¹ Comparative constitutional law has long been fascinated by the question of how constitutional values migrate. See Choudhry, Sujit, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law, 3 Vienna J. Int'l Const. L. 170 (2009); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1997); Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalisation of Constitutional Law, 49 Va. L. J. Int'l L. 985 (2009); Gábor Halmai, Perspectives on Global Constitutionalism: The Use of Foreign and International Law by Domestic Courts (2014); Gunter Frankenberg, Constitutional Transfer: The IKEA Theory Revisited, 8 Int'l J. Const. L. 563 (2010).Google Scholar

² Only few in the literature focus on the migration of antidemocratic and anti-constitutionalist ideas. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas: The Post-9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency, in Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). This Article focuses primarily on the influences of societal processes and does not deal with the democracy promotion by international organizations and constitutional democracies, for example the US, or with the autocracy promotion by authoritarian states, for example Russia. See Oisín Tansey, The Problem with Autocracy Promotion, 23 Democratization 141 (2016).Google Scholar

³ See, e.g., Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to a Government Without Checks: Hungary's Old and New Constitutions, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation: Hungary's New Fundamental Law 268 (Gäbor Attila Tóth ed., 2012); Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary's Constitutional Revolution, in Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend eds., 2015); Miklós Bánkuti et al., Opinion on Hungary's New Constitutional Order: Amicus Brief to the Venice Commission on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Key Cardinal Laws (Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele eds., 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).Google Scholar

⁴ See Radkiewicz, Piotr, The Axiological Clash as a Key Determinant of Expanded and Destructive Political Conflict in Poland, 31 East Eur. Pol. & Societies 382 (2017).Google Scholar

⁵ See Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 563–79, 570–75.Google Scholar

⁶ Note that we are talking about majorities in this broader sense, majorities as construed by governing majorities, identifying dominant views and values in a society.Google Scholar

⁷ See Rosenfeld, Michel, Constitutional Identity, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional law 756–57 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2012).Google Scholar

⁸ See Rosenfeld, Michel, Law and the Postmodern Mind: The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 1049 (1995); Rosenfeld, supra note 7.Google Scholar

⁹ This is not meant to challenge attempts to distinguish these concepts in other contexts. For us here, however, it would not make a difference for the values we are interested in can be analyzed equally as part of constitutional or Member State or national identity of a country. The constitutional aspects of identity are but one dimension of the broader notion of “national identity.” In social sciences, the overuse and the ambiguity of the term “identity” has long led to the observation that the terminology leads to obfuscation rather than conceptual clarity. See Brubaker, Rogers & Cooper, Frederick, Beyond “Identity”, 29 Theory & Soc'y 1 (2000). As we will see, the ambiguity that is a liability for analytic thinking as well as for law is an asset for politicians.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For defining values, see, e.g., Dennis Davis, Alan Richter & Cheryl Saunders, Introduction, in An Inquiry into the Existence of Global Values: Through the Lens of Comparative Constitutional Law 1 (Dennis Davis, Alan Richter & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2015); Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 Yale J. L. & Human. 219 (1994).Google Scholar

¹¹ Schlag, supra note 11, at 221.Google Scholar

¹² “[W]hile the EU Treaty speaks in Article 2 TEU about the ‘values’ of the Union, it is absolutely clear that what is meant by ‘values’ in this context is actually ‘principles'—fundamental principles—of EU law.” Dimitry Kochenov, The Acquis and its Principles: The Enforcement of the ‘Law’ vs. the Enforcement of ‘Values’ in the European Union, in The Enforcement of EU Law and Values 10 (András Jakab & Dimitry Kochenov eds., 2017).Google Scholar

¹³ See to this topic Tomasz Warczok & Hanna Dębska, Sacred Law and Profane Politics: The Symbolic Construction of the Constitutional Tribunal, 188 Polish Soc'ical Rev. 461 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Acknowledging that the difference, in use or misuse, is important, in this paper, we would like to remain agnostic as to whether applying the concept of constitutional identity for shielding illiberal practices is part of its “misuse” —for example, the concept itself cannot be blamed for undermining constitutionalism—or of its “use” for the concept is inherently problematic.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For an account on how exclusive values can easily lead to a “disunited nation,” see the volume Constitution for a Disunited Nation: Hungary's New Fundamental Law (Gábor Attila Tóth ed., 2012).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Alexander Yakobson, God and Religion in Modern Democratic Constitutions, in The Nation State and Religion: The Resurgence of Faith 9 (Anita Shapira, Stern, Yedidia Z. & Alexander Yakobson eds., 2013). Yakobson does not consider the Hungarian case.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Andräs Sajö, The Social in the Private: A Genealogy of “Private Life”, in Essays in Honour of Dean Spielmann 571 (Josep Casadevall et al. eds., 2017).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at 571.Google Scholar

¹⁹ We use the term “dominant” here to indicate that numerical majorities are not always in a dominant position and what is termed “majority” is often a construction of those in power. “Majority” in this sense is a shorthand reference for the interests best represented by those in power. We do not see equivalence between minority rights and “majority rights” to protect one's culture. See generally Orgad, Liav, The Cultural Defense of Nations. A Liberal Theory of Majority Rights (2015). If such a majority culture includes only inclusive elements, there seems to be no problem with protecting them constitutionally. If, however, this self-defense seeks to protect exclusive values, our argument applies, including the subversive potential of a critical mass of exclusivity. For the logical problem with the concept of “majority rights,” see Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously 194 (1978).Google Scholar

²⁰ For a recent and insightful reconstruction, see Levy, Jacob T., Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (2014).Google Scholar

²¹ See, e.g., The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Ziegler, Katja S., Elisabeth Wicks & Loveday Hodson eds., 2015).Google Scholar

²² See Margit Feischmidt & Balázs Majtényi, Introduction, in The Hungarian Fundamental Law and the Origins of New Nationalism (Margit Feischmidt & Balázs Majtényi eds., forthcoming 2018).Google Scholar

²³ See Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political 28–29 (2007).Google Scholar

²⁴ Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other 139 (1998).Google Scholar

²⁵ For a discussion on the topic of Brexit, see Michaels, Ralf, Does Brexit Spell the Death of Transnational Law?, 17 German L.J. 51 (2016); Neil Walker, The European Fallout, 17 German L.J. 125 (2016). The British case combines, similarly to the Central and Eastern European cases, Euroscepticism with human rights skepticism. See Ziegler, Katja S., Elisabeth Wicks & Loveday Hodson, The UK and Human Rights: Some Reflections, in The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? 504–06 (Ziegler, Katja S., Elisabeth Wicks & Loveday Hodson eds., 2015).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Feischmidt & Majtényi, supra note 22.Google Scholar

²⁷ Brubaker talks about “civilizationism” as well as “nationalism” in the case of Northern and Western national populists. See Brubaker, Rogers, Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective, 40 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 1191 (2017).Google Scholar

²⁸ See for example the interview of Hungarian Prime Minster Orbán to Bild: “The quota redraws the ethnic, cultural and religious face of Hungary and Europe. I decided [on the referendum against the quota] not against Europe but in defense of European democracy. For what is the fundamental principle of democracy? It is ultimately loyalty to the nation.” [“A kvóta pedig újrarajzolja Magyarország és Európa etnikai, kulturális és vallási arculatát. Nem Európa ellenében, hanem az európai demokrácia védelmében döntöttem így. Mert mi a demokrácia alapelve? Végső soron a nemzet iránti hŭiség.”] See Interview with Viktor Orbán to the German Newspaper Bild [Orbán Viktor interjúja a Bild címŭ német napilapnak], miniszterelnok.hu, 25 February 2016.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Feischmidt & Majtényi, supra note 22.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Feischmidt, Margit & Hervik, Peter, Mainstreaming the Extreme: Intersecting Challenges from the Far Right in Europe, 1 Intersections 3–17 (2015).Google Scholar

³¹ Aristotle Kallis, Far-Right “Contagion” or a Failing “Mainstream”? How Dangerous Ideas Cross Borders and Blur Boundaries, in 2013 Democracy and Security 235. Kallis draws a parallel with the interwar situation, which we do not assess here, but note the resemblance in that xenophobic populism gained force following an international financial crisis and economic depression.Google Scholar

³² See, e.g., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Alejandro Sariz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberto Llivina eds., 2013); Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1417 (2011).Google Scholar

³³ This is not to question whether or not case law matters. Yet, court cases only show a small part of the changes on the constitutional terrain that might not even be representative—in this sense they might be worse than the “tip of the iceberg” from the size of which we can infer the size of the full iceberg.Google Scholar

³⁴ For example, the Sayn-Witgenstein case is relevant and illuminating. See Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, 2010 E.C.R. I-13693. The plaintiff with Austrian nationality was adopted by a German national whose surname contained a nobility title of “Fürst” (Prince) and the Austrian authorities eventually modified her name by removing the title. According to the Court it should be taken into account that the Law on the abolition of the nobility is an element of Austrian national identity. See, e.g., Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 32, at 1423–25.Google Scholar

³⁵ Von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 32, at 1433.Google Scholar

³⁶ Wojciech Sadurski, Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe, 10 Eur. L.J. 401 (2004).Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. at 401.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Gábor Halmai, An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of Europe, in European Yearbook of Human Rights 512 (Wolfgang Benedek, Florence Benoît-Rohmer, Wolfram Karl, Kettemann, Matthias C. & Manfred Nowak eds., 2014).Google Scholar

³⁹ Political Declaration 1 of 2010 (16 June 2010) of the Hungarian National Assembly on National Cooperation, http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/1EC78EE5-8A4B-499C-9BE5-E5FD5DC2C0A1/0/Political_Declaration.pdf. The controversial Declaration was ordered to be hung in all offices of state institutions available to the public.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Id. Google Scholar

⁴¹ “In the spring of 2010 the Hungarian nation once again summoned its vitality and brought about another revolution in the voting booths.” Id. Google Scholar

⁴² According to the government, the Fundamental Law “determines fundamental human rights in the spirit of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.” The Hungarian Government, The Fundamental Law, http://www.kormany.hu/en/hungary/the-hungarian-state/the-fundamental-law. For an overview, see Nóra Chronowski, The New Hungarian Fundamental Law in the Light of the European Union's Normative Values, 2012 Revue Est Europa (Special Issue No. 1) 111.Google Scholar

⁴³ See, e.g., Constitution for a Disunited Nation, supra note 15; Amicus Briefs on the Hungarian Constitution, Amicus Briefs, https://sites.google.com/site/amicusbriefhungary/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017); Halmai, supra note 38; Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not Work, 26 Governance 559–62 (2013); Scheppele, supra note 3.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Schmitt, supra note 23, at 28–29.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Zoltán Miklósi, Demokrácia: liberális, alkotmányos és egyéb [Democracy: Liberal, Constitutional and Other] Szuveren.hu (July 31, 2014), http://szuveren.hu/politika/demokracia-liberalis-alkotmanyos-es-egyeb.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Timeline of Governmental Attacks Against Hungarian NGO Sphere, https://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/timeline_of_gov_attacks_against_hu_ngos_22022017_0.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Amendment of Act CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations Financed from Abroad, adopted on 13 June 2017.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Nem leszünk gyarmat! Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde, Budapesten, 2012. március 15. [Hungary will not be a colony! Viktor Orbán's commemoration speech in Budapest on 15 March 2012], http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/nem_leszunk_gyarmat; Kester Eddy, Orbán Compares EU to Soviet Union, Fin. Times (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6feaca90-6ecb-11e1-afb8-00144feab49a.html.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ It is in this sense that the anti-constitutionalist elements—implied in the self-label of the PM, “illiberal”—bring the Orbán regime to the point that the national identity identified by the government could be seen as an “anti-constitutional,” rather than constitutional, identity. For the understanding that by the insertion of anti-constitutionalist elements something ceases to be “constitutional” identity, see Pietro Faraguna's chapter in this volume. 18 German L.J. (2017). On a formal level, the Hungarian constitutional document does not call itself a constitution, but the Fundamental Law of Hungary. What is more important is that it is not a “non-constitutional,” but “anti-constitutional” constitution. Without lamenting whether there is a possible middle ground for “non-constitutional”—that is neither constitutional, nor anti-constitutional—the Hungarian case is example for an anti-constitutional regime in that it explicitly challenges basic tenets of constitutionalism, most importantly declaring a war on independent institutions that could serve as internal checks.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See, e.g., Interview with Viktor OrbánGoogle Scholar

The question is whether the same spirit, civilization, culture, way of thinking will define the character of European countries than during the times of our parents and grand-parents, or something completely different. This is at stake with migration …. We … want to conserve the foundations of Europe. We don't want parallel societies, we don't want to exchange populations and we don't want to replace Christian civilization with a different one. This is why we build fences, we protect ourselves and we don't allow migrants to flood us.Google Scholar

Ottó Gajdics, Magyarországon most a kampány főpróbája zajlik [We Witness Now the Rehearsal of the Campaign in Hungary], Magyar Idők (Apr. 15, 2017), http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/magyarorszagon-kampany-foprobaja-zajlik-1584190/.Google Scholar

⁵² See the episode, from the many turns in the Hungarian government's response to the arrival of asylum seekers, when people were not let board trains. See Hartocollis, Anemona & Bilefsky, Dan, Train Station in Budapest Cuts Off Service to Migrants, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/world/europe/keleti-train-station-budapest-migrant-crisis.html.Google Scholar

⁵³ The Hungarian radical right extremists had labeled both groups—refugees and the Roma—as enemies even before the start of the hostile governmental policy against refugees. For instance, there were a series of murders targeting the Roma and refugees in 2008 and 2009; four men did an armed robbery in Besenyszög, fired shots on the refugee camp in Debrecen, and attacked Roma with arms and Molotov cocktails in nine settlements.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ The relevant quote: Likewise, it is a historical feature of Hungary and a given—regardless of what anyone may think about it, whether one likes it or not – that it is home to hundreds of thousands of Roma. Someone, at some point in time, decided on this, and this is a situation which we have inherited.Google Scholar

Viktor Orbán, Speech at a Meeting of the Heads of Hungary's Diplomatic Missions Abroad (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-ministers-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-a-meeting-of-the-heads-of-hungary-s-diplomatic-missions-abroad.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ As an example: We are not talking about non-governmental organisations fighting to promote an important cause, but about paid activists from international organisations and their branch offices in Hungary. […] This is the transnational empire of George Soros, with its international heavy artillery and huge sums of money. […] the organisations of George Soros are working tirelessly to bring hundreds of thousands of migrants into Europe.Google Scholar

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, State of the Nation Address (Febr. 10, 2017), http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-state-of-the-nation-address-2/.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Kriszta Kovács's chapter in this volume. 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Gábor Halmai, The Invalid Anti-Migrant Referendum in Hungary, Verfassungsblog (Oct. 4, 2016), http://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-anti-european-immigration-laws/.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Resolution 22/2016 (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, http://hunconcourt.hu/letoltesek/en_22_2016.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Id. at para. 67.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ It is common to underline that the Hungarian populist turn is successful at least partly because the political moves are trying to predict what will work given the social preferences of dominant voting groups, most importantly (some would say, exclusively) the electorate that keeps FIDESZ in power. In the case of the anti-refugee campaign, the communication and the measures of the government seemed to meet with existing social sentiments.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Endre Sik, The Socio-Demographic Basis of Xenophobia in Contemporary Hungary, in The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary 41 (Bori Simonovits and Anikó Bernát eds., 2016).Google Scholar

⁶² Id. Google Scholar

⁶³ TÁRKI [Social Research Institute Inc.], Bizalomhiány, normazavarok, igazságtalanságérzet és paternalizmus a magyar társadalom értékszerkezetében [Lack of trust, norm disorder, sense of injustices and paternalism in the structure of Hungarian society], 2009, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/gazdkult/osszefoglalo_kepviselok_091026.pdf.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ István György Tóth, Turdnbdnya—Értékválasztások, beidegződések és az illiberalizmusra való fogadókészség Magyarországon [Turan Mine – Value Choices, Habits and Receptivity to Illiberalism in Hungary], Index (June 12, 2017), http://index.hu/gazdasag/penzbeszel/2017/06/12/turanbanya/ (contribution to the volume Hegymenet—Társadalmi és politikai kihívások Magyarországon [Uphill – Social and Political Challenges in Hungary] (András Jakab & László Urbán eds., 2017)). For the original report, see TÁRKI [Social Research Institute Inc.], Értékek 2013 [Values 2013] (2013), http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/gazdkult/2013/2013_zarotanulmany_gazd_kultura.pdf.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Id. at 55, 61.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary's Constitutional Revolution, in Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend eds., 2015); and the thematic issue of the Hungarian human rights quarterly, 19 Fundamentum No. 2–3 (2015).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Dániel Hegedŭ's, The Kremlin's Influence in Hungary: Are Russian Vested Interests Wearing Hungarian National Colors?, DGAPkompakt No. 8 (Feb. 2016).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For the list of countries based on the registry of the Government Debt Management Agency, see Bálint Szalai, Bődületeset kaszálnak Rogán ötletén [Making awful sums on Rogán's idea], Index (Jan. 29, 2015), http://index.hu/gazdasag/2015/01/29/valaki_boduleteset_kaszal_rogan_otleten/. For the English account, see Cooper, Harry, Hungarian Hole in the Schengen Fence, Politico (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-residence-permits-schengen-visa-free-viktor-orban/.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Pál Sonnevend, András Jakab & Lóránt Csink, The Constitution as an Instrument of Everyday Party Politics: The Basic Law of Hungary, in Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania 46 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend eds., 2015).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Orbán acknowledged this when he talked about what he learned from Sándor Demján, one of the richest men in Hungary, namely that in times of crisis, there is no normativity. Orbán Viktor beszéde [The Speech of Viktor Orbán], 17/5 VOSZ Hírek 29 [News of the National Alliance of Entrepreneurs and Employers] (Aug.–Sept. 2012), http://www.vosz.hu/rovat/file?id=j1Tm738STKVpXfA3_vn9wAC7RY7xjqApJ9eT2rkphNwLU8NcV1RoRVAq59wJYQ X7iwQDu0n7LTf2EEOw4cuSrJ.Google Scholar

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⁷² See The Speech of Viktor Orbán, supra note 70, at 21.Google Scholar

⁷³ Referring to the Swiss as a freedom-loving people that never gave up their independence and to Switzerland as an example that there is life outside the EU, “so nobody should be frightened.” Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök avatta fel a Stadler új szolnoki üzemrészeit [Prime Minister Viktor Orbán inaugurates the new factory blocks of Stadler in Szolnok], Kormanyhivatal.hu (Apr. 18, 2013, http://www.kormanyhivatal.hu/hu/jasz-nagykun-szolnok/hirek/orban-viktor-miniszterelnok-avatta-fel-a-stadler-uj-szolnoki-uzemreszeit.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ 180 perc: Ki kell-e lépni az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezményéből? [180 minutes: Should We Leave the European Convention on Human Rights?], Mediaklikk.hu (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.mediaklikk.hu/2017/03/23/180-perc-ki-kell-e-lepni-az-emberi-jogok-europai-egyezmenyebol/.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Orbán Viktor beszéde a határvadászok eskütételén [Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Swearing-in of “Border Hunters”], Miniszterelnok.hu (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-beszede-a-hatarvadaszok-eskutetelen-2/ (“This [i.e. that laws apply to those who ”illegally“ enter the country] is reality which cannot be overwritten by all that rarified claptrap about human rights.”). For the source of the translation, see The Hungarian Government's Shameful Treatment of Asylum Seekers, Hungarian Spectrum (Mar. 9, 2017), http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/03/09/the-hungarian-governments-shameful-treatment-of-asylum-seekers/.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Orbán to New Border Guards—“Nowhere Do Human Rights Prescribe National Suicide”, Budapest Beacon (Jan. 12, 2017), http://budapestbeacon.com/news-in-brief/orban-new-border-guards-nowhere-human-rights-prescribe-national-suicide/43718.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ For an insightful commentary on the legal inconsistency and political context of the decisions filtering referendum initiatives, see, e.g., Zoltán Szente, The Controversial Anti-Migrant Referendum in Hungary Is Invalid, Const. Making & Const. Change (Oct. 10, 2016), http://constitutional-change.com/the-controversial-anti-migrant-referendum-in-hungary-is-invalid/.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ For the term and the start of the trend, see Gábor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?, 19 Constellations 182 (2012).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ FIDESZ is still member of the European People's Party and has a member in its presidency and a vice-chair in its EP group.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Jack M. Balkin's argument that anything can become constitutionalized: “What is constitutional in one era becomes deconstitutionalized in another, and vice versa. Much depends on political entrepreneurs and how they express grievances.” For his summary on an exchange on his book, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (2011) see Balkin, Jack, Constitutional Televangelizing, Concurring Opinions (Aug. 3, 2011), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/08/constitutional-televangelizing.html.Google Scholar

⁸¹ These are rounds of manipulative questionnaires, often combined with political campaigns, sent out to all citizens who then can decide to send them back marking their preferences for lower commodity prices or to defend the country from terrorists. For a detailed description of the ways in which the questionnaires violate the basic principles of polling, specificslly the open letter of social scientists, including leading Hungarian polling experts, see Social Scientists About the National Consultation (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.peticiok.com/tarsadalomkutatok_a_nemzeti_konzultaciorol.Google Scholar

⁸² For the “troubles” that intermixing cause and the need for “ethnic homogeneity” for economic success, from Orbán, see Hungary's Orban: “Ethnic Homogeneity” Vital for Economic Success, DW (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-orban-ethnic-homogeneity-vital-for-economic-success/a-37755766; Orbán Calls “Ethnic Homogeneity” a Key to Success, Euractiv.com (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/orban-calls-ethnic-homogeneity-a-key-to-success/ (stating that the government “cannot risk changing the fundamental ethnic character of the country”).Google Scholar