1 Report of the International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004), Accountability of International Organisations, reprinted in: 1 International Organizations Law Review 225 (2004). Hereinafter referred to as ILA Report.Google Scholar

2 Curtin, Deirdre & Nollkaemper, André, Conceptualizing Accountability in International and European Law, 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 6, 9 (2005).Google Scholar

3 Krisch, Nico, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 European Journal of International Law 277 (2006); Patel, Bimal N., The Accountability of International Organisations: A Case Study of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 13 Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) 572–573 (2000). See also von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

4 See ILA Report (note 1), at 230.Google Scholar

5 See Bogdandy, von, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue, at part C.II.Google Scholar

6 Bovens, Mark, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 European Law Journal 450 (2007); Curtin & Nollkaemper (note) 2, at 10.Google Scholar

7 ILA Report (note 1), at 226.Google Scholar

8 Dann, Philip, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 Völkerrechts, Archiv des, 384–385 (2006). See also Curtin & Nollkaemper (note 2), at 4.Google Scholar

9 See definition in ILA Report (note 1), at 222.Google Scholar

10 Krisch (note 3), at 252.Google Scholar

11 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Stewart, Richard, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 45 (2005).Google Scholar

12 White, Nigel D., Accountability and Democracy within the United Nations: A Legal Perspective, 13 International Relations 6 (1997).Google Scholar

13 Id. at 8.Google Scholar

14 Krisch, (note 3), at 254, 277.Google Scholar

15 Id. at 254.Google Scholar

16 Id. at 255; Bovens (note 6), at 457; Patel (note 3), at 575.Google Scholar

17 Krisch, (note 3), at 260; Curtin, & Nolkaemper, (note 2), at 10.Google Scholar

18 ILA Report (note 1), at 226.Google Scholar

19 Krisch (note 3), at 266–267.Google Scholar

20 Curtin, & Nollkaemper, (note 2), at 5. See generally Grant, Ruth & Keohane, Robert, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 American Political Science Review 29 (2005).Google Scholar

21 ILA Report (note 1), at 226.Google Scholar

22 Id. at 226.Google Scholar

23 See Gaja, Giorgio (Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission), First Report on Responsibility of International Organisations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, 26 March 2003; Id., Second Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/541, 2 April 2004; Id., Third Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/553, 13 May 2005; Id., Fourth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/564, 28 February 2006; Id., Fifth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/583, 2 May 2007, all available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.Google Scholar

24 Curtin, & Nollkaemper, (note 2), at 8.Google Scholar

25 See ILA Report (note 1), at 230.Google Scholar

26 Id. at 229.Google Scholar

27 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, (note 11), at 39; ILA Report (note 1), at 238. See von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

28 ILA Report (note 1), at 238; Curtin & Nollkaemper (note 2), at 8.Google Scholar

29 Dann (note 8), at 384.Google Scholar

30 Id. at 384–385. Compare Curtin & Nollkaemper (note 2), at 11.Google Scholar

31 One could even argue that participation and transparency are prerequisites for efficient oversight mechanisms. For example, the quality of the oversight mechanisms themselves would be significantly enhanced if they were well-reasoned and transparent.Google Scholar

32 See generally Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004).Google Scholar

33 Bovens (note 6), at 460; Dann (note 8), at 392.Google Scholar

34 See Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.Google Scholar

35 See Schuler, in this issue.Google Scholar

36 See Zacharias, in this issue.Google Scholar

37 Id. Google Scholar

38 See Friedrich, in this issue.Google Scholar

39 Id. Google Scholar

40 See Farahat, in this issue.Google Scholar

41 See Windsor, in this issue.Google Scholar

42 Id. Google Scholar

43 See Feinäugle, in this issue.Google Scholar

44 Bovens (note 6), at 460.Google Scholar

45 Although the peer review first and foremost has a bearing on the behaviour of member States, it also reflects on the OECD's ability to regulate the behaviour of multinationals. See in this issue the contribution by Gefion Schuler.Google Scholar

46 Dann (note 8), at 388.Google Scholar

47 Bovens (note 6), at 467.Google Scholar

48 Dann (note 8), at 390.Google Scholar

49 Id. at 391.Google Scholar

50 See Smrkolj, in this issue.Google Scholar

51 Id. Google Scholar

52 Dann (note 8), at 390.Google Scholar

53 Id. Google Scholar

54 Id. at 392.Google Scholar

55 Id. at 393.Google Scholar

56 See Smrkolj, in this issue.Google Scholar

57 See de Wet, Erika & Nollkaemper, André, Review of the Security Council Decisions by National Courts, 45 German Yearbook of International Law 171 (2002).Google Scholar

58 See Feinäugle, in this issue.Google Scholar

59 Dann (note 8), at 389.Google Scholar

60 See Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.Google Scholar

61 See Smrkolj, in this issue.Google Scholar

62 See Kaiser, in this issue.Google Scholar

63 The possibility to take action against international institutions directly before domestic courts remains very limited, as those with separate international legal personality such as the United Nations and the World Bank enjoy immunity before domestic courts. See Dann (note 8), at 389.Google Scholar

64 Case C-84/85, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turzim ve Ticaret AS v. Minister of Trasport, Energy and Communications and Others, 1996 ECR I-3953.Google Scholar

65 EC Regulation 1990/93 O.J. 1993 L 102, 14.Google Scholar

66 Bosphorus decision (note 64), at para. 15.Google Scholar

67 Id. at para. 26.Google Scholar

68 Case C-355/04 P, Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga, Aritza Galarraga v Council of the European Union 2007 ECR I-01657, para. 57.Google Scholar

69 See Bulterman, Mielle, Fundamental Rights and the United Nations Financial Sanctions Regime: The Kadi and Yusuf Judgments of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 19 LJIL 757 (2006).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

70 See Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism O.J. 2001 L 344, 90; Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism O.J. 2001 L 344, 70; Decision 2001/927/EC establishing the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism O.J. 2001 L 344, 83; Common Position 2002/340/CFSP updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism O.J. 2002 L 116, 75 and Common Position 2002/462/CFSP updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2002/340/CFSP O.J. 2002 L 160, 32.Google Scholar

71 See Segi decision (note 68), at paras. 52 et seq. Google Scholar

72 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, supra, note 51; see also Segi decision, supra note 68 at paras. 51–52, para. 54.Google Scholar

73 See in particular the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered on 26 October 2006, Case C-355/04 P, Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga, Aritza Galarraga v Council of the European Union 2007 ECR I-01657, para. 57. He described the listing of inter alia Segi as a completely autonomously by the EU. See also Bulterman (note 69), at 757.Google Scholar

74 Case T- 306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission 2005 ECR II-3353.Google Scholar

75 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission 2005 ECR II-3649; Hereinafter reference will only be made to the relevant paragraphs of the Kadi decision.Google Scholar

76 See Feinäugle, in this issue.Google Scholar

77 Tomuschat, Christian, Primacy of United Nations Law – Innovative Features in the Community Legal Order, 43 Common Market Law Review 543 (2006).Google Scholar

78 Kadi decision (note 75), at para. 221, paras. 225–226.Google Scholar

79 See de Wet, Erika, Holding the United Nations Security Council Accountable for Human Rights Violations through Domestic and Regional Courts: A Case of Beware what you Ask For?, in Sanctions Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Jeremy Farrall & Kim Rubenstein eds., forthcoming 2009).Google Scholar

80 For the very restricted list of jus cogens norms generally recognized as such, see Report of the International Law Commission, 58th Session of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006) 421. For a different opinion, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006) (defining jus cogens in a much broader fashion).Google Scholar

81 The decision turned on European law and the ECJ did not address the jus cogens arguments raised by the CFI. See Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu.Google Scholar

82 Youssef Mustapha Nada v. Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft, BGE, No. 1A.45/2007, 14 November 2007. The Nada decision was rendered by the Federal Supreme Court, available at: http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/sr.html.Google Scholar

83 The Queen (on the application of Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali- Al-Jedda) v. the Secretary of Defence, [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin).Google Scholar

84 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58, judgment of 12 December 2007. See in particular the opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill, para. 35. However, it is also worth noting that the House of Lords was not inclined to accept a complete displacement of Art. 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights by S.C. Res. 1546 of 8 June 2004. The qualification of this right was therefore not to be equated with a complete displacement. See in particular the opinion of Baroness Hale of Richmond, paras. 126 et seq. Google Scholar

85 See Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v. France (Application No. 71412/01), Judgment, 31.05.2007; and Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Norway and Germany (Application No. 78166/01), Judgment, 31.05.2007. Both judgments available at: http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. The ECtHR did not accept effective (extra-territorial) control by the Member States in question in Kosovo at the time when the alleged violation of the right to life (Art. 2) and the right to deny the legality of one's detention (Art. 5) of the ECHR occurred in 2000 and therefore declared the case inadmissible. At the time the states in question formed part of the NATO forces in Kosovo, whose presence was authorized under SC. Res. 1244 of 10 June 1999. The ECtHR's rather distorted arguments in finding an absence of effective control on the part of the Member States arguably reflects the pressure exercised by the troop contributing countries not to review binding Security Council resolutions.Google Scholar

86 In Switzerland there is an ongoing debate as to whether the concept of jus cogens - which is explicitly recognized as a limitation to the legislative (constitutional) process in the federal Constitution of 1999 - should be defined to include also domestic fundamental norms. See e.g. Thürer, Daniel, Verfassungsrecht und Völkerrecht, in Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz 179–205 (Daniel Thürer et al. eds., 2001); Thürer, Daniel, Wer hat Angst vor dem Völkerrecht? Wer vor den Volksrechten? Keine unlösbaren Widersprüche, sondern gegenseitige Stärkung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung 17.11.2007; Tristan Zimmermann, “Quelles normes impératives du droit international comme limite à l'exercice du droit d'initiative par le peuple?,” 16 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 748 et seq. (2007).Google Scholar

87 Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu. See also the well-known Solange decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court. BVerfGE 89, 155 (12.10.1993); BVerfGE 73, 339 (22.10.1996). These decisions are also available at: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. Note that this “dualist” solution could trigger the international law of State responsibility. This would be the case where the domestic or regional obligations which are granted preference conflict with (other) international obligations, such as binding Security Council resolutions.Google Scholar

88 See also José E Alvarez, The Security Council's War on Terrorism: Problems and Policy Options, in Review of the Security Council by Member States, 134 (Erika de Wet & André Nollkaemper eds., 2003).Google Scholar

89 Case C-177/06, Gerda Möllendorf & Christiane Möllendorf-Niehuus 2007 ECR 0000 Judgment of 11 October 2007.Google Scholar

90 Id. at para. 24.Google Scholar

91 Id. at para. 52.Google Scholar

92 This money would then have to remain in a frozen account for as long as the buyers remained blacklisted. Id. at para. 70.Google Scholar

93 Id. at para. 76, para. 81.Google Scholar

94 Some might question whether the situation of third parties who are indirectly affected by the sanctions regime would at all be comparable with that of persons forming the direct object of the sanctions regime. However, this author submits that the Möllendorf-case remains an interesting example of how a court can read some human rights protection into a sanctions regime.Google Scholar

95 BVerfGE, 2BvE 6/99 of 22 November 2001, paras. 130–131; Birgit Schlütter in ILDC 134 (DE 2001) H1. See also the earlier AWACS case, i.e. BVerfGE 90, 286 et seq., decision of 12 July 1994, which concerned the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991.Google Scholar

96 BVerfGE, 2BvE 6/99 of 22 November 2001, para. 150; Birgit Schlütter in ILDC 134 (DE 2001) C5.Google Scholar

97 Id. at para. 130.Google Scholar

98 Id. at paras. 154, 161; ILDC 124 (DE 2001) H10-H11.Google Scholar

99 BVerfGE, 2BvE 6/99 of 22 November 2001, para. 157, para. 161. The New Strategic Concept did not call into question the mandatory prohibition on the threat or use of force contained in Art. 2(4) of the Charter; the accepted Charter prerequisites for the use of military force (which include a Security Council mandate in accordance with Art. 42 and Art. 48 of the Charter or to regional organizations in accordance with Art. 53 of the Charter); collective defence also of third states; intervention by request; and the proportionality of such action.Google Scholar

100 BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/07, decision of 3 July 2007, para. 45, para. 87.Google Scholar

101 BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/07, decision of 3 July 2007, para. 45, para. 87. The violation of international law by an individual NATO operation could be an indication of such a fundamental structural departure, but does not need to be the case.Google Scholar

102 Birgit Schlütter, in ILDC 134 (DE 2001) C5. See also Andreas L. Paulus, Quo vadis Democratic Control? The Afghanistan Decision of the Bundestag and the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the New Strategic Concept Case, 3 German Law Journal (2002), available at: www.germanlawjournal.com; Sauer, Heiko, Die NATO und das Verfassungsrecht: neues Konzept – alte Fragen, 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 317–346 (2002).Google Scholar