Article contents
The Limits of Social Europe: EU Law and the Ordoliberal Agenda
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Extract
Since the global economic crisis began in 2007, the EU's response has been an attempt to muddle through, but it is generally recognized that more far-reaching changes to its structures are inevitable in the long term. One possible trajectory is towards disintegration; another is towards an increasingly “multi-speed” Europe—possibly accompanied by a splintering of the Eurozone whereby one or more smaller countries depart. A third possibility is closer union. Many would agree with the proposition that if destructive centrifugal forces are to be kept at bay, the next step for the EU must be political union, including a fiscal and transfer union—one that requires countries of the developed core supporting their brethren struggling at the periphery. Through this fraternal process, the EU will be able to achieve a new constitutional moment, a moment of refoundation in which its “social” soul is rediscovered. No longer will corporate lobbies be granted privileged access to the offices of Brussels. Powerful and democratically accountable institutions will be constructed, and geared around one of the EU's defining values: Solidarity.
- Type
- Special Issue - Regeneration Europe
- Information
- German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 5: Special issue - Regeneration Europe , 01 May 2013 , pp. 613 - 649
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- Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR
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