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A European Constitutional Treaty: The Blueprint for the European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Udo Di Fabio

Extract

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The debate over a European constitution is fully underway. (1) The issue will play an important role at the 2004 intergovernmental conference, especially if negotiations over a new model for the division of competencies between the Union and its constituent Member States is taken up at the Conference. The various points of inquiry — a Charter of Fundamental Rights, institutional reform, the division of competencies, financing, eastward expansion, finality — belong together and they beg for a solution that is fully conceptualized. With this in mind, the German Federal Government is justified in making sweeping, well thought out proposals. At the same time, the French government is equally correct to promote practical solutions while expressing a healthy suspicion of the formation of a federal state of Europe, which is the holiest of all possibilities for the Germans. Against this background, let me begin by saying a few things with respect to the legal nature of a possible constitution for the EU, before I move on to a presentation of more practical conclusions. II.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 2 , Issue 14: Special issue – European Constitutionalism , 2001 , E1
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

That is the conclusion of the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ) (May 16, 2001).Google Scholar
For a discussion of the French tradition of rationally coherent state structures, see, CLAUDE NICOLET, HISTORIE, NATION, RÉPUBLIQUE (2000).Google Scholar
Herzog, Roman, Ist Europa reif für eine Verfassung? FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (May 14, 2001).Google Scholar
Compare, THOMAS OPPERMAN, EUROPARECHT 307 (2d ed. 1999).Google Scholar
Ludger Kühnhardt, Die Zukunft des europäischen Einigungsgedankens, ZEI, C 53, 1999, p. 28.Google Scholar
The participation of the Bundesrat by way of Art. 59.2 of the Basic Law would, normally, be understood only as a surmountable veto-right of the Bundestag. Today, as a result of Art. 23.1 of the Basic Law there is an obligation to obtain consent from the Bundesrat.Google Scholar