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Federalism on Trial: The Third International German Law Journal Workshop

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Anna S. Zöbeley  and
Katia Schier

Extract

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“The existing federal system is obsolete”, said Federal President Horst Köhler, announcing his decision, in a television address of 21 July 2005, to dissolve the German Bundestag (Parliament) and to call new elections. The following day, the German Law Journal hosted its third international workshop on theory and developments in German Federalism at the Max Planck Institute for the Research on Collective Goods, Bonn. The setting was appropriate, since the Institute is located between two former permanent representations of the federal states (Länder). The building itself once housed the Egyptian embassy, and so presented “neutral ground” for a discussion on federalism.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 8 , 01 August 2005 , pp. 1201 - 1208
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 “Die bestehende föderale Ordnung ist überholt.” Full text at http://www.bundespraesident.de/-,2.625010/Fernsehansprache-von-Bundespra.htm (26 July 2005).Google Scholar

Cite as: Anna S. Zoebeley and Katia Schier, Federalism on Trial: The Third International German Law Journal Workshop, in: 6 German Law Journal 1201 (2005), at: www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No08/PDF_Vol_06_No_08_1201-1208_Developments_Zoebeley_Schier.pdf Google Scholar

2 The reform changed the text of Art. 72 § 2 Basic Law to:Google Scholar

“(2) Der Bund hat in diesem Bereich das Gesetzgebungsrecht, wenn und soweit die Herstellung gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse im Bundesgebiet oder die Wahrung der Rechts- oder Wirtschaftseinheit im gesamtstaatlichen Interesse eine bundesgesetzliche Regelung erforderlich macht.”Google Scholar

((2) The Federation shall have the right to legislate on these matters if and to the extent that the establishment of equal2 living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.).Google Scholar

3 Cf. decision of 30 April 1952, 1 BvR 14, 25, 167/52, BVerfGE 1, 264 and decision of 22 April 1953, 1 BvL 18/52, BVerfGE 2, 213, 224, 225.Google Scholar

4 Decision of 24 October 2002, 2 BvF 1/01, BVerfGE 106, 62 – “Altenpflege”; decision of 16 March 2004, 1 BvR 1778/01, BVerfGE 110, 141 – “Bekämpfung gefährlicher Hunde”; decision of 9 June 2004, 1 BvR 636/02, BVerfGE 111, 10 – “Ladenschlußgesetz”; decision of 27th July 2004, 2 BvF 2/02, BVerfGE 111, 226 – “Juniorprofessur” and decision of 26th January 2005, 2 BvF 1/03, www.bverfg.de – “Studiengebühren”.Google Scholar

5 They were mostly made by a five-to-four majority with Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy being the “Federalist Five”.Google Scholar

6 531 U.S. 98 (2000).Google Scholar

7 For another view, see, e.g., http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/polisci/meta-elements/pdf/melnick/deregulating-the-states.pdf.Google Scholar

8 Cf. decision of 24 June 1997, 2 BvP 1/94, BVerfGE 96, 139 as an example of the Federal Constitutional Court's functional approach.Google Scholar

9 Statistics at http://www.bundesrat.de/Site/Inhalt/DE/6_20Parlamentsmaterialien/6.6_20Statistik/6.6.2_20Gesamtstatistik_20der_20Wahlperiode/Gesamtstatistik,property=Dokument.pdf.Google Scholar

10 See the statistics at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/cln_04/nn_4480/DE/Service/Downloads/Abt__V/LFA_20ab_201995,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/LFA%20ab%201995.Google Scholar

11 The “Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung” was convened in 2003. Two major issues, territorial reform and fiscal equalization, were taken off the agenda at the beginning and were not discussed by the commission at all. Even with this limited agenda, co-chairs Franz Müntefering and Edmund Stoiber announced the failure of the commission on 17 December 2004.Google Scholar

12 On this proposition see P. M. Huber, Klarere Verantwortungsteilung von Bund, Ländern und Kommunen, Gutachten, erstattet für den 65. Deutschen Juristentag, p. D 58-60, D 70-75, D 140 Thesis 16: “Auffanggesetzgebung mit Zugriffsrecht”.Google Scholar

13 Cf. Ch. Hillgruber, Klarere Verantwortungsteilung von Bund, Ländern und Gemeinden?; 59 Juristenzeitung 837, 841 (2004).Google Scholar

14 Cf. O. Bauer, Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (1908) or, in English translation, O. Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy (E. Nimni ed., 2000).Google Scholar

15 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (1977).Google Scholar