¹ John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 285 (P. Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 150 (1974).Google Scholar

² Locke, supra note 1, at 277. Lockeans can most plausibly invoke Kant for this claim, although Nozick understands the self-ownership argument as similarly expressing a Kantian injunction against instrumentalizing persons. Nozick, supra note 1, at 30.Google Scholar

³ Thus, in Locke, our natural right to appropriate depends inter alia on a claim about what is necessary for persons to make use of the world. Locke, supra note 1, at 286. Further, the proviso to leave “as much and as good” introduces a potential, if quite limited, consequentialist constraint. Id, at 291; Nozick, supra note 1, at 178.Google Scholar

⁴ We might equally label this second tradition Hobbesian. Given both Hobbes's moral egoism, and his appropriation by international relations realists, however, Hume seems a more suitable namesake.Google Scholar

⁵ See generally David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature §3.2 (Norton, David F. & Norton, Mary J. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1738); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 90, 125, 170–75 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651); Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code §1.8 (Étienne Dumont ed., 1843); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 114 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (1971) [hereinafter Rawls, Restatement]. Kant's recognition of property as relational, and in consequence deriving from social contract, most clearly places him in this category. Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Right, in Practical Philosophy 421–32 (Gregor, Mary J. ed., 1999) [hereinafter Kant, Doctrine of Right].Google Scholar

⁶ They do not deny, of course, that economic rules serve important moral functions, making human society possible, but deny only that they have force or content apart from their function in particular societies. See, e.g., Hume, supra note 5, at §§ 3.2.2.12, 3.2.3, 3.2.5, 3.2.6.6. Admittedly, some Humean liberals' accounts of liberty lead them towards a middle-ground. See generally, e.g., Dworkin, Ronald, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000).Google Scholar

⁷ This comes out clearly from Rawls's discussion of the basic structure and the need to continuously adjust basic institutions to ensure that they realize social justice over time. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 265 (1996).Google Scholar

⁸ See generally Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (2001); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 12–20 (2002). By contrast, while I focus on right-leaning Lockeans, who identify the intrinsic morality of the economy with property and contract, there are also leftist Lockeans, who ground egalitarian prescriptions in the intrinsic moral quality of particular relations. Consider, most prominently, Marx's concerns with exploitation and alienation. See Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 180, 190–92 (2d ed. 2002).Google Scholar

⁹ Recall that Locke understands government as instituted for the protection of property, and hence denies it can have general authority to interfere with property. See Locke, supra note 1, at 360; cf. Nozick, supra note 1, at ix.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This holds as much for deontological left-liberals, such as Rawls, as it does for utilitarian liberals, such as Mill. Recall, Rawls's basic liberties are themselves products of social cooperation, rather than a remainder of pre-social natural rights. For Hume, there are natural virtues, which we can understand apart from social cooperation; but the virtues of economic justice, including property and contract, are firmly social and conventional. Hume, supra note 5, at §§ 3.2.1.17–19, 3.2.2.9–11, 3.2.6.4. Natural rights play a role in Hobbes's theory, but these are limited to liberty rights in the state of nature. A small residue remain under the commonwealth, but impose no duties on others, whether individuals or the state. Any claim rights, which we can assert against others, are purely institutional.Google Scholar

¹¹ See generally, Keynes, John Maynard, The End of Laissez Faire, in The Essential Keynes (R. Skidelsky ed. 2015) (1926).Google Scholar

¹² See generally, Ruggie, John Gerard, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 Int'l Org. 379 (1982).Google Scholar

¹³ See, e.g., Cohen, G. A., Freedom, Justice and Capitalism, 126 New Left Rev. 1, 6 (1981). Many would argue these stories have again diverged since 2008 and that austerity policies pursued in various countries represent the prioritizing of property and contract at the expense of liberal equality and indeed social stability. This may be true, but for my purposes the more important point is that these domestic policies have continued to rely on both individual and social arguments for their legitimacy. Recall, for example, prominence invocations of the ostensible inverse correlation between sovereign debt and economic growth.Google Scholar

¹⁴ A comprehensive overview of these public debates, and the different moral claims invoked therein, is beyond the scope of this Article. I have included examples of the kinds of discourse with which I am concerned. As examples, they are open to challenge on their representativeness. It would require another paper entirely to rebut these. I can only hope the points made here will sound familiar to anyone who lived through, and paid attention to, Europe's public debates since 2008, including on the Fiscal Compact, banking union, Eurozone bail-outs and, most dramatically, Greek sovereign default.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, e.g., Heather Steward & Helena Smith, Greek and German Finance Ministers Clash at Debt Relief Talks, The Guardian (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/05/greek-german-finance-ministers-clash-debt-relief-talks (quoting German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble's insistence that “we must say that the reasons, the cause for the difficult journey to be undertaken by Greece, that the reason for this is to be found in Greece, and not outside Greece, and definitely not in Germany”). Thomas Piketty: “Germany has never repaid its debts. It has no right to lecture Greece,” The Wire (July 8, 2015), http://thewire.in/5851/thomas-piketty-germany-has-never-repaid-its-debts-it-has-no-right-to-lecture-greece/ (providing contemporary criticism of this aspect of German public discourse).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See, e.g., “France to Stand by Greece to Lighten Debt Burden,” Says Hollande, France 24 (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.france24.com/en/20151023-france-grece-hollande-tsipras-support-renegotiate-bailout-terms-creditors (quoting French President François Hollande's statement that, “Of course Greece must honor its commitments. But they are not contesting that What Greece is asking for is flexibility—that's understandable”).Google Scholar

¹⁷ EU Citizens Hold Greek Government Responsible for Debt Crisis, Ipsos European Pulse (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3616/EU-citizens-hold-Greek-government-responsible-for-debt-crisis.aspx (finding, in the immediate aftermath of the Greek referendum, sixty-one percent of Europeans agreed that austerity was harming the Greek economy, while seventy-three percent believed Greece should still repay all debts); Ipsos Public Affairs, The Crisis in Greece 6, 10 (2015), https://www.ipsos-na.com/download/pr.aspx?id=14813. Admittedly, the latter judgment referred to the risk of other countries defaulting, and so is not a pure case of the Lockean perspective. Nonetheless, the overall impression is not of citizens understanding debt as a social institution serving shared purposes.Google Scholar

¹⁸ It is perhaps no coincidence that David Graeber opens his book criticizing the moralizing of debt with an anecdote about sovereign lending. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years 1–4 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁹ There are ongoing debates between cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan liberals about how far their domestic theories commit them to egalitarian or other economic duties beyond the state. Rawls himself, for example, denies economic egalitarianism is appropriate across borders. However, his international view remains Humean in its underlying structure. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited 37 (1999) [hereinafter Rawls, The Law of the Peoples]; cf. Thomas Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 211, 195 (1994).Google Scholar

²⁰ Hobbes, supra note 5, at 124–25, 147–54, 200; Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings 73 (H.S. Reiss 2d ed. 1991) (1793); Kant, Doctrine of Right, supra note 5, at 136–38; Hume, supra note 5, at § 3.2.6.Google Scholar

²¹ See, e.g., Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice 10 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter Rawls, A Theory of Justice].Google Scholar

²² Rawls, Restatement, supra note 5, at 50.Google Scholar

²³ In fact, Rawls understands cooperation in two distinct senses. The first explanatory sense sees cooperation as the source of, and prerequisite for the production of, social primary goods, including the basic liberties and economic goods. The second normative sense understands social cooperation as free cooperation on fair terms for the rational advantage of each participant. This Article focuses, in what follows, on the first explanatory sense. Samuel Freeman has argued against the extension of Rawls's difference principle internationally on the basis that the international system is not cooperative in the second, normative, sense. Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract 266 (2007); cf. Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (2007). As this argument does not support the Lockean approach that I challenge, I do not discuss it here. Cf. Arash Abizadeh, Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice, 35 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 318, 318–58 (2007) (criticizing Freeman's work).Google Scholar

²⁴ Rawls, Restatement, supra note 5, at 50.Google Scholar

²⁵ Nozick, supra note 1, at 185.Google Scholar

²⁶ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 21, at 62.Google Scholar

²⁷ It is for this reason that, pace Nozick, Rawls understand social primary goods as being society's to distribute.Google Scholar

²⁸ For a discussion of the extent to which Rawls's theory is based on participation, rather than luck egalitarianism, see Freeman, supra note 23, at 111.Google Scholar

²⁹ Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, 24 Nomos: Ethics, Econ. & L. 219, 232–33 (1982).Google Scholar

³⁰ Oisin Suttle, Equality in Global Commerce: Towards a Political Theory of International Economic Law, 25 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1043, 1059–1060 (2014).Google Scholar

³¹ of course, it is possible another ship could have extracted the oil, or that this ship could have extracted other oil elsewhere, but what matters is that these goods and profits were produced through cooperation of both drillship owner and territorial state. That I could have cooperated with someone else does not alter the fact that I actually cooperated with you, giving you a claim on our joint production. An alternative line of thought emphasizing the marginal contribution of particular cooperators and the possibility of replacing them with others leads to Gauthier's contractarianism rather than Rawls' contractualism. See generally Gauthier, David, Morals by Agreement (1986).Google Scholar

³² Similarly, the territorial state's claim on the oil still in the ground is distinct from its cooperation with the drillship.Google Scholar

³³ We might distinguish these cases based on the legal form employed. The drillship owner has a property right, while the lender has a contractual claim. Certainly, for Locke, property and promise have distinct bases. However, these questions of legal form are not relevant to my present concern, namely whether the relevant transaction is cooperative in the required sense.Google Scholar

³⁴ The symmetry is unsurprising. We might retell the oil exploration story as involving a foreign loan to a domestic company to purchase a foreign manufactured ship, with the loan being serviced through revenues from the oil extracted.Google Scholar

³⁵ This does not need to imply lenders are unconcerned with repayment, although in practice their main interest may be in a revenue stream rather than a future capital sum. Rather, it is because an appropriate amendment of maturity and interest rate can have exactly the same impact on a lender's financial interest as a default on principal.Google Scholar

³⁶ See, e.g., Strupczewski, Jan, Greek Bid for Debt Relief Faces Euro Zone Skepticism, Reuters (June 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-debt-idUSKBN00N0QW20150607 (commenting on the insistence on distinguishing adjusting terms from writing down principal).Google Scholar

³⁷ See, e.g., Merton, Robert C., On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. Fin. 449, 449–70 (1974).Google Scholar

³⁸ In this view, the part of the interest covering the lender's cost of capital or opportunity cost constitutes payment for the temporary use of the capital borrowed, while the risk premium covers any potential loss of that capital.Google Scholar

³⁹ See, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Miller, Merton H., The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 263–65 (1958).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ We cannot push this argument too far. It requires a sufficiently stable long-term practice of investment to allow investors to cover risk and capital costs through returns on successful investments. If all or substantially all debtors defaulted, the situation would be more plausibly one of expropriation by debtor peoples of creditors' assets. That said, this would rapidly undermine the practice of cross-border lending itself. The fact that creditors commonly come to terms with defaulting debtors, who in turn regain access to capital markets, suggests this is generally not the case.Google Scholar

⁴¹ This is a difficult distinction to draw in practice. Borrowing to support current expenditure on, for example, public salaries, might still be understood as investment, whether because of public services' long-term economic value, such as health, education, or because financing these through debt may facilitate capital spending elsewhere in the economy. Non-investment deficit borrowing may thus be largely illusory; but to the extent it exists, this paragraph suggests how we should think about it.Google Scholar

⁴² Locke, supra note 1, at 293. Long-term trade imbalances and corresponding financial flows reflect surprisingly closely Locke's account of money as a cooperative institution.Google Scholar

⁴³ Hobbes, supra note 5, at 110–19; Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 30–36 (2d ed. 2014). While more institutionalist than realist, similar moral skepticism appears in Jack Goldsmith & Posner, Eric A., The Limits of International Law (2007).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ While Thomas Nagel recognizes this distinction, he nonetheless assumes a Lockean morality will apply in the absence of other duties of socio-economic justice. See generally Nagel, Thomas, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 113 (2005). Rawls is at least clearer that his quasi-libertarian principles represent a substantive account of justice, rather than the absence thereof. For an excellent overview, see Caney, Simon, Justice Beyond Borders 125–29 (2005) (highlighting the differences between Rawls's minimalism and genuine skepticism).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ While Hobbes's arguments are not the only ones motivating such skepticism, for convenience I label all such views Hobbesian.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For the classic statement of this position, see generally Singer, Peter, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 299 (1972).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Garcia, Frank J., Trade, Inequality and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade 89–90 (2003) (discussing the first challenge); David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice 56 (2007) (discussing the second challenge); id. at 71 (discussing the third challenge).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 19, at 23 (for Rawls's approach to both) and see generally Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice (2000) (criticizing that approach).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See generally Miller, David, Justice and Boundaries, 8 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 291 (2009) (advancing elements of this view); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983) (offering a stronger statement thereof).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See generally Nagel, supra note 44; Hobbes, supra note 5, at 91–92, 96, 100–01; cf. Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy, Ch. 3 (2012).Google Scholar

⁵¹ See generally, e.g., Nagel, supra note 44; Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 257 (2005); Mathias Risse, On Global Justice (2012); Laura Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework (2012) (suggesting this idea in a more qualified form).Google Scholar

⁵² Freeman, supra note 23, at 304 (highlighting the ways principles of domestic distributive justice may determine policies affecting outsiders). Similarly, realists emphasize how duties to insiders restrict statesmen's freedom to pursue cosmopolitan goals. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 235–49 (4th ed. 1966); Kennan, George F., Morality and Foreign Policy, 64 Foreign Aff. 205, 205–18 (1985).Google Scholar

⁵³ See Locke, supra note 1, at 362; Nozick, supra note 1, at 169–71 (on the limits of taxation in the Lockean mode). The Lockean might avoid this worry by suggesting that outsiders implicitly accept limits on economic rights, in line with those applied to insiders, as a condition of participation. The problem with this argument, however, is that it can be applied to qualify the Lockean position in any situation where two views conflict. The Lockean thus saves the structure of his view, but at the cost of any practical significance.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Such two-tier protection is already evident, albeit for particular political and historical reasons, in investment treaties and the customary law of aliens' rights.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Consider, for example, how a state's power to regulate particular property changes when transferred from insider to outsider and the perverse incentives this sets up.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ While the argument is Rawlsian, it is not Rawls's own view. Rawls denies that questions of distributive justice arise in the international economy. Two assumptions drive that conclusion, both of which I reject: First, that productive cooperation is substantially limited to the state; and second, that the international system is not itself coercive. See generally Rawls, The Law of the Peoples, supra note 19, at 105–20.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 21, at 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Pietro Maffettone, The WTO and the Limits of Distributive Justice, 35 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 243 (2009).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Eric Cavallero, Coercion, Inequality and the International Property Regime, 18 J. Pol. Phil. 16 (2010).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Drezner, Daniel W., All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (2007); Andreas Follesdal, The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A Category Mistake?, 10 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 46 (2011).Google Scholar

⁶¹ The fundamental assumption that justification is owed to both insiders and outsiders is substantially cosmopolitan. But depending on how institutions and justification are understood, the prescriptions flowing from it may leave significant room for the autonomy of states as well as for inequalities between them.Google Scholar

⁶² Suttle, supra note 30, develops in greater detail the points in the foregoing paragraphs.Google Scholar

⁶³ For two accounts that derive a global difference principle using this route, see Beitz, Charles, Political Theory and International Relations (1979) and Pogge, Thomas W., Realizing Rawls (1989).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ For prominent approaches highlighting how self-determination might temper distributive equality, see generally Miller, National Responsibility, supra note 47; Rawls, The Law of the Peoples, supra note 19.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Freeman follows this line to argue that the institutions of the international economy “supervene upon” those of particular states, and that there is in consequence no institutional structure to which an international difference principle can be applied. See Freeman, Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples, in Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia 243–60 (Rex Martin and Reidy, David A. ed., 2006), at 246–248.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ For an argument towards this view, see Abizadeh, supra note 23, at 318.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See generally Suttle supra note 30.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See generally Blake, supra note 51.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Buchanan, Allen, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations of International Law 18 (2007).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ It is disagreement on this point that leads Rawls to reject global egalitarianism. Rawls, The Law of the Peoples, supra note 19, at 108–11.Google Scholar

⁷¹ See generally, e.g., Beitz, supra note 63; Pogge, supra note 63; Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (2001).Google Scholar

⁷² For an analogous point, see Saladin Meckled-Garcia, On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: Constructivism and International Agency, 16 J. Pol. Phil. 245 (2008).Google Scholar

⁷³ This paragraph draws on arguments in Freeman, supra note 23, at 290, 305–07, 314–17.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Recall the suggestion above that justice is about situations where our options are subject to the choice of another: We do not enquire about the justice of the weather.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ This is important in pre-empting the following objection. We might accept that outcomes in the international economy, as presently organized, are not attributable to definite agents and so not directly criticizable in terms of justice. Yet this might suggest a duty to bring into being institutions that would make such criticism possible. Indeed, this would seem an obvious implication of Rawls's duty “to further just arrangements not yet established.” Rawls, Theory of Justice, supra note 21, at 99. But if, as Rawls himself holds, a global state is implausible or undesirable, then there can be no duty to bring such an institution into being. Rawls, The Law of the Peoples, supra note 19, at 36.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Some might object that this function can be fulfilled by one or a subset of leading states, coordinated through formal or informal international organizations. I do not deny that such coordinated action is possible in particular instances. But there clearly is not, nor is there likely in the foreseeable future to be, any individual or collective agent able to determine outcomes in the international economy, or international financial markets, as a whole.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ A similar point might be made in the language of positive and negative responsibilities. For such a strategy, albeit applying quite different standards, see Pogge, Thomas, Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?, 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. J. 2 (2011).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ This does not mean coordination problems are entirely avoided. Clearly, to judge whether a given institution is just, we must consider how its effects interact with those of other institutions; and we might conclude there were duties on various institutions to coordinate, including potentially by constituting new overarching institutions. But we will in all cases be working outwards, from existing institutions and loci of political authority, rather than beginning with a set of desirable outcomes and imagining into being institutions capable of bringing these about.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Obviously, in many cases political constraints in individual countries will preclude any effective action. But such cases reflect a failure of will, rather than an absence of agency. Assuming we can identify the changes that are required to the relevant institutions, no agent can claim that they do not know what they must do to bring these about, or that they lack assurance that others will play their part if they do themselves. This analysis would obviously be quite different if members' respect for EU law were substantially to decline.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Of course, in practice, many states are not unitary and many ostensibly liberal states act towards their citizens as members of groups. Whether this constitutes a failure of liberal theory or political practice is beyond the scope of this paper.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Communitarian critiques of liberal neutrality might offer inspiration here.Google Scholar

⁸² For a detailed account of the arguments supporting EGC, see generally Suttle, supra note 30.Google Scholar

⁸³ What exactly those goals are is an open question, the answer to which will depend on the domestic theory of justice adopted. If that domestic theory is Rawls's political liberalism, then the list will be very short. Rawls, The Law of the Peoples, supra note 19, at 34–35.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ We need not identify this as a separate obligation. Insofar as such institutions coordinate the policies of individual states, the side-constraint on national institutions translates into a side-constraint on non-universal international cooperation. Insofar as non-voluntary institutions have their own executive capacities, the reasons for imposing this side-constraint on national policies will apply equally to international executive capacities.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Consider, for example, the ways trading relations with colonies and former colonies were reorganized on a community-wide basis.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ These costs and uncertainties are painfully illustrated by the UK's exit vote.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ On some connections between EU membership and democratization, see Atoaneta Dimitrova & G. Pridham, International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and Its Limits, 11 Democratisation 5, 91–112 (2004).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ On the complexities of the Iberian cases, see Fishman, Robert M., Shaping, Not Making, Democracy: The European Union and the Post-Authoritarian Political Transformations of Spain and Portugal, 8 South Euro. Soc'y & Pol. 31–46 (2003).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ The assumption here is that arguments invoking the systemic effects of restructuring and the effects on the financing costs of others involve sacrificing the interests of the already disadvantaged for the benefit of those more advantaged. It does not mean that restructuring cannot be made conditional on policies to ensure it, in fact, leads to the borrower's effective self-determination. The creditor's obligation is to facilitate the borrower's self-determination, not simply to forgive the debt. Concerns for self-determination will also be relevant in deciding how far lenders or the international community can dictate the specific content of the required reforms. This further suggests that, where restructuring is contingent on domestic reforms, we carefully examine whether these are for the long-term benefit of the borrower, or rather serve to deter future defaults by others or to maximize recovery by creditors.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ On the various mechanisms whereby sovereign debt is enforced, see Panizza, U., F. Sturzenegger & J. Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. Econ. Literature 651 (2009).Google Scholar

⁹¹ We might thus distinguish states that have organized their capital markets and private law with an eye to becoming global centers from those for whom participation in international debt markets is largely limited to offering the state's own debt, currency reserve activities, and citizens' purchasing of domestic and foreign bonds.Google Scholar

⁹² A parallel might be drawn to personal bankruptcy laws, which do not necessarily reduce bankrupts to the lowest acceptable economic position but rather allow them to retain many economic advantages, such as tools of trade. If the function of bankruptcy is to give individuals back control of their own lives, which are continuous both before and after bankruptcy, then it may be necessary to allow them to keep Some of the advantages that accrued to them in their “former” life. To do otherwise might be to irreparably disrupt whatever ongoing projects they had, which are central to their continuing agency/identity. Of course, economic rationales can also be offered for these provisions.Google Scholar

⁹³ The priority of self-determination over economic advantage is a function of conceiving self-determination as extending to economic choices. If economic advantage took priority, the upshot would be continuous redistribution from more- to less-advantaged and a consequent denial of any meaningful economic self-determination; see for this problem Miller, National Responsibility, supra note 47, at 68 and Rawls, The Law of the Peoples, supra note 19, at 117.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ While plausible, this objection finds little empirical support. Bond prices seem largely unaffected by including restructuring clauses. See Becker, Torbjorn, A. Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. Int'l Econ. 127–61 (2003).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ For a further discussion, see infra pp. 829–831.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ The objection here recalls Joan Robinson's observation that “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all.” Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy 46 (1962). It is no objection to a proposal to say that it would make it more difficult for states to obtain financing, if their needing that financing itself constitutes an injustice for which those in whose name the objection is raised are themselves responsible. some might object to this allocation of responsibility, but a plausible reply highlighting states' dependence on international markets, and others' constitution of those markets through their domestic institutions, supports it.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ For this point in another context, see Olsaretti, Serena, Choice, Circumstance and the Cost of Children, in Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice (S. de Wijze, M. H. Kramer & I. Carter eds., 2009). We might further emphasize that, for Humean liberals, economic choice is valued for the goods it in turn realizes. To the extent that imposing the consequences of a choice undermine those goods, the mere fact of being chosen is no argument for it.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ But see supra note 94 (discussing contrary empirical evidence).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ For the analogous argument against slavery contracts, see Freeman, Samuel, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ This is the scenario anticipated in the text accompanying supra note 95.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ The claim here is that the creditor has facilitated the debtor's reliance on international funding, and cannot simply withdraw that funding without allowing the debtor some reasonable period to restructure its economy away from that reliance. Cf. generally James, supra note 50, (for an account of the international economy as a practice of mutual reliance on common markets).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Although for doubts about how far this insistence translates into practice, see Bulow, Jeremy, Kenneth Rogoff & Bevilaqua, Alfonso S., Official Creditor Seniority and Burden-Sharing in the Former Soviet Bloc, 1 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity 195–234 (1992).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Whether such constraints fall properly under the concept of justice is not a question I propose here to explore. See generally Cohen, G. A., Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ For an example including elements of each, see Buttonwood, More on Debt and Democracy, The Economist (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2015/02/greece-and-eu.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ In the pre-charter period, the prospect of gunboats in their harbors, foreign seizure of assets and revenues, and similar “super-sanctions” might deter borrowers. In the Eurozone context, unpredictable consequences for the stability of the defaulter's banking system and their continued membership in the currency union provide further disincentives.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ For a similar point, albeit invoking a different account of economic justice, see Kumm, Mathias, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 Global, Indiana J. Legal Stud. 605 (2013). Cf. generally Matthias Goldmann & Silvia Steininger, A Discourse Theoretical Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Towards a Democratic Financial Order, in this issue.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Incorporating such moral constraints on democratic choice is not a novel suggestion. See, e.g., Waldron, Jeremy, Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, 32 Nomos: Majorities Minorities 44 (1990); Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 216.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ We might express the same idea by suggesting that decisions by national polities may be internationally legitimate, given available alternatives, without being internationally just. This problem of democratic mismatch is not limited to whether to facilitate default but also such questions as what conditions, as to domestic reforms, can appropriately be attached to bailout lending.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ This raises similar problems of democratic legitimacy to judicial review under human rights treaties and domestic constitutions. That said, if we accept these latter practices, I see little reason in principle to exclude similar review against principles of global economic justice.Google Scholar