Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T05:08:07.398Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Judicial Self Government in the Netherlands: Demarcating Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Elaine Mak

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Based on which values and to what extent does a specific legal system endorse a model of self-government of the judiciary? How is such self-government shaped? Which lessons can be drawn from practical experiences relating to major organizational reforms? This article addresses these questions with the aim of analyzing the influence of reforms of judicial self-government in the Netherlands on the realization of the core values of independence, accountability, legitimacy, transparency of, and public confidence in the judiciary. Furthermore, this article assesses the influence of reforms of judicial self-government on the separation of powers and democracy as organizing principles for the Dutch legal system. The main focus of the article is on the interaction between rule-of-law values and New Public Management (NPM) values for judicial organization, taking into account the meaning and weight of these values over time in the evolving Dutch legal system. Furthermore, the analysis addresses both the legal framework for judicial government and tensions that have occurred between key actors, in particular judges and the Council for the Judiciary, in their experiences with this legal framework in practice. A red thread which runs through this analysis concerns the demarcation of spheres of autonomy for the different actors in the judicial system. The analysis of organizational reforms clarifies that a dynamic interaction has developed between judges, the bodies for judicial self-government in the Dutch system and the Minister of Justice and Security, revolving around claims of autonomy. The evolved framework of rule-of-law and NPM values for the judicial organization provides a theoretical “lens” for understanding this interaction and its outcomes.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 7: Special issue — Judicial Self-Government in Europe , 01 December 2018 , pp. 1801 - 1838
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Mak, E., The European Judicial Organisation in a New Paradigm: The Influence of Principles of “New Public Management” on the Organisation of the European Courts (2008) 14 European Law Journal 718 (2008).Google Scholar

2 Adviescommissie toerusting en organisatie zittende magistratuur (Commissie Leemhuis), Rechtspraak bij de tijd (The Hague 1998), 10.Google Scholar

3 Martens, S.K. & ten Kate, T.B., Commentaar d.d. 27 oktober 1999 van de President van en de Procureur-Generaal bij de Hoge Raad op de concept-wetsvoorstellen organisatie en bestuur gerechten en Raad voor de Rechtspraak Nederlands Juristenblad 1615 (2000). See infra, A.II.Google Scholar

4 The article's scope corresponds with the questionnaire presented in D. Kosar et al., ‘The Rise of Judicial Self-Government: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect. Questionnaire for the Network of Constitutional Experts’ (ERC project No. 678375, Masaryk University, 2017). This article was written on the basis of a national report prepared for this ERC project.Google Scholar

5 Judges’ Code (NVvR-rechterscode), para 2.2.Google Scholar

6 The Ministry of Justice and Security holds its current name since the fall of 2017. Between 2010 and 2017, the name of the Ministry was Ministry of Security and Justice, a name chosen to highlight the transfer of the police to the Ministry's sole sphere of competence. Before 2010, the Ministry was known as the Ministry of Justice. See https://www.parlement.com.Google Scholar

7 See infra, A.II.Google Scholar

8 See inter alia P.P.T. Bovend'Eert & C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Rechterlijke organisatie, rechters en rechtspraak (2013); P.M. van den Eijnden, Onafhankelijkheid van de rechter in constitutioneel perspectief (2011); R. de Lange, Judicial Independence in the Netherlands, in Judicial Independence in Transition (A. Seibert-Fohr ed. 2012).Google Scholar

9 See inter alia P.M. Langbroek et al., Performance Management of Courts and Judges: Organizational and Professional Learning versus Political Accountabilities, in Handle with Care: Assessing and Designing Methods for Evaluation and Development of the Quality of Justice (F. Contini ed. 2017); N. Holvast, In the Shadow of the Judge (2017).Google Scholar

10 Grootelaar, H.A.M. & van den Bos, K., How Litigants in Dutch Courtrooms Come to Trust Judges: The Role of Perceived Procedural Justice, Outcome Favorability, and Other Sociolegal Moderators 52 Law & Society Review 234 (2018).Google Scholar

11 G.Y. Ng, Quality of Judicial Organization and Checks and Balances (2007); E. Mak, De rechtspraak in balans (2007). See also M.A. Loth & E. Mak, The Judicial Domain in View: Figures, Trends and Perspectives 3(1) Utrecht Law Review 75 (2007).Google Scholar

12 Brenninkmeijer, A.F.M. & Grootelaar, H.A.M., De strijd om de rechterlijke macht 12 Rechtstreeks (2016).Google Scholar

13 This analysis does not address the Public Prosecutor's Service, which is organized separately from the judiciary in the Netherlands and resides directly under the Ministry of Justice and Security.Google Scholar

14 Kosar, D., supra note 4, 7.Google Scholar

15 Art. 84(2) and 84(4) Judicial Organization Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie) as revised in 2011. Between 2002 and 2011, the Council had to be composed of five members. Flexibility in the number of members was introduced after the evaluation of the Council's first years of performance, based on a new estimation of the required capacity for fulfilling its tasks. See Kabinetsstandpunt evaluatie Wet organisatie en bestuur gerechten en Wet Raad voor de rechtspraak (Modernisering rechterlijke organisatie) (2007, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl).Google Scholar

16 Incompatibilities, in particular political functions, are listed in Art. 84(6) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

17 Art. 85 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

18 See infra, B.I.1.2.Google Scholar

19 Art. 84(3) and 84(5) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

20 Art. 87(3) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

21 The Central Appeals Tribunal, located in Utrecht, decides appeals in social security and civil service cases. The Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, located in The Hague, decides appeals in the field of social-economic administrative law and appeals for specific laws, such as the Competition Act and the Telecommunications Act.Google Scholar

22 Art. 2 and 3 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

23 For the Supreme Court, a covenant outlines the Court's relationship with the Ministry of Justice and Security with regard to the operation of the Court (https://www.rechtspraak.nl). The Administrative Jurisdiction Division is governed as a part of the Council of State, beside the Advisory Division on legislation and governance.Google Scholar

24 Art. 91 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

25 Art. 92(1) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

26 Art. 94 and 95(1) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

27 Art. 96(1) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

28 Art. 15(1)-(3) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

29 Art. 15(4)-(5) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

30 Commissie Leemhuis 1998, supra note 2, 22–23.Google Scholar

31 Ibid., 8-10.Google Scholar

32 Art. 15 (old) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

33 Art. 15(2) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

34 Art. 22(1) and 28 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

35 Act on the Reform of the Judicial Map (Wet Herziening gerechtelijke kaart), Stb. 2012, 313.Google Scholar

36 Art. 19(1), 20(1), and 21a(1) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

37 Art. 21a(2) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

38 Art. 23(1) and 24(1) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

39 Art. 23(2) and 24(2) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

40 Art. 23(3) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

41 Art. 8(1) Regeling Landelijke selectiecommissie rechters (LSR). A supplementary judge has his or her main occupation elsewhere (e.g. as a university professor) and acts as a judge on a temporary basis (e.g. one day per month) based on the required capacity at the court where the supplementary judge has been appointed.Google Scholar

42 Art. 2(1)-(4) Regeling LSR. See also https://www.werkenbijderechtspraak.nl/lsr.Google Scholar

43 Art. 5(1) and 5(2) Regeling LSR.Google Scholar

44 https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

45 Convenant inzake Civiel Effect (22 March 2016, https://www.advocatenorde.nl). See also De Lange 2012, supra note 8, 240.Google Scholar

46 Art. 1 Act on the Legal Position of Judicial Officers (Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren).Google Scholar

47 Art. 117(2) Constitution.Google Scholar

48 https://www.ssr.nl.Google Scholar

49 http://www.ejtn.eu.Google Scholar

50 Art. 40 Decree on the Financing of the Judiciary (Besluit financiering rechtspraak 2005).Google Scholar

51 http://www.ssr.nl.Google Scholar

52 https://www.rechtspraak.nl. See also infra, C.II.Google Scholar

53 http://www.nvvr.org.Google Scholar

54 https://www.linkedin.com.Google Scholar

55 Articles 6 and 7 of the Statutes of the NVvR, available at http://www.nvvr.org.Google Scholar

56 http://www.nvvr.org.Google Scholar

57 See infra, B.I.1.2.Google Scholar

58 See supra, A.I.Google Scholar

59 Mak, supra note 11, 33–36.Google Scholar

60 On this trend more generally, see M. Barzelay, Origins of the New Public Management. An International View from Public Administration/Political Science, in New Public Management. Current Trends and Future Perspectives (K. McLaughlin, S.P. Osborne & E. Ferlie eds.2002), 15.Google Scholar

61 https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

62 On the long and not always easy process of innovation, see D. Reiling, ‘Court IT: we must, we can, but it's not easy’ (blog Technology for Justice, 19 March 2018).Google Scholar

63 Mak, supra note 1, 725.Google Scholar

64 Benthem v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 23 October 1985, Appl. No. 8848/80, Series A No. 97; Van den Hurk v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 19 April 1994, Appl. No. 16034/90, Series A No. 288. See De Lange 2012, supra note 8, 231–232.Google Scholar

65 Procola v. Luxembourg, Judgment of 28 September 1995, Appl. No. 14570/89, Series A No. 326.Google Scholar

66 De Lange, , supra note 8, 232 and 234.Google Scholar

67 'Kabinet trekt wetsvoorstel Organisatie hoogste bestuursrechtspraak in’ (Dutch government, press release 16 November 2016, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl).Google Scholar

68 Commissie Leemhuis, supra note 2, 8.Google Scholar

69 Kosar, supra note 4, 8–9.Google Scholar

70 van Lierop, W.A.J., Het komen en gaan van het wetsvoorstel Organisatie hoogste bestuursrechtspraak 4, Nederlands Juristenblad (2017).Google Scholar

71 Art. 116 and 117 Constitution.Google Scholar

72 de Werd, M.F.J.M., De benoeming van rechters: constitutionele aspecten van de toegang tot het rechtersambt in Nederland en de Amerikaanse deelstaat New York (1994).Google Scholar

73 Yakis v. Turkey, Judgment of 25 September 2001, Appl. No. 33368/96. See De Lange, supra note 8, 233.Google Scholar

74 Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 27182, no. 3, 11. See also De Lange, supra note 8, 264.Google Scholar

75 Judges’ Code, para. 2.1.Google Scholar

76 Id.Google Scholar

77 Id., para. 3.1.Google Scholar

78 H. Franken, Onafhankelijk en verantwoordelijk (1997), 13. See also R. de Lange & P.A.M. Mevis, Constitutional Guarantees for the Independence of the Judiciary, in Netherlands Reports to the Seventeenth International Congress of Comparative Law (J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet ed. 2006), 327.Google Scholar

79 van der Knaap, P. & van den Broek, R., Recht van spreken. Een resultaatgericht sturingsmodel voor de rechtsprekende macht 7 Bestuurskunde 313, 319–320 (2000).Google Scholar

80 De Lange, , supra note 8, 236. See further infra, B.I.2.Google Scholar

81 Robroek, R., De macht over het strafproces (2016).Google Scholar

82 Judges’ Code, para. 2.2.Google Scholar

83 Leeuwarden Manifesto (Manifest van Leeuwarden). See also M. Fikkers et al., Het Manifest van Leeuwarden: vijf jaar na dato 1024 Ars Aequi (2017).Google Scholar

84 Seegers, J., ‘Hoogste rechter van Nederland luidt in brief noodklok over werkdruk’ (NRC Handelsblad, 4 February 2013), supporting concerns about the workload of the courts.Google Scholar

85 Leeuwarden Manifesto.Google Scholar

86 Ibid. See also supra, A.I.Google Scholar

87 Council for the Judiciary, ‘Brief van de Raad voor de rechtspraak aan iedereen werkzaam in de Rechtspraak over de voorlopige opbrengst van de dialoog tussen Raad en gerechten’ (21 February 2013).Google Scholar

88 Jorritsma, E., ‘Toga-protest leidt tot uitstel sluiting rechtbanken’ (NRC Handelsblad, 9 September 2015).Google Scholar

89 Leeuwarden Manifesto.Google Scholar

90 Council for the Judiciary 2013, supra note 87.Google Scholar

91 Leeuwarden Manifesto.Google Scholar

92 B. Fruytier et al., Werkdruk bewezen: eindrapport werkdrukonderzoek rechterlijke macht (2013).Google Scholar

93 Ibid., 85; M. Husken & H. Lensink, ‘Het grote VN-onderzoek: de rechter geeft zich bloot’ (Vrij Nederland, 14 December 2013).Google Scholar

94 See infra, B.III.1.Google Scholar

95 Council for the Judiciary 2013, supra note 87.Google Scholar

96 Fikkers et al., supra note 83, 1024.Google Scholar

97 Ibid., 1026.Google Scholar

98 Ibid., 1026-1027.Google Scholar

99 F.C. Bakker, Jaarverslag Rechtspraak 2015 (2015).Google Scholar

100 Court of Audit, Rapport bekostiging rechtspraak: gevolgen voor doelmatigheid (2016).Google Scholar

101 'Resultaten enquête Tegenlicht: de rechterlijke organisatie tegen het licht’ (https://www.rechtspraak.nl). See also Fikkers et al., supra note 83, 1026–1027.Google Scholar

102 See supra, B.I.1.Google Scholar

103 Bakker, supra note 99; Fikkers et al., supra note 83, 1026.Google Scholar

104 Kamerstukken II, 2016/17, 34426, no. 9.Google Scholar

105 Fikkers et al., supra note 83, 1027.Google Scholar

106 Kamerstukken II, 2016/17, 34618, no. 2.Google Scholar

107 Berendsen, R.M. et al. (group Tegenlicht), ‘Opinie: Geef de rechtspraak eigen begroting’ (De Volkskrant, 26 March 2018).Google Scholar

108 Art. 104(1)-(5) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

109 Art. 91(1)(d) and 91(1)(e) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

110 Art. 2-4 Decree on the Financing of the Judiciary.Google Scholar

111 See supra, B.I.1.1.Google Scholar

112 Robroek, supra note 81.Google Scholar

113 Art. 116(4) and 117(4) Constitution and Chapter 6A Act on the Legal Position of Judicial Officers. A reform is underway to allow for more variety of disciplinary measures, including a cut in a judge's salary in case of insufficient performance.Google Scholar

114 Robroek, supra note 81.Google Scholar

115 Art. 93(1)-(4) and art. 109 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

116 Art. 106(1) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

117 Art. 105 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

118 Art. 90(3) and 90(4) Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

119 See Franken, supra note 78, 28.Google Scholar

120 Corstens, G., ‘Bescherm onze rechters tegen de politiek’ (NRC Handelsblad, 9 January 2018). See also C. Jansen & D. Venema, De Hoge Raad en de Tweede Wereldoorlog (2012).Google Scholar

121 Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands, District Court of The Hague, 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196.Google Scholar

122 Foundation Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. State of the Netherlands, Court of Appeal of The Hague, 27 June 2017, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:1761.Google Scholar

123 Foundation Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda et al. v. State of the Netherlands, District Court of The Hague, 14 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BS8793.Google Scholar

124 Luban, D., Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2619, 2632 (1995).Google Scholar

125 Ch.-L. de Secondat Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois (1973).Google Scholar

126 W. van Rossum, J. Tlgchelaar & P. Ippel, Wraking bottom-up. Een empirisch onderzoek (2012).Google Scholar

127 'Oud-rechters Kalbfleisch and Westenberg vrijgesproken van meineed’ (AD, 23 November 2012).Google Scholar

128 Art. 127 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

129 Art. 128 Judicial Organization Act.Google Scholar

130 Art. 12 Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering).Google Scholar

131 Act on the Deciding of Cases by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Wet OM-afdoening).Google Scholar

132 Crijns, J.J., Het wetsvoorstel OM-afdoening: een wolf in schaapskledij Sancties 225 (2004).Google Scholar

133 Groenendijk, K., Een venijnig proces (2008).Google Scholar

134 Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04.Google Scholar

135 Ellian, A., ‘Politiek moet zich niet met rechters bemoeien’ (NRC Handelsblad, 5 October 2009). See also P.M. Langbroek, Administering Courts and Judges: Rethinking the Tension Between Judicial Independence and Accountability (2009).Google Scholar

136 Ibid.Google Scholar

137 District Court of Amsterdam, 23 June 2011, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2011:BQ9001.Google Scholar

138 District Court of The Hague, 9 December 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:15014.Google Scholar

139 Korteweg, A., ‘Politieke kleur van rechters speelt in Nederland geen rol’ (Volkskrant, 13 March 2016).Google Scholar

140 District Court of The Hague, 11 November 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:13520.Google Scholar

141 District Court of The Hague, 9 December 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:15014.Google Scholar

142 'Reactie voorzitter gerechtshof op vraag Geert Wilders tijdens regiezitting’ (press release, 26 October 2017, https://www.rechtspraak.nl).Google Scholar

143 Boogaard, G., ‘De benoeming van Buruma’ (blog Publiekrecht & politiek, 10 March 2011, www.publiekrechtenpolitiek.nl).Google Scholar

144 Art. 118(1) Constitution.Google Scholar

145 Jensma, F., ‘Hoe de PVV een raadsheer uit de Hoge Raad weerde’ (NRC Handelsblad 17 December 2011).Google Scholar

146 Ibid.Google Scholar

147 Kosar, supra note 4, 14–15.Google Scholar

148 See supra, B.I.1.2.Google Scholar

149 E.g. Sentencing Guidelines (Oričntatiepunten straftoemeting) for criminal cases, https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

150 See supra, B.Google Scholar

151 E.g. Wagenaar, W.A., Israëls, H. & van Koppen, P.J., De slapende rechter (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker 2009); T. Derksen, Lucia de B. Reconstructie van een gerechtelijke dwaling (Diemen: Veen Media 2006).Google Scholar

152 van Boom, W. & Giesen, I. (eds.), Civilology Book Series (The Hague: Boom Juridisch 2011-).Google Scholar

153 Yet, a recent critical report claimed that access to justice is not sufficiently guaranteed for all citizens: M. Barendrecht, K. van Beek & S. Muller, Menselijk en rechtvaardig. Is de rechtsstaat er voor de burger? (The Hague: HiiL 2017).Google Scholar

154 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP), Culturele Veranderingen (The Hague: SCP 2016), mentioned in SCP, De sociale staat van Nederland 2017 (The Hague: SCP), 292.Google Scholar

155 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), Continue Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven (The Hague: SCP 2016).Google Scholar

156 van den Bos, K., Kijken naar het recht (Utrecht University 2014), http://njb.nl/kijken-naar-het-recht.Google Scholar

157 Brants, C., ‘Wrongful Convictions and Inquisitorial Process: The Case of the Netherlands’ (2012) 80 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1069, 1090–1099.Google Scholar

158 Eurobarometer, http://ec.europa.eu.Google Scholar

159 'Hoeveel vertrouwen geniet de rechtspraak?’ (2016), https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

160 Broeders, D. et al., Speelruimte voor transparantere rechtspraak (2013).Google Scholar

161 https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

162 Ibid.Google Scholar

163 Reiling, supra note 62.Google Scholar

164 'Digitale procedures Rechtspraak blijven gewoon in gebruik’ (press release, 15 April 2018, https://www.rechtspraak.nl).Google Scholar

165 See Bakker, F., ‘Nieuwjaarstoespraak 2018’ (speech The Hague, 11 January 2018, https://www.rechtspraak.nl).Google Scholar

166 See Press Guidelines 2013, https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

167 Judge Joyce Lie, @JudgeJoyce.Google Scholar

168 Judge Marc de Werd, @European Courts.Google Scholar

169 Judges’ Code, para. 2.5.4. See also S. Dijkstra, De rechter als evenwichtskunstenaar (2016).Google Scholar

170 'Twitterende rechter krijgt reprimande voor “Knettergek”-tweet over Wilders’ (NRC Handelsblad, 21 December 2016).Google Scholar

171 Verheij, L., ‘Etnische diversiteit in de Rechtspraak’ (installation speech Court of Appeal of The Hague, 2 June 2016, https://www.rechtspraak.nl). See also S. van der Raad, Othering and Inclusion of Ethnic Minority Professionals: A Study on Ethnic Diversity Discourses, Practices and Narratives in the Dutch Legal Workplace (2015).Google Scholar

172 van Wijk, L., ‘Vrouwelijke rechters in de meerderheid: wat is daarvan het probleem?’ (Trouw, 22 May 2014).Google Scholar

173 https://www.rechtspraak.nl.Google Scholar

174 Claes, M., The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (2006).Google Scholar

175 Art. 120 Constitution.Google Scholar

176 Gerards, J. & Fleuren, J. (eds.), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of Judgments of the ECtHR in National Case Law (2014).Google Scholar

177 See supra, A.II and B.II.Google Scholar

178 Martens & Ten Kate, supra note 3, 1615.Google Scholar

179 Kamerstukken II, 1999/2000, 27 182, no. 3, 3; Kamerstukken II, 2000/2001, 27 182, no. 6, 10.Google Scholar

180 P. Bovend'Eert, Wat is er mis met de rechterlijke organisatie? Ars Aequi 406, 409 (2016).Google Scholar

181 See supra, B.I.1.2.Google Scholar

182 See supra, A.I.Google Scholar

183 See supra, B.III.2.Google Scholar

184 Compare the controversies surrounding two intended appointments in the Supreme Court in 2011; see supra, B.II. See also P.P.T. Bovend'Eert & C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Het Court-Packing Plan van het cabinet-Kok Nederlands Juristenblad 1769, 1771 (2000).Google Scholar

185 Art. 51e, 258, and 260 Code of Criminal Procedure.Google Scholar

186 Corstens, supra note 120.Google Scholar