¹ Gustav Radbruch, Der Mensch im Recht. Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze über Grundfragen des Rechts 9 (1961) (“Nichts ist so entscheidend für den Stil eines Rechtszeitalters wie die Auffassung vom Menschen, an der es sich orientiert”).Google Scholar

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⁵ In many civil law countries, however, the law of persons is recognized as a special area of family law, with textbooks, monographs, and sometimes even heated scholarly debates on the subject.Google Scholar

⁶ See Fagundes, supra note 4.Google Scholar

⁷ The term “natural person” is used throughout this article in a strictly legal sense and should not be confused with actual flesh-and-blood human beings.Google Scholar

⁸ Even though the terms “juristic” or “juridical person” are also common, “artificial person” is used here because the main theme of this article concerns the artificialization of natural persons and human beings.Google Scholar

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