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Canadian Mining Companies and Domestic Law Reform: A Critical Legal Account*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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In the last decade, Canada has become the most important home jurisdiction for mining companies operating globally. Certain Canadian NGOs, faith groups and labor unions argue that these activities systematically give rise to conflicts between companies and local communities in circumstances where companies frequently enjoy effective impunity for the human rights violations they may commit. This assessment has prompted these groups and other likeminded actors to advocate for a series of law reform proposals.

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Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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29 The Report defined this as including export and project financing together with services offered by Canadian missions abroad, see id. at 2.Google Scholar

30 Id. The Report suggested that compliance could be demonstrated through the mechanism of human rights impact assessments.Google Scholar

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32 Certain IFIs, such as the World Bank and those banks that have signed onto the Equator Principles, have CSR policies. However, as of 2010, there was no known example of a case where an IFI had withdrawn project financing on the basis of a violation of these policies: Catherine Coumans, Alternative Accountability Mechanisms and Mining: The Problems of Effective Impunity, Human Rights, and Agency 30 C.J.D.S. 27, 36, (2010).Google Scholar

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37 Id. at v. In its Report, the Advisory Group acknowledges that the initial recommended framework falls short of addressing the full range of issues of concern regarding extractive industry, particularly with regard to human rights, see id. at iv.Google Scholar

38 Id. at vi-vii.Google Scholar

39 Id. at xii-xiii.Google Scholar

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86 The policy's first pillar involves supporting initiatives to enhance the capacity of developing countries to manage the development of extractive activities and improve economic development. However, there is no clear link made between this objective and the concerns of communities and individuals adversely affected by a Canadian company. The fact that economic development in the form of resource extraction does not necessarily translate into an improved situation for mining-affected communities is well documented in the resource curse literature. See for instance, Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for the “Resource Curse” 11 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 9, (2008); Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice 11 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 37, (2008); Jeffery D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources 45 Eur. Econ. R., 827 (2001); Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse 51 World Politics 297, (1999).Google Scholar

87 The Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor, Government of Canada, Rules of Procedure for the Review Mechanism of the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor (October 2012), at 4, available online at: http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/assets/pdfs/rules_procedure-regles_procedure-eng.pdf (last accessed: 1 December 2012).Google Scholar

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89 For example, two defamation suits were recently brought in Canada by Canadian mining companies against journalists and academics who published research critical of these companies, see Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) Bulletin, Noir Canada Defamation Lawsuit Settled, Publication of Book Stopped (Nov. 2011), available online at: http://www.cautbulletin.ca/en_article.asp?articleid=3342 (last accessed: 1 December 2012).Google Scholar

90 The Bill's sponsor, Member of Parliament Peter Julian, organized a conference in support of the Bill, held on 16 March 2012 in Ottawa. The subject matter of this conference focused exclusively on Canadian companies’ operations abroad, particularly in the area of mining, and the impacts on communities. See Peter Julian, Walking the Talk: Human Rights Abroad, Take II (Mar., 16, 2012), available online at: http://peterjulian.ndp.ca/conference-agenda-programme (last accessed: 1 December 2012).Google Scholar

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92 In the United States, as of 2004 there were approximately twelve active cases against corporate defendants under the ATCA, only three or four of which had survived a motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction. Most of the ATCA cases against private corporations have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and none have resulted in a final judgment against a U.S. corporation: Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. of Int'l Econ. L. 263, 269-70, 298 (2004).Google Scholar

93 In Canada the courts have adopted such a narrow approach to the doctrine of forum non-conveniens that most litigants have been unable to convince the courts to take jurisdiction over the harm allegedly caused by a Canadian mining companies abroad. Recherches Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] Q.J. no 2554 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct. J.); Anvil Mining Limited v. Association canadienne contre l'impunité, [2012] J.Q. no 368, 2012 QCCA 117 (Can. Que. Ct. A.). For a review of these cases, see Webb, supra note 15, at 48-52; Imai, Maheandiran & Crystal, supra note 19.Google Scholar

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