(1) I recognise the inappropriateness of calling the debate within the European Union a European debate, when at least half of Europe is excluded. However, this would seem to be the accepted practice and for the sake of ease I have followed it. The question of the chosen title of the book will, however, be considered later.Google Scholar

(2) The analogy of an orchestra to the European Union has been used many times, for example by Timothy Garton Ash, (“The European Orchestra” (2001) 3 Hoover Digest; accessed on-line at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/013/ash.html) although not perhaps to refer to the academics and politicians who dominate much of the debate.Google Scholar

(3) Hereinafter, WVfE.Google Scholar

(4) Voigt, Stefan, “What Constitution for Europe? The Constitutional Question from the Point of View of (Positive) Constitutional Economics,” WVfE, 41. It remains, however, a simplification of the debate to suggest that most now accept a constitution as a necessity, as this claim glosses over a wide variety of strongly held opinions, such as those that hold the European Union to be a constituted legal order without desiring a formal constitution, an opinion held notably by Weiler (see The Constitution of Europe. Cambridge: CUP, 1999) and Pernice (below).Google Scholar

(5) Weizsäcker, Richard von, Dehaene, Jean-Luc, Simon, David, Die institutionellen Auswirkungen der Erweiterung. Bericht an die Europäische Kommission, 18/10/1999.Google Scholar

(6) The selected sections were chosen, respectively, for their general nature, best placed to allow consideration of the inter-disciplinary approach, and as best representing the areas to which it was hoped to bring new perspectives.Google Scholar

(7) For an introduction to the ‘no-demos’ thesis: Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?”, (1995) 1 European Law Journal 282. For a reply: Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?'”, (1995) 1 European Law Journal 303. See also Joseph Weiler, “Demos, Telos, Ethos and the Maastricht Decision” (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219.Google Scholar

(8) Voigt, supra n. 6.Google Scholar

(9) Ingolf Pernice, “Die Verfassungsfrage aus rechtwissenschaftlicher Sicht”, WVfE, 21.Google Scholar

(10) Case 26/ 62 [1963] ECR, 1-30.Google Scholar

(11) Pernice, supra n. 11, at 22.Google Scholar

(12) Hesse, Joachim Jens, “Die Diskussion um eine europäische Verfassung: Vom Kopf auf die Füβe zu stellen”, WVfE, 63.Google Scholar

(13) Hesse, supra n. 14, at 65Google Scholar

(14) Voigt, supra n.6, fn 15, at 47.Google Scholar

(15) Weiler, supra n.6Google Scholar

(16) Pernice, supra n.11, at 27.Google Scholar

(17) Ibid., at 30.Google Scholar

(18) In an Autumn 1999 Euro barometer survey, 52% identified themselves as European; figures in Christine Landfried, “Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Verfassungsstaat?”, WVfE, at 273.Google Scholar

(19) Pernice, supra n.11, at 31.Google Scholar

(20) Gert Nicholayson, “Der Streit zwischen dem Bundesverfassungsgericht und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof”, WVfE, at 91. See particularly Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 Common Market Law Review 57 (the so-called Maastricht decision).Google Scholar

(21) Oeter, Stefan, “Vertrag oder Verfassung: Wie offen läβt sich die Souveränitätsfrage halten?”, WVfE, at 243. Jo Shaw has, interestingly, commented that much of the constitutional debate has in fact been a discussion about sovereignty, that constitutionalism has been viewed largely “through the prism of sovereignty and legal power.” (Shaw, “Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union” (1999) 6 Journal of European Public Policy 579, at 585).Google Scholar

(22) Oeter, ibid., at 247.Google Scholar

(23) Bieber, too, warns of a situation in which the European institutions are both “Träger und … Objekte der Integration” (Roland Bieber, “Verfassungsfrage und institutionelle Reform”, WVfE, 111, at 114). Interesting in this regard, and also for Wagner's essay discussed below, is an excellent paper by Hans Lindahl, “Sovereignty and Representation in the European Union” (in N. Walker, Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: Hart, forthcoming), in which his (indisputable) contention that every unit is necessarily a represented unity suggests that the enactment of a constitution must be an act of “seizing the initiative” of construction.Google Scholar

(24) Oeter, supra, n.29, at 257.Google Scholar

(25) Landfried, supra, n.24, at 265.Google Scholar

(26) Landfried, supra, n.24, at 275. The possibility of treaty revision along the lines of the recommendations made by the Robert Schuman Centre was considered and rejected on the grounds that a basic treaty will not make the Union more democratic. (Robert Schuman Centre, Reforming the Treaties’ Amendment Procedure: Second Report on the Reorganisation of the Union Treaties (Robert Schuman Centre, 2000))Google Scholar

(27) Ibid., at 269Google Scholar

(28) Weiler, “Fischer: The Dark Side” in Joerges, C., Meny, Y. and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds), What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre, 2000; available on-line at: http://www.iue.it/RSC/symposium/ Google Scholar

(29) Landfried, supra, n.24, at 277.Google Scholar

(30) Ibid., at 276.Google Scholar

(31) Wagner, Helmut, “Gibt es einen Königsweg zu einer europäischen Verfassung?”, WVfE, 281.Google Scholar

(32) Wagner sees it as essential that a constitutional creation process include not just the fifteen Member States, but also the candidate countries – a point which no other contributor makes, with the exception of the only east European in the volume, Hanna Suchocka. (Suchocka, “Reflexionen über die Idee einer europäischen Verfassung”, WVfE, 149.)Google Scholar

(33) Wagner, supra, n. 42, at 293.Google Scholar

(34) Although, some, notably Walker, have expressed warnings about applying the Charter process to other areas of reform within the Union (paper given in the context of a departmental seminar “The Charter of Fundamental Rights” at the European University Institute, Florence, 21st November, 2001.)Google Scholar

(35) Wagner, supra, n.42, at 298.Google Scholar

(36) The literature is truly vast in all three disciplines. For a place to start: Weiler, supra n.6; G. de Búrca & J.Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the European Union: From Uniformity to Flexibility?, Oxford: Hart, 2000; Frank Ronge (Hrsg.), In Welche Verfassung ist Europa – Welche Verfassung für Europa? Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001.Google Scholar

(37) Shaw, supra, n.29, at 593. See in particular, among others: James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: CUP, 1995; N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Practical Reason. Oxford: OUP, 1999 (esp. Chapter 7); N. Walker, “European Constitutionalism and European Integration” (1996) Public Law 266; J. Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge. Frankfurt: Suhrkampf, 2001, chapter 7.Google Scholar

(38) “Kompetenz- Kompetenz” refers to the competence to decide jurisdictional boundaries.Google Scholar

(39) See in this regard, Marks, G., Scharpf, F.W., Schmitter, P., Streek, W. (eds.), Governance in the European Union. London: Sage, 1996; Alex Warleigh, The Committee of the Regions: Institutionalising Multi-level governance?, European Dossier Series. London: Kogan Page, 1999.Google Scholar

(40) The danger of failing to understand the importance of a ‘politics of recognition’ is well explained by Charles Taylor in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.Google Scholar

(41) The recognition of modern constitutionalism as one inherently prejudiced to minority and disadvantaged groups within society and thus of the need to renegotiate a common understanding of the constitutional process is Tully's, supra, n. 53Google Scholar

(42) In this regard, see Suchocka in this volume, supra, n.44; also Wojciech Sadursky, Charter and Enlargement, 2001 (on file with the author).Google Scholar