¹ Instead of enabling individuals to bring a claim to certain socioeconomic guarantees before a (constitutional) court, they often guide government behavior—but may be overshadowed, at least in times of austerity, by other state concerns. See, on social rights in European constitutions generally, for example, Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Fons Coomans ed., 2006); Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Malcolm Langford ed., 2009). Interesting are also Avi Ben-Bassat & Momi Dahan, Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice, 36 J. Comp. Econ. 103 (2008) (on the effects of constitutional commitments to social rights on policy) and Monica Brito Vieira & Filipe Carreira da Silva, Getting Rights Right: Explaining Social Rights Constitutionalization in Portugal, 11 Int'l J. Const. Law (ICON) 898 (2013).Google Scholar

² International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.Google Scholar

³ See id. arts. 9, 11.Google Scholar

⁴ European Social Charter (Revised), ETS 163 (May 3, 1996), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm.Google Scholar

⁵ See id. arts. 12, 13, 14.Google Scholar

⁶ See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10 2008) (allowing for individual communications). On 5 May 2013, this Optional Protocol entered into force. Communications result in “views” by the CESCR on the alleged rights violation. These views do not have binding force. However, within six months the State Party is required to submit a written response.Google Scholar

⁷ At the moment, only twelve states have ratified the Optional Protocol.Google Scholar

⁸ See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, Nov. 9, 1995, C.E.T.S. No. 158; http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng# (for the case law of the ECSR).Google Scholar

⁹ Instead, when a violation is found, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe can adopt a recommendation addressed to the State Party concerned. An interesting development is, however, that the ECSR has started taking decisions on interim measures. See, e.g., Complaint No. 90/2013, Conference of European Churches v. the Netherlands (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/Complaints/CC90DecisionImmediateMeasures_en.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [CFR] art. 34, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 2.Google Scholar

¹¹ Art. 51(1) CFR reads:Google Scholar

The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers.

¹² In the explanatory report to the CFR, it is stated with regard to Article 34 that “[t]he reference to social services relates to cases in which such services have been introduced to provide certain advantages but does not imply that such services must be created where they do not exist.” Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Dec. 14, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 2.Google Scholar

¹³ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See id. art. 3(1).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See id. art. 8(1).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 18, 1954, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁷ E.g., Alston, Philip, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 332, 351 (1987) (with regard to the task of the CESCR). Cf. also Conor Gearty, Against Judicial Enforcement, in Debating Social Rights 1, 58 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See, for some early examples in the case law of the ECtHR, Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, ECHR App. Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § I(B)(3)–(4) (1968); Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 31 (1979). This is different in the United States, however. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 109 U.S. 998 (1989).Google Scholar

¹⁹ This was confirmed by the ECtHR in Airey v. Ireland, ECHR App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 26 (1979). Cf. Cecile Fabre, Canstitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 263, 267 (1998); Koch, Ida Elisabeth, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Components in Civil and Political Rights: A Hermeneutic Perspective, 10 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 405, 408 (2006).Google Scholar

²⁰ In the sense that the norms (the articles as they are written down) enumerated in for example the ECHR are mostly phrased in ‘civil and political’ terms and can thus be labeled as such.Google Scholar

²¹ E.g., Marzari v. Italy, ECHR App. No. 36448/97, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (1999); Bah v. the United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 56328/07 (Sept. 27, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. For a recent example see, Winterstein and Others v. France, ECHR App. No. 27013/07 (Oct. 17, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

²² E.g., Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECHR App. Nos. 65731/01, 65900/01, 2005-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 321. A recent example is Damjanac v. Croatia, ECHR App. No. 52943/10 (Oct. 24, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. For an overview see Ingrid Leijten, From Stec to Valkov: Possessions and Margins in the Social Security Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 13 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 309 (2013).Google Scholar

²³ E.g., D. v. the United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 30240/96, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 777.Google Scholar

²⁴ See for this critique, for example, Marc Bossuyt, Should the Strasbourg Court Exercise More Self-Restraint? On the extension of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to Social Security Regulations, 28 Hum. Rts. L.J. 321 (2007).Google Scholar

²⁵ The ECtHR is explicit with regard to one thing only, namely that it does not provide for social rights generally. See, e.g., Pancenko v. Latvia, ECHR App. No. 40772/98 (28 October 1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ (“[T]he Convention does not guarantee, as such, socioeconomic rights, including the right to charge-free dwelling, the right to work, the right to free medical assistance, or the right to claim financial assistance from a State to maintain a certain level of living.”). See on the lack of a clear interpretation of socioeconomic guarantees under the Convention, Ingrid Leijten, Defining the Scope of Economic and Social Guarantees in the Case Law of the ECtHR, in Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights 109, 116-20 (Eva Brems & Janneke Gerards eds., 2014). Examples are Valkov and Other v. Bulgaria, ECHR App. Nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04, 19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05, 2041/05, paras. 87, 113 (Oct. 25, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Sentges, ECHR App. No. 27677/02. Also, the ECtHR holds that responsibility of the State under Article 3 “may be engaged … where an applicant, who was wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity” (emphasis added). See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECHR App. No. 30696/09, para. 253. (Jan. 21, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. Cf. Budina v. Russia, App. No. 45603/05 (June 18, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/, and Laroshina v. Russia, ECHR App. No. 56869/00 (Apr. 23, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

²⁶ Cf. Leijten, supra note 22, and Leijten, supra note 25. See more generally Janneke Gerards & Hanneke Senden, The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 7 Int'l J. Const. L. 619 (2009) (stressing the importance of distinguishing between the interpretation and application of Convention norms in order to enhance the clarity of the case law).Google Scholar

²⁷ On social rights in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR see also, for example, Eva Brems, Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, in Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice 135 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyel M. Gross eds., 2007); Clements, Luke & Simmons, Allen, European Court of Human Rights: Sympathetic Unease, in Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law, 409 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008); O'Cinneide, Calm, A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 European Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 583 (2008); Palmer, Ellie, Protecting Socioeconomic Rights Through the European Convention on Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights, 2 Erasmus L. Rev. 397 (2009); Ida Elisabeth Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socioeconomic Demands under the European Convention on Human Rights (2009).Google Scholar

²⁸ See infra Section B.Google Scholar

²⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 220/51, 1 BVerfGE 97, 104 (Dec. 19, 1951). See, e.g., Claudia Bittner, Casenote, Human Dignity as a Matter of Legislative Consistency in an ideal World: The Fundamental Right to Guarantee a Subsistence Minimum in the German Federal Constitutional Court's Judgment of 9 February 2010, 12 German L.J. 1941, 1942 (2011).Google Scholar

³⁰ See infra Section B.Google Scholar

³¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL, 1/09, 125 BVerfGE 175 (Feb. 9 2010) [hereinafter Hartz IV] (English translation available at www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109en.html); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL 10/10, 132 BVerfGE 134 (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter Asylum Seekers Benefits], See, on the Hartz IV judgment, the special section on “The Hartz IV Case and the German Sozialstaat,” 12 German L.J. 1879 (2011), and in particular Bittner, supra note 29, and Stefanie Egidy, Casenote, The Fundamental Right to the Guarantee of a Subsistence Minimum in the Hartz IV Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 12 German L.J. 1961 (2011). See, on the Asylum Seekers Benefits case in particular, Inga Winkler & Claudia Mahler, Interpreting the Right to a Dignified Minimum Existence: A New Era in German Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence, 13 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 388 (2013).Google Scholar

³² See supra note 29.Google Scholar

³³ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 20 (“Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat.”).Google Scholar

³⁴ E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. V C 78.54 1 BVerfGE 159, 161 (Jun. 24, 1954).Google Scholar

³⁵ Article 1 (1) of the German Basic Law reads: “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.” (“Human dignity is inviolable. It is the duty of all public authorities to respect and protect it.”)Google Scholar

³⁶ E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL 20/84, 1 BvL 26/84, 1 BvL 4/86, 82 BVerfGE 60 (May 29, 1990). In order for parents to provide for their children, moreover, aliments to be paid have to be tax free.Google Scholar

³⁷ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 569/05, 5 BVerfGE 237 (May 12, 2005).Google Scholar

³⁸ See supra note 30. See, on this development also, for example, Christian Seiler, Das Grundrecht auf ein menschenwürdiges Existenzminimum: Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 9.2.2010, Juristenzeitung 500 (2010); Kingreen, Thorsten, Schätzungen „ins Blaue hinein“: Zu den Auswirkungen des Hartz IV-Urteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts auf das Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 558 (2010); Schnath, Matthias, Auswirkungen des neuen Grundrechts auf Gewährleistung des Existenzminimums auf die besonderen Hilfen nach dem Zwölften Sozialgesetzbuches (SGB XII), Sozialrecht aktuell 173 (2010); Jens-Hendrik Hörmann, Rechtsprobleme des Grundrechts auf Gewährleistung eines menschenwürdigen Existenzminimums. Zu den Auswirkungen des “Regelleistungsurteils” auf die “Hartz IV”-Gesetzgebung und andere Sozialgesetze (2012).Google Scholar

³⁹ Hartz IV. Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Bittner, supra note 29, at 1944.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Hartz IV at para. 133.Google Scholar

⁴² Id. at para. 135. Indeed, there is a right to both the physical and socio-cultural aspects thereof. Cf. Bittner, supra note 28, at 1952-53 (“The Court explicitly denied a division of this guarantee into an absolute part (for example food, housing and clothing) and additional parts covering the participation in social and political life.”). See, for a different view, Egidy, supra note 30, at 1976.Google Scholar

⁴³ Either from the state or from third persons. See Hartz IV at para. 136 (referring to earlier cases). Cf. also Asylum Seekers Benefits at para. 91.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Hartz IV at para. 142.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id. para. 141 (“Since the Basic Law itself does not permit any precise figure to be put on the claim, the material review as regards the result is restricted to whether the benefits are evidently insufficient.” (referring to Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL 20/84, 82 BVerfGE 60, 91-92 (May 29, 1990))).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. at para. 142.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See id. at para. 143. These can be translated in the “rationale,” “transparency” and “consistency requirement.” See also Bittner, supra note 29, at 1948.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Hartz IV at para. 146.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See id. at para. 171. There it holds that:Google Scholar

'[R]andom’ estimates … run counter to a procedure of realistic investigation, and hence violate Article 1.1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with the principle of the social welfare state contained in Article 20.1 of the Basic Law. To make it possible to examine whether the valuations and decisions taken by the legislature correspond to the constitutional guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity, the legislature handing down the provision is subject to the obligation to reason them in a comprehensible manner; this is to be demanded above all if the legislature deviates from a method which it has selected itself.

See for a more detailed overview of the (very detailed) review of the FCC, Bittner, supra note 29, at 1949-50.

⁵⁰ See Hartz IV at paras. 144, 210.Google Scholar

⁵¹ id. at para. 216. In 2011, a new law was enacted (Regelbedarfs-Ermittlungsgesetz, Mar. 24, 2011, BGBl. I § 435 (Ger.)), see, e.g., Winkler, & Mahler, , supra note 31, at 401.Google Scholar

⁵² Asylum Seekers Benefits. Google Scholar

⁵³ The shortfall was calculated to be at least 31 percent. See also Winkler & Mahler, supra note 31, at 391.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ In fact, already for some time, and especially after the Hartz IV judgment, doubts had been voiced as regards the constitutionality of the Act. See, e.g., Kingreen, supra note 38; Hörmann, supra note 38, at 208; Haedrich, Martina, Das Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, das Existenzminimum und die Standards der EU-Aufnahmerichtlinie, 30 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 227 (2010); Görsch, Christoph, Asylbewerberleistungsrechtliches Existenzminimum und gesetzgeberischer Gestaltungsspielraum, Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialrecht 646 (2011).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Asylum Seekers Benefits, at para. 63 (author's translation) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Council Directive 2003/9, 2003 O.J. (L 31/18) (EC).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 22(1), 28, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989). See also Asylum Seekers Benefits at para. 94.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Asylum Seekers Benefits at paras. 97, 99.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See id. at para. 100. See also Hartz IV at para. 138.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Asylum Seekers Benefits at paras. 117, 122.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See id. at paras. 106-15.Google Scholar

⁶² See id. at paras. 108-11.Google Scholar

⁶³ See id. at paras. 112-15.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See id. at para. 121.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Hartz IV at para. 138; Asylum Seekers Benefits at para. 93.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Gearty, supra note 17.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Article 2(1) of the ICESCR reads:Google Scholar

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adaption of legislative measures.Google Scholar

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). On the problematic effects on this requirement, see Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction, in Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 4-5 (Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002). According to Henry J. Steiner and others, “Governments can present themselves as defenders of ESR without international imposition of any precise constraints on their policies and behavior.” Steiner et al., International Human Rights in Context (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2007).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Far the different General Comments, see United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodvexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=9&DocTypeID=11.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See, in particular, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, Rep. on its 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) (“The Nature of State Parties Obligations”), where it was stated that “the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.” This recognition of the existence of minimum core obligations has been further elaborated in General Comments concerning the separate economic and social rights like the right to housing, health, social security, etc.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The broadly phrased Article 12(1) of the ICESCR reads: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” ICESCR, supra note 67, art. 12(1).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, para. 43, Rep. on its 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (“The Highest Attainable Standard of Health”).Google Scholar

⁷² Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19, para. 59, Rep. on its 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) (“The Right to Social Security”).Google Scholar

⁷³ Cf. Egidy, , supra note 31, at 1972.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ The right to an Existenzminimum “only covers those means which are vital to maintain an existence that is in line with human dignity. It guarantees the whole subsistence minimum by a uniform fundamental rights guarantee which encompasses both the physical existence of the individual, that is food, clothing, household goods, housing, heating, hygiene and health.” Hartz IV at para. 135. See also Asylum Seekers Benefits at para. 90. Different from the ICESCR example, however, in Germany there is no fundamental right to anything beyond this minimum, whereas fundamental economic and social rights ideally be guaranteed “in full,” at least when the available resources allow for this.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See id. Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Hartz IV at para. 140. See also Asylum Seekers Benefits at para. 98.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Hartz IV at para. 140; Asylum Seekers Benefits at para. 98.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ General Comment No. 3, supra note 69.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ It is considered impossible to come up with a workable standard all states can comply with. At the same time, even if there could be a state based minimum core, the actual provision of essential means might be too big a burden. This was recognized by the South African Constitutional Court in the TAC case. See Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 35 (5. Afr.).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Young, Katharine G., The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights; A Concept in Search of Content, 33 Yale J. Int'l L. 113 (2008) (explaining different starting points for determining the minimum core).Google Scholar

⁸¹ See, e.g., Sachs, Albie, The Judicial Enforcement of Socioeconomic Rights, 56 Current Legal Probs, 579 (2003); Wesson, Murray, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socioeconomic Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 20 5. African J. of Hum. Rts. 284 (2004); Kende, Mark S., The South African Constitutional Court's Construction of Socioeconomic Rights: A Response to the Critics, 19 Conn. J. Int'l L. 617, 622-24 (2004); Lehmann, Karin, In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socioeconomic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core, 22 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 163, 182-94 (2006).Google Scholar

⁸² Cf. General Comment No. 3, supra note 69, at para. 10 (“In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations”).Google Scholar

⁸³ See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom & Others, ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.), paras. 32-33.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Id. para. 41. E.g., Paul O'Connell, Vindicating Socioeconomic Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experiences 76-77 (2012).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Dreier, Horst, Art. 1 (1), in Grundgesetz Kommentar (Horst Dreier ed., 2013).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Although this “absoluteness” is of a distinct kind. Cf. id. at 155; Neumann, Volker, Menschenwürde und Existenzminimum, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 426, 428 (1995); Bittner, , supra note 29, at 1953. Seiler, supra note 38, at 504 (holding that because the right has to be carved out by the legislature, “das Grundrecht auf materielle Existenzsicherung [ist] … seiner Natur nach relativ”).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ “[The Existenzminimum] guarantees the whole subsistence minimum by a uniform fundamental rights guarantee which encompasses both the physical existence of the individual, that is food, clothing, household goods, housing, heating, hygiene and health …, and ensuring the possibility to maintain inter-human relationships and a minimum of participation in social, cultural and political life.” Hartz IV at para. 135. Cf. Egidy, supra note 31, at 1971.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ It is important that actually “formulating” these guarantees, rather than implicitly recognizing them, increases the transparency of a court's practice while—in the case of “classic” norms—it duly recognizes the principle of indivisibility. See, infra Section D.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See Hartz IV at para. 143. These can be translated in the “rationale,” “transparency” and “consistency requirement.” See Bittner, supra note 29, at 1948.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See Bittner, supra note 29, at 1957. Speaking of the requirement of consistency, she holds that:Google Scholar

This is an enormous task—even if the competent ministry makes every effort to implement a consistent scheme of calculating the standard benefits—because this result may be diluted and distorted in the political process leading up to enactment. The goal of consistency is not what dominates the democratic legislative process in a pluralistic society. Egidy, supra note 31, at 1981.

⁹¹ So far, no agreement has been reached on legislative alterations, which is disappointing according to some. See Winkler & Mahler, supra note 31, at 400. Cf. Egidy, supra note 31, at 1982 (regarding the effects of the judgments more generally); Bittner, , supra note 29, at 1957.Google Scholar

⁹² Having held for a long time that the duty of providing for a subsistence minimum could be conferred on the state on the basis of the social state principle, which does not entail individually enforceable fundamental rights, the FCC goes one step further in the cases presented above. An actual and autonomous right to a subsistence minimum is inferred by combining the Sozialstaatsprinzip with Article 1, Section 1 of the Basic Law. See supra Section B.Google Scholar

⁹³ Of course this does not go for every state. For a great number of states, the provision of such a minimum does not seem feasible at all. As Bittner notes: “It is the crux of the absolute right to guarantee a subsistence minimum, … that the state guaranteeing such a right may not be able to administer it when most urgently needed.” Bittner, supra note 29, at 1960.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Yet, as Bittner argued, one needs to be mindful of not stretching the concept of human dignity too far as “[t]he constant and inflationary invocation of human dignity can ultimately lead to a loss of meaning. The absolute right to human dignity is in danger of being trivialized by the public at large.” Bittner, supra note 29, at 1957.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), pmbl., arts. 1, 22, 23 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., art. 10, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, pmbl., art. 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [CFR] title I, arts. 1, 23, 31, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 2.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Except for in the Preamble to Protocol 13 to the ECHR, where it is stated “that everyone's right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings.” Protocol No. 13 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., Jan. 7, 2003, E.T.S. No. 187.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Pretty v. the United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 65 (2002).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Cf. Airey v. Ireland, ECHR App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 26 (1979); Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECHR App. Nos. 65731/01, 65900/01, paras. 50-51 (Apr. 12, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ (stressing the provision of welfare benefits as rights).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Cf. Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transtormed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties 10-14 (2008); Amartya, Sen, Development as Freedom 90-91 (1999); Nussbaum, Martha, Women and Human Development 12 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Unlike national courts, the ECtHR does not have the possibility to directly enter into a dialogue with the national legislature to find a compromise between the majority's will and the minority's concerns.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Of course, the possibilities for courts to deal with social issues vary from state to state. In some states—for example, due to the fact that economic and social rights are enumerated in the Constitution—the role for courts in this respect is a relatively large one. In other states, the emphasis is on negative fundamental rights protection.Google Scholar

¹⁰² See supra note 25.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ While for a “social state” it might be worth aiming for more than the provision of an absolute minimum. Cf. Görsch, supra note 54, at 649. The ECtHR should arguably not move beyond any minimum provision of social guarantees.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Koch, supra note 27 (in relation to the ECHR).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Hartz IV at para. 142.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Indeed, even in the German context the requirements are arguably too detailed. See Bittner, supra note 90, at 1954.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ For example, in the so-called “pilot judgments” the legislature is indirectly called upon to alter the legal regime in place. See, e.g., Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR App. No. 31443/96 (June 22, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ This could imply that in the case of the provision of social benefits, one has a right to have his personal situation considered by the responsible authorities. Cf. the Roma housing case law of the Court, where it has formulated demands as to the proportionality analysis that has to take place at the national level. See, e.g., Winterstein and Others v. France, ECHR App. No. 27013/07 (Oct. 17, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Indeed, an equal treatment approach can have a significant “socializing” effect. See, e.g., Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Discrimination as a Magnifying Lens: Scope and Ambit under Article 14 and Protocol No. 12, in Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights 330 (Eva Brems & Janneke Gerards eds., 2014).Google Scholar