Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T05:29:20.623Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Limits of Social Europe: EU Law and the Ordoliberal Agenda

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Since the global economic crisis began in 2007, the EU's response has been an attempt to muddle through, but it is generally recognized that more far-reaching changes to its structures are inevitable in the long term. One possible trajectory is towards disintegration; another is towards an increasingly “multi-speed” Europe—possibly accompanied by a splintering of the Eurozone whereby one or more smaller countries depart. A third possibility is closer union. Many would agree with the proposition that if destructive centrifugal forces are to be kept at bay, the next step for the EU must be political union, including a fiscal and transfer union—one that requires countries of the developed core supporting their brethren struggling at the periphery. Through this fraternal process, the EU will be able to achieve a new constitutional moment, a moment of refoundation in which its “social” soul is rediscovered. No longer will corporate lobbies be granted privileged access to the offices of Brussels. Powerful and democratically accountable institutions will be constructed, and geared around one of the EU's defining values: Solidarity.

Type
Special Issue - Regeneration Europe
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Mahnkopf, Birgit, The Political State of the Union, Plenary Discussion at the 17th Workshop on Alternative Economic Policy in Europe (Sept. 16–18, 2011), available at http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/plenary_mahnkopf_the_political_state_of_the_union.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

2 Floris De Witte, EU Law and the Question of Justice (June 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) (on file with the London School of Economics), available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/452/1/DeWitte_EU%20law%20and%20the%20question%20of%20justice.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

6 See this special issue of the German Law Journal. Moritz Hartmann & Floris de Witte, Regeneration Europe: Towards Another Europe (in this issue); see also 18 Eur. L. J 607–737 (2012).Google Scholar

7 Albers, Detlev, Stephen Haseler & Henning Meyer, Social Europe: An Introduction, in Social Europe: A Continent's Answer to Market Fundamentalism 1 (Detlev Albers, Stephen Haseler & Henning Meyer eds., 2006).Google Scholar

8 László Andor, Building a Social Market Economy in the European Union, Speech at Manchester Business School (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-695_en.htm (last visited May 6, 2013); For the European Commission, the “European social model” is defined in fundamentally liberal terms: “It is characterized by democracy and rights of the individual, absence of tariffs, market economy, equal chances for each and everybody as well as social security and solidarity.” See Von Walter Baier, On the European Social Model, Transform!, 2009, available at http://transform-network.net/de/blog/archiv-2009/news/detail/Blog/on-the-european-social-model.html (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

9 Andor, , supra note 8.Google Scholar

10 Andor, , supra note 8.Google Scholar

11 Monti, Mario, Competition in a Social Market Economy, Speech at the Conference of the European Parliament and the European Commission: Reform of European Competition Law (November 9–10, 2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_022_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

16 Ebner, Alexander, The Intellectual Foundations of the Social Market Economy: Theory, Policy, and Implications for European Integration, 33 J. of Econ. Stud. 206, 216 (2006).Google Scholar

17 Ptak, Ralf, Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social Market Economy, in The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective 98–138 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009).Google Scholar

18 Id. at 104–5.Google Scholar

19 Cf., Thomas Lemke, Eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft: Foucaults Analyse der modernen Gouvernmentalität 242 (1997) (detailing Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collège de France on neo-liberal governmentality).Google Scholar

20 Yamawaki, Naoshi, Walther Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke: A Reappraisal of Their Economic Thought and the Policy of Ordoliberalism, in The German Historical School: The Historical and Ethical Approach to Economics 188-201 (Yuichi Shionoya ed., 2001).Google Scholar

21 Lemke, , supra note 19, at 247.Google Scholar

22 Yamawaki, , supra note 20, at 192.Google Scholar

23 Ptak, , supra note 17, at 107 (quoting Erhard).Google Scholar

24 Ebner, , supra note 16, at 207.Google Scholar

25 Schmoller, Gustav, leader of the GHS, rejected use of the term capitalism and proffered his own, hardly more elegant, substitute: “die modernen geldwirtschaftlichen, unter dem liberalen System der Gewerbefreiheit, der freien Konkurrenz und des unbeschränkten Erwerbtriebes ausgebildeten Betriebsformen.” Gustav Schmoller, Historisch-ethische Nationalökonomie als Kulturwissenschaft. Ausgewaehlte methodologische Schriften 211 (Heino Heinrich Nau, ed., Metropolis 1998). Commenting on the preference for the term, “market economy,” in recent times, J.K. Galbraith remarks: “When capitalism, the historical reference, ceased to be acceptable, the system was renamed.” John Kenneth Galbraith, The Economics of Innocent Fraud 6–8 (2004). The term “market system” took its place, but this term was “without meaning, erroneous, bland, benign … It emerged from the desire for protection from the unsavory experience of capitalist power and from Marx, Engels and their disciples.” Id. In the new term, history is absent, and so is power. “No individual or firm is dominant. No economic power is evoked. There is nothing here from Marx or Engels. There is only the impersonal market, a not wholly innocent fraud … [i]t would have been hard, indeed, to find a more meaningless designation—this is a reason for the choice.” Id. Google Scholar

26 Roesler, Jörg, Momente deutsch-deutscher Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 1945 bis 1990: Eine Analyse auf Gleicher Augenhöhe (2006); Gerhard Beier, Der Demonstrations- und Generalstreik vom 12. November 1948 (1975).Google Scholar

27 Streeck, Wolfgang, Works Councils in Western Europe: From Consultation to Participation, in Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations 313, 313–350 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).Google Scholar

28 Godesberg Programme of the SPD (November 1959), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3341 (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

29 Following World War II, writes Purdey, Keynesianism and social democracy came to be identified with a “grand bargain that rested on a shared expectation that regulated national economies within a liberal world market would enable economic growth, the fruits of which would be shared reasonably among the deserving sectors of the populace—not least, thanks to the welfare state.” Stephen Purdey, Economic Growth, the Environment and International Relations 5 (2010). With entry into the age of abundance, social democrats no longer needed to focus upon questions of social class and inequality—economic growth would ensure that access to the good life is available to all. Id.; Cf. Gareth Dale, The Growth Paradigm: A Critique, 134 Int'l Socialism (2012), available at http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=798&issue=134.Google Scholar

30 Schui, Herbert, Soziale Marktwirtschaft, SPD und Gewerkschaften (Arbeitspapier Arp. 14, 2008), available at http://www.herbert-schui.de/uploads/media/Soziale_Marktwirtschaft__SPD_und_Gewerkschaften.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

31 However, , on ordoliberal influences upon the ERP, see Takeshi, Ito, Searching for the Ordoliberal Origin of European Integration: Lessons from the Politics of the European Recovery Program (2011), available at http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/7f_ito.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

32 Andor, , supra note 8.Google Scholar

33 Moss, Bernard, The European Community as Monetarist Construction: A Critique of Moravcsik, 8 J. of Eur. Area Stud. 247, 260 (2000).Google Scholar

34 Joerges, Christian, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy, 30 Eur. L. Rev. 461, 461–489 (2005).Google Scholar

35 Wilkinson, Michael, The Spectre of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on The Constitutional Crisis of the European Union (in this issue).Google Scholar

36 Jan-Werner Müller, Beyond Militant Democracy?, 73 New Left Rev. 40 (2012).Google Scholar

37 Moss, , supra note 33, at 259.Google Scholar

38 Id. at 259.Google Scholar

39 Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union 305 (2007).Google Scholar

40 Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. I-1.Google Scholar

41 Peebles, Gustav, “A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man?” A Marxist Look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law, 22 L. & Soc. Inquiry 581, 588 (1997).Google Scholar

42 Hyman, Richard, Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020: From Dream to Nightmare (LEQS Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 45, 2011), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper45.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013).Google Scholar

43 Höpner, Martin & Schäfer, Armin, A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe, 33 W. Eur. Pol. 344, 344 (2010).Google Scholar

44 Mazower, Mark, What Remains: On the European Union, The Nation, Sep. 24, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/article/169756/what-remains-european-union# (last visited May 6, 2013); See also Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (2007).Google Scholar

45 Greg Palast & Robert Mundell, Evil Genius of the Euro, Guardian, June 26, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/robert-mundell-evil-genius-euro; Paul Krugman, Mundell and the Euro, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2012, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/mundell-and-the-euro/.Google Scholar

46 Palast, , supra note 45.Google Scholar

48 Scharpf, Fritz, Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis, and the Pre-Emption of Democracy (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies [MPIfG] Discussion Paper No. 11/11, 2011).Google Scholar

49 If this is indeed the underlying theory of the 2011–12 reforms to EMU, Fritz Scharpf has ventured, it would begin to make sense of the factGoogle Scholar

[T]hat many of the requirements imposed by the “Memoranda of Understanding” for Greece and Ireland appear unlikely to reduce public-sector deficits over the short or medium term. Instead, they will impose a wide range of liberalizing and market-making ‘structural reforms’ that will weaken union power, privatize public services, liberalize the professions and open public health care and education to commercial service providers.

Id.

50 Aglietta, Michel, The European Vortex, 75 New Left Rev. 15 (2012).Google Scholar

51 Georgiou, Christakis, The Euro Crisis and the Future of European Integration, 128 Int'l Socialism (2010), available at http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=682.Google Scholar

52 Costas Lapavitsas et al., Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and thy Neighbour (Research on Money and Fin. [RMF], Occasional Report Mar., 2010).Google Scholar

53 Id.; Georgiou, supra note 51.Google Scholar

54 Lapavitsas, , supra note 52.Google Scholar

55 Scharpf, Fritz, The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot be a “Social Market Economy, 8 Socio-Econ. Rev. 211, 211–250 (2010). In this, Scharpf is followed by Alexander Somek, What Is Political Union? (in this issue). Somek argues that “Member States with a “social market economy” encounter grave difficulties in sustaining the institutions underpinning their political economy.” The ECJ has been putting “social market economies under pressure to alter their institutional arrangements and systems of industrial relations.” In other words, and paradoxically, “the Union threatens to push Europe out of the European Union.” In our reading, by contrast, Europe continues to evolve as a social market economy, albeit in an increasingly ordoliberal sense of the term.Google Scholar

56 Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van, The Contradictions of “Embedded Neoliberalism” and Europe's Multi-level Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and its Limits, in Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon 21, 31 (Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Jan Drahokoupil & Laura Horn eds., 1999).Google Scholar

57 Gough, Ian, The Political Economy of the Welfare State ch. 4 (1979).Google Scholar

58 Lemke, , supra note 19.Google Scholar

59 Müller-Armack, quoted in Volker Berghahn and Brigitte Young, Reflections on Werner Bonefeld's “Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism” and the Continuing Importance of the Ideas of Ordoliberalism to Understand Germany's (Contested) Role in Resolving the Euro Zone Crisis, New Pol. Econ. (forthcoming).Google Scholar

60 Müller-Armack, quoted in Werner Bonefeld, Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism, 17 New Pol. Econ. 633, 635 (2012).Google Scholar

61 Ebner, , supra note 16, at 213. See also Walter Eucken, Die Soziale Frage, in Grundsätzen zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft Vol. 2 (Gustav Fischer ed., 1988).Google Scholar

62 Ebner, , supra note 16, at 213.Google Scholar

63 Lemke, , supra note 19.Google Scholar

64 Apeldoorn, Van, supra note 56, at 29.Google Scholar

65 Hyman, , supra note 42.Google Scholar

66 Apeldoorn, Van, supra note 56, at 29.Google Scholar

67 This applies less to Die Linke, although at least one of its leading thinkers sees herself as a follower of ordoliberalism. See Sahra Wagenknecht, Freiheit Statt Kapitalismus: Über Vergessene Ideale, Die Eurokrise Und Unsere Zukunft (2012).Google Scholar

68 Dullien, Sebastian & Guérot, Ulrike, The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany's Approach to the Euro Crisis (Euro. Council on Foreign Rel., 2012), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR49_GERMANY_BRIEF_AW.pdf.Google Scholar

69 Vauchez, Antoine, The Economic Order That Inspires Merkel, Libération, Dec. 6, 2011, http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/01012375841-ce-qu-ambitionne-en-verite-l-allemagne.Google Scholar

70 Müller-Armack, supra note 60.Google Scholar

71 Peter Coy, Will Angela Merkel Act, or Won't She?, Bloomberg Businessweek, Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/will-angela-merkel-act-or-wont-she-11302011.html.Google Scholar

72 Sotiris, Panagiotis, Austerity, Limited Sovereignty and Social Devastation. Greece and the Dark Side of European Integration, Luxemburg: Gesellschaftsanalyse und Linke Praxis, June 28, 2012, http://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/?p=2238.Google Scholar

73 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Feb. 3, 2012, available at http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf Google Scholar

74 Witte, Floris de, EU Law, Politics, and the Social Question (in this issue).Google Scholar

75 Sotiris, , supra note 72.Google Scholar

77 Anderson, Perry, After the Event, 73 New Left Rev. 49, 56–57 (2012), available at http://newleftreview.org/II/73/perry-anderson-after-the-event.Google Scholar

78 Anderson, Perry, Europe Speaks German, Z Communications, Dec. 5, 2012, www.zcommunications.org/europe-speaks-german-by-perry-anderson.Google Scholar

79 Vauchez, , supra note 69.Google Scholar

80 Schwarzer, Daniela & Lang, Kai-Olaf, The Myth of German Hegemony, Foreign Affairs, Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138162/daniela-schwarzer-and-kai-olaf-lang/the-myth-of-german-hegemony.Google Scholar

81 Hanns Jürgen Küsters, West Germany's Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949–58: The Art of the Possible, in Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945–1960, 62 (Clemens Wurm ed. 1996) (quoting Konrad Adenauer).Google Scholar

82 Anderson, , supra note 78.Google Scholar

83 Soros, George, Remarks at the Festival of Economics at Trento, Italy (June 2, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/).Google Scholar

85 Schönberger, Christoph, Hegemon Wider Willen: Zur Stellung Deutschlands in der Europäischen Union, Eurozine, Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-01-10-schonberger-de.html.; Cf. Anderson, supra note 78.Google Scholar

86 Müller, supra note 36.Google Scholar

87 Münkler, Herfried, Democratization Can't Save Europe: The Need for a Centralization of Power, Spiegel Online, Jul. 8, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/democratization-can-t-save-europe-the-need-for-a-centralization-of-power-a-773071-2.html.Google Scholar

88 Teschke, Benno, Imperial Doxa From the New Berlin Republic, 40 New Left Rev. (2006), available at http://newleftreview.org/II/40/benno-teschke-imperial-doxa-from-the-berlin-republic.Google Scholar

89 Caporaso, James & Tarrow, Sidney, Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding of Markets, 63 Int'l Org. 593, 593–620 (2009). See also the more appropriately titled draft by Caporaso: James Caporaso, Polanyi in Luxembourg: Market Participation, Embeddedness, and Rights in the European Union (Conf. of Int'l Pol. Econ. Soc'y [IPES], Working Paper, Nov. 7, 2006), available at https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2006/papers/caporaso_S300_16.pdf.Google Scholar

90 Caporaso, & Tarrow, , supra note 89, at 599.Google Scholar

93 Case C-66/92, Acciardi v Commissie Beroepszaken Administratieve Geschillen in de Provincie Noord-Holland, 1993 E.C.R. I-4567.Google Scholar

94 Caporaso, & Tarrow, , supra note 89, at 599.Google Scholar

96 Id. at 605.Google Scholar

97 Id. at 604–05.Google Scholar

98 Id. at 610.Google Scholar

99 Ebner, Alexander, Transnational Markets and the Polanyi Problem, in Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets 19, 37 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke, eds. 2011), available at http://www.gesellschaftswissenschaften.uni-frankfurt.de/institut_1/aebner/Downloads_Publikationen/2010_Transnational_Markets_and_the_Polanyi_Problem.pdf.Google Scholar

100 See, e.g., Emons, Ben, Evaluating Optimum Currency Areas: The U.S. Versus Europe, PIMCO (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/Evaluating-Optimum-Currency-Areas-The-US-versus-Europe-.aspx.Google Scholar

101 Copaciu, Mihai, Asymmetric Shocks Across European Monetary Union: Can Labor Mobility Act as an Adjustment Mechanism? 53 (2004), available at http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00003395/01/asymetric_shocks_across_european_monetary_union.pdf.Google Scholar

102 Zimmermann, Klaus F., Labor Mobility and the Integration of European Labor Markets, (Inst. for the Study of Labor [IZA], Discussion Paper No. 3999, Feb. 2009), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp3999.pdf.Google Scholar

103 Caporaso, & Tarrow, , supra note 89, at 603.Google Scholar

104 Krajewski, Markus, Commodifying and Embedding Services of General Interests in Transnational Contexts: The Example of Healthcare Liberalisation in the EU and the WTO, in Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets 231, 231–54 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011).Google Scholar

105 Dani, Marco, Rehabilitating Social Conflicts in European Public Law, 18 Eur. L.J, 607, 634 (2012).Google Scholar

107 Höpner, Martin & Schäfer, Armin, Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three Dimensions of European Economic Integration (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies [MPlfG], Discussion Paper No. 10/8, 2010), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp10-8.pdf.Google Scholar

108 Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-07995; Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. I-10837.Google Scholar

110 Case C-438/05, Int'l Transp. Workers’ Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779.Google Scholar

111 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767.Google Scholar

112 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989.Google Scholar

113 Joerges, Christian & Rödl, Florian, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval, 15 Eur. L.J. 1, 1–19 (2009).Google Scholar

114 Id. at 7.Google Scholar

115 Joerges, Christian, Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration Process, 9 Comp. Soc. 65, 71 (2010); Joerges & Rödl, supra note 113, at 7.Google Scholar

116 Joerges, & Rödl, supra note 113, at 18.Google Scholar

117 Joerges, , supra note 115, at 70.Google Scholar

118 Id. at 71.Google Scholar

119 Joerges, & Rödl, supra note 113, at 5.Google Scholar

121 Id. at 6.Google Scholar

122 Joerges, , supra note 115, at 69.Google Scholar

124 Everson, Michelle & Joerges, Christian, Reconfiguring the Politics - Law Relationship in the Integration Project Through Conflicts—Law Constitutionalism, 15 Eur. L. J. 644, 646 (2012).Google Scholar

125 Id. at 645.Google Scholar

126 Joerges, & Rödl, supra note 113, at 1.Google Scholar

127 Joerges, Christian, A New Type of Conflicts Law as the Legal Paradigm of the Postnational Constellation, in Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets 465, 482 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011).Google Scholar

130 Id. at 467, 477.Google Scholar

131 Id. at 483.Google Scholar

132 Id. at 466. Joerges’ interpretation of Polanyi, borrowed from Fred Block, is contentious. This is not the place to explore the point, but see Dale, Gareth, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market 137–87 (2010); see also Dale, Gareth, Lineages of Embeddedness: On the Antecedents and Successors of a Polanyian Concept, 70 Am. J. of Econ. & Soc. 306, 306–39 (2011); Dale, Gareth, Social Democracy, Embeddedness, and Decommodification: On the Conceptual Innovations and Intellectual Affiliations of Karl Polanyi, 15 New Pol. Econ. 369, 369–95 (2010).Google Scholar

133 Joerges, , supra note 127, at 500.Google Scholar

134 Joerges, & Rödl, supra note 113, at 7.Google Scholar

135 Joerges, , supra note 127, at 466.Google Scholar

137 Id. at 500.Google Scholar

138 Joerges, & Rödl, supra note 113, at 18.Google Scholar

139 Dani, , supra note 105, at 629–30.Google Scholar

140 Id. at 629.Google Scholar

142 Id. at 636.Google Scholar

143 Id. at 635–36.Google Scholar

144 Id. at 637.Google Scholar

145 Chalmers, Damian, The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle, 18 Eur. L.J. 667, 693 (2012).Google Scholar

147 Council, European, Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU: Report of the Task Force to the European Council (2010), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf.Google Scholar

148 Chalmers, , supra note 145, at 693.Google Scholar

149 Id. at 676–77.Google Scholar

150 Id. at 692.Google Scholar

151 Id. at 690.Google Scholar

152 Id. at 692.Google Scholar

153 Id. at 693.Google Scholar

154 Id. at 690.Google Scholar

155 Id. at 693.Google Scholar

156 Id. at 685.Google Scholar

157 Dani, , supra note 105, at 623 (citing Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict 34 (1956)).Google Scholar

158 Carr, Matthew, Europe's Hard Borders, Red Pepper, Dec. 2012, http://www.redpepper.org.uk/essay-europes-hard-borders/.Google Scholar

159 Delanty, Gerard, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality 96, 99 (1995).Google Scholar

161 Id. at 98.Google Scholar

162 Fine, Robert, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx's Critique of the Legal Form 108 (2002).Google Scholar

163 See Adorno, Theodor W., Negative Dialectics (1973).Google Scholar

164 Barker, Colin, Some Reflections on Two Books by Ellen Wood, in 1 Historical Materialism 22, 36 (1997) (explicating Karl Marx).Google Scholar

165 Thompson, Edward P., Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 263 (1975).Google Scholar

166 Id. at 266.Google Scholar

167 See Reeves, Craig, The Idea of Critique (forthcoming 2013).Google Scholar

168 Fine, , supra note 162, at 124 (quoting Karl Marx).Google Scholar

169 See Norrie, Alan, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (2d ed. 2001); Evgeny Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, Marxists’ Internet Archive, 1924, http://www.marxists.org/archive/pashukanis/1924/law/index.htm.Google Scholar

170 Fine, , supra note 162.Google Scholar

171 Id. at 206.Google Scholar

172 Witte, De, supra note 74, at 13.Google Scholar

174 Scharpf, , supra note 55, at 216.Google Scholar

176 Höpner & Schäfer, supra note 107.Google Scholar

177 Dani, , supra note 105, at 626 (citing Luca Nogler, Cittadinanza e Diritto del Lavoro: Una Storia Comune, in Diritti e Lavoro Nell'Italia Repubblicana 85, 85–86 (Giovanni Cazzetta & Gian Giudo Balandi eds., 2009)).Google Scholar

178 Dani, , supra note 105, at 626 (citing R. Bin, Che cos'è la Costituzione?, in 27 Quaderni Costituzionali 11, 17 (2007)).Google Scholar

179 Witte, De, supra note 74, at 5.Google Scholar

180 Peck, Jamie, Nik Theodore & Neil Brenner, Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents, 41 Antipode 94 (2010).Google Scholar

181 Gill, Stephen, European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe, 3 New Pol. Econ., 5–26 (1998); Ben Rosamond, The Discursive Construction of Neoliberalism: The EU and the Contested Substance of European Economic Space, in Eur. Regionalism and the Left 40 (Gerard Strange & Owen Worth eds., 2012).Google Scholar

182 Ebner, , supra note 99, at 37.Google Scholar

184 Id. Indeed, according to one study, only eight cross-sectorial agreements have been reached within the social dialogue framework since 1992, and none of them have been of great significance. The same study concludes that this is not unrelated to the fact that the social dialogue is conceived of as “deliberation” rather than as collective bargaining backed by the threat of industrial action. For the European Commission, this “deliberative” emphasis belongs explicitly to a strategy of persuading Europe's trade unions to adopt a moderate identity, one that envisages their role as one of partnership with employers. See Ruth Dukes & Emilios Christodoulidis, Habermas and the European Social Dialogue: Deliberative Democracy as Industrial Democracy? (2011), available at http://www.labourlawresearch.net/Portals/0/Habermas_and_Trade_Union_Rights_FINAL.pdf.Google Scholar

185 See this special issue of the German Law Journal; see also 18 Eur. L. J 607–737 (2012).Google Scholar

186 Bieler, Andreas, Co-option or Resistance? Trade Unions and Neoliberal Restructuring in Europe, in European Regionalism and the Left (Gerard Strange & Owen Worth eds., 2012).Google Scholar