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⁶ Tillmann Rudolf Braun, Globalization-driven Innovation: The Investor as a Partial Subject in Public International Law - An Inquiry into the Nature and Limits of Investors Rights, 15 J. WORLD Inv. & Trade 73, 96–106 (2014). For ITA practice, see especially Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 141 (Feb. 8, 2005).Google Scholar

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⁹ As such, SOEs complicate the common taxonomy where companies are treated simultaneously as things whose stock is owned by their shareholders and as persons capable of owning property and representing themselves in legal proceedings. See, e.g., Iwai, Katsuhito, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 583 (1999).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹² Roberto Esposito, Persons and Things: From the Body's Point of View 35 (2015). For broader discussion, see Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 3.Google Scholar

¹³ Esposito, supra note 12 at 16–17.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Here, Esposito points out that in ancient Rome, for instance, “nobody stayed a person for their whole life, from birth to death—everybody, for at least some period of time, passed through a condition not far removed from that of a possessed thing.” Id. at 29. Thus, even an adult male Roman citizen, the quintessential person, “entered into the regime of personhood after a long internship in the entirely subordinate realm of sonship.” See Esposito, Roberto, Third Person: Politics of Life and Philosophy of the Impersonal 10 (2012).Google Scholar

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¹⁸ Id. at 69.Google Scholar

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²² See also Ukri Soirila chapter in this volume, 18 German L. J. (2017).Google Scholar

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²⁴ Id. at 21. See also Esposito, supra note 12 at 27.Google Scholar

²⁵ Esposito, supra note 14 at 9. Similar distinctions appear also in the context of children (filii in potestate) and married women (uxores in matrimonio). See Esposito, supra note 20 at 23–24.Google Scholar

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²⁷ Id. at 9.Google Scholar

²⁸ Esposito, supra note 12 at 26.Google Scholar

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³³ Roberto Esposito, Communitas. The Origin and Destiny of Community (2010).Google Scholar

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³⁵ See e.g., Campbell, Timothy, “Enough of a Self”: Esposito's Impersonal Biopolitics, 8 L. Culture & Human. 31 (2012); Tierney, Thomas F., Roberto Esposito's “Affirmative Biopolitics” and the Gift, 33 Theory Culture & Soc. 53 (2016).Google Scholar

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³⁹ See Barkan, Joshua, Roberto Esposito's Political Biology and Corporate Forms of Life, 8 L. Culture & Human. 84 (2012); Joshua Barkan, Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under Capitalism 76–86 (2013).Google Scholar

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⁴³ Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (ICSID Convention).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award (Mar. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Tulip v. Turkey Award].Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id. at 152–54.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Agreement on Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Turkey, (1986), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2090 [hereinafter the Netherlands-Turkey BIT].Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 60 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

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⁴⁹ Id. at 262.Google Scholar

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⁵¹ Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Tulip v. Turkey Annulment].Google Scholar

⁵² Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 276 (Mar. 10, 2014). The third important dimension would be the differentiation of contractual and treaty claims, but for the sake of brevity this Article does not discuss these elements in detail. For comprehensive discussion, see, e.g., Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 835 (2005); James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 Arb. Int'l 351 (2008); Schill, Stephan W., Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 Minn. J. Int'l L. 1 (2009); Michael Feit, Attribution and the Umbrella Clause - Is there a Way out of the Deadlock?, Minn. J. Int'l L. 21 (2012) and Shotaro Hamamoto, Parties to crawthe “Obligations” in the Obligations Observance (“Umbrella”) Clause, 30 ICSID Rev. 449 (2015).Google Scholar

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⁵⁴ Formally, neither international law nor investment law abide by strict adherence to precedent. In reality, however, parties to the dispute base their litigation strategies on earlier awards and judgements of other international courts and tribunals. In Tulip v. Turkey, for instance, the tribunal noted that “[e]ach Party refers the Tribunal to previous ICSID and investment treaty awards, and statements made in ICJ judgments. Although not bound by such citations, the Tribunal accepts that, as a matter of comity, it should have regard to earlier decisions of courts (particularly the ICJ) and of other international dispute tribunals engaged in the interpretation of the terms of a BIT.” Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision on Bifurcated Jurisdiction Issue, para. 45 (Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Tulip v. Turkey Jurisdiction].Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 281 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Id. at 438.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Id. at 58.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Due to this Article's scope and aim, the following discussion will focus solely on the international law dimension.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 5 at 119–93.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Tim Büthe & Milner, Helen V., The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 741 (2008) and Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment To Developing Countries?, in The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows 226 (Sauvant, Karl P. & Sachs, Lisa E. eds., 2009). For a critical examination, see Yackee, Jason Webb, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. Int'l L. 397 (2011).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Compare with S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., Fr., Italy, Japan v. Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Judgment of Aug. 17). See also Crawford, supra note 52 at 354–55.Google Scholar

⁶² The Netherlands-Turkey BIT, supra note 46 at Art. 8(2).Google Scholar

⁶³ Id. at Art. 8(3).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Christoph Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 9 (2d ed. 2009).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Id. at 9. See also Roberts, Anthea, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 Am. J. Int'l L. 45, 64 (2013). For similar expression in the case at hand, Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para 176 (Mar. 10, 2014). For a classic text, see Paulsson, Jan, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev. 232 (1995).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Out of these, roughly 2,600 are already in force. See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator (2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See generally Raustiala, Kal, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int'l Econ. L. 841 (2003).Google Scholar

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⁶⁹ Such actions may, however, take time. The Netherlands-Turkey BIT, for instance, remains in force for ten year periods and is tacitly extended for the same period, unless terminated. The Netherlands-Turkey BIT, supra note 46 at Art. 13(1)–13(2).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Schreuer et al., supra note 64 at 4. See also Harten, Gus Van, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 Trade L. Dev. 19 (2010).Google Scholar

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⁷³ Compare with how “public undertakings” are understood in the EU law. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-482/99, 2001, E.C.R. I-4400, para. 32–56.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For a succinct introduction to the issue, see Badia, Albert, Piercing the Veil of State Enterprises in International Arbitration 2–15 (2014).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See, e.g., OECD, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015 ed.) 11–14, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Guidelines-Corporate-Governance-SOEs-2015.pdf. See also Feit, supra note 52 at 21–23.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ In the OECD area, for instance, states have retained control of over 60% of privatized companies. Bernardo Bortolotti & Mara Faccio, Government Control of Privatized Firms, 22 Rev. Financ. Stud. 2907 (2009).Google Scholar

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⁸¹ Naturally, there are exceptions and some investment treaties do contain highly specific clauses on state-owned entities. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), for example, stipulates that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall ensure that any state enterprise which it maintains or establishes shall conduct its activities in relation to the sale or provision of goods and services in its Area in a manner consistent with the Contracting Party's obligations under … this Treaty.” Art. 22(1) ECT. The North American Free Trade Agreement uses broadly similar language. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I. L. M. 289 art. 1503 (1993).Google Scholar

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⁹² Tulip v. Turkey Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 192–93 (Dec. 30, 2015). Tulip v. Turkey is by no means unique with regard to the complex delineation between the host state and its SOEs, or other instrumentalities, at the jurisdictional stage. For detailed discussion, see Schicho, Luca, The Relationship between a State and State Entities: A Matter of Jurisdiction or of the Merits?, in Austrian Y.B. Int'l Arb., 367 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2011).Google Scholar

⁹³ Due to immense literature on the law of state responsibility, this Article focuses primarily on the ITA-related aspects of attribution doctrines. See Vidmar, Jure, Some Observations on Wrongfulness, Responsibility and Defences in International Law, 63 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 335 (2016) and Outi Korhonen & Toni Selkälä, Theorizing Responsibility, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 844 (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffmann eds., 2016).Google Scholar

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⁹⁹ Id. at 359.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. COMM'N 31 [hereinafter ILC ARSIWA Commentary].Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ In 2001, the U.N. General Assembly noted the ARSIWA and annexed them into its resolution, commending “them to the attention of Governments,” see U.N. GA Res 56/83, para. 4 (12 December 2001). For application of the ARSIWA in the ICJ's jurisprudence, see especially the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, para. 385 (Feb. 26).Google Scholar

¹⁰² David Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and Authority, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 857 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Alain Pellet, The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment Arbitration, 28 ICSID Rev. 223, 232–33 (2013). In the case at hand, the parties had divergent views on hierarchy between the ICJ and ITA tribunals' decisions: “Respondent submits that the judgments of the ICJ are at the apex; whilst Claimant submits that decisions of previous ICSID tribunals are more relevant as they specifically concern investment treaty law, and the construction of BITs, as compared to general principles of international law.” Tulip v. Turkey Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para 45 (Mar. 5, 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para 281 (Mar. 10, 2014). For similar approvals in other arbitral tribunals, see, e.g., Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 69 (Oct. 12, 2005), MCI Power Group v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, para. 42 (July 31, 2007) and Hamester v. Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, para. 171 (June 18, 2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 235 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Id. at 258.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part 113–61 (2013). The ARSIWA does contain other rules of attribution but these are—Article 11 ARSIWA aside—less relevant for SOEs and ITA.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ For discussion on de facto organs, see id. at 124–26.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ ILC ARSIWA Commentary supra note 100 at Art. 4, para. 6.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 235 (Mar. 10, 2014). Note, however, that the tribunal found that the claimant changed its target entity from Emlak to TOKI in the course of the proceedings. Id. at 283.Google Scholar

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¹¹³ Id. at 289. Other tribunals have ruled differently on this issue. See, e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para 96–97 (Jan. 25, 2000) and Salini Construttori S.P.A. & Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/04, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 32–35 (July 23, 2001). Note, however, that these cases predate the ARSIWA.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ ILC ARSIWA Commentary supra note 100, at Art. 5, para. 3.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 237 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Id. at 242.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Id. at 293.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Id. at 299.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ ILC ARSIWA Commentary supra note 100 at Art. 8, para. 6.Google Scholar

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¹²¹ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 243 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

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¹²³ Id. at 301.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Id. at 307.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Id. at 309–11.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Id. at 321.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Id. at 324.Google Scholar

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¹²⁹ Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, paras. 367–69 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Kristen Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution Doctrines, 15 Melb. J. Int'l L. 1, 17 (2014). See also Crawford, supra note 107 at 161–165. For a critique of the tribunal's conclusions, see Badia, Albert, Attribution of Conducts of State-Owned Enterprises Based on Control by the State, in ICSID Convention after 50 Years: Unsettled Issues 189, 200–01, 207–08 (Crina Baltag ed., 2016).Google Scholar

¹³¹ Compare this requirement for claimants with the findings in Khan Resources v. The Government of Mongolia, PCA Case No. 2011-09, Award, para. 189 (Mar. 2, 2015).Google Scholar

¹³² Many critical commentators would not hesitate to interpret the knockout victory of Turkey both at the merits and the annulment stages as reinforcing the notion that ITA proceedings are a site for adventurous litigation by foreign investors.Google Scholar

¹³³ Similar patterns emerge when states are parties to international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., Heiskanen, Veijo, State As a Private: The Participation of States in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt. 1 (2010).Google Scholar

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¹³⁵ Compare with delineation processes in the practice of human rights treaty bodies, particularly the European Court of Human Rights. Mikko Rajavuori, How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany and the Emergence of Human Rights-sensitive State Ownership Function, 26 Eur. J. Int'l L. 727, 732–37 (2015).Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See, e.g., EnCana Corp. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case UN3481, Award (Feb. 3, 2006) and Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Arbitration No. 80/2005, Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008).Google Scholar

¹³⁷ See, e.g., EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award (8 October 2009) and Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award (Apr. 8, 2013).Google Scholar

¹³⁸ See, e.g., Gustav F.W. Hamester GmbH & Co. KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, para. 143 (June 18, 2010).Google Scholar

¹³⁹ See, e.g., Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award (Dec. 8, 2000) and Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, (Nov. 8, 2010).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., Waste Management Inc v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (Apr. 30, 2004).Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award (Oct. 31, 2012).Google Scholar

¹⁴² See, e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, UNCITRAL (Aug. 19, 2005) and Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award (Oct. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

¹⁴³ See, e.g., Rusoro Mining Limited v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award (Aug. 22, 2016).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Yukos Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award, para. 1450–80 (July 18, 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ For good overviews of SOE-related ITA cases, see Schicho, supra note 92 at 369–70 and Badia, supra note 130.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Note, however, that even SOE-related ITA claims often impinge on various substantive protections where attribution is not necessary. See Petrochilos, Georgios, Bosh International, Inc and B & P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v Ukraine. When is Conduct by a University Attributable to the State?, 28 ICSID Rev. 262, 269–72 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ James Crawford & Paul Mertenskötter, The Use of the ILC's Attribution Rules in Investment Arbitration, in Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID 27, 33 (Meg Kinnear et al. eds., 2015). See also Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Dissenting Opinion of Jerzy Rajski, para. 11 (Aug. 19, 2005).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Naturally, tough questions regarding the exact definition of “a foreign investor” emerge. For a major case concerning the investor's nationality, see Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 29, 2004). For a case involving a state-owned claimant, see Ceskoslovenska obchodni banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award (Dec. 29, 2004).Google Scholar

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¹⁵⁰ Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 3.Google Scholar

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¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., Franck, Susan D., The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, para. 145 (Mar. 21, 2007).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, para. 131, 148 (June 30, 2009).Google Scholar

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¹⁵⁹ Id. at 171.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Niko Resources v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration & Production Company Limited and Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 220-27, 235 (Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Niko v. Bangladesh, Bapex and Petrobangla, Jurisdiction].Google Scholar

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¹⁶³ Niko v. Bangladesh, Bapex and Petrobangla, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18, paras. 330–45 (Aug. 19, 2013).Google Scholar

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