¹ See, e.g., Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government 1 (1947); Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems 6 (2^nd ed., 1999); exemplary for the Germanic law tradition: Martin Usteri, Theorie des Bundesstaates 4 (1954); Fried Esterbauer, Kriterien föderativer und konföderativer Systeme 175 (1976); Otto Kimminich, Der Bundesstaat, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. I: Grundlagen von Staat und Verfassung, 1113, 1115 (Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987); Karl Weber, Elemente eines umfassenden Föderalismusbegriffes, in Auf dem Weg zur Menschenwürde und Gerechtigkeit, 1013, 1016 (Ludwig Adamovich/Peter Pernthaler eds., 1989); Peter Pernthaler, Österreichische Föderalismusbegriffe, in Festschrift Guy Héraud, 315, 318 (Franz Hieronymus Riedl/Theodor Veiter eds., 1989); Peter Pernthaler, Zum Begriff von Föderalismus und Bundesstaat in Österreich, in Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus in Österreich, 35, 38 (Herbert Schambeck ed., 1992); Ludger Helms, Strukturelemente und Entwicklungsdynamik des deutschen Bundesstaates im internationalen Vergleich, Zeitschrift für Politik (ZfP) 125 (2002); Anna Gamper, Die Regionen mit Gesetzgebungshoheit 16 (2004); Matthias Jestaedt, Bundesstaat als Verfassungsprinzip, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. II: Verfassungsstaat, 785, 793 (Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof eds., 3^rd ed., 2004).Google Scholar

² See, Gamper, supra, note 1, 16.Google Scholar

³ See, however, Usteri, supra, note 1; Friedrich Koja, Der Bundesstaat als Rechtsbegriff, in Föderative Ordnung III: Theorie und Praxis des Bundesstaates, 61 (Ernst C. Hellbling/Theo Mayer-Maly/Herbert Miehsler eds., 1974); Peter Pernthaler, Allgemeine Staatslehre 294 (2^nd ed., 1996); Peter Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht 297 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴ See infra C.I.Google Scholar

⁵ Reference has particularly been made to the United States, Switzerland and the German Empire. See, e.g., The Federalist Papers of 1787-88; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835, 1840); Wheare, supra, note 1; Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 138 (10^th ed., 1965). Watts, supra, note 1, 2 even refers to the ancient Israelite federal system, similarly, Daniel J. Elazar, Federal Systems of the World xv (2^nd ed., 1994).Google Scholar

⁶ See Braun, Dietmar, Hat die vergleichende Föderalismusforschung eine Zukunft?, in Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2002, 97 (Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen ed., 2002).Google Scholar

⁷ See, recently, the “Global Dialogue on Federalism” project of the Forum of Federations and the International Association of Centers for Federal Studies.Google Scholar

⁸ See, most recently and comprehensively, Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005 (Ann L. Griffiths ed., 2005) and Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries (John Kincaid/G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005). Another very valuable source of information is the Annual Yearbook on Federalism (“Jahrbuch des Föderalismus”) published by the Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen (since 2000).Google Scholar

⁹ See, most recently Kincaid, John, Comparative Observations, in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, 409 (John Kincaid/G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005). The terminological history is reflected by Ernst Deuerlein, Föderalismus 11 (1972).Google Scholar

¹⁰ For summary, see, Gamper, supra, note 1, 44.Google Scholar

¹¹ On the works of Pierre Joseph Proudhon and, in particular, Alexandre Marc, see, e.g., Ferdinand Kinsky, Le fédéralisme integral, in Le Fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc, 70 (Centre de Recherches Européennes ed., 1974).Google Scholar

¹² See, however, the distinction made by Watts, supra, note 1, 6.Google Scholar

¹³ See, e.g., Weber, supra, note 1, and Pernthaler, Allgemeine Staatslehre, supra,note 3, 290.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See, e.g., Josef Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht (2^nd ed., 2001); Knut W. Nörr/Thomas Oppermann eds., Subsidiarität: Idee und Wirklichkeit (1997), Christian Calliess, Subsidiaritäts- und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (2^nd ed., 1999); Peter Blickle/Thomas O. Hüglin/Dieter Wyduckel eds., Subsidiarität als rechtliches und politisches Ordnungsprinzip in Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism 190 (1970). See also Hans Maier, Der Föderalismus -Ursprünge und Wandlungen, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (AÖR) 213, 215 (1990) and Neil Walker, Beyond the Unitary Conception of the United Kingdom Constitution?, Public Law 384, 390 (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Frenkel, Max, Föderalismus und Bundesstaat, vol. 1: Föderalismus 76 (1984). Even more radically, Anthony H. Birch, Approaches to the Study of Federalism, 14 Political Studies 15 (1966): The meaning of federalism “in any particular study is defined by the student in a manner which is determined by the approach which he wishes to make to his material”.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Within this context, the Germanic tradition roughly comprises the German, Austrian and Swiss theory of federalism.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See, with more detail, Pernthaler, Allgemeine Staatslehre, supra, note 3, 294; Koja, supra, note 3; Gamper, supra, note 1, 50; Karl Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates 65 (1980).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Above all, Hans Kelsen, Die Bundesexekution (1927) and Hans Nawiasky, Allgemeine Staatslehre, part 3 159 (1956).Google Scholar

²⁰ The most radical approach was perhaps taken by the Viennese School of Legal Positivism that found the term “state” obsolete and replaced it by “legal system” (see infra note 26).Google Scholar

²¹ See the attitudes of Georg Waitz, Grundzüge der Politik (1862) and Hans Nawiasky, Der Bundesstaat als Rechtsbegriff 48 (1920), discussed by Koja, supra, note 3, 68 and Gamper, supra, note 1, 52.Google Scholar

²² See, most recently, Albrecht Randelzhofer, Staatsgewalt und Souveränität, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. II: Verfassungsstaat, 143 (Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof eds., 3^rd ed., 2004) and Utz Schliesky, Souveränität und Legitimität von Herrschaftsgewalt (2004).Google Scholar

²³ Following de Tocqueville see, e.g., Waitz, supra, note 21, 153; id., Das Wesen des Bundesstaates, Allgemeine Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur 494 (1853).Google Scholar

²⁴ See Georg Meyer, Staatsrechtliche Erörterungen über die deutsche Reichsverfassung (1872); Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 751 (2^nd ed., 1905); Siegfried Brie, Theorie der Staatenverbindungen 112 (1886); Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, vol. I, 62 (5^th ed., 1911).Google Scholar

²⁵ See The Works of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1 (Richard K. Crallé ed., 1858); Max v. Seydel, Der Bundesstaatsbegriff, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 185 (1872).Google Scholar

²⁶ Merkl, Adolf J., Zum rechtstechnischen Problem der bundesstaatlichen Kompetenzverteilung, 2 ZÖR 336 (1921); id., Zur deutsch-österreichischen Verfassung, Zeitschrift für Verwaltung 28 (1921); Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts 287 (1928); id., Reine Rechtslehre 315 (reprint 2000); Robert Walter, Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht 108 (1972); Rudolf Thienel, Ein “komplexer” oder normativer Bundesstaatsbegriff?, 42 Austrian Journal of Public and International Law (AJPIL) 215 (1991); id., Der Bundesstaatsbegriff der Reinen Rechtslehre, in Schwerpunkte der Reinen Rechtslehre, 123 (Robert Walter ed., 1992); similarly, Koja, supra, note 1,91; id., Allgemeine Staatslehre 346 (1993).Google Scholar

²⁷ See, within this context, particularly Kelsen, supra, note 19; id., Allgemeine Staatslehre 199 and 208 (1925).Google Scholar

²⁸ Nawiasky, Hans, Die Grundgedanken des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 35 (1950); id., supra, note 19, 159Google Scholar

²⁹ See, e.g., Art 3 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), which stipulates that certain territorial changes need the joint enactment of a federal constitutional act and constitutional acts of the concerned Länder.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Kincaid, supra, note 9, 438.Google Scholar

³¹ See, most recently, Weber, Karl, Zwei- oder dreigliedriger Bundesstaat? Bemerkungen zur Stellung der Gemeinden in einer möglichen künftigen Bundesverfassung, in Vom Verfassungsstaat am Scheideweg, 413 (id./NORBERT Wimmer eds., 2005).Google Scholar

³² As for Germany, see, in particular, the famous judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE 13, 54) and, for a summary, see Jestaedt, supra, note 1, 794.Google Scholar

³³ See, e.g., Weber, supra, note 18, 87; Gamper, supra, note 1, 60.Google Scholar

³⁴ See, for a summary, Gamper, supra, note 1, 62.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Watts, supra, note 1, 7; Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, supra, note 3, 299.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Gamper, Anna, “Arithmetische” und “geometrische” Gleichheit im Bundesstaat, in Der Verfassungsstaat am Scheideweg, 143, 147 (Karl Weber/Norbert Wimmer eds., 2005).Google Scholar

³⁷ See the most recent list made by Thomas Fleiner/Lidija R. Basta Fleiner, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3^rd ed., 2004) 554.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, e.g., in Europe particularly Spain and Italy, to a much lesser degree the United Kingdom and France.Google Scholar

³⁹ The most prominent example is the European Union, at least with a view to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe which, however, is unlikely to enter into force (see infra, note 80).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Häberle, Peter, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Europa, 10 ERPL 299 (1998); with many further references, Gamper, supra, note 1 and Dian Schefold, Zur Gestalt der Region, in Europa und seine Verfassung, 288 (Charlotte Gaitanides et alii eds., 2005).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Belgium is now generally admitted to the arena of federal states, although it took some time to recognize it as such, which may be due to the long and various stages of its decentralisation process.Google Scholar

⁴² The traditional idea was that a federal state was created by the voluntary agreement of independent states (constitutional compact) which, however, raises questions as to the states’ right of secession (see, with references, Kincaid, supra, note 9, 442).Google Scholar

⁴³ See, from a comparative perspective, Pernthaler, Peter, Asymmetric Federalism as a Comprehensive Framework of Regional Autonomy, in Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002, 472 (Ann L. Griffiths ed., 2002); Roland Sturm, Aktuelle Entwicklungen und Schwerpunkte in der internationalen Föderalismus- und Regionalismusforschung, in Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2000, 29, 31 (Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen ed., 2000); Watts, supra, note 1, 63.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, with more analysis, Gamper, supra, note 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Kincaid, supra, note 9, 424.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See infra C.II.3.c.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ As regards supreme or constitutional courts, which regularly also serve as umpires for conflicts between the central unit and the constituent units, it is often provided that the constituent units may take some influence, e.g. on the nomination of judges. See Watts, supra, note 1, 100 and Kincaid, supra, note 9, 431.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Schäffer, Heinz, Die Kompetenzverteilung im Bundesstaat, in Bundesstaat und Bundesrat in Österreich, 65, 68 (Herbert Schambeck ed., 1997). However, the residual power is a central power in Canada, India, South Africa and Belgium (see Kincaid, supra, note 9, 424; Watts, supra, note 1, 39).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See supra, note 13. Sceptically, Markus Kenntner, Justitiabler Föderalismus 20 (2000); Gamper, supra, note 1, 102.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Similarly, Kincaid, supra, note 9 425; Watts, supra, note 1, 39.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See also Kincaid, supra, note 9, 422. Even a comparison between the three classical European federal states – Germany, Switzerland and Austria – shows that the kind and number of the constituent units’ subject-matters vary considerably between them.Google Scholar

⁵² Foreign affairs may sometimes be a shared power: From a comparative perspective, see Watts, supra, note 1, 40; Kincaid, supra, note 9, 434, and the comparative chapters in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, issue II, 2004.Google Scholar

⁵³ See, e.g., Watts, supra, note 1, 40 and Kincaid, supra, note 9, 422.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See also the examples listed by Watts, supra, note 1, 40.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See, for instance, Art 117 para 4 of the Italian Constitution; without prejudice to the UK parliament's sovereignty, Art 29 of the Scotland Act 1998.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ From a comparative perspective, Jens Woelk, Konfliktregelung und Kooperation im italienischen und deutschen Verfassungsrecht (1999); id., Die Verpflichtung zur Treue bzw Loyalität als inhärentes Prinzip dezentralisierter Systeme?, 52 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (ZÖR) 527 (1997); Hartmut Bauer, Die Bundestreue (1992). However, distinction must be drawn between the principle of mutual consideration, based on the co-operation and co-ordination of both central and constituent units – as expressed, for instance, by the Austrian Constitutional Court (see, e.g., cases VfSlg 10.292/1984; 15.552/1999) – and the unilateral principle of “federal loyalty” (“Bundestreue“).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See, lately, Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, supra, note 3, 344. See also the doctrine according to which ancillary law of another legislature is not outside competence if it is necessary to give effect to the purpose of the provisions enacted by the competent legislature (See, e. g., Part I Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See, from a comparative perspective, Kenntner, supra, note 48.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Vice versa, the constituent units are represented at the federal level (see infra, C.II.4), but this is inherent in a federal system, whereas strong (and unilateral) federal supervision is much more typical of non-federal decentralized systems (see the distinction made by Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, supra, note 3, 483).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Kincaid, supra, note 9, 437; Friedrich Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der österreichischen Bundesländer (2^nd ed., 1988); lately, Gamper, supra, note 1, 91.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Kincaid, supra, note 9, 437. The constitutional autonomy of the constituent units is particularly restricted in Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and Belgium.Google Scholar

⁶² See, e.g., the restrictive case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court (Anna Gamper, The Principle of Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian Federalism: The Constitutional Court's Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg, in Publius – The Journal of Federalism 45 [2003]).Google Scholar

⁶³ See Sturm, supra, note 43, 34.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See supra, C.I.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, supra, note 3, 391.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Kincaid, supra, note 9, 432; Watts, supra, note 1, 57; Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, supra, note 3, 433.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See supra, note 59.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See, lately, Gamper, supra, note 36, 153.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Watts, supra, note 1, 92; Role and Function of the Second Chamber (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1999); Der Bundesrat in Deutschland und Österreich (Detlef Merten ed., 2001); Herbert Schambeck, Zur Bedeutung des parlamentarischen Zweikammernsystems – eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse des “Bikameralismus”, Journal für Rechtspolitik (JRP) 87 (2003); Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Samuel C. Patterson/Anthony Mughan eds., 1999); Gisela Riescher/Sabine Ruß/Christoph Haas, Zweite Kammern (2000); Gisela Riescher, Do Second Chambers matter? Fragen und Ergebnisse zum internationalen Vergleich bikameraler Systeme, in Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2001 (Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen ed., 2001) 87; Nicholas D. J. Baldwin/Donald Shell, Second Chambers (2001); Gamper, supra, note 36, 153; Gamper, Demokratische Legitimation und gewaltenteilende Funktion Zweiter Kammern in der “gemischten” Verfassung, in Reflexionen zum Internationalen Verfassungsrecht – Tagungsband zum 1^st Vienna Workshop on International Constitutional Law (Harald Eberhard/Konrad Lachmayer/Gerhard Thallinger eds., 2005) 63.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, United States of America, in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, 381 (John Kincaid/G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005).Google Scholar

⁷¹ See, e.g., Nicolas Schmitt, Swiss Confederation, in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, 347 (John Kincaid/G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005).Google Scholar

⁷² In the case of the USA, direct elections of Senators were introduced by amendment XVII (1913), whereas Art 150 of the Swiss Constitution empowers the cantons to decide on the election system (which is regularly a system of direct election).Google Scholar

⁷³ In the Swiss case an exception is made insofar as the cantons Obwalden, Nidwalden, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden are represented by just one (instead of two) delegates.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Watts, supra, note 1, 93.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See James Madison in no. 62 of the “Federalist Papers“ (1788): “But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but ‘of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable'.”Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See, with more detail on the equality of the constituent units, Gamper, supra, note 36 and Marcus C. F. Pleyer, Föderative Gleichheit (2005).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Bundesstaat und Bundesrat in Österreich (Herbert Schambeck ed., 1997); Heinz Schäffer, The Austrian Bundesrat: Constitutional Law – Political Reality – Reform Ideas, in Role and Function of the Second Chamber, 25 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1999); Die Zukunft der Mitwirkung der Länder an der Bundesgesetzgebung (Peter Bußjäger/Jürgen Weiss eds., 2004).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See Kincaid, supra, note 9, 430.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See, e.g. in Europe, the reform discussion on the second chambers in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Germany und the UK.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ After the unsuccessful referendum in France and the Netherlands, however, a ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution of Europe (Official Journal C 310 of 16 December 2004) seems unlikely. A brilliant view on the background and contents of a possible European constitution is given by Peter Häberle, Europäische Verfassungslehre (3^rd ed., 2005).Google Scholar