1 See generally Markesinis, Basil & Fedtke, Jörg, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? (2006); Adrienne Stone, Comparativism in Constitutional Interpretation, 1 N.Z. L. Rev. 45, 45 (2009).Google Scholar

2 From its establishment in 1994 until the end of 2011 the Constitutional Court has handed down 437 judgments. More than half of these judgments, a total of 223, have considered foreign case law. What is remarkable is that in these cases in the region of 3047 foreign cases have been cited. See Christa Rautenbach, Use of Foreign Law, North-West University, http://www4-win2.p.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-wpd/textbases/ccj.htm.Google Scholar

3 Wood, Darlene S., In Defense of Transjudicialism, 44 Duq. L. Rev. 93, 93 (2005).Google Scholar

4 Black, Ryan C & Epstein, Lee, (Re-)Setting the Scholarly Agenda on Transjudicial Communication, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 791, 791 (2007) (book review); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99, 101 (1994).Google Scholar

5 Bryde, Brun-Otto, The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 203, 203 (2005).Google Scholar

6 Buxbaum, Hannah L., From Empire to Globalization … and Back? A Post-Colonial View of Transjudicialism, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 183, 183 (2004).Google Scholar

7 Id. at 184.Google Scholar

8 Lourens M. Du Plessis, Interpretation, in Constitutional Law of South Africa 32.171 (Stuart Woolman, Michael Bishop & Jason Brickhill eds., 2012).Google Scholar

9 Bahdi, Reem, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 555, 555 (2002).Google Scholar

10 Tawfik, Myra J., No Longer Living in Splendid Isolation: The Globalization of National Courts and the Internationalization of Intellectual Property Law, 32 Queen's L.J. 573 (2007).Google Scholar

11 Tebbe, Nelson & Tsai, Robert L, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 459 (2010); Dennis M. Davis, Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local History in the Construction of Comparative Influence: The South African Experience, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 181 (2003).Google Scholar

12 Ackermann, Laurie W.H., Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 169 (2005).Google Scholar

13 Gray, David C., Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist … Sometimes, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1249 (2007).Google Scholar

14 See discussion infra Part C. For the statistics from 1998 to 2010, see Christa Rautenbach, South Africa: Teaching an “Old Dog” New Tricks? An Empirical Study of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the South African Constitutional Court (1995–2010), in The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges 185 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013).Google Scholar

15 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (finding the death penalty to be unconstitutional in South Africa).Google Scholar

16 The word “borrowing” is a noun describing the action of borrowing something. Its corresponding verb is “to borrow” which means amongst others “take and use (something belonging to someone else) with the intention of returning it.” See Oxford Dictionary of English (Catherine Soanes & Angus Stevenson eds., 2005), under the lemmas “borrowing” and “borrow”.Google Scholar

17 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras. 106–07 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

18 Justice Chaskalson was President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa from 1994–2001 and Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa (2001–2005). He graduated from the University of the Witwatersrand with a B Com (1952) and LLB (cum laude) (1954). See Judges: Justice Arthur Chaskalson (1931–2012); Chief Justice of South Africa (2001–2005), Constitutional Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicearthurchaskalson/index1.html (last visited June 25, 2013).Google Scholar

19 R v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 135–36. Canadian cases are popular and have been cited quite often by the Constitutional Court. Between 1998 and 2011 there were 879 citations of Canadian cases.Google Scholar

20 Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para. 41 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

21 Justice Kentridge has been an acting judge of the Constitutional Court since 1995 and obtained the BA degree (1941) at the University of the Witwatersrand. See Judges: Justice Kentridge, Constitutional Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicekentridge/index1.html (last visited June 25, 2013).Google Scholar

22 See generally S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993.Google Scholar

23 The judgment was delivered when the transitional Constitution was still in operation, and it is now generally accepted that the new Constitution applies directly to the private law. For a more thorough discussion, see generally Stu Woolman, Application, in Constitutional Law of South Africa 31.3–31.161 (Stu Woolman, Michael Bishop & Jason Brickhill eds., 2012).Google Scholar

24 See discussion infra Part C.Google Scholar

25 See generally Lourens Marthinus du Plessis, German Verfassungsrecht under the Southern Cross. Observations on South African-German Interaction in Constitutional Scholarship in Recent History with Particular Reference to Constitution-Making in South Africa in Verfassungen – Zwischen Recht und Politik. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag für Hans-Peter Schneider 524, 524–26 (Friedhelm Hufen ed., 2008).Google Scholar

26 Although there were plenty of efforts to unify and codify the law of the Netherlands, the first successful attempt was the code adopted as the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838, which was influenced by the Code Napoleon. The code was adopted many times over the years, most notably in 1947 and 1992. See Gerrit Meijer, The influence of the Code Civil in the Netherlands, 14 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 228 (2002).Google Scholar

27 See generally Gardiol J. van Niekerk, Legal Pluralism, in Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3–7, 9–12 (Christa Rautenbach, Jan C. Bekker & Nazeem M.I. Goolam eds., 2010).Google Scholar

28 Plessis, Lourens du, Learned Staatsrecht From the Heartland of the Rechtsstaat: Observations On the Significance of South African-German Interaction in Constitutional Scholarship, 8 Potchefstroom Elec. L.J. 76, 78 (2005).Google Scholar

29 See Plessis, Lourens du, An Introduction to Law 57–63 (1999); Eduard Fagan, Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context, in Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 33–64, 60–64 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser eds., 1996).Google Scholar

30 See Plessis, du, supra note 29, at 57–63.Google Scholar

31 For insightful discussions of this influence, see J.W.G. van der Walt, Skerwe uit “die” Geschichte van die Leerstuk van Subjektiewe Regte, in 31 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 521, 626 (1993); André J van der Walt, Personal Rights and Limited Real Rights: An Historical Overview and Analysis of Contemporary Problems Related to the Registrability of Rights, 55 J. Contemp. Roman-Dutch L. 170 (1992).Google Scholar

32 Excluding formal private law, which was influenced by English law.Google Scholar

33 Excluding criminal procedure, which was influenced by English law.Google Scholar

34 With both private and public international law eventually also creeping into the picture.Google Scholar

35 See Plessis, du, supra note 28, at 78.Google Scholar

36 Id. at 79.Google Scholar

37 See, e.g., Dennis Davis, Matthew Chaskalson & Johan de Waal, Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of Constitutional Interpretation, in Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order 1–130 (David van Wyk, John Dugard, Bertus de Villiers & Dennis Davis eds., 1994).Google Scholar

38 See generally S. Afr. Const., 1996.Google Scholar

39 For a succinct depiction of this style of thinking, see Donald P Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 40–41 (1997).Google Scholar

40 Id. at 40.Google Scholar

41 With Afrikaans as the first and English as the second language, these being the then two official South African languages.Google Scholar

42 André Rabie, Schalk van der Merwe & J.M.T. Labuschagne, The Contribution of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to the Development of the South African Legal System and Literature, 56 J. Contemp. Roman-Dutch L. 608, 622 (1993).Google Scholar

43 Id. Google Scholar

44 See du Plessis, supra note 28, at 83.Google Scholar

45 Johan de Waal, A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the Interim Bill of Rights, 11 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 1 (1995).Google Scholar

46 S. Afr. Const., 1996, ch. 1, § 1.Google Scholar

47 Grundgesetz fürb die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 20 (Ger.). Translation:Google Scholar

1. (1)

   (1) The federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies. (3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice. (4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.

See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministarium der Justiz, http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/gg/index.html (Christian Tomuschat & Donald P. Kommers trans., last visited June 25, 2013).

48 See, for example, the discussion of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on the rule of law in 1 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal, The New Constitutional & Administrative Law 75–81 (2001).Google Scholar

49 For an example of South Africa as a social state in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, see Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.); see also generally Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health (No 1) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

50 See, e.g., Currie & De Waal, supra note 48, at 119–24. In Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at paras. 80–82, the South African Constitutional Court nevertheless argued that the South African and German federal systems coincide in vital respects.Google Scholar

51 The South African Constitution speaks of “spheres” rather than “levels” or “tiers” of government in relation to the division of power between national, provincial and local government, thereby lending precedence to the notion of co-operation rather than hierarchy.Google Scholar

52 The second author was directly involved in the multi-party negotiations during the writing of the transitional Constitution and has personal knowledge of these facts.Google Scholar

53 This judgment teems with references to German constitutional-law sources. See, e.g., Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) paras. 33, 36, 39, 40–42, 58, 60, 63, 92, 94, 99, 103–06, 112, 121,143,147, 162, 164, 173 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

54 See, e.g., Govender v. Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) para. 10 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

55 See S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 98; S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 166(a), 167.Google Scholar

56 See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 74(1). On the founding values in general, see discussion supra Part B.II.Google Scholar

57 See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 239.Google Scholar

58 See id. § 167(5).Google Scholar

59 See id. § 167(2)(b).Google Scholar

60 See discussion supra Part B.II.Google Scholar

61 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 39 (S. Afr.) (internal citations omitted).Google Scholar

62 Sanderson v. Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para. 26 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

63 Referred to in section 35(1) of the transitional (and in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996) Constitution. See S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 35(1); S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 39(1)(b).Google Scholar

64 Referred to in section 35(1) of the transitional (and in section 39(1)(c) of the 1996) Constitution. See S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 35(1); S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 39(1)(c).Google Scholar

65 See generally Bryde, Brun-Otto, Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts 42 Der Staat 61, 61–75 (2003); see also Anne Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions, in New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law 251–308 (Janne Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007).Google Scholar

66 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 34 (S. Afr.) (“[The international and foreign authorities] may also have to be considered because of their relevance to section [sic] 35(1) of the Constitution. …”).Google Scholar

67 See discussion infra Part C.Google Scholar

68 For the statistics on which Part C relies, see Christa Rautenbach, Use of Foreign Law, North-West University, http://www4-win2.p.nwu.ac.za/dbtw-wpd/textbases/ccj.htm.Google Scholar

69 Bentele, Ursula, Mining for Gold: the Constitutional Court of South Africa's Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law, 37 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 219, 242–43 (2009) (quoting Justice Kriegler in an interview for the article).Google Scholar

70 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para. 39 (S. Afr.) (“The German jurisprudence on this subject is not by any means easy to summarise, especially for one who does not read German. There are, however useful, accounts of the German approach in some of the South African literature, as also in the work of Justice Barak, which I have mentioned above.”) (internal citation omitted). “I have also had the benefit of reading an extensive article entitled ‘Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory’ by Professor Peter E. Quint, to which I am much indebted.” Id. Google Scholar

71 Id. at para. 33.Google Scholar

72 Id. at para. 147.Google Scholar

73 Citations used at the very first stage of the process when reasoning must be oriented. In this context, citations of foreign precedents may be useful to illustrate the range of potential choices or consequences. During this stage the influence of a particular foreign precedent is not always clear. In most instances the judges merely refer to the foreign precedents in passing. This phase can also be described as the “inspirational” phase. See Bryde, supra note 5, at 213–14.Google Scholar

74 Citations used with the purpose of proving that “even there” a certain measure was adopted, which the court intends to adopt “even here.” This phase can also be described as the “legal argument” phase. See Bryde, supra note 5, at 214–19.Google Scholar

75 Citations used as an example not to be followed (a contrario) in order to set aside some of the potential interpretative readings.Google Scholar

76 See Holland, Paul W, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 945 (1986); Biljana Popović, The Potentials and Limitations of Statistics as a Scientific Method of Inference, 2 Godišnjak Za Psihologiju 57 (2003); Tom Siegfried, Odds Are, It's Wrong: Science Fails to Face the Shortcomings of Statistics, 177 Soc'y for Sci. & the Pub. 26 (2010).Google Scholar

77 More than half of these cases, twenty-eight to be more precise, were cited in the second judgment delivered by the Constitutional Court, namely S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). See supra Figure 2.Google Scholar

78 See S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

79 Some of the foreign cases were referred to more than once, bringing the total citations of foreign cases up to 220.Google Scholar

80 Justice Chaskalson refers here to section 35(1) of the transitional Constitution, which provided as follows:Google Scholar

81 Id. at para. 37 (citation omitted).Google Scholar

82 Id. at para. 16.Google Scholar

83 Id. at para. 16, n.18 (referencing Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 315 (1989)). This author is quite popular amongst the Constitutional Court judges and is often referred to. See discussion supra Part V.Google Scholar

84 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL 14/76, 45 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 187 (Mar. 22–23, 1977) (Ger.). [hereinafter Life Imprisonment Case]Google Scholar

85 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 16, n.17 (referencing Kommers, supra note 83).Google Scholar

86 Id. at para. 59 (referencing Kommers in a footnote as translator of Life Imprisonment Case).Google Scholar

87 Id. Google Scholar

88 He is a former justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, where he served from 1994 to 2004. His academic qualifications include BA (US), BA Honours (Oxford), LLB (US) and LLD (US). See Judges: Justice Laurie Ackermann, Constitutional Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicelwhackermann/index1.html (last visited July 15, 2013).Google Scholar

89 See S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 167 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

90 Grundgesetz fürb die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 19(2) (Ger.). Translation: “In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.” See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministarium der Justiz, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/index.html (Christian Tomuschat & Donald P. Kommers trans., last visited June 25, 2013).Google Scholar

91 He is a former justice of the Constitutional Court, where he served from 1994 to 2009. See Judges: Justice Albie Sachs, Constitutional Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicealbiesachs/index1.html (last visited July 15, 2013).Google Scholar

92 See S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 355, n.17 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

93 See Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

94 It provides that “[a]ny such person may be required to answer any question put to him or her at the examination, notwithstanding that the answer might tend to incriminate him or her and shall, if he or she does so refuse on that ground, be obliged to so answer at the instance of the Master or the Court. …” Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para. 1 (quoting Companies Act 61 of 1973 § 417(2)(b)).Google Scholar

95 The relevant portion provided as follows: “(3) Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, which shall include the right … (c) to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or trial and not to testify during trial. …” S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 25(3).Google Scholar

96 See Ackermann, , supra note 12, at 188.Google Scholar

97 See Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para. 29, n. 18 (referencing Klaus Schlaich, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 220–21 (1994) and his discussion of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvG 1/51, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 14 (Oct. 23, 1951) (Ger.).Google Scholar

98 Id. at para. 71. Section 11(1) of the transitional Constitution stipulates: “Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, which shall include the right not to be detained without trial.” S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 11(1).Google Scholar

99 See Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para. 72 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

100 Id. Google Scholar

101 Grundgesetz fürb die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 2 (Ger.).Google Scholar

1. (1)

   (1) Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt. (2) Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit. Die Freiheit der Person ist unverletzlich. In diese Rechte darf nur auf Grund eines Gesetzes eingegriffen werden.Google Scholar

Id.

Translation:

1. (1)

   (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. (2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.Google Scholar

See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministarium der Justiz, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/index.html (Christian Tomuschat & Donald P. Kommers trans., last visited June 25, 2013).

102 Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para. 83 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

103 Id. at paras. 83–87 (noting that Justice Ackermann spent a considerable time and effort in assessing the German jurisprudence in the context of Article 2 of the German Basic Law with the aim of drawing an analogy between this provision and section 11(1) of the transitional Constitution).Google Scholar

104 Id. at para. 85. The limitations are those mentioned in terms of section 33(1) of the transitional Constitution, namely:Google Scholar

105 Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para. 84 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

106 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL 253/56, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 32 (Jan. 16, 1957) (Ger.) [hereinafter the Elfes Case]. Translation directed by Professors P. Schlechtriem, B. Markesinis, & S. Lorenz, available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/tgcm/velfes.htm (last visited June 25, 2013). See Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para. 86 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

107 See Ferreira v. Levin; Vryenhoek v. Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para. 86 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

108 Id. at para. 87.Google Scholar

109 Id. Google Scholar

110 Id. at para. 180. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

111 Bernstein v. Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

112 Companies Act 61 of 1973. Section 417 dealt with the summoning and examination of persons as to affairs of company and section 418 dealt with the process of examination by commissioners. The whole Act was replaced on 1 May 2011 by the Companies Act 71 of 2008.Google Scholar

113 Right to equality.Google Scholar

114 Right to freedom and security of the person.Google Scholar

115 Right to privacy.Google Scholar

116 Right to fair administrative action.Google Scholar

117 Bernstein v. Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para. 59, note 109 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

118 Id. at para 79.Google Scholar

119 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para. 41 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

120 It is generally accepted that the new Constitution overruled the finding of the Du Plessis Court by making express provision in Sections 8 and 9 of the Bill of Rights to have horizontal application. See Ackermann, supra note 12, at 189.Google Scholar

121 See Ackermann, supra note 12, at 189.Google Scholar

122 President of the RSA v. Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC). This case dealt with the constitutionality of the President's act to grant remission of sentences to female prisoners who were mothers of children under 12 years without granting the same remission to the fathers of children.Google Scholar

123 Jooste v. Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). The Constitutional Court held that a provision of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (providing that employees could not claim damages from their employers, except where provided for in the Act) is constitutional, because viewed in the context of the Act as a whole, the challenged provision—depriving employees of their common law right to damages from their employer—was not arbitrary or irrational.Google Scholar

124 The number of citations per case is reflected in Figure 2, infra. Google Scholar

125 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner of South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

126 In general, he cited forty-five foreign cases.Google Scholar

127 The culprit provision is Section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 which prescribes that any duty, interest, penalty or forfeiture incurred under this Act and which is payable in terms of this Act, must be regarded as a debt to the state. Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 § 114 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

128 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner of South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para. 64 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

129 Id. at para. 71.Google Scholar

130 Id. at paras. 87–93.Google Scholar

131 Kaunda v. President of the RSA 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

132 Id. at paras. 73, 74, 130.Google Scholar

133 Id. at para. 246.Google Scholar

134 Id. at para. 190.Google Scholar

135 Id. at paras. 73, 74, 130.Google Scholar

136 She was a justice of the Constitutional Court from 1994 to 2009.Google Scholar

137 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 419/80, 55 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 349 (Dec. 16, 1980) (Ger.) [hereinafter the Hess decision] reported in 90 ILR 386 as it is cited by Justice O'Regan in Kaunda v. President of the RSA 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) paras. 246, 247 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

138 He was a Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court from 1999 to 2011.Google Scholar

139 Kaunda v. President of the RSA 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para. 190 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

140 Id. at para. 191. Emphasis added. The word “therefore” refers back to the discussion he had about foreign law, in which he also refers specifically to German law.Google Scholar

141 Affordable Medicines Trust v. Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

142 Id. at paras. 59, 64, 65, 87, 88, 89, 90.Google Scholar

143 It provides that “Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law.” S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 22.Google Scholar

144 It provides that “[a]ll Germans shall have the right freely to choose their trade, occupation, or profession, their place of work, and their place of training. The practice of trades, occupations, and professions may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.” As quoted by Justice Ngcobo in Affordable Medicines Trust v. Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) para. 64 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

145 Id. at para. 87.Google Scholar

146 Id. at paras. 87–91.Google Scholar

147 Id. at para. 91. (footnotes omitted).Google Scholar

148 See figure 2, infra. Google Scholar

149 He was a justice of the Constitutional Court from 1994 to 1998.Google Scholar

150 He paid a short visit in 1990, followed by a six-week visit in 2000 and regular visits since his retirement in 2004.Google Scholar

151 He is a current justice of the Constitutional Court who was appointed in 2004.Google Scholar

152 Sydney Kentridge, Judge, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., Speech delivered in Johannesburg, South Africa: Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication (Mar. 20, 2004), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicekentridge/index1.html.Google Scholar

153 For the purpose of this discussion, we discard the results we obtain under the heading “other issues,” which mostly include an explanation of the kinds of human rights or institutional issues the cases dealt with. For example, the right to a fair trial is strictly speaking a right on its own but it is placed in the category “arrested, detained and accused persons.” However, in order to give more information on the kind of right we speak of, it is classified under “other issues” as “a right to a fair trial.”Google Scholar

154 One such example is MEC for Education Kwazulu-Natal v. Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (S. Afr.), where the school board of a public school prohibited a learner from wearing a nose stud. The decision by the school board was an institutional issue but the prohibition infringed the cultural and religious rights of the learner.Google Scholar

155 Kentridge, , supra note 152, at 2–4.Google Scholar

156 Kentridge, , supra note 152, at 3–4.Google Scholar

157 See Groppi, Tania & Ponthoreau, Marie-Claire, Introduction: The Methodology of the Research: How to Assess the Reality of Transjudicial Communication?, in The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges 1–9 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013).Google Scholar

158 Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para. 41 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

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160 See Matatiele Municipality v. President of the RSA (No 2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para. 36, n.11 (S. Afr.); Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para. 23, n.70 (S. Afr.); Affordable Medicines Trust v. Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) para. 59, n.53 (S. Afr.); First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner, SARS; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras. 88, n.136, 91 n.139; Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para. 40, n.40 (S. Afr.); Beyers v. Elf Regters van die Grondwetlike Hof 2002 6 SA 630 (CC) para. 7 (S. Afr.); Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para. 7, n.11 (S. Afr.); Christian Education SA v. Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para. 24, n.24 (S. Afr.); Maphahlele v. First National Bank of SA Ltd 1999 1 SACR 373 (CC) para. 15, n.10 (S. Afr.); Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para. 104 (S. Afr.); S v. Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras. 59 n.89, 134 n.164 (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

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