See, generally, Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Introduction in, Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism, forthcoming. It is true that the way in which the domestic consultative process is structured may be seriously flawed. Public choice theory suggests that negotiating positions may be the result of the unequal ability of rent-seeking interest groups to organize and influence the political process. (Peter Behrens, Weltwirtschaftsverfassung, in: Jahrbuch fuer Neue Politische Oekonomie, Band 19, p. 12–3.) Positions may not therefore reflect conceptions of self-interest and prevailing conviction in a given community but may represent the expression of political decisionmaking. This phenomenon is likely to make international consensus more difficult to reach during negotiations in which there should otherwise be no significant differences in conceptions of self-interest and prevailing conviction. What is important for our purposes here, however, is that a position is taken and put forward in negotiation and not its development.Google Scholar

See, generally, Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.Google Scholar

Waldron, Jeremy, “Co-ordination is not enough”, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 22 September 2000, p. 12.Google Scholar

Ibid.Google Scholar

Ibid.Google Scholar

Streeck, Wolfgang, Einleitung: Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie? in Wolfgang Streeck (Hrsg.), Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie. Herausforderungen fuer die Demokratietheorie, Campus: Frankfurt/New York, 1998, p. 25.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 25–6.Google Scholar

See, for example, Martin Nettesheim, Von der Verhandlungsdemokratie zur internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung: Zur Entwicklung des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts, in: Jahrbuch fuer Neue Politische Oekonomie, Band 19, p. 18–9.Google Scholar

Streeck, p. 23.Google Scholar

Hall, p. 21.Google Scholar

Ladeur, Karl-Heinz, Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks — Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation States?, Paper presented in Florence at Workshop on Globalization and Public Governance, April 2000, forthcoming, p. 3. Recognition of the latter ability was, for example, behind Thatcher's interest in creating a true single market within the EEC as part of the privatization and deregulation of the British economy.Google Scholar

Streeck, p. 38. As Otto von Bismarck put it, “I have always found people demanding in the name of Europe that which they dare not ask for themselves.” As quoted in ECONOMIST, 2 June 2001, p. 16.Google Scholar

Adam Roberts, “Creating something unique”, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 14 July 2000, p. 10.Google Scholar

Habermas, Juergen, Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie, in: Die postnationale Konstellation, Frankfurt, p. 149.Google Scholar

Streeck, p. 11.Google Scholar

Habermas, p. 155.Google Scholar

Gloeckler, Gabriel et al., Guide to EU Policies, Blackstone, London, 1998, p. 26.Google Scholar

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 8 December 2001, no page citation at hand. The Euro-skepticism variously manifested in Denmark and Austria as well as Ireland over the last several years offers evidence of this reality.Google Scholar

Streeck, footnote 7.Google Scholar

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), 18 December 2000, p. 5. This proposal strikes me as paradoxical, if not contradictory to purpose of the whole project. In effect, it argues that to further European integration — especially through enlargement — the number of issues settled at the European level must be reduced.Google Scholar

Gloeckler, p. 14.Google Scholar

Ibid.Google Scholar

Adam Roberts, “Creating something unique”, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 14 July 2000, p. 10.Google Scholar

Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (2nd ed.), Routledge: London/New York, 1999, p. 503.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 21 July 2001, p. 34.Google Scholar

Ibid.Google Scholar

Ibid.Google Scholar

The new action plan for development partnership agreed between poor and wealthy states at a recent UN meeting notably contained no pledges of aid or debt relief. (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 May 2001, no page citation at hand) Such gestures would in any event have to be considerable to more than reverse the drop in developed world aid to sub-Saharan Africa that occurred during the 1990s.Google Scholar

Gloeckler, p. 13.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 21 July 2001, p. 34.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 19 May 2001, Survey, p. 10.Google Scholar

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 27 July 2001, p. 6.Google Scholar

In Poland and Hungary, for example, current support for EU membership barely exceeds 50%. ECONOMIST, 19 May 2001, Survey, p. 15.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 10.Google Scholar

One expert put it semi-facetiously: “I'm sure there is 100% support in Albania.” Ibid.Google Scholar

The sensitivity of popular opinion in applicant states was recently demonstrated by a large swing in support in favour of membership in Estonia following EU payments to the local agricultural sector and the victory of a local duo in the Eurovision song contest. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 13 August 2001, p. 6.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 19 May 2001, Survey, p. 10.Google Scholar

Gloeckler, p. 343.Google Scholar

The experience of past enlargement, particularly to Spain, Greece, and Portugal, fills supporters with hope of success in realizing these objectives.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 19 May 2001, Survey, p. 9.Google Scholar

Some participants argue that the veto rights of member states must be further curtailed if the EU is to maintain the integration dynamic and to avoid paralysis after enlargement. Others argue that increased heterogeneity should be managed by ‘flexible integration’ (i.e. by differentiated modes of integration that allow various groupings of member states to pursue public policies with different procedural and institutional arrangements). Each of the proposed approaches remains unsatisfactory to the extent that it does not constitute a means of resolving a difference of opinion when the integration process has reached a critical depth for certain member states. Gloeckler, p. 67–8.Google Scholar

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 February 2001, no page citation at hand.Google Scholar

Siedentop, Larry, Democracy in Europe, Allen Lane The Penguin Press: London, 2000, p. xi.Google Scholar

The negative response was particularly remarkable in the Irish context, as Ireland has benefitted greatly from EU membership. As a result of EU-related subsidies and foreign investment, Ireland has gone from being one of Europe's poorest states to being one of its richest in a remarkably short space of time.Google Scholar

“The seemingly sudden appearance of the Community in all walks of life caused people to question how it had happened and, more importantly, what basis it had in terms of legitimacy” (Gloeckler, p. 23). Since Maastricht, the EU can hardly be spoken publicly of without mention of a ‘democratic deficit’.Google Scholar

A poll taken early in the year showed 61% of French and German respondents “unsatisfied” with how the EU is organizing itself. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 February 2001, no page citation at hand.Google Scholar

Ibid.Google Scholar

The proposal of a special EU tax mooted recently (ECONOMIST, 14 July 2001, p. 30) may attract more popular attention to the supernational body, but it seems unlikely to enhance its popularity.Google Scholar

Siedentop, p. 215 on. The Economist pithly characterized this approach to steering the EU as “we decide everything; one day you'll thank us.” ECONOMIST, 28 October 2000, p. 11.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 2 June 2001, p. 16.Google Scholar

Prodi, Romano, as quoted in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), 14 February 2001, p. 1.Google Scholar

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 24 October 2000, no page citation at hand. Gerhard Schroeder is alleged to have complained during the Nice negotiations that the endless haggling over states' voting power within the EU “makes me sick” (as quoted in ECONOMIST, 16 December 2000, p. 23).Google Scholar

According to other observers, pragmatism and not grand visions has always dominated the progress from EEC to EC to EU. A recent account by Andrew Moravcsik finds, for example, that at five major treaty-amending turning points in the history of the EC the decisions taken were bargains among national governments based on concrete national interests, relative power and carefully calculated transfers of sovereignty. (See generally, Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, UCL Press: London, 2000.)Google Scholar

In both France and Germany, the traditional motors of European integration, the governments must soon face their electorates.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 28 October 2000, p. 11.Google Scholar

Siedentop, p. 217.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 229.Google Scholar

It is true that there is a gap between politicians and citizens throughout the West, but as European Commission President Romano Prodi noted, the alienation is “particularly acute” in the EU's case. (As quoted in ECONOMIST, 28 July 2001, p. 31.)Google Scholar

Marquand, David, “No End in Sight”, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 20 April 2001, p. 6.Google Scholar

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 27 July 2001, p. 6.Google Scholar

Siedentop, p. 28.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 28 October 2000, p. 11–2.Google Scholar

“Certainly, anyone betting against the EU over the past 50-odd years would have lost a lot of money.” ECONOMIST, 16 June 2001, p. 34.Google Scholar

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), 6 December 2000, p. 1.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 2 June 2001, p. 16.Google Scholar

A good argument can, however, be made that a persistent diversity of economic, fiscal, and social policies would be good for the European economy as it would stimulate competition among governments for mobile capital. Political union is accordingly to be resisted, as it implies policy harmonization.Google Scholar

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), 14 February 2001, p. 1.Google Scholar

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 12 June 2001, p. 12.Google Scholar

Siedentop., p. 231. Building up a US-style system may, as argued by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, be an “illusion”, as Europe may “never have a homogeneous national population. It is made up of different languages, cultures.” (As quoted in INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 15 November 2000, no page citation at hand.) With the proclamation of a Charter of Fundamental Rights in Nice, the existing member states have made some progress in this direction. They declared their desire thereby to be a community bound by shared values. Roman Herzog, chair of the drafting group, has referred to the Charter as a part of a future European constitution. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), 8 December 2000, p. 1.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 3 February 2001, p. 31.Google Scholar

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), 23 March 2001, p. 5.Google Scholar

Hall, p. 21 (manuscript).Google Scholar

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6 February 2001, no page citation at hand.Google Scholar

ECONOMIST, 16 June 2001, p. 33.Google Scholar