¹ As strongly recommended by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders, 22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 329, 329 (2004), who claims that “[w]e are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.”Google Scholar

² As Posner puts it, “[t]he problem is not learning from abroad; it is treating foreign judicial decisions as authorities in U.S. cases, as if the world were a single legal community.” Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, in Legal Affairs (2004), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp.Google Scholar

³ See Christoph Schönberger, Verfassungsvergleichung heute, 43 VRÜ 6, 7 (2010).Google Scholar

⁴ Susanne Baer argues in favor of comparative constitutional law by the courts, which is not based on curiosity about the foreign, unknown, or exotic, but is employed because of the new insights the comparative approach provides. See Baer, Susanne, Zum Potenzial der Rechtsvergleichung für den Konstitutionalismus, 63 JöR 389, 398 (Susanne Baer et al. eds., 2015).Google Scholar

⁵ On the German and US-American discussions, see Reimer, Franz, Juristische Methodenlehre, 123–31 (2016). On the debate about the role of the interpreter, see also id. at 29; id. at 30; Dorsen infra note 48; Kommers & Miller infra note 49, at 91–92.Google Scholar

⁶ Carl Friedrich von Savigny has, however, pointed out that his four “elements of interpretation” are not to be regarded as alternative methods, instead, they are to be regarded as four steps in a single process of interpretation. He also terms his “elements” slightly differently: grammatical, logical, historical, and systematic. Carl Friedrich von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, 213–15 (1st ed. 1840).Google Scholar

⁷ Peter Häberle, Grundrechtsgeltung und Grundrechtsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat, 44 JZ 913, 913 & 916–18 (1989).Google Scholar

⁸ See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, 26 Harv. Int'l L. J. 411, 411 (1985).Google Scholar

⁹ See id. at 415.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Wahl, Rainer, Verfassungsvergleichung als Kulturvergleichung, in Verfassungsstaat, Europäisierung, InterNationalisierung 96 (Rainer Wahl ed., 2003).Google Scholar

¹¹ See Baer, Susanne, Verfassungsvergleichung als reflexive Methode, 64 ZaöRV 735, 736 (2004).Google Scholar

¹² Wahl, supra note 10, at 174.Google Scholar

¹³ For a lightly edited version of the debate, approved by the Justices, see Dorsen, Norman, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int'l J. Const. L 519 (2005). Cause for this public disagreement was a triad of decisions. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Justice Breyer's new book will most likely revive the discussion, Stephen Breyer, The Court And The World: American Law And The New Global Realities 236 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Baer, supra note 4; Christian Hillgruber, Die Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung für das deutsche Verfassungsrecht und die verfassungsgerichtliche Rechtsprechung in Deutschland, 63 JÖR 367 (Susanne Baer et al. eds., 2015).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Markesinis, Basil, National Self-Sufficiency or Intellectual Arrogance?, 65.2 Cambridge J. Int'l L. 301, 315 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Sauer, Heiko, Verfassungsvergleichung durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 18 JRP 194, 194, 202 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Aura María Cárdenas Paulsen, Über Die Rechtsvergleichung In Der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 181–82 (2009). See also Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, Conclusion: The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, in The Use of Foreign Precedent by Constitutional Judges 411, 416 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds, 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 128, 226, 253, 1 BvR 699/06, Feb. 22 2011, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2011/02/rs20110222_1bvr069906en.html [last visited 15 February 2017]. See Baer, supra note 4, at 393.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Baer, supra note 4, at 390; Andreas Voßkuhle, Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1, 8 (2010).Google Scholar

²⁰ Peter Häberle, Wechselwirkungen zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Verfassungen, in 1 Handbuch der Grundrechte, § 7, para. 24 (Detlef Merten & Hans-Jürgen Papier eds., 2004). Breyer, supra note 13, at 249–51, 253–80. Part IV of his book also deals with the advantages of informal exchange between justices from different jurisdictions.Google Scholar

²¹ See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 4, 2009, 124 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 300.Google Scholar

²² See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 130, para. 4. This law was adopted in the context of an increasing number of demonstrations glorifying the National Socialist regime in the city of Wunsiedel. The demonstrations took place near the grave of Rudolph Heß; Heß was Hitler's deputy from 1933 onwards. § 130 para. 4 of the German Criminal Code states the following: “Whosoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in a manner that violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of arbitrary force shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.” Translation by Michael Bohlander, Bundesministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz (2015), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1241.Google Scholar

²³ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 4, 2009, 124 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 300, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20091104_1bvr215008en.html. See also Uwe Volkmann, Die Geistesfreiheit und der Ungeist: Der Wunsiedel-Beschluss des BVerfG, 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 417, 418–20 (2010).Google Scholar

²⁴ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 4, 2009, 124 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 300, 329, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20091104_1bvr215008en.html.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Hong, Mathias, Hassrede und extremistische Meinungsäußerungen in der Rechtsprechung des EGMR und nach dem Wunsiedel-Beschluss des BVerfG, 70 ZaöRV 73, 116–17 (2010) (arguing that the jurisprudence of SCOTUS was generally more favorable to freedom of speech); see also R v Zundel, 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C. 1992).Google Scholar

²⁶ For this classic differentiation, see Wasserstrom, Richard A., The Judicial Decision 27 (1961). For an account along a similar vein, German discourse differentiates between the decision-making process (Herstellung) on the one hand and the presentation of the decision (Darstellung) on the other, see, e.g., Baer, supra note 4, at 398.Google Scholar

²⁷ It may also be of importance to interpreters of FCC judgments that there is a period of protection for the FCC's files. For more about the period of protection—60 years for important documents such as draft judgments,—see Meinel, Florian & Kram, Benjamin, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Gegenstand historischer Forschung: Leitfragen, Quellenzugang und Perspektiven nach der Reform des § 35b BVerfGG, 69 JZ 913, 916–17. Justices also underlie the secrecy of deliberations. For the merits and demerits of this approach, see Baer's contribution in this volume.Google Scholar

²⁸ Baer, supra note 27, holds the view that the FCC “indeed must … anchor its rulings in the European Court of Human Rights interpretation of the European Charter on Human Rights.”Google Scholar

²⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 14, 2004, 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 307, 317, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html.Google Scholar

³⁰ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 4, 2011, 128 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 326, 326, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20110504_2bvr236509en.html.Google Scholar

³¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 14, 2004, 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 307, 317, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html.Google Scholar

³² For a differentiation based on different criteria, see Kischel, Uwe, Rechtsvergleichung 74–76 (2015).Google Scholar

³³ See id. at 74–75.Google Scholar

³⁴ Breyer, supra note 13, at 236–46 in his new book; Justice Breyer does not differentiate between these two accounts of comparative law—his argument applies to both necessary and merely optional comparison. See Markesinis, supra note 15, at 306. Markesinis, by contrast, neatly distinguishes two questions: First, whether national judges may seek inspiration from the practice of sister courts, and second, whether foreign law is used as public international law, or as supranational law, and foreign law application due to a rule of conflicts of laws.Google Scholar

³⁵ Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 291, 292 (2005).Google Scholar

³⁶ See Groppi & Ponthoreau, supra note 17, at 412.Google Scholar

³⁷ Constitution Restoration Act, H.R. 3799, 108^th Cong. (2^nd Session 2004); Section 520, 109^th Cong. (1^st Session 2005).Google Scholar

³⁸ See, e.g., Turner, Elizabeth Bulat, The Relevancy of Foreign Law as Persuasive Authority and Congress's Response to its Use, 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 455, 474 (2006).Google Scholar

³⁹ For example, this welcoming approach is seen in the above-mentioned cases. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Dorsen, supra note 13, at 519.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Breyer, supra note 13, at 236. There certainly is a political debate in the U.S., as the unsuccessful bill in Congress aiming at the prohibition of citing foreign legal sources shows. See Act, Constitution Restoration, supra note 37.Google Scholar

⁴² See Scalia, Antonin, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 849 (1988); Antonin Scalia & Amy Gutmann, A Matter of Interpretation, 37–41 (1997). According to Mark Tushnet, a major part of the criticism of reference to non-U.S. law is based on the conviction that originalism is the only right way of interpreting the Constitution. See Tushnet, Mark, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More?, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1275, 1278–79 (2006).Google Scholar

⁴³ Dorsen supra note 13, at 521. Justice Scalia makes one exception to the purported irrelevance of foreign law for constitutional interpretation. Phrases like “due process” have to be understood in the light of the law they were taken from: old English law. See Dorsen, supra note 13, at 525.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For an overview, see Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties - USA, University of Minnesota Human Rights, Library, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-USA.html.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35, at 311.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Konrad Zweigert, Der Einfluss des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 28 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 601, 610–11 (1964); Zweigert, by contrast, recognizes that there are several possible solutions when interpreting a judicial provision. He argues, for the special case of ECJ case law, that to interpret general principles of EU law, the aim of comparison is to arrive at the best solution.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Opponents of this opinion claim that constitutional texts do not have one true meaning. See, e.g., Barak, Aharon, Constitutional Interpretation, in L'interprétation constitutionnelle 91, 92 (Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien ed., 2005): there simply is no pre-exegetic understanding of a text. We can only access and understand a text—and this implies written constitutional texts—through an interpretive process.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Dorsen, supra note 13, at 523. More convincing than this “argument of pity” is Justice Ginsburg's approach. See Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, Gebührender Respekt vor den Meinungen der Menschheit: Der Wert einer vergleichenden Perspektive in der Verfassungsrechtspechung, EuGRZ 341, 346 (2005) (comparative constitutional law is a question of comity and should be practiced with modesty because other legal orders constantly change).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ With regard to SCOTUS' attention to FCC cases, Justice Ginsburg quotes U.S. Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi: “Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to the Third Edition, in XI The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Kommers, Donald P. & Miller, Russel A. eds., 2012).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For the hope that a comparative perspective opens up the possibility of constitutional change within this mutual process of learning from new and innovative solutions found in other legal systems, see Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 337.Google Scholar

⁵¹ AU News Media Relations, Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, AU Washington College of Law, http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument.Google Scholar

⁵² See Breyer, supra note 13, at 239.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Waldron, Jeremy, Partly Laws Common to All Mankind: Foreign Law in American Courts 3 (2012).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Waldron, supra note 53, at 28.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Critical of such a universalist stance is Sandra Fredman, Foreign Fads or Fashions? The Role of Comparativism in Human Rights Law, 64 Int'l & Comparative L. Q. 631 (2015). Stefan Kadelbach, Konstitutionalisierung und Rechtspluralismus, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (in press); Kadelbach argues that there is a context-dependent adaptation of universal norm contents. In the abstract, their content may be universal, but applications will differ from case to case.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ 63 JÖR (Susanne Baer et al. eds., 2015). For the articles, see Baer, supra note 4; Hillgruber, supra note 14.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See generally Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 5, 6–7, 10–12 (1988); Raoul Berger, “Original Intention” in Historical Perspective, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 296, 297–308 (1985–1986).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Christian Hillgruber, § 15 Verfassungsinterpretation, in Verfassungstheorie 505, 512–13 (Otto Depenheuer, Christoph Grabenwarter eds., 2010) limits his view to the German Basic Law.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Section 39, para. 1: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum … may consider foreign law.”Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Cárdenas Paulsen, supra note 17, at 141–45.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Baer, supra note 4, at 399.Google Scholar

⁶² See id. Google Scholar

⁶³ See id. Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Jackson, Vicki, Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies, in Comparative Constitutional Law 54, 68 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See id. Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Waldron, supra note 53, at 24.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Provided one does not call the bestowal a fairy tale, as Isensee does. See Isensee, Josef, Das Volk Als Grund Der Verfassung 73 (1995).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35, at 299–304.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ For the triad of comparators—legislative, academic, and judicial comparison,—see Oberheiden, Nick, Typologie und Grenzen des richterlichen Verfassungsvergleichs 11 (2011).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Jestaedt, Matthias, Grundrechtsentfaltung Im Gesetz 104 (1999). Jestaedt raises a parallel to diachronic legal comparison. According to him, comparison over time is relevant only to the extent that an express approval or dismissal of the constituent assembly can be shown by way of interpretation.Google Scholar

⁷¹ See supra note 59 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

⁷² In particular, Article 1(2) of the German Basic Law is no such provision. See Dreier, Horst, in 2 Grundgesetz. Kommentar Art. 1(2) recital 17 (Horst Dreier ed., 3d ed. 2013).Google Scholar

⁷³ One has to admit that this may not entirely resolve the problem of legitimacy. Allegations of illegitimacy would prevail. See schönberger, supra note 3, at 20 (“As opposed to legislators who can, for instance, make and change laws, constitutional courts must confine themselves to a more restrictive development of the constitution by way of constitutional interpretation.” (emphasis added)).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Häberle, supra note 7, at 913 (acting as its main proponent).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Glensy, Rex D., Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 357, 357 (2005); Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 125, 125 (2005).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Schönberger, supra note 3, at 21.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Article 102 of the German Basic Law expressly provides for the abolition of the death penalty.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ For representative views, see Bodo Pieroth, Hans D. Jarass in Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kommentar, Art. 102 recital 1 (Jarass, Hans D. & Bodo Pieroth eds., 14th ed. 2016) (providing a violation of Article 1 (1), human dignity). But see Matthias Herdegen, in Grundgesetz. Kommentar Art. 1(1) recital 99 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig eds., 2009) (arguing against a violation of Article 1 (1)).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ But see infra note 89, at 634.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Tushnet, supra note 42, at 1280–84, who—in the U.S. context—is optimistic that more complete references to non-U.S. law can be expected and appropriate techniques for distinguishing adverse material, rather than not citing it at all, will develop when the practice of referring to non U.S. law matures.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Article 118 of the Weimar Constitution.Google Scholar

⁸² This does not, however, apply to concerns about comparative law in general. See Sebastian Müller-Franken, § 26 Verfassungsvergleichung, in Verfassungstheorie 885, 908 (Otto Depenheuer & Christoph Grabenwarter eds., 2010). Müller-Franken argues that although comparative constitutional law may not itself be a method of interpretation, comparative arguments might be taken into account by applying the canonical four methods of interpretation, especially those of teleological and historical interpretation.Google Scholar

⁸³ See Häberle, supra note 20, at para. 26. schönberger, supra note 3, at 20 (stressing the difference between constitutional interpreters and constituent power when it comes to the use of comparative constitutional law).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Tushnet, supra note 42, at 1284.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ For this deliberative understanding of comparativism, see Fredman, Sandra, supra note 55, at 634 (stating that “[o]nce it is recognized that the function of comparative law is deliberative rather than binding, the force of many of the criticisms fall away”).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See schönberger, supra note 3, at 26.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ This might not be the case if the court's aim is just to make plausible empirical connections. An example would be the impact on society caused by criminal law's prohibition of incest.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ The FCC also has the possibility to request expert opinions from the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, as in BVerfGE 95, 335, 363–364—Überhangmandate, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv095335.html.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ If one accepts that arguments derived from foreign court opinions can only be deliberative and not authoritative, the cherry-picking concern loses much of its force. For more on this line of argument, see Fredman, supra note 55, at 634.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See Choudhry, Sujit, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2007).Google Scholar