¹ Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419.Google Scholar

⁴ E.g. Case C-155/91, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. I-939; Case C-209/97, Commission v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8067.Google Scholar

⁵ Private litigation before a national court prompting a preliminary reference raising questions of validity was in principle possible but dauntingly difficult given the absence of any case law suggesting the likelihood of a receptive hearing in Luxembourg. Even the expression of academic disquiet was rare: for a lonely and thoughtful voice see George Close, The Legal Basis for the Consumer Protection Programme of the EEC and Priorities for Action, 8 European Law Review 8 (1983).Google Scholar

⁶ Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra, note 1, at para. 83.Google Scholar

⁷ Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra, note 1, at paras. 84, 106, 86 respectively.Google Scholar

⁸ Case C-58/08, Vodafone, 02 et al v. Secretary of State, judgment of 8 June 2010, paras. 32-33.Google Scholar

⁹ See especially Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra, note 1, at paras. 84 & 106.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra, note 1, at para. 107.Google Scholar

¹¹ And it is considered in the opinion of Fennelly, A.G., Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra, note 1, at paras. 14-20, 74-77.Google Scholar

¹² Cf. Seidel, Martin, Präventive Rechtsangleichumg im Bereich des gemiensamen Marktes, 41 Europarecht 25 (2006).Google Scholar

¹³ Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health v. Secretary of State for Health, 2005 E.C.R. I-6451, at para. 30.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Case C-210/03, Swedish Match, 2004 E.C.R. I-11893, at para. 34; Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, supra, note 13, at para. 33; Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-11573, at para. 43.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For an introductory survey see Vries, Sybe de, Tensions within the internal market: the Functioning of the Internal Market and the Development of Horizontal and Flanking Policies 274-297 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Case C-491/01, R v. Secretary of State ex parte BAT and Imperial Tobacco, 2002 E.C.R. I-11543.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Not so daunting once they had the vocabulary: see, supra, note 5.Google Scholar

¹⁸ R. v. Secretary of State, supra, note 16, at para. 67.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For a careful explanation see Wyatt, Derrick, Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market, in 50 years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward, 93 (Michael Dougan and Samantha Currie eds., 2009).Google Scholar

²⁰ Case C-210/03, Swedish Match, 2004 E.C.R. I-11893.Google Scholar

²¹ Swedish Match, supra, note 20, at paras. 38, 39.Google Scholar

²² O.J. 1992 L 228/24, now replaced by Directive 2001/95 O.J. 2002 L 11/4.Google Scholar

²³ O.J. 2005 L 149/22.Google Scholar

²⁴ See powerfully in this vein Wyatt, supra, note 19.Google Scholar

²⁵ Swedish Match, supra, note 20, paras. 35-42 are the culprits.Google Scholar

²⁶ O.J. 2009 L 286/36.Google Scholar

²⁷ Article 4(2) Regulation 1007/2009.Google Scholar

²⁸ Recital 9 to the Regulation.Google Scholar

²⁹ Case T-18/10R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al v. Parliament and Council, order of 30 April 2010.Google Scholar

³⁰ DS400, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm.Google Scholar

³¹ Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health v. Secretary of State for Health, 2005 E.C.R. I-6451.Google Scholar

³² Alliance for Natural Health, supra, note 31, at para. 37.Google Scholar

³³ The legislative impulse to go further (and to address e.g. ashtrays) was not abandoned but recycled in non-binding form: see Council Recommendation on the prevention of smoking and on initiatives to improve tobacco control, O.J. 2003 L 22/31, based on Article 152(4) EC.Google Scholar

³⁴ Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-11573.Google Scholar

³⁵ Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra, note 34, at para. 80. See also Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 & C-139/01, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, 2003 E.C.R. I-4989, para. 41.Google Scholar

³⁶ Case C-359/92, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-3681; Case C-66/04, UK v. Parliament and Council, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10553; Case C-217/04, UK v. Parliament and Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-3771 (annotated in this vein by Vincenzo Randazzo, 44 Common Market Law Review 155 (2007). See also Robert Schütze, From Rome to Lisbon: “Executive Federalism” in the (new) European Union, 47 Common market Law Review 1385 especially 1394-96, 1406-08 (2010).Google Scholar

³⁷ Case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council, 2009 E.C.R. I-593.Google Scholar

³⁸ On this aspect (and others) see Ester Herlin-Karnell, Annotation, 46 Common Market Law Review 1667 (2009).Google Scholar

³⁹ Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-4721.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Parliament v. Council, supra, note 39, at para. 56.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Case C-58/08, Vodafone, 02 et al v. Secretary of State, judgment of 8 June 2010.Google Scholar

⁴² Regulation 2560/01 on cross-border payments in euros, O.J. 2001 L 344/13, based on Article 95 EC, requires that bank charges for cross-border payments in euro be the same as charges for payments made in euro within a Member State. Regulation 2560/01 is now replaced by Regulation 924/2009 O.J. 2009 L 266/11 but it maintains the model of legislative harmonization of private commercial practices.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf. Brennke, Martin, Annotation, 47 Common market Law Review 1793 especially at 1804-06 (2010). The same author pursued this interesting inquiry well in advance of the judgment: Martin Brennke, The EU Roaming Regulation and its Non-Compliance with Article 95, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht Heft 79 (October 2009), http://www2.jura.uni-halle.de/INSTITUT/Heft 79.pdf, last accessed 2 March 2011.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Contra Brennke id., who treats Article 114 as inadequate and argues Article 352 is the correct legal base.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Vodafone, supra, note 41, at para. 44.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The reference is specific to a political scandal of the 1960s in the UK but the phrase is apt nonetheless to pierce self-serving attitudes more generally: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandy_Rice-Davies, last accessed 2 March 2011.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ For a sustained critique, taking EU tobacco regulation as its principal case study, see, Alexander Somek, Individualism: an Essay on the Authority of the European Union (2008).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Case C-210/03, supra, note 20.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ E.g. Case C-66/04, supra, note 36, at para. 45; Case C-217/04, supra, note 36, para. 43; Case C-380/03, supra, note 34, at para. 42; Case C-58/08, supra, note 41, at para. 35.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport, judgment of 8 July 2010, at para. 33.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Case C-491/01, supra, note 16, at para. 123.Google Scholar

⁵² On the different contexts in which proportionality is applied see Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law Chapters 3-5 (2006).Google Scholar

⁵³ Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, supra, note 31, at para. 68.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For an egregious example see Case C-103/01, Commission v. Germany, 2003 E.C.R. I-5369 para. 48.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Case C-491/01, supra, note 16, at paras. 181-183.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Cf. Case C-103/01, supra, note 54, at para. 47; Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, supra, note 31, at paras. 104-07.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Supra, note 26.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ There are countless examples! See e.g. Recital 12 of Directive 2006/7 on bathing water quality, O.J. 2006 L 64/37; Recitals 6 and 10 of Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce O.J. 2000 L 178/1; Recital 22 of Regulation 924/2009, supra, note 42. It is not only binding acts which commonly attract unsubstantiated assertion of compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity: see e.g. the Council Conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2011-2014, O.J. 2010 C 325/1; Council Conclusions on the role of sport as a source and a driver for active social inclusion, O.J. 2010 C 326/5.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405 para. 28.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ The literature is vast, the concepts contested, the restraining influence of subsidiarity (if any) controversial. For helpful introductions to the debate in a European context (not necessarily using the language of subsidiarity explicitly) see e.g. Emanuela Carbonara, Barbara Luppi and Francesco Parisi, Self-Defeating Subsidiarity, 5/1 Review of Law and Economics 742 (2009); Roger Van den Bergh and Wolfgang Kerber, Mutual Recognition Revisited: Misunderstandings, Inconsistencies, and a Suggested Reinterpretation, 61/3 Kyklos 447 (2008); Deakin, Simon, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?, 12 European Law Journal 440 (2006); Snell, Jukka, Who's Got the Power? Free Movement and Allocation of Competences in EC Law, 22 Yearbook of European Law 323 (2003); Pelkmans, Jacques, Subsidiarity between Law and Economics, 1/2005 College of Europe Research Papers in Law, http://www.coleurop.be/content/studyprogrammes/law/studyprog/pdf/ResearchPaper_1_2005_Pelkmans.pdf.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Here too the literature is rich and (appropriately!) diverse: for a helpful starting-point see e.g. Peter A. Kraus, A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity-Building in Europe (2008).Google Scholar

⁶² Convincingly examined in this vein, albeit expecting the Court to exercise more controlling influence than does this paper, by Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43 Common Market law Review 63 (2006) and by Kumm, Matthias, Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union, 12 European Law Journal 503 (2006). See also Gerard Conway, Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ, 11 German Law Journal 966 especially at 988-990 (2010); and Somek, , supra, note 47, especially Chapter 8.Google Scholar

⁶³ Cf. emphasizing the political/ procedural character of subsidiarity Schütze, Robert, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law Chapter 5 (2009); Halberstam, Daniel, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 Virginia Law Review 731, especially 827-832 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Article 5 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality attached to the TEU and the TFEU.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The Court of Justice, Principles of EC Law, Court Reform and Constitutional Adjudication, 15 European Business Law Review 1115, 1117 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Opinion 1/91, Draft Treaty on the establishment of a European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Case C-376/98, supra, note 1, at para. 99.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Id., para. 16.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Case C-491/01, supra, note 16.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Case C-210/03, supra, note 20.Google Scholar

⁷² Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, supra, note 31.Google Scholar

⁷³ Case C-380/03, supra, note 34.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For analysis with rich bibliography see Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, The Federal Order of Competences, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, 275 (Armin Von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010), noting that preoccupation with matters of competence is a relatively recent phenomenon in EU scholarship. For comment on the adjustments planned by the Treaty establishing a Constitution which were left largely unchanged in subsequent wrangling, see Paul Craig, Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration, 29 European Law Review 323 (2004); Weatherill, Stephen, Better Competence Monitoring, 30 European Law Review 23 (2005); Nettesheim, Martin, Die Kompetenzordnung im Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa, 39 Europarecht 511 (2004); Constantinesco, Vlad, Les competences et le principle de subsidianté, 41(2) Revue Trimistrielle de Droit Européen 305 (2005). On aspects of the debate even in advance of the Treaty establishing a Constitution see Ingolf Pernice, Rethinking the methods of Dividing and Controlling the Competences of the Union, in The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform, 121 (Mads Andenas and John Usher eds., 2003).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Case C-58/08, supra, note 41.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See Wyatt, , supra, note 19, finding the case law to disclose both competence-restricting and competence-enhancing elements, the latter steadily eroding the former.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ On the several ideas aired and largely rejected in the debate over the last decade, see Stephen Weatherill, Competence Creep and Competence Control, 23 Yearbook of European Law 1 (2004); Bermann, George, Competences of the Union, in European Union Law for the 21st Century, Volume 1, 65, (Takis Tridimas and Paolisa Nebbia eds., 2004). For pioneering anxieties, see Joseph Weiler, The European Union belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals, 22 European Law Review 150 (1997).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Cf. Pollack, Mark, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community, 14 Journal of Public Policy 95 (1994); Weatherill, , supra, note 77.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Case C-376/98, supra, note 1.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Case C-372/04 2006 E.C.R. I-4325.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Case C-438/05 2007 E.C.R. I-10779.Google Scholar

⁸² Case C-144/04 2005 E.C.R. I-9981.Google Scholar

⁸³ On this, and more generally, see Martin Gennart, Les Parlements Nationaux dans le Traité de Lisbonne: Evolution ou Révolution, 46/ 1 – 2 Cahiers de Droit Europeen 17 (2010).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Derrick Wyatt, Could a Yellow Card for National Parliaments strengthen Judicial as well as Political Policing of Subsidiarity?, 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1 (2006): this concerns procedures foreseen by the Treaty establishing a Constitution but applies mutatis mutandis to the finally agreed version.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Cf. Gennart, supra, note 83, especially at p. 46.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Anne Peters, European Democracy after the 2003 Convention, 41 Common market Law Review 37, especially at 62 (2004). See on this and more generally Adam Cygan, The Role of National Parliaments in the EU's New Constitutional Order, in European Union Law for the 21st Century, Volume 1, 153, (Takis Tridimas and Paolisa Nebbia eds., 2004); Cygan, Adam, The Parliamentarisation of EU Decision-Making? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on National Parliaments, 36 European Law Review (forthcoming, 2012).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ E.g. Thorlakson, Lori, Building Firewalls or Floodgates? Constitutional Design for the European Union, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 139 (2006); Swenden, Wifried, Is the European Union in need of a Competence Catalogue? Insights from Comparative Federalism, 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 371 (2004). For general EU/ US comparisons, see Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (2001).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ For relevant documentation see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-regulation/index_en.htm, last accessed 2 March 2011. The Commission publishes an annual report on “Better Lawmaking” pursuant to the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The report on 2006 was the last to cover not only subsidiarity and proportionality but also improving the quality of the regulatory environment: “Better Lawmaking 2006,” COM (2007) 286, 6 June 2007. Beginning in 2007 the coverage has been split between a “Report on Subsidiarity and Proportionality,” e.g. the report covering 2009 is COM (2010) 547, 8 October 2010, and a separate strategic review of Better Regulation, now to be transformed into Smart Regulation: see Commission Communication “Smart Regulation in the European Union” (COM (2010) 543, 8 October 2010). “Intelligent” would be a more elegant word in English and is indeed the chosen word in the French and German texts - “smart” betrays a strong background American influence. See generally Stephen Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation (2007); Claudio Radaelli and Fabrizio De Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe: Concepts, Measures, and Policy Processes (2007).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Cf. the sustained critique in this vein offered by Somek, supra, note 47.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See Weatherill, Stephen, Competence and Legitimacy, in The Outer Limits of European Union Law, 17, (Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2009).Google Scholar

⁹¹ On the progress of the matter at the Convention see Weatherill, , supra, note 74.Google Scholar

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⁹³ Judgment of 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 144 (Brunner v. European Union Treaty).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Cf. Kiiver, Philip, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: A Court-Ordered Strengthening of the National Legislature in the EU, 16 European Law Journal 578 (2010).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See especially, but not only, para. 362.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Case C-491/01, supra, note 16: paragraph 184 cross-refers to paragraphs 122 to 141.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ On the composition and progress of the Working Groups see Weatherill, supra, note 74.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ O.J. 2010 C 340/9, at para 4.4.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ For a helpfully nuanced discussion see Auel, Katrin, Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs, 13 European Law Journal 487 (2007). For a skeptical view of the value of national Parliaments in this area see Philip Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European Union – a Critical View on EU Constitution-Building (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Case C-343/09, supra, note 50 (where there was such departure, adequately explained); Case C-58/08, supra, note 41 (where there was no departure).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Cf. Wyatt, , supra, note 84.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ On emergent practice even pre-Lisbon see Commission Report on Better Lawmaking 2006, COM (2007) 286, 6 June 2007, pages 8-9; see also the (short) report of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), O.J. 2007 OJ C 206/7, section 2. The Commission Report on Subsidiarity and Proportionality covering 2009 (COM (2010) 547, 8 October 2010) also contains brief mention of pre-Lisbon practice (para. 3.2) and promises an overview of post-Lisbon co-operation with national Parliaments in the following year's report (para. 5).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ 545 U.S. 1 (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ 545 U.S. 1, supra, note 104, Majority Opinion pages 16, 19, 24, 28, 30.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ 545 U.S. 1, supra, note 104, pages 17-18.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Supra, note 31.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Supra, note 20.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ 514 U.S. 549 (1995).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ 529 U.S. 598 (2000).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ 529 U.S. 598, supra, note 110, the quotes are from pages 2, 4, 4, 4 & 6, and 5 respectively.Google Scholar

¹¹² 529 U.S. 598, supra, note 110, page 6.Google Scholar

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¹¹⁴ Innocent Europeans should be aware that although the phrase “states’ rights” seems to capture rather well the intent behind controlling the limits of the competence of the central authorities (federal or EU), for Americans it carries echoes of the struggle by Southern states to protect slavery and, later, racial segregation in the name of state autonomy.Google Scholar