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68 The fruitfulness of this approach is shown in several case studies which focus on the evolution of the German tort and accident law which was a result of the introduction of modern technologies like railroads and steam engines in the 19th century, see Eckardt, , supra, note 1, 207-311; Eckardt, Martina, The Evolution of the German Tort Law in the 19^th Century – An Economic Analysis of the Evolution of Law, in Institutional Analysis of History 83-116 (Oliver Volckart ed., 2004).Google Scholar

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