1 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund und die Rolle des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts, in Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund 7 (Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold eds., 2005). For a similar approach, see Giacinto della Cananea, L'Unione europea. Un ordinamento composito 6, 146 (2003).Google Scholar

2 Armin von Bogdandy, Supranationaler Föderalismus als Wirklichkeit und Idee einer neuen Herrschaftsform 11 (1999); Cassese, Sabino, Der Einfluß des gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Verwaltungsrechts auf die nationalen Verwaltungsrechtssysteme, 33 Der Staat 25 (1994).Google Scholar

3 Britz, Gabriele, Vom Verwaltungsverbund zum Regulierungsverbund?, 41 Europarecht 47 (2006); Schneider, Jens-Peter, Verwaltungsrechtliche Instrumente des Sozialstaats, 64 Veröffentlichung der Vereiningung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL) 262. For a similar treatment but with his own terminology, see Gernot Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union (2004).Google Scholar

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5 On the differences between European and international composite administration, see Part C. Against proto-federal concepts in the analysis of global governance, see von Bogdandy, in this issue.Google Scholar

6 The notion of “administration” is understood here primarily in its operational (not its organizational) meaning, i.e. focused on activity. On the terminology, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

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9 On these issues, see International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, 58th session, General Assembly A/CN.4/L.682; Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (2005); Christoph Möllers, Gewaltengliederung. Legitimation und Dogmatik im nationalen und internationalen Rechtsvergleich 253 (2005).Google Scholar

10 It is easier to express this very point in German: we focus on Verbundverwaltung, not on the Verwaltungsverbund. Google Scholar

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12 Cassese, Sabino, Administrative Law without a State?, 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 684 (2005).Google Scholar

13 By composite administration we therefore focus on a smaller range of institutions than the overall project.Google Scholar

14 In German, the terms “Verband“ and “Verbund“ easily express the difference between these two forms of association. In English such wordplay is not possible. On the notion of Verband (organization / association) as a social relationship that is closed or limited in the admission of outsiders and the regulations of which are enforced by specific individuals, see Max Weber, Economy and Society §§ 12, 17 (Gunter Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).Google Scholar

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16 See Venzke, in this issue.Google Scholar

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19 The concept of multi-level systems made a fast career since the 1990s in political science as well as law. For political scientist's perspective, see Kohler-Koch, Beate & Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensysten, in Europäische Integration, 15 (Beate Kohler-Koch & Markus Jachtenfuchs eds., 1996); Das europäische Mehrebenensystem (Thomas König, Elmar Rieger & Hermann Schmitt eds., 1996); Marks, Gary & Hooghe, Liesbet, Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level Governance, in Multi-level governance 15 (Ian Bache & Matthew Flinders eds., 2004). For the perspective of legal scholarship, see Thomas Groß, Verantwortung und Effizienz in der Mehrebenenverwaltung, 66 VVDStRL 154–157 (2006); Wahl (note 18); Pernice, Ingolf, The Global Dimension of Multilevel Constitutionalism, in Völkerrecht als Wertordnung. Festschrift für Christian Tomuschat, 973 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy ed., 2006).Google Scholar

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36 Schmidt-Aßmann (note 1), at 16.Google Scholar

37 Art. 11(1) of the Convention; para. 32 Operational Guidelines 2005. On the UNESCO World Heritage regime in general and on these informational connections in particular, see Diana Zacharias, in this issue.Google Scholar

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50 International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property in Rome (ICCROM).Google Scholar

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64 The effect depends on the concrete legal relation between UNHCR and the host country in question. In more detail, id. Google Scholar

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67 The registration of domain names for the internet follows a similar, though slightly different procedure. ICANN, the global internet administration, does not have the competence to register domain names itself but has contracts with national registries. These can be public authorities or private companies but they are accredited with ICANN.Google Scholar

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78 See Dann, Philipp, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 Archiv für Völkerrecht 394 (2006).Google Scholar

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