1 Gusztáv Szászy-Schwarz, Parerga: vegyes jogi dolgozatok 420 (1912) (author's translation).Google Scholar

2 The short and abstract nature of constitutions is not to be explained by a cynical attempt to make it more difficult to control state power, but for such a view see Napoléon Bonaparte: “[i]l faut qu'une constitution soit courte et obscure“ (a Constitution has to be short and obscure). The actual reason for this is that the constitution maker could not decide everything beforehand, on the one hand, and that too many detailed rules would inflate the text of the constitution and make it necessary to modify the text often, which would ruin its prestige, on the other hand. See Meinhard Hilf, Die sprachliche Struktur der Verfassung, in VII Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 79, 90 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1992).Google Scholar

3 The German term Rechtsdogmatik is normally translated into English either as “doctrine” or as “dogmatic.” I would, however, stick to the German original as “doctrine” is too general and does not express the systematic conceptual nature of the genre, and dogmatic has a rather pejorative connotation in English, which I would like to avoid. One of the reasons for translation problems is that in common law countries the conceptual system as developed by legal scholarship is relatively simplistic—it is done by judgments on a case-by-case basis.Google Scholar

4 A sophisticated conceptual system also helps (a) to decide future cases the same way, if their relevant facts are the same, and (b) to give reasons for this, i.e., not to decide arbitrarily and not to appear to have decided arbitrarily. See Eike von Savigny, Methodologie der Dogmatik: Wissenschaftstheoretische Fragen, in Juristische Dogmatik und Wissenschaftstheorie 7, 8 (Ulfrid Neumann ed., 1976).Google Scholar

5 Theo Öhlinger, Der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung: Rechtstheoretische und ideologische Aspekte 17 (1975).Google Scholar

6 See Ridley, F.F., There is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 41 Parliamentary Aff. 340–61 (1988).Google Scholar

7 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 § 4 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/4.Google Scholar

8 For such a problem, see the Spanish Constitutional Court's inability to decide about the Statute of Catalonia for several years. See B.G.G, Cuatro años de encarnizada batalla política, El País, Apr. 16, 2010, http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/04/16/actualidad/1271405842_850215.html.Google Scholar

9 See Jakab, András, What Makes a Good Lawyer? Was Magnaud Indeed Such a Good Judge?, 62 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 275–87 (2007), (discussing purposive (teleological) reasoning as a bridge or a method facilitating the translation of non-legal considerations into legal ones. Teleological arguments are able to respond to new social challenges without modifying the text of the constitution).Google Scholar

10 For a traditional positivist conceptualization separating sharply between the interpretation of the text and the actual legal decision as a choice from the different options offered by the interpretation, while criticizing Robert Alexy, Michel Troper, and Ronald Dworkin for not doing this separation, see Otto Pfersmann, Le sophisme onomastique: Changer au lieu connaître. L'interprétation da la Constitution, in L'interprétation constitutionnelle 33–60 (Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien ed., 2005). If following this positivistic path, then the legal theoretical task becomes quite complicated: For the first, interpretative, step one also has to clarify precisely what should be interpreted, i.e., what the law is. See Otto Pfersmann, Ontologie des normes juridiques et argumentation, in Raisonnement juridique et interprétation 11–34 (Otto Pfersmann & Gérard Timsit eds., 2001). Non-positivists, or non-traditional positivists, have it easier at this point, as they can avoid this hopelessly complicated ontological question.Google Scholar

11 Here objectivity means the lack of arbitrariness, i.e., “it can be supported by arguments thought to be relevant which are independent from the person of the speaker/author of those arguments.”Google Scholar

12 Different outcomes of different interpretations are called norm hypotheses (Normhypothesen). See, e.g., Karl Korinek, Zur Interpretation von Verfassungsrecht, in Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis. Festschrift für Robert Walter 363, 367 (Heinz Mayer ed., 1991).Google Scholar

13 MacCormick, Neil, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 67–68 (1978).Google Scholar

14 It was not always the case, the practice of the Middle Ages is very diverse from this point of view, see Tony Sauvel, Histoire du jugement motivé, 71 Revue du droit public 5–53 (1955).Google Scholar

15 On the difference between convincing and justifying, see Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Positivism vs The Theory of Legal Argumentation, in Law and Legal Cultures in the 21^ST Century. Diversity and Unity 221, 224 (Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki & Jerzy Stelmach eds., 2007). On convincing as the purpose of legal reasoning, see Chaïm Perelman, Logique juridique—nouvelle rhétorique (1976).Google Scholar

16 See, e.g., in the judgment by the Spanish constitutional court Nr. 36/82.Google Scholar

17 See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre 100–04 (1934); Holländer, Pavel, Verfassungsrechtliche Argumentation—zwischen dem Optimismus und der Skepsis 107–08 (2007).Google Scholar

18 See Katja, Hemke, Methodik der Analogiebildung im öffentlichen Recht 43 (2006) (calling these Existenzlücke (“existence gap”)).Google Scholar

19 Id. at 44 (calling these Relationslücke (“relation gap”), as they exist in relation to the legal system or its values as a whole).Google Scholar

20 One way of escaping the charge of arbitrariness is trying to trace the substantive gap back to provisions of the normative text—e.g., to principles of the constitution, perhaps combined with particular provisions. A thorough argument—i.e., answering the possible counterarguments, especially of the types “Why this very provision?” and “Is there no other, more important principle that would suggest the use of analogy from another particular provision?”—is not used normally.Google Scholar

21 For example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court], Mar. 16, 1988, Erkenntnisse und beschlüsse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes [VfSlg] No. 11.663/1988 (Austria), demonstrates one of the usual rejections of the use of analogy by the Austrian constitutional court.Google Scholar

22 See Miklós Szabó, Ars juris. A jogdogmatika alapjai 182–83 (2005).Google Scholar

23 Cf. Larenz, Karl, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 391–95 (1991). Against teleological reduction for fundamental rights see BVerfGE 51, 97 (110).Google Scholar

24 Teleological reduction, if used contrary to the statutes, may conceal a decentralized constitutional review. Its disadvantages are even worse as it is not even based on positive law, namely the constitution. For arguments against decentralized constitutional review, see Attila Vincze, Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit der ungarischen Verfassung, in 1 Jahrbuch für Ostrecht 83–94 (2009).Google Scholar

25 This is the reason why most criminal law regimes forbid the use of analogy in disfavour of the defendant, see e.g. BVerfGE 92, 1. Similarly problematic is analogy if used by the state for any limitation of individual rights (e.g. in tax law or in administrative law), see e.g. BVerfGE 71, 108.Google Scholar

26 For similar Jellinekian arguments, see Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 16–17 (1914) (Vorbehalt des “politisch Möglichen”); Jellinek at 18 (Vermutung für die Rechtmäßgkeit der Handlungen der obersten Staatsorgane). For a convincing critique of the latter, see Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie 80 (1929). As soon as you try to find a base for such doctrines in the text of the constitution, these doctrines become issues of constitutional interpretation. Without this, they are rather just bold attempts to limit constitutionalism.Google Scholar

27 For an overview of extra-, or pre-textual constitutional arguments, see András Jakab, German Constitutional Law and Doctrine on “State of Emergency”; Paradigms and Dilemmas of a Traditional (Continental) Discourse, 7 German L.J. 453–78 (2006).Google Scholar

28 See Krüger, Herbert, Allgemeine Staatslehre 31 (2d ed. 1966); Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie 19 (2d ed. 1934).Google Scholar

29 Schmitt, Carl, Legalität und Legitimität, in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–1954 321 (1958).Google Scholar

30 The state is viewed as a pre-legal institution whose power is originally unlimited, and only tamed by the law. Even moderate state-centred theorists display this Schmittian viewpoint. See, e.g, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Der verdrängte Ausnahmezustand, 31 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1885 (1978)Google Scholar

31 See Carl Friedrich Wilhelm von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts 42, margin n. 2 (3d ed. 1880) (“The recognition of emergency powers contains the idea of the state's right of existence beyond its usual constitutional life, a right that appears in abnormal emergency circumstances”) (author's translation); Erich Kaufmann, Zur Problematik des Volkswillens 14 (1931) (“For the extreme case, an ultimate right of necessity exists, alongside standardized and formalized exceptional rights, in the unwritten, natural-law content of every body of constitutional law”) (author's translation). See also Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht 330 (8th ed. 1923) (“As the individual human being, so too the state has a right of necessity when its existence is threatened”) (author's translation). Or from antiquity, see Cicero, De Legibus III, at 3 (“Salus rei publicae suprema lex esto”).Google Scholar

32 See Schröder, Meinhard, Staatsrecht an den Grenzen des Rechtsstaates, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 121, 132 (1978) (detailing the history of the term jus eminens and citing further references).Google Scholar

33 See Krüger, supra note 28, at 31 (“Emergency law, by its very concept, implies recourse to natural law as against positive law”) (author's translation). See also Klaus Stern, 2 Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1336 (1980) (reasoning identically).Google Scholar

34 See, e.g., Georg Meyer & Gerhard Anschütz, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts 906 (7th ed. 1919) (“Only one thing is sure: the constitution does not intend, cannot intend … for the life of the state to stand still … Here, constitutional law ceases, and the inquiry … is no longer a legal inquiry”) (author's translation). See also Schmitt, supra note 28, at 11 (describing the supremacy of this right to existence over positive law: “Sovereign is whoever decides in the exceptional state”). Schmitt claims that positive law cannot bind this sovereign decision-making and this state of emergency. See Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf IX (1921).Google Scholar

35 See Stern, , supra note 33, at 1334, 1337.Google Scholar

36 Id. at 1337.Google Scholar

37 On constitutional interpretation using basically the general methods of statutory interpretation, with certain differences in degree, see Ernst Forsthoff, Die Umbildung des Verfassungsgesetzes, in Festschrift für Carl Schmitt zum 70 Geburtstag 35, 36 (Hans Barion et al. eds., 1959).Google Scholar

38 See the description and convincing refutation of these arguments by María Luisa Balaguer Callejón, Interpretación de la Constitución y ordenamiento jurídico 39–40 (1997).Google Scholar

39 See Kägi, Werner, Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundordnung des Staates 65–66, 120 (1945).Google Scholar

40 In Europe, there are currently four constitutional courts where actio popularis exists: Bavaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In Croatia, there is a similar type of popular claim, but the constitutional court is not obliged to begin the procedure. See Bernd Wieser, Vergleichendes Verfassungsrecht 140 (2005). In Hungary, the actio popularis was abolished by the end of 2011, and the new constitution introduced a German-type constitutional complaint in which the violation of a fundamental right has to be claimed.Google Scholar

41 William Twining & David Miers, How to do Things with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation 268 (1982) (following John Wisdom, Gods, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 185, 185–194 (1944)). In the original text of Wisdom, the phrase “legs of a chair” also implied that single arguments are not conclusive, but if we used the expression in this sense here, we could not distinguish between this type and that of topical reasoning. We therefore use the phrase in a sense slightly different from the original (i.e. for a reasoning in which every argument is conclusive in itself).Google Scholar

42 See e.g., Dec. Hung. CC 41/2005. (X. 27.) AB, ABH 2005, 459, 502 (László Kiss, dissenting).Google Scholar

43 See Viehweg, Theodor, Topik und Jurisprudenz (1953). On the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court sometimes accepting this argument, see criticism by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation, 46 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2089, 2092–94 (1976).Google Scholar

44 The third, topical pattern of argumentation is more frequent in German constitutional review, but, e.g. is hardly ever used in Hungary, see András Jakab, Az Alkotmány kommentárjának feladata, in Az Alkotmány kommentárja margin n. 5 (András Jakab ed., 2d ed. 2009). A convincing set of arguments against it, namely that it is unclear, uncontrollable, and leads to arbitrary and unpredictable decisions, see Ulrich Karpen, Auslegung und Anwendung des Grundgesetzes 54–55 (1987), with further references.Google Scholar

45 See Horak, Franz, Zur rechtstheoretischen Problematik der Begründung, in Die Entsheidungsbegründung in europäischen Verfahrensrechten und im Verfahren vor internationalen Gerichten 9, 14–15. (Rainer Sprung ed., 1974).Google Scholar

46 Wróblewski, Jerzy, Legal Reasoning in Legal Interpretation, 12 Logique et Analyse 3, 7 (1969).Google Scholar

47 See art. 16(2) Constitution of Portugal: ‘The provisions of the Constitution and laws relating to fundamental rights are to be read and interpreted in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ and art. 10(2) Constitution of Spain: ‘The norms relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognised by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements on those matters ratified by Spain.'Google Scholar

48 On the Hungarian traditions of interpretive preambles, see Márton Sulyok & László Trócsányi, Preambulum, in Jakab, supra note 44, at 91. See generally Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 Int'l J. Const. L. 714–38 (2010).Google Scholar

49 Jakab, András & Sonnevend, Pál, Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hungary 9 European Constitutional Law Review 102, 108–109 (2013).Google Scholar

50 On the (failed) attempt of Leibniz, aiming at this, see Fritjof Haft, Recht und Sprache, in Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart 233, 278 (Arthur Kaufmann & Winfried Hassemer eds., 2006); Benoît Frydman, Le sens des lois. Histoire de l'interprétation et de la raison juridique 274–77 (2005).Google Scholar

51 This is also self-understanding of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see BVerfGE 82, 30 (38f).Google Scholar

52 This makes the style of European continental constitutional court judgments normally more discursive than that of ordinary courts, where normally there is no dissenting opinion, see e.g., Lech Morawski & Marek Zirk-Sadowski, Precedent in Poland, in Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study 225 (Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997). On the institution of dissenting opinions in constitutional courts, see Katalin Kelemen, The Road from Common Law to East-Central Europe, in Legal and Political Theory in the Post-National Age 135–52 (Péter Cserne & Miklós Könczöl eds., 2011).Google Scholar

53 Even within the subjective factors, one can distinguish legitimate (e.g. a different conception of democracy) and illegitimate (e.g. party allegiance) ones. The former may be referred to in an argument, while the latter may not. See Ralf Dreier, Zur Problematik und Situation der Verfassungsinterpretation, in Recht Moral Ideologie. Studien zur Rechtstheorie 126 (1981).Google Scholar

54 This is reflected in an exaggerated form by the lawyerly adage cited by Schneider: “Tell me who is interpreting the norm and I tell you what it means.” Hans-Peter Schneider, Verfassungsinterpretation aus theoretischer Sicht, in Verfassungsrecht zwischen Wissenschaft und Richterkunst. Konrad Hesse zum 70. Geburtstag 39 (Hans-Peter Schneider & Rudolf Steinberg eds., 1990).Google Scholar

55 Judicial procedures themselves are transparent, but how they shape the interpretation of statutes or constitutions is very far from transparent, only in the rarest case we find an explicit change of former case-law.Google Scholar

56 The idea of narrowing down the circle of acceptable arguments to a canon, stems from ancient Rome, and is alien to Asian or African legal cultures, see Tony Honoré, Legal Reasoning in Rome and Today, 91 S. Afr. L.J. 92 (1974).Google Scholar

57 The discussion of the methods follows Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, in Interpreting Statutes 461, 464–65 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).Google Scholar

58 With a focus on German and American preferences in methodology, see David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 79–120 (2001). The American ranking of methods: (A) Precedents, (B) textualist and originalist arguments, and (C) others, is discussed by Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189–1286 (1987).Google Scholar

59 Fish calls these supplementary norms of the interpretive community, into which the new members, in our case young lawyers at the beginning of their careers, are “socialized.” Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 133 (1989).Google Scholar

60 This kind of limit works only if the “web of beliefs in the legal community” clearly shows the solution to the given, easy, case; if, however, views on the problem diverge or there are no views yet, it being a new problem, then it is a hard case. See Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 125–43 (1985).Google Scholar

61 See Eisenberg, Melvin Aron, The Nature of the Common Law 99–103 (1988).Google Scholar

62 E.g., BVerfGE 92, 130 (134); 102, 26 (39)‥Google Scholar

63 The technical meaning is that used by some particular community—e.g., lawyers—as opposed to the whole of the society. See Susan J. Brison & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, A Philosophical Introduction to Constitutional Interpretation, in Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation 1, 5 (Susan J. Brison & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1993). An idiosyncratic terminology makes the text more difficult to understand, but it improves its clarity and thus, contributes to legal certainty.Google Scholar

64 One of the most influential formulations of the textualist theory is John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673–739 (1997) (supporting his theory by arguments of legitimacy). Richard Posner's contrary theory of “pragmatic judgement”—i.e., it is only the best solution of the actual case and the filling of legal gaps that one has to aim for—is critically discussed by Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 910–13 (2002–03), with detailed references.Google Scholar

65 See e.g., Dec. Hung. CC 1/1999. (II. 24.) AB, ABH 1999, 25, 37.Google Scholar

66 See Tushnet, Mark, The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in Interpreting Constitutions. A Comparative Study 28 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).Google Scholar

67 Antonin Scalia, A Theory of Constitution Interpretation, Remarks at the Catholic University of America (Oct. 18, 1996), available at http://www.proconservative.net/pcvol5is225scaliatheoryconstlinterpretation.shtml. For a convincing collection of anti-originalist arguments [in essence: (a) the constitution has to develop, (b) yet it is difficult to amend, (c) therefore it has to be adapted to the changing circumstances through interpretation] is given (under the heading open ended modernism), see Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution (1987).Google Scholar

68 See Pierre-André Côté, Interprétation des lois 240 (1990).Google Scholar

69 See the convincing examples in Glanville Williams, 61 Language and the Law, Law Quarterly Review 71–86, 179–95, 293–303, 384–406 (1945); Williams, Glanville, 62 Language and the Law, Law Quarterly Review 387–406 (1946).Google Scholar

70 See Schmitt, Carl, Verfassungslehre 31–32 (1928) (calling this dilatorischer Formelkompromiß, i.e., when the solution of a question is delayed, and placed to courts by formulating the norm very vaguely).Google Scholar

71 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 para 23–27; Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Multilingual and Multicultural Legal Reasoning: The European Court of Justice, in Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy 97–122 (Anne Lise Kjær & Silvia Adamo eds., 2011); Mattias Derlén, Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law (2009).Google Scholar

72 See e.g., BVerfGE 62, 1 (35, 38ff, 44); 69, 1, 57 (61). Documents containing informal interpretations—e.g., explanatory notes by the ministries—are not like this, as they are not legal acts. Their use is forbidden in Hungary for reasons of legal certainty, see Dec. Hung. CC 37/2001 (X. 11.) AB, ABH 2001, 302, 305, with further references.Google Scholar

73 This is called intrinsic aid in English scholarship. Extrinsic aid, in turn, refers to other legal acts or scholarly works, or even parliamentary materials. See e.g., Alisdair A. Gillespie, The English Legal System 43–50 (2007).Google Scholar

74 With reference to constitutional law, see Chester James Antieau, Constitutional Construction 21–22 (1982).Google Scholar

75 See e.g., VfSlg 11.829/1988, 11.927/1988, 16.327/2001. When interpreting statutes below the rank of the constitution, the usual form of this type of argument is the interpretation in the light of the constitution. See, Harald Bogs, Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung von Gesetzen (1966); Burmeister, Joachim, Die Verfassungsorientierung der Gesetzesauslegung (1966); Peter Raisch, Juristische Methoden. Vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart 179–80 (1995), with further references. A statutory interpretation in the light of the constitution is essentially a presumption of the validity, constitutionality, of the statute, see Tobias van Reenen, Tendences actuelles dans l'interprétation de la Constitution de l'Afrique du Sud, 2 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 355, 360–61 (2002).Google Scholar

76 On the principle of völkerrechtskonforme Auslegung as part of the interpretation according to the general hierarchy, see Ernst Zeller, Auslegung von Gesetz und Vertrag 372 (1989). In the U.S., this general principle is known as the “Charming Betsy” canon, after the first case where it was deployed: The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). An excellent analysis of the topic is Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479–537 (1998). On international law arguments used in constitutional interpretation in American constitutional law, see Gerald L. Newman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 82–90 (2004). On the fact that the influence of Strasbourg jurisprudence on national constitutional law is similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court on the practice of the states, see Gerda Kleijkamp, Comparing the Application and Interpretation of the United States Constitution and The European Convention on Human Rights, 12 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 307–34 (2002).Google Scholar

77 The meaning of a word, particularly in enumerations, can be determined with the help of the words adjacent to it. See Antieau, supra note 74, at 22–23.Google Scholar

78 If words of specific meaning are followed by a more general expression in a list, then the latter has to be understood as a broader expression having a meaning similar to those of the preceding specific words. In an enumeration like “cars, vans and other vehicles,” the word “vehicle” cannot mean ship or bicycle, only land motor vehicles. See Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method and Techniques 110 (1986).Google Scholar

79 In another formulation: exceptiones non extendendae, see Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason 399 (1989).Google Scholar

80 E.g. BVerfGE 19, 206 (220); 55, 274 (300) with further references. An example from Hungarian practice is the Dec. Hung. CC 48/1991. (IX. 26.) AB, ABH 1991, 217, 242.Google Scholar

81 Hesse, Konrad, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 28 (1999).Google Scholar

82 Jackson, Vicki C., Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v Blitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1259–1310 (2001). This doctrine, however, is not yet accepted by the courts, only a scholarly opinion.Google Scholar

83 For classical formulations, see VfSlg 4349/1963, 4680/1964, 11.503/1987. It differs from references to the American original meaning, see supra sec. B.I., to the extent that here the meaning is inferred from other legal rules, while there is no such limit in the case of the original meaning. Google Scholar

84 See e.g., Felix Ermacora, Österreichische Verfassungslehre 96 (1998). This kind of argument is not unknown to the BVerfG either, see BVerfGE, 7, 29 (44); BVerfGE, 33, 125 (152 f.); BVerfGE, 42, 20 (29); BVerfGE, 61, 149 (175); BVerfGE, 68, 319 (328), but it is used as a less strict and conclusive argument.Google Scholar

85 On the problem in general, with reference to statutes, see Rolf Wank, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen 80–90 (2005).Google Scholar

86 The school of American constitutional interpretation focusing on such arguments is called “doctrinalist,” see Walter F. Murphy, American Constitutional Interpretation 405–10 (2003).Google Scholar

87 Cf. I Edgar Reiners, Die Normenhierarchie in den Mitgliedstaaten der europäischen Gemeinschaften 275–76 (1971). Most constitutional courts consider “established practice” stronger, since if it was otherwise, they would quote the most recent decision only, however they usually quote several decisions if available.Google Scholar

88 In the U.K., in case of contradictory precedents, the judge is free to choose amongst them. See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd, (1944) 1 K.B. 718.Google Scholar

89 Also common law countries differ in whether a court binds itself for the future by a decision, or whether it only binds courts lower in the hierarchy. The latter is the case in the U.S., the former, with the exception of the House of Lords, today's Supreme Court in the U.K. See Patrick S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions 118–27 (1987).Google Scholar

90 See, Dec. Hung. CC 75/2008. (V. 29.) AB, ABH 2008, 651, 656 (discussing the issue that there is res iudicata in the Court, only if a certain statute has already been examined from the same constitutional aspect. The same statute can thus be examined again, if it is challenged on the basis of another constitutional provision.).Google Scholar

91 Explicit overruling: see, e.g., BVerfGE 85, 264 (285f). Mostly overruling happens in silence, see e.g. Alfonso Ruiz-Miguel & Francisco J. Laporta, Precedent in Spain, in Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study, supra note 52, at 285. A special technique of overruling allowing for legal certainty is the so-called prospective overruling. See Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 127–32. This means that although the new rule is applied for the actual case, or not even for it, the former one will be applied for all other cases that happened before the decision. Thus, the newly declared rule is going to be valid for cases emerging after the decision. Implicit suppression without an explicit modification is called transformation, whereas the narrowing of the scope of the previous case is overriding. See Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 132–36. “Anticipatory overruling” in the U.S. is when a lower court does not follow the precedent by a higher court, because it expects the higher court to overturn its decision anyway.Google Scholar

92 Cf. Scalia, Antonin, A Matter of Interpretation 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The whole function of [stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nevertheless be held to be true.“).Google Scholar

93 Cf. Practice Statement, (1966) 3 All E.R. 77 (H.L) (discussing the proper development of the law).Google Scholar

94 On the notion of decisions per incuriam, see Morelle Ltd v. Wakeling, (1955) 1 All E.R. 708, 2 Q.B. 379.Google Scholar

95 See Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire 228–32 (1986).Google Scholar

96 Following Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy § 3 (Edward N. Zalta ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/.Google Scholar

97 See Schauer, Frederick, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 597–98 (1987).Google Scholar

98 Cf. Joseph, Raz, The Authority of Law 194–201 (1979) (arguing that courts ought to have law-making competence because there are unforeseen situations).Google Scholar

99 Accord Bell, John, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions 17–20 (1983) (claiming that the judge is in fact an interstitial legislator).Google Scholar

100 See Rasmussen, Eric B., Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 63–83 (1994)Google Scholar

101 See Golding, Martin P., Legal Reasoning 98 (1984), following Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V. 3, 1131a10–b15.Google Scholar

102 Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation, supra note. 63, at 1, 13.Google Scholar

103 See Dec. Hung CC 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB, ABH 1990, 88, 97–98.Google Scholar

104 On the dangers—narrowing the room for politics, without democratic legitimacy—and advantages of this phenomenon—solving situations where politics came to a standstill, see Christian Starck, Vefassung und Gesetz, in, Rangordnung der Gesetze 29, 32–33 (Christian Starck ed., 1995).Google Scholar

105 The definition stems from Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J. 161–83 (1930); Arthur L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 M.L.R. 117–24 (1959). For a more subtle discussion, see Peczenik, supra note 79, at 334, who means by “construed ratio decidendi“ also the arguments, which may not be mentioned in the reasoning, but were implicitly essential for passing a decision. A special difficulty arises in cases where, because of concurring reasoning and dissenting opinions, there is no reasoning accepted by the majority, thus the ratio cannot be established with certainty either.Google Scholar

106 In Germany the situation is not entirely clear: we find statements that only the ratio decidendi is binding, see BVerfGE 1, 14 (37); 19, 377 (392); 20, 56 (87); 40, 88 (93); but we also find judgments which say that the Federal Constitutional Court can disregard its own precedents, if the circumstances require it to do so, see BVerfGE 4, 31 (38); 20, 56 (87); 77, 84 (104). Yet another judgment states that a precedent should be followed not because it is a precedent, but because it contains sound reasoning, see BVerfGE 84, 212 (227). This unclear situation is of course favourable to the court, as it can pick the doctrine favouring its own moral preferences.Google Scholar

107 Further on this concept, see Richard Bronaugh, Persuasive Precedent, in Precedent in Law 217–47 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).Google Scholar

108 We call arguments from a name or description argumentum a notatione. Google Scholar

109 In the case of an argument, the lack of binding force means that it may be countered by asking “So what?”. Arguments with no binding force show the mere possibility of a solution, the acceptance of which has to be supported with arguments having binding force.Google Scholar

110 See, e.g., Dec. Hung. CC 42/2005. (XI. 14.) AB, ABH 2005, 504, 526, with further references.Google Scholar

111 Decision of the Spanish constitutional court Nr. 2/81 and 77/83.Google Scholar

112 See François Ost & Michel van de Kerchove, Entre la lettre et l'esprit. Les directives d'interprétation en droit 54 (1989).Google Scholar

113 See, e.g., László Kiss (dissenting) Dec. Hung. CC 18/1999. (VI. 11.) AB, ABH 1999, 137, 143. Sometimes the a contrario argument is referred to as e contrario, meaning the same though.Google Scholar

114 Cf. Szabó, supra note 22, at 208.Google Scholar

115 BVerfGE 57, 43 (62ff), 69, 1, 57 (72). For the most thorough explanation of this method, see Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2005).Google Scholar

116 See Barak, Aharon, Purposive Interpretation in Law xi (2005) (“Intent of any reasonable author.”).Google Scholar

117 An interesting way of dealing with this problem is the Québec Interpretation Act, providing that “Every provision of an Act is deemed to be enacted for the recognition of rights, the imposition of obligations or the furtherance of the exercise of rights, or for the remedying of some injustice or the securing of some benefit. Such statute shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction as will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions, according to their true intent, meaning and spirit.” Interpretation Act (Québec) sect. 41.Google Scholar

118 Bydlinski, Franz, Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff 453 (1991).Google Scholar

119 A special case of this is where the establishment of representative democracy is considered to be the purpose of the constitution, and its text is interpreted in this light. This idea leads to judicial self-restraint, since judicial review by a constitutional court is a limit to representative democracy. If, however, the purpose is understood to be the protection of fundamental rights, then it may justify activism. See Murphy, supra note 86, at 419–426.Google Scholar

120 Côté, supra note 68, at 353, n. 1.Google Scholar

121 Dig. 1.3.17 (Celsus).Google Scholar

122 See Raisch, supra note 75, at 176–78.Google Scholar

123 This is a historical argument, where one refers not to what a norm says but what it does not (eloquent silence). This is to mean that the norm is actually silent on an issue, which seems doubtful, because it was beyond any question at the time of enacting. E.g. the B-VG does not prescribe whether the cabinet decides unanimously or by majority vote, but since this (viz. unanimous decision) was evident at the time art. 69 B-VG was enacted, one has to assume that this is implied by the B-VG even today, or else the constitution-makers would have amended it explicitly. Silence means that the purpose of the norm is to stick to the old, then obvious, solution. See Bernhard Raschauer, Art. 69, in Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht margin n. 28 (Karl Korinek & Michael Holoubek eds., loose-leaf ed., 2003).Google Scholar

124 See Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Momodou Jobe, (1984) A.C. 689, 702 (Lord Diplock).Google Scholar

125 VfSlg 2720/1954.Google Scholar

126 Hogg, Peter W., Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study, supra note 66, at 55, 85–87. The same idea has made a career in the U.S. under the name living constitution, see, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976).Google Scholar

127 For more detail and further references, see András Jakab, Surviving Socialist Legal Concepts and Methods, in The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985–2005 606, 606–619 (András Jakab et al. eds., 2007).Google Scholar

128 Jakab, András, Two Opposing Paradigms of Continental European Constitutional Thinking: Austria and Germany, Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 933, 933–55, (2009) (with further references).Google Scholar

129 Dworkin, , supra note 95, at viii–ix.Google Scholar

130 Id. at 239.Google Scholar

131 Id. at 225–28, 254–58.Google Scholar

132 Posner, Richard A., The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1637–1715 (1998) (Especially at 1695, this presents Dworkin as ‘the Taliban of Western legal thought').Google Scholar

133 Burton, , supra note 60, at 101–23.Google Scholar

134 It is for this reason that the theory stemming from Rudolf Smend, according to which the constitution as a whole aims for “integration,” has to be rejected. Integration in the Smendian sense in pluralist societies is verging on the impossible. Smend, and the reception of Schmitt, are heavily criticized as the projection of a conservative state-centred (etatist) morality by Robert Chr. van Ooyen, Der Begriff des Politischen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (2005). For a fitting argument possibly scaring away liberals in some European countries from Dworkin, see also the opinion of an Irish judge: “The political philosophy of our Constitution owes infinitely more to Thomas Aquinas than Thomas Paine” in High Court of Ireland [H. Ct. - Federal Court], Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best, (2000), 2 I.R. 17, 65. Dworkin would probably answer to this that his theory is geographically not universal—i.e., it has been developed solely for the U.S. or at the most for democracies of a similar liberal approach, cf. Dworkin, supra note 95, at 102–03—but if he does so, then it would be simpler, more open and more honest just to leave aside the “fit” part of his argument as what he does is interpreting constitutional law in the light of his own, liberal, moral preferences. With the anti-universal approach, he basically filters out those cases where there could be a contradiction between “fit” and “appeal,” and he seems to filter the possible legal orders, thus the “fit”-side, based on his political philosophy—i.e., based on his “appeal” preferences.Google Scholar

135 For a similar criticism on Dworkin, see Nigel E. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence. Justice, Law and Rights 217 (2002).Google Scholar

136 Similarly problematic is John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1981) who suggests that the (U.S.) Constitution should always be interpreted in a way that reinforces the nation's system of democratic representation. The supposition of such overarching purposes behind the Constitution leads to never ending political philosophical debates.Google Scholar

137 Peczenik, , supra note 79, at 412, 414–15.Google Scholar

138 This may be difficult to prove—particularly in the case of a group decision where some may not be aware of what they vote for; or different persons may have different purposes—therefore some consider this concept as fiction. See Côté, supra note 68, at 13–14. The same problems arise to an even greater extent if one refers to the will of the “people” in the case of a statute, see, e.g., Ekkehart Stein & Götz Frank, Staatsrecht 34 (2002). One may refer to the intent of the drafter(s) instead, see, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 17 (1971). This, however, raises problems in terms of legitimacy, since it is not the drafters but the constitution-maker that makes the constitution.Google Scholar

139 Kis, János, Alkotmányos demokrácia 134 (2000).Google Scholar

140 A Hungarian example is Dec. Hung. CC 4/1997. (I. 22.) AB, ABH 1997, 41, 45–46.Google Scholar

141 E.g. BVerfGE 88, 40 (56f.); 102, 176 (185).Google Scholar

142 Pescatore, Pierre, Introduction à la science du droit 333–35 (1960).Google Scholar

143 Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England 59 (8th ed. 1765) (“The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made.”).Google Scholar

144 Cf. Pescatore, , supra note 142, at 331 (discussing statutory interpretation in general).Google Scholar

145 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in The Portable Jefferson 558–59 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).Google Scholar

146 Brison, & Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 63, at 11.Google Scholar

147 Scalia, Antonin, supra note 92, at 17.Google Scholar

148 In one of his dissenting opinions, Dec. Hung. CC 675/B/2001, ABH 2002, 1320, 1344–1345.Google Scholar

149 For a more detailed discussion of these arguments, see François Ost, L'interprétation logique et systématique et le postulat de rationalité du législateur, in L'interprétation en droit: Approche pluridisciplinaire 97, 159–77 (Michel van de Kerchove ed., 1978).Google Scholar

150 Cf. Holland, James & Webb, Julian, Learning Legal Rules 234–36 (2006) (discussing statutory interpretation in general).Google Scholar

151 See Szabó, supra note 22, at 210 (discussing the argumentum ad absurdum).Google Scholar

152 See Eskridge, William N., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988) (discussing its impact on legal interpretation). For a consequence-based theory of interpretation under the heading “pragmatism,” see Richard A. Posner, Interpretation Revisited, in Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 63, at 102–17.Google Scholar

153 Louis Brandeis, Justice of the Supreme Court between 1916 and 1939, argued as an attorney in the case Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) by delivering a detailed sociological presentation of the social effects of long working hours on women.Google Scholar

154 On these German and French schools, see Jean-Louis Bergel, Méthodologie juridique 249–53 (2001); Jean-Cassien Billier & Aglaé Maryoli, Histoire de la philosophie du droit 189–94 (2001).Google Scholar

155 See Posner, Richard A., The Costs of Enforcing Legal Rights, 3 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 71 (1995) (discussing the “right” interpretation of fundamental rights based on a cost-benefit analysis, with examples from U.S. constitutional interpretation). For a critique of Posner on moral grounds, see Kis János, From Costs and Benefits to Fairness: Comments on Richard Posner, 3 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 84 (1995).Google Scholar

156 E.g. BVerfGE 84, 212 (221). Within moral arguments one may further distinguish between references to critical morality (“the” right approach of morality) and references to the moral views of the majority of the society (social morality), see, e.g., Rainer Arnold, Réflexions sur l'argumentation juridique en droit constitutionnel allemande, in Raisonnement juridique et interprétation, supra note 10, at 61. The latter emerges very rarely in Hungarian constitutional case law: 154/2008. (XII. 17.) AB, ABH 2008, 1203, 1235.Google Scholar

157 For a combined example, see Dec. Hung. CC 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB, ABH 1990, 88, 93, with references to values on the one hand, and the lack of effectiveness, on the other.Google Scholar

158 See the commentary to the decision BVerfGE 95, 96 in Verfassungsrechtssprechung 605–611 (Jörg Menzel ed., 2000). On German references to natural law, see BVerfGE 3, 88; 6, 132; 23, 98. On the arguments for and against the references to values in the jurisprudence of the German constitutional court, see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Zur Kritik der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in Rechtspositivismus und Wertbezug des Rechts 33, 45 (Ralf Dreier ed., 1990); Christian Starck, Zur Notwendigkeit der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in id. at 59–61.Google Scholar

159 Dec. Hung. CC 11/1992. (III. 5.) AB, ABH 1992, 77, 82, 84–85. Unlike e.g. the USA, where such arguments do play a major role, see Mark Tushnet, supra note 66, at 38–40.Google Scholar

160 László Sólyom, Aufbau und dogmatische Fundierung der ungarischen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, OsteuropaRecht 235 (2000).Google Scholar

161 Further objections to moral arguments: (1) Giving them a legal form (i.e. forbidding direct references to morality) serves the taming and easing of ideological oppositions, see Ernst Forsthoff, Zur Problematik der Verfassungsauslegung 22–25 (1961); (2) References to morality are not representative of the whole of society, as they reflect the morality of (upper middle-class) lawyers and are therefore anti-democratic, see Ely, supra note 136, at 59.Google Scholar

162 For a discussion on the historical reasons of the differences in use of legal scholarship, see András Jakab, Seven Role Models of Legal Scholars, 2 German L.J. 757 (2011). For an example of deference of the German Federal Constitutional Court to academic critique, see BVerfGE 84, 212 (227).Google Scholar

163 Tushnet, , supra note 66, at 44 n. 109.Google Scholar

164 E.g., BVerfGE 84, 239 (269); 89, 155 (189); 95, 408 (423f.). Peter Häberle, Grundrechtsgeltung und Grundrechtsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat – Zugleich zur Rechtsvergleichung als “fünfter” Auslegungsmethode, 44 Juristen-Zeitung 913 (1989) (mentioning comparative law as the fifth method of interpretation in addition to the traditional four (grammatical, logical, systematic and historical) of Savigny).Google Scholar

165 S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993 (“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.”).Google Scholar

166 S. Afr. Const., 1996. (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”).Google Scholar

167 For a discussion on this topic, see D. M. Davis, Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local History in the Reconstruction of Comparative Influence: The South African Experience, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 181, 189–91 (2003).Google Scholar

168 This is called ‘soft use’ by Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of Selecting the Right Argument, 14 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 301 (2004). According to an even more radical description, such references have a merely ‘ornamental function.’ See Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in The Use of Comparative Law by Courts 3, 18. (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999).Google Scholar

169 McCrudden, Christopher, A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversation on Constitutional Rights, 20 O.J.L.S. 499, 506 (2000).Google Scholar

170 Ackerman, Bruce, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1997); Donald P. Kommers, Comparative Constitutional Law: Its Increasing Relevance, in Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law 61 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in id. at 3.Google Scholar

171 This is characteristic not only of small countries, but may also be observed e.g. in the U.S., see, e.g., Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 37, 39 (2006). An interesting figure is that 60% of the cases referred to by Québécois courts are of foreign law (e.g. French or common law). See H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGill L.J. 261, 294 (1987).Google Scholar

172 In the context of the ECJ, see T. Koopmans, Comparative Law and the Courts, 45 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 545, 546 (1996).Google Scholar

173 For a discussion on the clarification of vague principles through comparison in international law, see Sigrid Jacoby, Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze: Begriffsentwicklung und Funktion in der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 184–90 (1997). From EU law, Sigrid Jacoby discusses the example of Art. 288. 2 [ex Art. 215.2] of the EC Treaty, id. at 210–15.Google Scholar

174 See Halmai, Gábor, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 1331–32 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).Google Scholar

175 For a discussion on the dialogue model of this phenomenon, see Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819, 855–65 (1999); Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experiences (Filippo Fontanelli et al. eds., 2010).Google Scholar

176 For a discussion on this phenomenon as part of the international communication between courts, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99, 129–32 (1994).Google Scholar

177 The defense of authentic national identity against the new imperialism, see Carlos F Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoratitative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 269 (2003). General concerns of legitimacy, see Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 305 (2004).Google Scholar

178 The choice of foreign material is not only arbitrary (or, more properly, one looks for support for an already given conclusion) and uncontrollable, it is also dangerous for stability, delivering arguments for departing from the already established case law, see Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1985); George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 (1998). Borrowing is always problematic because of the different cultural and political contexts, see Wiktor Osiatynski, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 244 (2003); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, Legal Affairs, Aug. 2004, at 41, 41–42. Every country has a different argumentative culture, so legal reasoning cannot be borrowed, see Pierre Legrand, Le droit comparé 81–99 (1999). The tacit presupposition that constitutional laws converge, is not true, see Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutionalism in a Global Age, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2570, 2584 (2004).Google Scholar

179 Walter, Christian, Dezentrale Konstitutionalisierung durch nationale und internationale Gerichte: Überlegungen zur Rechtsvergleichung als Methode im öffentlichen Recht, in Nicht-normative Steuerung in dezentralen Systemen 205, 224 (Janbernd Oebbecke ed., 2005).Google Scholar

180 Tushnet, Mark, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1225, 1307 (1999).Google Scholar

181 The attitude towards the creative arguments of type (C) also depends on which institutions one trusts. If one thinks that the legislature is short-sighted, populist, and incompetent, then constitutional courts are likely to prefer creative, interpretatory techniques, while if the prestige of judges is low (because they are considered to be anti-democratic, elitist, corrupt, or maybe adherents of the ancien régime), then one opts for a text-based interpretation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 169 (1996).Google Scholar

182 There are also tacit political philosophies, (conceptions of democracy) underlying the preferences in terms of methods of legal interpretation, but we shall not discuss these here. For a detailed analysis, see Martin Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung entwickelt am Problem der Verfassungsinterpretation 27–31 (1976).Google Scholar

183 It is described as an argument used in Belgian jurisprudence, see François Ost & Michel van de Kerchove, Les directives d'interprétation en théorie du droit et en droit positif belge. La lettre et l'esprit, in Les règles d'interprétation 25, 25–27 (Jean-François Perrin ed., 1989).Google Scholar

184 It is formulated (also) somewhat differently, see Côté, supra note 68, at 265–285.Google Scholar

185 Cf. the British Golden Rule, see supra p. 206.Google Scholar

186 For a discussion on debates concerning this problem in Austrian scholarship, see Jakab, supra note 128, at 943–45.Google Scholar

187 Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law 120–131 (1961) uses the metaphor of “the open texture of law.” For Hart's thesis being applied to constitutional interpretation, see José Juan Moreso, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation 131–71 (1997).Google Scholar

188 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. 1 (1997).Google Scholar

189 Moreover, constitutional ideas, and therefore the abstract provisions implementing them, partly contradict one another, see Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 58–60 (1949).Google Scholar

190 Cardozo, Benjamin L., The Nature of the Judicial Process 83 (1921).Google Scholar

191 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Introduction, in Interpreting Constitutions. A Comparative Study, supra note 66, at 5. This argument does not apply, though, to most European countries where constitutions are usually younger than civil or criminal codes.Google Scholar

192 A change in the Constitution without a formal amendment to the text (i.e. modification through interpretation) is called Verfassungswandlung by Jellinek. Georg Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung 9, 21, 26–27 (1906).Google Scholar

193 A broader conception of Rechtdogmatik (i.e. including not only the conceptual system, but the job of building it up) is used e.g. by Ulfrid Neumann, Wissenschaftstheorie der Rechtswissenschaft, in Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie der Gegenwart 394, 394–96 (Arthur Kaufmann et al. eds., 2004). We use the concept here in a more narrow sense, which likewise allows for a thorough explanation of methodological problems, while making the explanation clearer and easier to understand.Google Scholar

194 Contradictions have to be eliminated by way of interpretation otherwise one cannot contribute to the solution of future problems. If contradictions are merely highlighted, those applying the law will stare puzzled at the two passages, then decide which passage to follow by tossing a coin, as it were. Our task is to help to avoid this arbitrary decision-making process, thus making a calculable functioning of the system possible. See Eike von Savigny, Die Rolle der Dogmatik – wissenschaftstheoretisch gesehen, in Juristiche Dogmatik und Wissenschaftstheorie, supra note 4, at 104.Google Scholar

195 See, e.g., in Austria: Karl Spielbüchler, Grundrecht und Grundrechtsformel, in Arbeitsrecht und soziale Grundrechte: Festschrift Hans Floretta 289–307 (Oswin Martinek et al eds., 1983).Google Scholar

196 If one introduces a legal concept only for understanding and describing (heuristics), but does not intend to use it when deciding legal cases, then one has no doctrinal ambitions with it.Google Scholar

197 This is similar to the conceptual system of administrative law: It becomes sophisticated only if there is judicial review of administrative acts. See András Jakab, Wissenschaft vom Verwaltungsrecht: Ungarn, in Ius Publicum Europaeum IV, marginal nos. 5 and 16 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2011). Constitutional courts are a necessary, but on their own, not a sufficient precondition of a sophisticated Verfassungsdogmatik. Google Scholar

198 As explained infra pp. 35–38, in the absence of judicial review of statutes, the elaboration of a detailed constitutional Rechtsdogmatik would really be just a “useless lawyerly pursuit.”Google Scholar

199 MacCormick, Neil D., Coherence in Legal Justification, in Theory of Legal Science 235–51 (Aleksander Peczenik et al eds., 1984).Google Scholar

200 Alexy, Following Robert & Peczenik, Aleksander, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality, 3 Ratio Juris 130 (1990) (with some simplification and modification).Google Scholar

201 The concept comes from Rudolph von Jhering, Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz 337 (1884), who used it primarily for Puchta. An excellent overview of Puchta's scholarship is Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Georg Friedrich Puchta und die “Begriffsjurisprudenz” (2004).Google Scholar

202 Interests and benefits have to be formulated as rights and duties. See Philippe A. Mastronardi, Juristisches Denken 264–76 (2001). Moral arguments have to be translated likewise. As it is formulated in a decision by the ICJ, see South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (“It is a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be rendered.”).Google Scholar

203 It is for this reason that journalists and proper constitutional lawyers argue in an apparently different way on the same problem. Cf. supra note 56 (discussing the canon of acceptable arguments).Google Scholar

204 Bucher, Eugen, Was ist “Begriffsjurisprudenz”?, in Theorie und Technik der Begriffsjurisprudenz 372 (Werner Krawietz ed., 1976). It is also worth noting that the Interessenjurisprudenz, frequently referred to as the opposite of Begriffsjurisprudenz, was not in fact its counterpart but rather complementary to it. This is well shown by the fact that the four traditional methods of Savigny (grammatical, logical, systemic and historical) are not replaced by the teleological interpretation (of which Jhering is thought to be the inventor): It is added to them as a fifth method, cf. Géza Kiss, A jogalkalmazás módszeréről 53–58 (1909). The opposite of Begriffsjurisprudenz is rather the “School of Free Law” (Freirechtsschule). See Bucher, supra note 204, at 372–73.Google Scholar

205 See especially Heck, Philipp, Was ist die Begriffsjurisprudenz, die wir bekämpfen?, 14 Deutsche Juristenzeitung 1456 (1909).Google Scholar

206 Bucher, , supra note 204, at 388; Horst-Eberhard Henke, Wie tot ist die Begriffsjurisprudenz?, in Theorie und Technik der Begriffsjurisprudenz, supra note 204, at 415.Google Scholar

207 Bucher, , supra note 204, at 389.Google Scholar

208 Some of the concepts of legal theory do not directly contribute to legal certainty, but only as a building block of the system. This means that they are generally not directly used in the application of law, yet they are necessary for building a coherent system. In this way they help the predictable introduction of new elements (of positive law and Rechtsdogmatik) into the system, thereby improving the predictability of the application of law indirectly.Google Scholar

209 Compare the constitutional-law proverb, “The Constitution is what the judges say it is,” Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira (May 3, 1907), cited by Bernard Schwartz, Constitutional Law VII (1972). For a similar view, see Rudolf Smend, Festvortrag zur Feier des zehnjährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts am 26. Januar 1962, in Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 24 (1963) (“The Basic Law is now virtually identical with its interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court.”).Google Scholar

210 Cf. the dictum Hung. CC Dec. CC 57/1991. (XI. 8.) AB (ABH 1991, 236, 239.): “the content and meaning of a legal rule is what is attributed to it by the permanent and uniform practice of courts.” For a detailed discussion of this concept of Italian origin (diritto vivente or living law), see e.g., Antonio Ruggeri & Antonino Spadaro, Lineamenti de giustizia constituzionale 134 (2004).Google Scholar

211 Building a conceptual system instead of mere reproductivity is also advocated by Henke, supra note 206, at 414.Google Scholar

212 The ideal of gaplessness is characteristic not only of Begriffsjurisprudenz, but also of the rationalist natural law tradition. See Gustav Boehmer, Grundlagen der bürgerlichen Rechtsordnung 2.1, Dogmengeschichtliche Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes 63 (1951); with reference to Christian Wolff, see Werner Krawietz, Begriffsjurisprudenz, in Theorie und Technik der Begriffsjurisprudenz, supra note 204, at 436. The beginnings of conceptual system-building in law are traced back to the scholastics, or its reflections in the works of the glossators and commentators, by Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, in The Western Idea of Law 399, 401, 405 (J. C. Smith & David N. Weisstub eds., 1983).Google Scholar

213 Even authors outside of the Begriffsjurisprudenz tradition often assume non-contradiction in the case of a legal system, see, e.g., J. W. Harris, Law and Legal Science: An Inquiry into the Concepts Legal Rule and Legal System 11, 81–83 (1979).Google Scholar

214 Views of the end of Begriffsjurisprudenz are clearly refuted by e.g. Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte 38 (2001). While rejecting mere logical inference, he still thinks that the elaboration of the conceptual system is the primary goal of legal scholarship, and on this point he explicitly sides with the tradition of Begriffsjurisprudenz. Google Scholar

215 See Francis Delpérée, La Constitution et son interpretation, in L'interprétation en droit: Approche pluridisciplinaire, supra note 149, at 193.Google Scholar

216 E.g., Antieau, supra note 74, at 44–45. In French works, such arguments are referred to as coutume constituante or coutume constitutionelle (“constitutional custom”). See, e.g., Marcel Prélot & Jean Boulouis, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel 207–16 (1990). On the German debate, see Christian Tomuschat, Verfassungsgewohnheitsrecht (1972).Google Scholar

217 The same claim is made, focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court in a more detailed form by Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997). Contrary to this, and to our view, is the pluralist (viz. involving the whole of society: die offene Gesellschaft der Verfassungsinterpreten) approach of constitutional interpretation put forth by Peter Häberle, see Peter Häberle, Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozess 150–152 (1996) (ignoring the place of constitutional courts within constitutional law). For criticism on Häberle in the same vein (and emphasizing the obscurity of his theory), see Christian Starck, Die Verfassungsauslegung, in VII Handbuch des Straatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, supra note 2, at 205–06.Google Scholar

218 For a discussion on this task of the commentaries, see Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Was macht die Qualität öffentlich-rechtlicher Forschung aus?, Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart Vol. VII 1, 20 (Peter Häberle ed., 2002).Google Scholar

219 For a discussion on the nature of principles, see András Jakab, Re-Defining Principles as ‘Important Rules': A Critique of Robert Alexy, in On the Nature of Legal Principles 145 (Martin Borowski ed., 2009).Google Scholar

220 The organic statutes often contain the requirement that constitutional/supreme court decisions must be somehow justified, e.g. VfGG [Constitutional Court Act 1953] No. 85/1953 § 26(2) (Austria) (“mit den wesentlichen Entscheidungsgründen […] zu verkünden”), but on how exactly it should be done, explicit legal rules, except regarding dissenting or parallel opinions, are usually silent. Internal standing orders often refer to certain necessary parts of the judgment (e.g., statement of facts, submissions, applied law, whether to separate these under different headings, decision on costs), but they also do not say much about the style of the reasoning.Google Scholar

221 Cf. Goldsworthy, supra note 66, (including from Europe only Germany and, from outside Europe, the US, India, Canada, South Africa and Australia); Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (2004) (comparing the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ, and the French Cour de cassation, thus not treating any national constitutional court in Europe). For some European reports, with serious contributions only from Germany, Austria, and France though, but without an actual comparison, see Verfassungsinterpretation in Europa (Georg Lienbacher ed., 2011). For general studies in judicial style, see Basil Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 349 (1986); Basil Markesinis, A Matter of Style, 110 L.Q. Rev. 607 (1994); Jean Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain, and the USA, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 43 (1976); Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1010 (1974); MacCormick & Summers, supra note 57; MacCormick & Summers, supra note 52. In September 2011, a research group began to work at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg in the frame of a five years project on “Comparative Constitutional Reasoning” to fill in this research gap, see CONREASON Project, http://www.conreasonproject.com/.Google Scholar

222 The relevance of scholarship for constitutional reasoning might be the consequence of the fact that, most of the time, the majority of these constitutional courts consists of law professors or former university assistants.Google Scholar

223 Jakab, , supra note 128, at 935–40.Google Scholar

224 The short style has the advantage of being able to hand down faster decisions, thus contributing to a faster enforcement of constitutional claims. Peter Pernthaler & Peter Pallwein-Prettner, Die Entscheidungsbegründung des österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs, in Die Entsheidungsbegründung in europäischen Verfahrensrechten und im Verfahren vor internationalen Gerichten, supra note 45, at 210.Google Scholar

225 Cf. Stern, supra note 33, at 584–86. Reference is frequently made to such traditional platitudes as, for example, the equating of executive power with the application of the law without any mention of government decrees or regulations. See, e.g., Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 88 (20^th ed. 1995).Google Scholar

226 Robert Chr. van Ooyen, Der Begriff des Politischen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (2005).Google Scholar

227 Hesse, , supra note 225, at 97.Google Scholar

228 Id. at 86 (in German, Recht als Ordnungsfaktor).Google Scholar

229 Id. at 97 (in German, Bundesstaatliche Ordnung ist Form föderativer Gestaltung). One can only guess as to its meaning.Google Scholar

230 Or etatistic (state-centered) combinations of both, such as the figure of a state's recognition of a right. See Stern, supra note 33, at 588.Google Scholar

231 Jestaedt, Matthias, Phänomen Bundesverfassungsgericht, in Das entgrenzte Gericht 125 (Christoph Schönberger ed., 2011).Google Scholar

232 For a different explanation referring to the dismissal of the judges of the Constitutional Court in 1929, see Ewald Wiederin, Verfassungsinterpretation in Österreich, in Verfassungsinterpretation in Europa, supra note 221, at 105.Google Scholar

233 Pernthaler, & Pallwein-Prettner, supra note 224, at 207–208 (referring to VfSlg 2455/1952 where the Austrian Constitutional Court explicitly refused to discuss scholarly opinions. But in fact, scholarly opinions, often contained in the submissions, hugely influence the decisions.)Google Scholar

234 Kommers, Donald P., Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study, supra note 66, at 210. For a discussion on the distinctively scholarly style of BVerfG decisions, see Peter Lerche, Stil und Methode verfassungsgerichtlicher Entscheidungspraxis, in Festschrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht Vol. I, 333 (Peter Badura & Horts Dreier eds., 2001). The abstract style serves also as a means of self-empowerment as the FCC creates in this way long-term detailed, and seemingly objective, standards for politics, see Oliver Lepsius, Die maßstabsetzende Gewalt, in Das entgrenzte Gericht, supra note 231, at 171–81.Google Scholar

235 See, e.g., Norbert Achterberg, Die öffentliche Verwaltung 445–54 (1974) (Hans Kelsens Bedeutung in der gegenwärtigen deutschen Staatslehre) (citing, inter alia, Hermann Klenner, Rechtsleere: Die Verurteilung der Reinen Rechtslehre (1972)). See also Horst Dreier et al., Rezeption und Rolle der Reinen Rechtslehre 25, 29 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Larenz, Heller, Schmitt, and Smend); Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen 19–25 (1986).Google Scholar

236 Fabbrini, Federico, Kelsen in Paris: France's Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of a Posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation, 9 German L.J. 1297 (2008).Google Scholar

237 The original 1958 French Constitutional Council was classified as an example of the “political [i.e. non-judicial] control of constitutionality,” see Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 2–6 (1971).Google Scholar

238 For a notable exception, but as a noticeably shorter and less sophisticated version of its German counterparts, see Code constitutionnel (Michel de Villiers & Thierry Renoux eds., 2011).Google Scholar

239 For a discussion on French constitutional reasoning, see Luc Heuschling, Verfassungsinterpretation in Frankreich, in Verfassungsinterpretation in Europa, supra note 221, at 37–68.Google Scholar

240 This still lasting judicial shyness can be depicted as the legacy of the French Revolution of 1789. At that time, judges were considered as corrupt and, as far as it was possible within the limits of corruption, as royalist, both for good reasons. Thus the revolutionaries and their imperial successors during Napoleon did everything to limit the power of the judges ranging from the explicit prohibition of the binding power of judgments on future cases in the Code civil to placing the judicial review of administrative actions into the hands of the State Council (a traditional advisory institution, filled up with high profile bureaucrats and reliable politicians) instead of ordinary courts. See Goutal, supra note 221; Rudden, supra note 221. They even introduced the institution of référé legislatif, which basically meant that judges had to ask the legislator if they were uncertain about the correct interpretation of a statute, see Loi du 27 novembre 1790 instituant un tribunal de cassation et reglant sa composition, son organization et ses attributions [Law of November 27, 1790 Establishing a Court of Appeals and Regulating its Composition, Organization and Responsibilities], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 20, 1944, p. 65; Loi n°1790-12-01 du 1 décembre 1790 portant institution d'un tribunal de cassation et réglant sa composition, son organization et ses attributions [Law No. 1790–12-01 of December 1, 1790 on the Establishment of a Court of Cassation and Adjusting its Composition, Organization and Functions] (repealed 2007) that resulted in slowing down trials and in the legislator's constantly rewriting of the statutes which it was asked about. The institution is now only legal history which, however, was widely used also in German territories during the 19^th century, see Matthias Miersch, Der Sogenannte Référé Legislatif (2000).Google Scholar

241 For the situation in England in general, see FH Lawson, Doctrinal Writing: A Foreign Element in English Law, in Ius Privatum Gentium: Festschrift für Max Rheinstein Vol. I. 191–210 (1969).Google Scholar

242 Proven on the example of the Cour de cassation by Lasser, supra note 221, at 27–61.Google Scholar

243 The obsessively strict French requirements on forms and style can be seen also in constitutional (or in general, legal) scholarship: doctoral theses have to consist of two parts (A and B), each of them consisting of two sub-parts (le plan). Any alteration of this structure has to be thoroughly justified. This seemingly logical structure results in the violation of the internal logic of topics and occasionally results in more effort being put into the structure than into the intellectual content. For foreigners, this structure makes it very difficult to make use of French constitutional literature, and it therefore contributes to the isolation of French constitutional scholarship.Google Scholar

244 This style and structure of judgments is very similar to the ordinary court judgments. For a detailed analysis and a historical explanation with further references on the judgments of ordinary courts, see Lasser, supra note 221, at 30–38; Hein Kötz, Über den Stil höchstrichterlicher Entscheidungen, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 1973, 245, 247–252 (1973); Pierre Mimin, Le style des jugements: Vocabulaire, Construction, Dialectique, Formes juridiques (1978).Google Scholar

245 Goutal, , supra note 221, at 61–65.Google Scholar

246 The style of constitutional scholarship literature is similar to the style of judgments: lengthy, essayistic style (sometimes rather an unstructured textflow or collection of legal and non-legal information), building inductively on a series of examples explained in detail with an impressive eloquence, often with numerous proverbs and metaphors, but in a conceptually and methodologically rather undisciplined and unstructured manner. It reminds one rather of the speeches of barristers or judges in courts, than of continental Verfassungsdogmatik. Large amounts of non-legal, factual political, or political philosophical, information are also contained in the works (besides legal history, never or just not yet enacted draft statutes, or policy papers) which might be explained by the sporadic and unsystematic nature of British constitutional law itself (corrected in practice by non-legal constitutional conventions as a modus vivendi). On the latter point in general see Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability (1984). Consequently, the context of law seems to have sometimes even more emphasis than law itself, also in mainstream legal scholarship.Google Scholar

247 Beaud, Olivier, La puissance de l'État (1994); Michel Troper, Pour une théorie juridique de l'État (1994); Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (2010).Google Scholar

248 It is not the first time that European continental, more specifically, German, legal methodology has influenced its English counterpart. For a discussion on Samuel Pufendorf's influence on Blackstone, see Jan Schröder, Zur gesamteuropäischen Tradition der juristischen Methodenlehre, 2/2002 Akademie-Journal 37, 40. For a discussion on Savigny's influence on John Austin, see Herbert Hart, Introduction, in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined: And the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence vii, vii (1971).Google Scholar

249 The Portuguese and the Spanish constitutional courts as daughters of the German Federal Constitutional Court (originally by Roman Herzog), the Hungarian and the Polish as his ‘grandchildren', see László Sólyom, Anmerkungen zur Rezeption auf dem Gebiet der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Rechte aus ungarischer Sicht, in Grundfragen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel- und Osteuropa 83 (Jochen Abr. Frowein and Thilo Marauhn eds., 1998).Google Scholar

250 Some even proudly criticize from this confused methodological point of view the attempts at building a Verfassungsdogmatik. See György Müller, Kormányzati viszonyainkról az új alkotmánykommentár “A Kormány” című fejezete kapcsán, 1 Jogelméleti Szemle (2010), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/muller41.html. For a response, see Vilmos Térey, Csodaváróknak, 2 Jogelméleti Szemle (2010), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/terey42.html.Google Scholar

251 The school of Hungarian textualists, as analyzed in András Jakab, Wissenschaft und Lehre des Verfassungsrechts in Ungarn, in Ius Publicum Europaeum Vol. II, marginal numbers 23–30 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2007), represent this symptom.Google Scholar

252 This is particularly dangerous in the field of constitutional law, as it may lead the scholarly debate into one of political confessions. Arguments of constitutional law are (sometimes rightly) subject to ‘ideological insinuation’ anyway. See Hans Peter Ipsen, Die deutsche Staatsrechtswissenschaft im Spiegel der Lehrbücher, 106 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 161, 198 (1981).Google Scholar

253 See Jakab, , supra note 127, at 607–08.Google Scholar

254 At this point, the Westminster system and the socialist countries were very similar.Google Scholar

255 See Dupré, Catherine, Importing the Law in Post-Communist Transitions. The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity 65–86 (2003); Sólyom, supra note 160, at 230–41.Google Scholar

256 For an exception, see Manuel García-Pelayo, Derecho constitucional comparado (1950), not a strictly doctrinal analysis, but rather an institutional and historical comparison. García-Pelayo left the country during Franco because of his political ideas and first returned after the regime change.Google Scholar

257 Leonardo Álvarez, Die spanische Dogmatik der Verfassungstreue. Geschichte einer fehlgeschlagenen Rezeption des deutschen Verfassungsdenkens, 70 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 433 (2010). For similar problems in Hungary concerning human dignity, see Jakab, supra note 251, at n. 71.Google Scholar

258 Judges in the U.S. often behave like politicians (state judges are sometimes directly elected by the local population for a limited term, federal judges are appointed mostly exactly because of party membership and loyalty, so their audience is much less the legal profession than the electing people or the appointing politicians), so non-legal (political, social, policy, moral) arguments are much more acceptable for them than in other countries. Atiyah & Summers, supra note 89, at 342, 344, 350–51, 379.Google Scholar

259 According to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study, supra note 66, at 342, the real reason for the low popularity of comparative law arguments in the U.S. is that the Constitution is old, thus there is a bigger pool of precedents to rely on for the solution of new cases. Comparative law is therefore rather used where guidance is needed because the Constitution is new. In Europe, the integration rather results in a growing use of comparative constitutional law in constitutional reasoning. See Ingolf Pernice, Europarechtswissenschaft oder Staatslehre?, in Staatslehre als Wissenschaft 239 (Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz ed., 2007).Google Scholar

260 Post, Robert C., Constitutional Scholarship in the United States, 7 Int'l J. Const. L. 418 (2009).Google Scholar

261 Rosenfeld, Michel, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in European and US Constitutionalism 187–94 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005).Google Scholar

262 For a discussion on the teleological practices of the ECJ, see Joxerammon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence 181–270 (1993); Anna Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law 70–105 (1978) (calling it the ‘functional method'). For a discussion on the ‘dynamic interpretation’ of the ECtHR, see Hans-Joachim Cremer, Regeln der Konventionsinterpretation, in EMRK/GG. Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz 155–230 (Rainer Grote & Thilo Marauhn eds., 2006). For a discussion on the influence of the EC (EU) on the British judicial style, see Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Europeanization of the British Legal Style, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 347 (1994). For recent normative accounts of how the ECJ and the ECHR should reason, see Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (2012); George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights (2007).Google Scholar

263 Sweet, Alec Stone & Mathews, Jud, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 72 (2008).Google Scholar

264 Jakab, , supra note 128, at 953–55.Google Scholar