(1) Draft of a U.S.-British Resolution on Iraq and Inspectors, New York Times, 23 October 2002, A23. Note especially U.S.-U.K. draft clause 2 (“DECIDES that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution or failure at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute further material breach of Iraq's obligations.”) and draft clause 3 (“RECALLS that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”) See also Julia Preston, “‘Big 5’ at the United Nations Still Jockeying Over Iraq Text,” New York Times, 23 October 2002, A23.Google Scholar

(2) Sanger, David E., “Iraq Makes U.N. Seem ‘Foolish', Bush Asserts,” New York Times, 29 October 2002, A13: “[t]he White House declared that time had run out at the United Nations, and that the United States would demand a vote on an Iraq resolution, whether it wins the wording it wants or not. With each [US Congress] campaign stop, Mr. Bush reiterated – sometimes nearly shouting – that the United States was willing to disarm Mr. Hussein without the explicit authorization of the United Nations. ‘If the United Nations doesn't have the courage to disarm, for the sake of peace, for the sake of freedom, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm Iraq,’ Mr Bush said…”Google Scholar

(3) See e.g. “France lauds its own role in influencing UN resolution,” The Globe and Mail, 19 October 2002, A21. The U.S.-U.K. October 21 draft resolution, supra note 2, also contains reference to a second-stage process without, however, making that process a condition precedent for military force. See draft clause 11 (“DIRECTS the executive chairman of Unmovic and the director general of the I.A.E.A. to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution.”) and draft clause 12 (“DECIDES to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with Paragraph 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Security Council resolutions, in order to restore international peace and security.”). The draft resolution ends with a standard final clause, Clause 13 (“DECIDES to remain seized of the matter.”).Google Scholar

(4) For a key official statement of France's public position as it remained as of the week of October 27, see “Irak: La maison blanche presse l'ONU”, Le Monde, 28 octobre 2002: “Le ministre des affaires étrangères, Dominique de Villepin, a ainsi récusé l'idée d'une résolution américaine sur l'Irak à la carte, donnant à Washington dans le cadre de l'ONU un “chèque en blanc” pour attaquer ce pays. “Il ne peut pas y avoir à la fois une action collective et une action unilatérale. Il faut choisir, a-t-il déclaré lors d'une conférence de presse à l'issue d'un entretien avec son homologue finlandais, Erki Tuomioja. Dès lors que nous sommes dans le cadre du Conseil de sécurité, il faut que la responsabilité collective s'exerce à plein. Et cette responsabilité collective ne peut pas se déléguer. Nous ne pouvons pas faire une partie du chemin avec les Nations unies et en měme temps imaginer qu'un chèque en blanc puisse ětre donné”, a-t-il souligné. “Nous sommes déterminés à prendre nos responsabilités dans le cadre de cette sécurité collective parce que nous sommes convaincus que c'est la seule façon d'ětre véritablement efficace dans une crise”, a-t-il encore ajouté. M. de Villepin a réitéré que “tout doit ětre fait pour que le recours à la force soit véritablement la dernière option possible”. “Nous voulons une résolution qui soit à la fois claire, ferme et déterminée, qui adresse un message très fort à l'Irak, et l'ensemble de la communauté internationale est d'accord pour cet objectif, y compris le monde arabe”, a-t-il expliqué.”Google Scholar

(5) See Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, January 27, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.Google Scholar

(6) UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), November 29, 1990, text can be accessed online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/678e.pdf> (last visited March 28, 2002).+(last+visited+March+28,+2002).>Google Scholar

(7) UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991, text can be accessed online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/687e.pdf> (last visited March 28, 2002).+(last+visited+March+28,+2002).>Google Scholar

(8) Preston, Julia, “U.S. Raises Pressure on Russia and France for Iraq Resolution,” New York Times, 26 October 2002, A8.Google Scholar

(9) Ibid.Google Scholar

(10) Ibid.,.Google Scholar

(11) Weiner, Tim, “Holding Swing Vote, Mexico Tells Bush It Won't Support Iraq Resolution U.S. Favours,” New York Times, 28 October 2002, A11.Google Scholar

(12) Ibid.Google Scholar

(13) United Nations — Iraq Memorandum of Understanding, February 23, 1998, (1998) 37 I.L.M. 501.Google Scholar

(14) See, UN Security Council Resolution 1154 (1998), March 2, 1998, at para. 3, text can be accessed online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1154.htm> (last visited March 28, 2002): “The Security Council… [s]tresses that compliance… is necessary for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991), but that any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq.”+(last+visited+March+28,+2002):+“The+Security+Council…+[s]tresses+that+compliance…+is+necessary+for+the+implementation+of+resolution+687+(1991),+but+that+any+violation+would+have+severest+consequences+for+Iraq.”>Google Scholar

(15) Note by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25091 (1993). In 1997, the president said: “The Security Council warns of the serious consequences of Iraq's failure to comply immediately and fully.” Statement of the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/49, October 29, 1997, text can be accessed online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/1997/prst9749.htm> (last visited 28 March 2002).+(last+visited+28+March+2002).>Google Scholar

(16) See Gray, Christine, “After the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force” (1994) 65 British Yearbook of International Law 135 at 154, 167.Google Scholar

(17) For the summary records of China's remarks, see UN Doc. S/PV.3858, 1998, at 14. With respect to the fact that China was reported to have the support of two other permanent members, see John Goshko, “Three on Security Council Oppose ‘Automatic Trigger’ on Iraq,” Washington Post, February 28, 1998, at A20: “[Diplomatic sources said that France, Russia, China and Council members belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, all of which have opposed military strikes, are insisting that any resolution require further Council consideration before force is authorized. The sources said these countries are agreeable to warning Iraq of potential consequences but, as of now, refuse to accede to the idea of an automatic trigger.”Google Scholar

(18) See “Annan: U.S. Must Consult before Attacking Iraq,” remarks of the Secretary-General, which can be accessed online at <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/08/iraq.wrap/index.html> (last visited March 28, 2002) [emphasis added]. The remarks of the Secretary-General were made on ABC News, This Week (ABC television broadcast, March 8, 1998).+(last+visited+March+28,+2002)+[emphasis+added].+The+remarks+of+the+Secretary-General+were+made+on+ABC+News,+This+Week+(ABC+television+broadcast,+March+8,+1998).>Google Scholar

(19) France would do well to remind itself of President Chirac's noble statement: “La France en tant que membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité prendra ses responsabilités” (“Le dossier irakien aggrave les divergences entre la France et les Etats-Unis”, Le Monde, 16 octobre 2002).Google Scholar

(20) Preston, “U.S. raises pressure…”, supra, A8.Google Scholar

(21) None of this is to naively assume that Russia will maintain its own opposition. After the raid against the Chechen hostage-takers in Moscow, President Bush's support for Putin's approach to the crisis and Putin's invocation of the Bush terrorism doctrine to say Russia will use force throughout the world wherever Chechen terrorists are ‘harboured', it is entirely possible Russia will slip gently into line with the US – or, perhaps more likely, side with France and Mexico by double-voicedly relying on “serious consequences” language. See Steven Lee Myers, “Putin Vows Hunt for Terror Cells Around the World,” New York Times, 29 October 2002, A1, A10. Nor is it to assume that the Americans will not succeed in having “material breach” language retained, now that chief arms inspector Hans Blix has welcomed that language – albeit in terms that suggest that he does not see it as an automatic trigger, without a further Security Council process following a report by him on compliance. See Julia Preston, “Arms inspectors want tough terms to pressure Iraq,” New York Times, 29 October 2002, A1, A13. American power and resolve to force a vote on their preferred resolution, and go ahead if they lose, may be such that the final end game will be either adoption of a version of the US draft resolution with some version of both “material breach” and “serious consequences” language retained, or no resolution at all should Security Council member states marshall the courage to defeat the US draft.Google Scholar