1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 et al, (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html. All references to the ruling and the dissenting opinion use the paragraph numbers established in this internet publication by the FCC.Google Scholar

2 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, 1993 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 89, 155 (Oct. 12, 1993).Google Scholar

3 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1877/97, 2 BvR 50/98, 1998 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 97, 350 (Mar. 31, 1998) (rejecting the complaint).Google Scholar

4 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10, 2011 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 129, 124 (Sept. 7, 2011) (“Greek bailout”, rejecting complaint).Google Scholar

5 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 1/05 - 2 BvR 636/05, 2005 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 112, 363 (Apr. 28, 2004) (rejecting as inadmissible).Google Scholar

6 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08 et. al., 2009 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 123, 267 (June 30, 2009).Google Scholar

7 Regulations 1173/2011 (on effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro-Area), 1174/2011 (on enforcement measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances), 1175/2011 (amendment of the Stability and Growth pact of 1997 preventive arm), 1176/2011 (on prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances); 1177/2011 (amendment of SGP—corrective arm) and Directive 2011/85 (on requirements for budgetary frameworks of member states).Google Scholar

8 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 et al, (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20140318_2bvr139012en.html.Google Scholar

9 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 et al, 2012 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 132, 139 (Sept. 12, 2012).Google Scholar

10 ECB press release of Sept. 6, 2012, quoted in the case discussed here under paragraph 3. The ECB's own justification of the program can be found in ECB Monthly Bulletin October 2012, page 7–9 (box 1). The TARGET2 system, which is also challenged by some of the applicants before the FCC, will not be considered in this note.Google Scholar

11 Darvas, Zolt, The ECB's Magic Wand, 47 Intereconomics 266–67 (2012).Google Scholar

12 On the irrationality of that perception, see Grauwe, Paul De & Ji, Yuemei, The fiscal implications of the ECB's bond-buying programme, voxEU, 2013, http://bit/ly/14M6SUd.Google Scholar

13 Procedural decision of Dec. 17, 2013 (allocating new case numbers to these applications).Google Scholar

14 This is also mentioned as problematic in the dissenting opinion by Judge Lübbe-Wolff. BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 2 of dissent.Google Scholar

15 Christlich-Soziale Union, the Bavarian arm of the German conservative party.Google Scholar

16 New case number: 2 BvR 2727/13.Google Scholar

17 Submission of 11.10.2012, on file with the author.Google Scholar

18 See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08.Google Scholar

19 New case number: 2 BvR 2729/13.Google Scholar

20 See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92.Google Scholar

21 See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08.Google Scholar

22 See BVerfG, 2 BvR 1877/97, 2 BvR 50/98.Google Scholar

23 Freiheitspartei Österreich (Austrian Freedom Party), a right-wing populist party founded by Jörg Haider in the 1990s.Google Scholar

24 Wilhelm Hankel & Wilhelm Nölting.Google Scholar

25 Joachim Starbatty. “Alternative für Deutschland” was founded much later than the activities of the group against EMU began. As its name—alternative perspectives for Germany—indicates, the group challenges the frequent reliance on “TINA” (there is no alternative) in debates around the European Union and in particular the euro area crisis. Its aims include that Germany leaves the EU or at least the euro-area, which is supported by populist arguments stressing different national characters in the EU, among other arguments. The party did not gain a sufficient number of votes for representation in the Bundestag so far.Google Scholar

26 Bruno Bandulet. Bandulet has been considered as associated with the dissolved “Bund Freier Bürger,” a former grouping which also aimed at standing for parliamentary elections.Google Scholar

27 Submission of Nov. 13, 2012, on file with the author.Google Scholar

28 New case number: 2 BvR 2730/13.Google Scholar

29 http://www.mehr-demokratie.de/.Google Scholar

30 Originally, these were two claims, raised by about 11000 and 26000 citizens respectively.Google Scholar

31 Submissions of Nov. 14, 2012 & July 8, 2013, on file with the author.Google Scholar

32 New case number 2 BvR 2731/13. RA Professor Dr. Markus C Kerber also represented claimants in the challenge of the Lisbon Treaty, See supra note 18) and the “Greek bailout,” See supra note 4. He should not be confused with Markus Kerber, acting director of BDI (Bund Deutscher Industrie) from July 2011, http://www.bdi.eu/bdi_english/649_660.htm, Feb. 20, 2014.Google Scholar

33 Henkel, Olaf, who was the former president of the BDI, now also supports AfD, as stated in the last chapter of his most recent book: Olaf Henkel, Die Euro-Lügner: Unsinnige Rettungspakete, vertuschte Risiken–So werden wir getäuscht (Munich: Heyne, 2013).Google Scholar

34 The background of the claims is explained in a number of press releases, available at http://www.europolis-online.org/.Google Scholar

35 Beatrix von Storch also supports AfD, and was one of their candidates for the German general elections in Berlin, as is still reported on her web page, http://www.beatrixvonstorch.de/, Feb. 23, 2014.Google Scholar

36 General Court decision in case T-492/12 of Dec. 10, 2013, nyr (available in French and German).Google Scholar

37 Zivile Koalition has its registered office in Berlin, at the same address as B von Storch. Available at: http://www.zivilekoalition.de/aktionen/schluss-mit-der-schuldenunion-raus-aus-dem-esm-zurueck-zur-demokratie.Google Scholar

38 This party results from a merger of the PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus – Party of Democratic Socialism), a successor of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the governing party of the GDR) and some Western German parties, among others a split off from the Social Democrats, after German reunification, www.die-linke.de.Google Scholar

39 New case number 2 BvE 13/13.Google Scholar

40 This procedure is one of two constitutional procedures before the FCC, and allows a party or faction in the parliament to clarify questions of political party law, electoral or parliamentary law. See Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act], Aug. 29, 2013, BGBI I. at 3463, § 93.Google Scholar

41 The FCC confirmed that the social state principle is part of the “constitutional identity” of Germany, but did not consider it to encompass stability of the currency. See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08.Google Scholar

42 Submissions of Nov. 2012, on file with the author, 31.Google Scholar

43 Submissions of May 26, 2013, on file with the author, 2.Google Scholar

44 Id. at 2, 7. See also the reference to their argumentation in the Lisbon ruling. BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08 at para. 117.Google Scholar

45 Roedl, Florian, Autoritär und unso, Mitbestimmung Magazin, 2012, http://www.boeckler.de/40891_40906.htm. Challenges to this argument are explored more expansively in Schiek, Dagmar, The EU Constitution of Social Governance in an Economic Crisis: in Defence of a Transnational Dimension to Social Europe, 20 Maastricht J. of Comp. & Eur. L., 185–208 (2013).Google Scholar

46 For example, Paul Taylor states for Reuters that the FCC side-steps the question who decides about sovereignty in the EU - http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/07/us-germany-court-ecb-precedent-analysis-idUSBREA161I420140207 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).Google Scholar

47 BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 99–100 (the main purpose of the decision was to influence markets).Google Scholar

48 Id. at para. 101.Google Scholar

49 Id. at para.45.Google Scholar

50 Id. at para. 48.Google Scholar

51 Id. at para. 53.Google Scholar

52 Id. at para. 51–52, 54.Google Scholar

53 Id. at para. 20 (dissenting opinion).Google Scholar

54 See supra note 18.Google Scholar

55 BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 221.Google Scholar

56 Id. at para. 280–292.Google Scholar

57 Goulard, Sylvie, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Apr. 1, 2010).Google Scholar

58 Steinbach, Armin, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court—New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?, 11 German L. J. 367, 389 (2010).Google Scholar

59 Weiler, Joseph, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 Euro. L. J. 219–58 (1995).Google Scholar

60 See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08 et. al. at para. 178 et. seq., 181 et. seq.Google Scholar

61 See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 at para. 168–169.Google Scholar

62 See BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08.Google Scholar

63 Id. at para. 28 seq.Google Scholar

64 Craig, Paul, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology, 20 Maastricht J. of Comp. & Eur. L. 3, 7–9 (2013).Google Scholar

65 Schiek, Dagmar, The EU Constitution of Social Governance in an Economic Crisis: in Defence of a Transnational Dimension to Social Europe, 20 Maastricht J. of Comp. & Eur. L. 185–208 (2013). See also Economic and Social Integration: The Challenge for EU Constitutional Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 308.Google Scholar