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Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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This paper makes the claim that the legal framework governing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is contradictory, conceptually incoherent and may be characterized as a circumvention of Union law. It is further claimed that such circumvention, and the resulting establishment of a significant permanent institution outside and beyond the scope of the Union legal order, represents a challenge to European democracy and to the principle of respect for the rule of law.

Type
Special Section: The ESM Before the Courts
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism Between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Finland, 2 Feb. 2012, Eur. Comm'n DOC/12/3 [hereinafter ESMT], http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf.Google Scholar

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3 ESMT, supra note 1, at art. 8.Google Scholar

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5 Statement of the Eurogroup (30 Mar. 2012), http://eurozone.europa.eu/media/678952/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf. This alters the terms of Article 39 of the ESM Treaty.Google Scholar

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14 It is of note that it is the Decision as opposed to merely the amendment contained in the Decision that is to enter into force at the relevant date.Google Scholar

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21 See e.g., Euro. Parl., EP Analytical Summary of the Debates on EMU for the ICG (11 June 1991), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter13/19910611fr14analyticalsummary.pdf (Available only in French; these are the records of the proceedings of the Inter-Institutional Conference on Economic and Monetary Union accompanying the Intergovernmental Conferences, held on Tuesday 11 June 1991). See also the records of the Monetary Committee, working on the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty.Google Scholar

22 Observations of Pringle, at page 7, in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0000 (27 Nov. 2012). The Observations of Pringle are available at http://www.extempore.ie/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/C-370.12-Observations-of-T.Pringle-as-filed-2.pdf. This position rests on arguments concerning competence of Union in economic and monetary policy set out in pages 20 to 28 of the submissions.Google Scholar

23 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 7.Google Scholar

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25 Resolution of the European Parliament of 23 March 2011, supra note 24. Paragraph 9 states the European Parliament:Google Scholar

Regrets that the European Council has not explored all the possibilities contained in the Treaties for establishing a permanent stability mechanism; considers in particular that, in the framework of the present Union competences with regard to economic and monetary union (Article 3(4) TEU) and monetary policy for Member States whose currency is the euro (Article 3(1)(c) TFEU), it would have been appropriate to make use of the powers conferred on the Council in Article 136 TFEU, or in the alternative to have recourse to Article 352 TFEU in conjunction with Articles 133 and 136 TFEU. …

26 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 March 2011 on a Draft European Council Decision Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency Is the Euro, at para. 8, 2011 O.J. (C 140) 8, 9. Paragraph 8 observes: “A key element of the draft decision is that it provides for an intergovernmental mechanism instead of a Union mechanism. The ECB supports recourse to the Union method and would welcome that, with the benefit of the experience gained, the ESM would become a Union mechanism at an appropriate point in time.”Google Scholar

27 Observations of Cyprus, Ireland & Austria in Pringle v. Ireland, supra note 22 (on file with author). Cyprus states: “[T]he prohibition in Article 125 TFEU relates to the Union and the Member States, not to a third party such as the ESM, which has a legal personality distinct from Member States. …” The Government of Ireland submitted at paragraph 72 of its observations that “The Article 125(1) TFEU prohibition applies to “[a] Member State”, while the ESM will be an international financial institution. The ESM will have legal personality, which will be separate and distinct from the ESM Members. …” Austria submitted that “Article 122 TFEU expressly relates only to the Union. An international organisation such as the ESM is therefore not covered by that provision, especially since, furthermore, the Union is not a contracting party. …”Google Scholar

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29 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 38, para. 3.97. Reference was made to Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161, paras. 33 & 34; Case C-55/00, Gottardo v. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale, 2002 E.C.R. I-413, paras. 33 & 34; and Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen, 2005 E.C.R. I-5821, para. 52.Google Scholar

30 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 34–38, paras. 3.85 & 3.91. Reference was made to Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1977 E.C.R. 137, para. 35.Google Scholar

31 Case 249/81, Comm'n v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005; Joined Cases 67, 68 & 70/85, Van der Kooy BV v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 219; Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. I-3313; Case C-306/97, Connemara Machine Turf Co. v. Coillte Teoranta, 1998 E.C.R. I-8761; and Case C-325/00, Comm'n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-9977. See also, by analogy, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-7995, concerning creation of legal structures designed to avoid tax. The “decisive control” test was advocated by Advocate General Van Gerven in his Opinion in Foster v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. at I-3313Google Scholar

32 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 20–28, 50, para. 3.146.Google Scholar

33 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 52, para. 4.3. Case C-266/03, Comm'n v. Luxembourg, 2005 E.C.R. I-4805. See also Case C-433/03, Comm'n v. Germany, 2005 E.C.R. I-6985, paras. 57 & 59; and Case 22/70, Comm'n v. Council (European Agreement on Road Transport) [AETR], 1971 E.C.R. 263.Google Scholar

34 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3(1)(c), 5 Sept. 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].Google Scholar

35 TFEU art. 2(3). Koen Lenaerts, Piet Van Nuffel, Robert Bray & Nathan Cambien, European Union Law ¶ 7–023 (3d ed. 2011) (“Since all competences outside the areas referred to in Arts 3 and 6 are shared by the Union with the Member States (see TFEU art.4(1)) [the coordination of the economic and employment policies of the Member States] can only be classified as falling within the general category of shared competences.”).Google Scholar

36 See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12; Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on Enforcement Measures To Correct Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 25. See also Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6, as amended by Council Regulation No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33.Google Scholar

37 TFEU art. 5(1).Google Scholar

38 Expressed in Oral observations on behalf of Pringle at the hearing of 23 Oct. 2012 (on file with author).Google Scholar

39 On its own website, the ESM expressly referred to the amendment to the TFEU as its legal basis. See European Stability Mechanism, Frequently Asked Questions About the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Eur. Stability Mechanism (8 Oct. 2012), http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20ESM%2008102012.pdf. In reply to the question “What is the legal basis of the ESM and how was it established?” it is stated that “the European Council agreed that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should be amended in order for a permanent mechanism—the European Stability Mechanism—to be established by the Member States whose currency is the euro to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. The amendment (in Article 136 of the Treaty) was adopted by the European Council on 25 March 2011.” Although, this assertion was subsequently withdrawn and references to the European Council Decision removed. This revised explanation of the legal basis is available at European Stability Mechanism, Frequently Asked Questions About the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Eur. Stability Mechanism (12 Nov. 2012), http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20ESM%2012112012.pdf.Google Scholar

40 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 18–19, paras. 3.6–3.10.Google Scholar

41 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 54, para. 5.4.Google Scholar

42 Observations of Pringle, supra note 22, at 55, paras. 5.6, 5.7.Google Scholar

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44 See Observations of Austria, para. 24, in Pringle v. Ireland, supra note 22 (on file with author), and Observations of the European Commission, para. 78, in Pringle v. Ireland, supra note 22 (on file with author).Google Scholar

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50 Id. at paras. 129–47.Google Scholar

51 Id. at para. 136.Google Scholar

52 Id. at paras. 137–38, 41, 43 & 45.Google Scholar

53 Id. at paras. 136–38.Google Scholar

54 Id. at para. 142.Google Scholar

55 Id. at paras. 53–57.Google Scholar

56 Id. at para. 56.Google Scholar

57 Id. at para. 60.Google Scholar

58 Id. at paras. 64–68.Google Scholar

59 Id. at para. 67.Google Scholar

60 Id. at paras. 183–85.Google Scholar

61 Id. at para. 123.Google Scholar

62 Id. at paras. 123–28.Google Scholar

63 See records of the Monetary Committee, working on the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty, cited by the Commission.Google Scholar

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71 Ireland, Pringle v., supra note 22, paras. 69, 124, 126.Google Scholar

72 It is noteworthy that this point was also identified by the ECJ at the hearing of the Pringle case on 23 October 2012. The Court inquired whether the establishment of the ESM outside the Union legal order could not reasonably be regarded as a circumvention of the requirement to amend the Treaties using an ordinary revision procedure.Google Scholar

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79 TFEU art. 3(1)(c).Google Scholar

80 TFEU art. 2(2).Google Scholar

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89 Observations of Cyprus, Ireland & Austria, supra note 27.Google Scholar

90 Observations of the Netherlands, supra note 43. That government states: “Disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the ESM Treaty are evidently disputes which relate to the subject matter of the Treaties.Google Scholar

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95 See for example the characterization of the Union legal order by Professor Walter Van Gerven in Walter Van Gerven, The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples (2005).Google Scholar