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³¹ Global Witness notes that the MDA agreement identifies Mittal Steel (Liberia) Holdings Limited as the party to the MDA agreement where it is referred to as concessionaire’ ‘CONCESSIONAIRE'. The Mittal Steel Liberia Limited is identified as ‘as the agent of the Concessionaire and operating company in Liberia.’ Global Witness notes that Mittal Steel (Liberia) Holdings Limited is ‘70% owned by Mittal Steel Holdings AG and 30% by the Government of Liberia'. Mittal Steel Holdings AG is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Mittal Steel NV, which is incorporated in the Netherlands and is the parent company in the Mittal corporate group. Global Witness, Heavy Mittal? A State within a State: The inequitable Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Holdings NV, Report, 15, October 2006, available at: http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/156/en/heavy_mittal. Mittal Steel NV merged in 2006 with Arcelor and now operated under the name of Arcetal Mittal, available at: http://www.arcelormittal.com/.Google Scholar

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