google Scholar

⁸ See Zumbansen, P., Comparative Law's Coming of Age?, 6 German Law Journal 1073, 1075 (2005).Google Scholar

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¹³ See Norrie, A., The Limits of Justice: Finding the Fault in the Criminal Law, 59 Mod. L. Rev. 540, 543 (1996)(connecting this to the liberal “conception of the individual as an abstract, universal subject endowed with rational action, autonomy and self-determination.”). Norrie continues by stating “[t]he individual is a unified, centred being who acts as the basis for legitimating the state, law and punishment. … The rational subject receives ‘just deserts’ from the state through law. The ‘penal equation'—crime plus responsibility equals punishment—is founded on liberal bedrock.” Norrie refers to Kant and Hegel.Google Scholar

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¹⁶ Id. at 1488.Google Scholar

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¹⁸ Id. at 493 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id.Google Scholar

²⁰ Id. at 518.Google Scholar

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²² Id. at 122 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

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²⁵ Id. at 139.Google Scholar

²⁶ Wagner, supra note 11, at 10.Google Scholar

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³¹ The dialecticism of continental philosophy was heavily criticised by Popper (1937) for accommodating contradiction. This seems to be one of the crucial points: Is a contradiction resolvable or does the “aporia” have to be accepted?Google Scholar

³² Named after the publications on this topic in the Utah Law Review (1997).Google Scholar

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³⁴ See Legrand, P., Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 262 (1995) (stating the observation that, following his claims will “naturally take the comparatist away from the traditional approaches to comparative legal studies which … do not accept the need for theory and obstinately pursue similarity and consensus as if confined to a groove” does not help to enter a constructive dialogue with practical comparatists).Google Scholar

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³⁹ Derrida, J., Writing and Difference 360 (2006).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See generally Tanner (1994).Google Scholar

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⁴² See Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 464 (1898) (“He who fights monsters should look into it that he himself does not become a monster. When you gaze long into the Abyss, the Abyss also gazes into you.”).Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ Nietzsche, supra note 43, at On the Genealogy of Morals I, 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ This is not in a strictly historical sense, as Nietzsche considers normal historians not to be concerned about history—what is relevant for him is the “real origin,” the ahistorical but thus even more true narrative.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Nietzsche, supra note 43, at On the Genealogy of Morals III, 27. “All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming in the nature of, life – the lawgiver himself eventually receives the call: Submit to the law you yourself proposed.” Id.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Nietzsche, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Yovel, J., Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschen Jurisprudence, in Nietzsche and Legal Theory, Half-written laws 23, 25 (Peter Goodrich & Mariana Valverde eds., 2005) (“Nietzsche's prophecies, we must keep in mind, are untimely meditations. He is ‘pregnant with future’ [reference to GM II 16, not from the author].”).Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ See id. (stating that Copper said “[t]he instinct of the civilian is to systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer is solvitur ambulando.”).Google Scholar

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⁷⁶ This is connected with Kant and Hegel defending a retribution theory. Also notable is also Feuerbach, who partly created German criminal law and follows an absolute justification of punishment, similar to Kant's. See Rosbach, O., Strafrecht und Gesellschaft bei Anselm von Feuerbach, Forum Historia Iuris, 1 Dec. 2000, http://www.forhistiur.de/index_de.htm.Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ See Corporation, http://www.investorwords.com/1140/corporation.html.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953).Google Scholar

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⁸⁶ Thus this situation in England was the case before Bentham and his utilitarianism became influential.Google Scholar

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⁸⁸ There are wrong understandings of civil law. See Bernard, T. J., The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability, 22 Criminology 3 (1984). He states that they never developed the concept of juristic persons. This does not mirror reality. Albert, supra note 53, at 103 (“In the neo-American model, a company is a negotiable good like any other, whereas for the Rhine economies it is not just a commodity, but a community.”).Google Scholar

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⁹¹ See Bernard, supra note 88 (stating that CCL evolved, even though judges did not regard it as useful). This is a naïve view onto judgments. If the concept would be unwanted, judges could have argued otherwise.Google Scholar

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⁹⁴ See Khanna, supra note 15, at 1512, 1533 (showing that CCL does not lower this standard).Google Scholar

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¹⁰¹ Recently Austria (Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesetz, since 2006) and France. See Hartan, supra note 11, at 96 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁰² See Peters & Schwenke, supra note 3 (discussing the growing U.S. skepticism).Google Scholar

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