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Data Screening of Muslim Sleepers Unconstitutional

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Gabriele Kett-Straub

Extract

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Shocking news for police and intelligence agencies in Germany: the search for inland sleepers following the terrorist attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon was unconstitutional. Preventive data screening is incompatible with the fundamental right of informational self-determination according to Article 2 (I) in connection with Article 1 (I) of the Grundgesetz (GG - Basic Law). Since the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG - Federal Constitutional Court) of 4 April, 2006 (1 BvR 518/02), such numerous acquisition of data is not permitted unless a concrete threat to important objects of legal protection is existent.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 7 , Issue 11 , 01 November 2006 , pp. 967 - 975
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 A comprehensive outline about the controversial estimation of the current measures of data screening by the courts is given in: Winfried Bausback, Rasterfahndung als Mittel der vorbeugenden Verbrechensbekämpfung – Notwendigkeit einer Vereinheitlichung der landesrechtlichen Regelung angesichts des internationalen Terrorismus?, 133 Bayrische Verwaltungsblätter (BayVBl) 713, 714 (2002). See also Wilhelm Achelpöhler and Holger Niehaus, Data Screening as a Means of Preventing Islamist Terrorist Attacks on Germany, 5 German Law Journal 495, 504 (2004), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol05No05/PDF_Vol_05_No_05_495–513_special_issue_Achelpoehler_Niehaus.pdf.Google Scholar

2 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court), 59 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1939, 1947, 147 (2006). As the adjudication in the NJW is partly shortened, quotes are occasionally taken from the Federal Constitutional Court's homepage, where complete adjudications are published.Google Scholar

3 Id. at 1947, 184. See also Bausback, Winfried, Fesseln für die wehrhafte Demokratie?, 59 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1922, 1924 (2006).Google Scholar

4 See Hilger, Hans, Neues Strafverfahrensrecht durch das OrgKG, 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 457, 460 (1992). See also Klever, Stefan, Die Rasterfahndung nach § 98 a StPO (2003); Siebrecht, MichAel, Rasterfahndung (1997); and Achelpöhler & Niehaus, supra note 1, at 495–496.Google Scholar

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6 The aim of the abduction was to extort the release of founder members of the RAF detained in Germany. Authorities did not concede to the pressure; Schleyer was murdered. See Aust, Stefan, Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex (1983); Peters, Butz, RAF (1994); Peters, Butz, Tödlicher Irrtum (2004); Willi Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF (2005).Google Scholar

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8 See Herold, Horst, “Rasterfahndung” – eine computergeschützte Fahndungsform der Polizei, 84 Recht und Politik (RuP) 91 (1985).Google Scholar

9 This method is called “negative data screening.” as the intersection is brought to a manageable amount by erasing negative criteria of single groups of people. On the contrary, “positive data screening” implies the search for circumstances which apply to the perpetrator. See Siebrecht, supra note 4, at 22.Google Scholar

10 At that time, the data screening measures were based on the following general regulations: Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] §161, 163.Google Scholar

11 Conducting a dragnet investigation as a measure of inquiry assumes that at least a primary suspicion concerning a committed offense is known, and which must be of great seriousness also. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] §98 a (catalog of offenses).Google Scholar

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19 Only 5.2 million pieces of information came from North Rhine-Westphalia. See Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutioal Court), 1 BvR 518/02, para. 28, (April 4, 2006) http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060404_1bvr051802.html.Google Scholar

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21 Id. at 1942. See also Achelpöhler & Niehaus, supra note 1, at 496–98 (further discussion of the background as regards constitutional law and basic rights).Google Scholar

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32 The traditional term of a present threat was abided by: Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt (OLG – Higher Regional Court), 21 Neue Zeitschrift Fuer Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 626 (2002); Landesgericht Wiesbaden (LG – Regional Court), 26 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD) 240, 241 (2002); Landesgericht Berlin (LG – Regional Court), 26 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD) 175, 176 (2002). However, the requirements on probability of damage were lowered by: Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (OLG – Higher Regional Court), 26 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD) 241 (2002); Kammergericht Berlin (KG – Regional Court), 5 Multimedia und Recht (MMR) 616, 617 (2002); Oberverwaltungsgericht Koblenz (OVG – Higher Regional Administrative Court), 21 Neue Zeitschrift Fuer Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 1528 (2002); Verwaltungsgerichtshof Mainz (VG – Administrative Court), 21 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD) 303, 305 (2002); Amtsgericht Wiesbaden (AG – District Court), 25 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD) 752, 753 (2001); Amtsgericht Tiergarten (AG – District Court), 25 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD) 691, 692 (2001). The different requirements on the notion of damage are clearly laid out by Matthias Jahn, Das Strafrecht des Staatsnotstandes 87 (2004). See also Kutscha, Martin, Rechtsschutzdefizite bei Grundrechtseingriffen von Sicherheitsbehörden, 22 Neue Zeitschrift Fuer Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 1296, 1299 (2003).Google Scholar

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