1 I use the term “binding” instrument as a heuristic category, defined as those instruments which can be ascribed to one of the traditional sources of international law stipulated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. On the difficulties related to the distinction between binding and non-binding norms, see Part E.Google Scholar

2 World Bank loan or financing agreements, see Dann, Philipp, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 archiv des Völkerrechts 381 (2006).Google Scholar

3 Amendments to CITES Annexes, see Fuchs, in this issue; and to the WCO Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, see Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

4 Listings of terror suspects by the UN Security Council Taliban and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, see Feinäugle, in this issue; Conferral of world heritage status by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, see Zacharias, in this issue; Waivers for WTO members for implementing changes in the Harmonized System, see Feichtner, in this issue; decisions by the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee for the Emission Trading System on, e.g., the reduction of emission rights due to past non-compliance, see Láncos, in this issue.Google Scholar

5 International trademark registrations, see Kaiser, in this issue.Google Scholar

6 The “HS Procedure” for adapting WTO scales of concessions to changes in the WCO Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, see Feichtner, in this issue; the accounting rules for the administration of ETS allowances, see Láncos, in this issue; and the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Committee, see Zacharias, in this issue.Google Scholar

7 The term “non-binding legal instrument”, which I use in a strictly heuristic sense, is not an oxymoron. Rather, it is based on a relative concept of law which comprises both binding law and non-binding law, see, infra, Part B.I. On the problems related to a conceptual distinction between binding and non-binding law see, infra, Part E.Google Scholar

8 Refugee Status Determination by UNHCR, see Smrkolj, in this issue; ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, see de Wet, Governance Through Promotion and Persuasion, in this issue; general and country-specific recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, see Farahat, in this issue.Google Scholar

9 Codex Alimentarius, see Pereira, in this issue; FAO Codes of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, see Friedrich, in this issue; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see Schuler, in this issue.Google Scholar

10 Interpol notices, see Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.Google Scholar

11 Proceedings before National Contact Points in case of complaints for violations of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs, see Schuler, in this issue; country visits and confidential follow-up reports by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, see Farahat, in this issue; as well as the HS Procedure, see (note 6).Google Scholar

12 Decision letters concerning ICHEIC insurance claims, see Less, in this issue.Google Scholar

13 Only instruments with a significant prevalence of deontic vocabulary expressing commands, requests, and recommendations may be termed legal. As it is sometimes difficult to make a precise distinction between facts and norms at a theoretical level, my distinction between “legal” and “non-legal” instruments is rather heuristic than systematic. In most cases, though, it will not cause any practical difficulty. On the differences between facts, norms and normative facts, see Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit 623–6 (1994). For a critical assessment, see Habermas, Jürgen, From Kant to Hegel. On Robert Brandom's Pragmatic Philosophy of Language, 8 European Journal of Philosophy (2000) 322.Google Scholar

14 Risk assessment reports containing scientific information for risk management within the Codex Alimentarius Commission, see Pereira, in this issue; reports assessing eligibility for the Emission Trading System, see Láncos, in this issue.Google Scholar

15 Armin von Bogdandy & Matthias Goldmann, The Exercise of International Public Authority through National Policy Assessment. The OECD's PISA Policy as a Paradigm for a New International Standard Instrument, 5 International Organizations Law Review (forthcoming 2008).Google Scholar

16 Many examples are mentioned in the thematic studies. See, for example, the review mechanism in the Committee on Trade in Financial Services installed on the basis of China's Accession Protocol to the WTO, see Windsor, in this issue.Google Scholar

17 In the context of Interpol, see Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.Google Scholar

18 On the concept of public authority, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

19 This is what distinguishes this project from research on compliance. See Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works (2008); Commitment and Compliance (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997). For a critical viewpoint, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005).Google Scholar

20 See Abbott, Kenneth W. & Snidal, Duncan, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 International Organization 421 (2000); Lipson, Charles, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 International Organization 495 (1991).Google Scholar

21 On this agenda, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue, part B.II.Google Scholar

22 This is the common denominator of otherwise very different legal theories within the communicative paradigm, see Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions 200 (1989); Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia 563 et seq. (2nd ed., 2005); Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung 272 et seq. (1992).Google Scholar

23 Martti Koskenniemi, Introduction, in Sources of International Law xi, xiii (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2001). This idea is also a driving factor for constitutionalist approaches, see Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 579, 610 (2006). Comprehensive on the role of the rule of law for channeling disagreement on questions of justice, see Samantha Besson, The Morality of Conflict 205 et seq. (2005).Google Scholar

24 By “our approach,” I mean the concept set out in von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue. It goes with out saying that not all aspects of this approach are shared by all participants in the project.Google Scholar

25 “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe blind.” (Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind): Immanuel Kant, Critik der reinen Vernunft 75 (2nd ed., 1787).Google Scholar

26 For a detailed analysis, see Part B.Google Scholar

27 The term “secondary” does not allude to Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 79 (1961), but to the concept of secondary, or delegated, legislation as used in the context of EU law. See also Jurij Aston, Sekundärgesetzgebung internationaler Organisationen zwischen mitgliedstaatlicher Souveränität und Gemeinschaftsdisziplin (2005).Google Scholar

28 Changes to CITES appendixes, see Fuchs, in this issue; modifications of the Harmonized System, see Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

29 See de Wet (note 8).Google Scholar

30 In this article, “soft law” is used in reference to the bindingness, and not to the degree of textual precision of an instrument.Google Scholar

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33 Illustrative is the ECJ Case 322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407.Google Scholar

34 Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.Google Scholar

35 For many others, see Weiler, Joseph H. H., The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 547 (2004).Google Scholar

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37 See Weil, Prosper, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 413 (1983).Google Scholar

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39 de Beco, Gauthier, Human Rights Indicators for Assessing State Compliance with International Human Rights, 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 23 (2008). National law perspectives are similarly rare, see Karkkainen, Bradley C., Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 Georgetown Law Journal 257 (2000-2001); Bumke, Christian, Publikumsinformation. Erscheinungsformen, Funktionen und verfassungsrechtlicher Rahmen einer Handlungsform des Gewährleistungsstaates, 37 Die Verwaltung 3 (2004). Remarkably more research has been carried out on the Open Method of Coordination, which also comprises non-legal instruments, see Trubek, David M. & Trubek, Louise G., Hard and Soft law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 European Law Journal 343 (2005); Christian Engel, Integration durch Koordination und Benchmarking, in Europäisches Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht 408 (Hermann Hill & Rainer Pitschas eds., 2004). On research from other disciplines, see Lehmkuhl, Dirk, Governance by Rating and Ranking, Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, on file with the author.Google Scholar

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41 For reasons of conceptual clarity, it should be added that absolute and relative positions can be combined both with uniform accounts of law, which assume that there is only one overarching international legal order, and with pluralist accounts, which embrace the view that there is a heterarchy of different legal orders. On uniform and pluralist accounts, see Günther (note 38), at 6. On the relationship between legal pluralism and the monism vs. dualism debate, see Bogdandy, Armin von, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship Between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 397 (2008).Google Scholar

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46 Thürer, Daniel, Soft Law, in IV Encyclopedia of Public International Law 452 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000); see also the statements in A Hard Look at Soft Law, in Proceedings of the 82nd Annual Meeting 371 (American Society of International Law ed., 1988). The list could be continued. This account is shared by scholars arguing from very different theoretical standpoints, including traditional positivist as well as constructivist approaches. See Kratochwil (note 22).Google Scholar

47 Theorists like Austin, Kelsen, Hart, and Luhmann generally follow an absolute approach.Google Scholar

48 See the strictly horizontal view of the international legal order in Weil (note 37), at 417–9. Further, the distinction between legal acts and legal facts is based on a voluntaristic concept of law, see d'Aspremont (note 43), at 4.Google Scholar

49 Weil (note 37), at 421.Google Scholar

50 Insofar I agree with Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AJIL 296, 301 (1977).Google Scholar

51 Fastenrath, Ulrich, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 305, 325 (1993).Google Scholar

52 See Ingo Venzke, in this issue.Google Scholar

53 This is particularly the case of financial regulations which are usually made by developed states.Google Scholar

54 See Part A. For further examples of effective governance through alternative instruments, see José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 217 et seq. (2005). For the literature about compliance with alternative instruments, see (note 20).Google Scholar

55 Ravi Afonso Pereira, in this issue; Gefion Schuler, in this issue.Google Scholar

56 Jürgen Friedrich, in this issue.Google Scholar

57 In addition, it is difficult to conceptualize the agreement or promise contained in such instruments in other normative orders like politics or morals, see Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law 121 (1996).Google Scholar

58 On this purpose of public law, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

59 Godefridus van Hoof, Rethinking the sources of international law (1983). Those points of recognition comprise abstract statements (declarations etc. which indicate a state's conviction to be bound), travaux préparatoires, characteristics of the text of an instrument (e.g. language employed, name and preamble of a document), follow-up mechanisms and subsequent practice. Id. at 215–279.Google Scholar

60 Guzman, Andrew T., A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 California Law Review 1823, 1878 et seq. (2002).Google Scholar

61 According to Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 33–91 (1964), legal norms (as opposed to moral norms) require generality; promulgation; limited retroactivity; clarity; absence of contradictions; not requiring the impossible; constancy through time; and congruence between official action and declared rule.Google Scholar

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64 Klabbers (note 62), at 108.Google Scholar

65 On these aims see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

66 In fact, the concept suggested by Klabbers and Brunnée is of great value insofar as it approximates our concept of international public authority, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue. The concept of international public authority seems to be more inclusive insofar as it also encompasses non-legal instruments, and less inclusive insofar as it approaches purely private self-regulation with more caution.Google Scholar

67 Similar Peters & Pagotto (note 40), at 9; Tietje, Christian, Recht ohne Rechtsquellen?, 24 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 27 (2003).Google Scholar

68 Karl Popper, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie 368 (2nd ed., Troels Eggers Hansen ed., 1994); Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft 35–44 (5th ed., 1991).Google Scholar

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78 The rule of identification is constituted by formal criteria only and designed for an internal standpoint. I therefore refrain from using the term rule of recognition, which Hart uses for the analysis of the law from an external perspective.Google Scholar

79 On the concept of a pluriverse of internal constitutional principles see von Bogdandy, General Principles, in this issue.Google Scholar

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83 René Jean Dupuy, Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to “Soft Law”, in Declarations on Principles 247 (Robert Akkerman, Peter van Krieken und Charles Pannenborg eds., 1977). Similarly, see Chodosh, Hiram E., Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 Texas International Law Journal 87 (1991). However, both authors include external and internal parameters in the proposed rules of identification.Google Scholar

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97 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see Schuler, in this issue.Google Scholar

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105 Supra, note 13.Google Scholar

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108 The most prominent example are certainly the Security Council anti-terrorism lists, see Feinäugle, in this issue.Google Scholar

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110 See, most notably, Feinäugle, in this issue; Smrkolj, in this issue.Google Scholar

111 Anne van Aaken, Making International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Provisions of Ius Standi, 23 Conferences on New Political Economy 29 (2006).Google Scholar

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124 Schuler, in this issue.Google Scholar

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126 Certainly, these distinctions are difficult to draw. Similar problems can be observed in German police law, where it is controversial whether the issuance of a search request according to section 30 Federal Police Act (Bundespolizeigesetz of 19 October 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt (1994) I-2978), and the request of the individual affected to withdraw the pending search, are to be qualified as administrative decisions (Verwaltungsakte). See Michael Drewes, Section 30, in Bundespolizeigesetz, margin number 4 (Karl-Heinz Blümel et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2006).Google Scholar

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128 Láncos, in this issue.Google Scholar

129 See Dann (note 2).Google Scholar

130 Jochen von Bernstorff, in this issue (calling them “operational decisions”).Google Scholar

131 Farahat, in this issue.Google Scholar

132 de Wet (note 8).Google Scholar

133 Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

134 Fuchs, in this issue.Google Scholar

135 Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

136 Láncos, in this issue.Google Scholar

137 Decisions by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.Google Scholar

138 ILO Conventions, see de Wet (note 8).Google Scholar

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141 Zacharias, in this issue; Láncos, in this issue; Kaiser, in this issue.Google Scholar

142 Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.Google Scholar

143 Feinäugle and Smrkolj, both in this issue.Google Scholar

144 Fuchs, in this issue.Google Scholar

145 Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

146 CITES is an exception. However, the secondary law that the resolutions prepare is specific with regard to the animal concerned.Google Scholar

147 See Schuler, in this issue; Pereira, in this issue; de Wet (note 8); Friedrich, in this issue.Google Scholar

148 The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. See Schuler, in this issue.Google Scholar

149 Pereira, in this issue.Google Scholar

150 Friedrich, in this issue.Google Scholar

151 Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

152 Farahat, in this issue.Google Scholar

153 Zacharias, in this issue.Google Scholar

154 Láncos, in this issue.Google Scholar

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156 Less, in this issue.Google Scholar

157 von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

158 On structural principles, see von Bogdandy, General Principles, in this issue.Google Scholar

159 von Bogdandy, General Principles, in this issue; von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).Google Scholar

160 Stefan Kadelbach & Thomas Kleinlein, International Law - A Constitution for Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles, 50 German Yearbook of International Law 303 (2007).Google Scholar

161 von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).Google Scholar

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163 See, however, Farahat, in this issue.Google Scholar

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170 Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

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173 Schulze-Fielitz, Helmuth, Art. 20 (Rechtsstaat), in Grundgesetz-Kommentar, margin number 113 (Horst Dreier ed., 2nd ed., 2006).Google Scholar

174 CITES recommendations; rules within the Emission Trading System of the Kyoto Protocol; the HS procedures of the WTO.Google Scholar

175 The Enforcement Branch of the Kyoto Compliance Committee.Google Scholar

176 Feinäugle, in this issue.Google Scholar

177 The World Heritage Committee Operational Guidelines.Google Scholar

178 Láncos, in this issue; Zacharias, in this issue; Farahat, in this issue; Fuchs, in this issue; von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

179 Láncos, in this issue; Zacharias, in this issue.Google Scholar

180 Farahat, in this issue; Less, in this issue.Google Scholar

181 Bast (note 95), at 329.Google Scholar

182 Supra, notes 1 and 7.Google Scholar

183 In this sense, see Baxter (note 42), at 549; Neuhold, Hanspeter, The Inadequacy of Law-Making by International Treaties: “Soft Law” as an Alternative?, in Developments of International Law in Treaty Making 39, 48 et seq. (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005); Alford, Roger, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 675 (2003). On the elusiveness of referrals to the intention to be bound, see Klabbers (note 57), at 65 et seq. Google Scholar

184 For an impressive deconstruction of intent see Klabbers (note 57), at 65 et seq. Google Scholar

185 d'Aspremont (note 43), at 10 (accepting reference to these instruments as “soft law”).Google Scholar

186 Friedrich, in this issue.Google Scholar

187 Klabbers (note 57), at 164.Google Scholar