¹ Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable 3 (1987); Alexander Peczenik, On Law and Reason 31 (1989) and Alexander Peczenik, Vad är rätt? Om demokrati, rättssäkerhet, etik och juridisk argumentation 43 (1995).Google Scholar

² Georg Henrik von Wright, Norms and Action: A Logical Inquiry (1963).Google Scholar

³ It should be noted that the concept of legal certainty is generally used in Civil law systems. In Common law, the closest equivalent would be the principle of rule of law. See e.g. Peczenik (note 1), 31.Google Scholar

⁴ Kaarlo Tuori, Oikeuden ratio ja voluntas 152–158, 221–247 (2007).Google Scholar

⁵ This is also why the ECJ's extensive body of case law related to the principle of legal certainty is not discussed in this article.Google Scholar

⁶ Isabel Schübel-Pfister, Enjeux et perspectives du multilinguisme dans l'Union européenne: après l'élargissement, la « babelisation », 488 Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne, 332 (2005); Hjalte Rasmussen, Towards a normative theory of interpretation of Community law 33 (1993).Google Scholar

⁷ Id. Rasmussen, 33.Google Scholar

⁸ The choice of a systemic theory as the basis for my analysis is explained by the fact that the principle of legal certainty has been of particular interest to theorists with a background in Civil law legal systems.Google Scholar

⁹ Jürgen Habermas, The theory of communicative action. Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society 86 (1984).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms – Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 222–236 (1996). See also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 239–240 (1986).Google Scholar

¹¹ Id. Habermas, 166.Google Scholar

¹² Miguel Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 European Journal of Legal Studies, 1, 9 (2007).Google Scholar

¹³ Id., 9.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 66 (1990). See Aarnio (note 1), 225 for criticism of value cognitivism.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 194–237.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Id., 198–199.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id., 202.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id., 194–195.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See, supra, note 10, Dworkin 52.Google Scholar

²⁰ Klaus Günther, A Normative Conception of Coherence for a Discursive Theory of Legal Justification, 2 Ratio Juris, 155, 157 (1989). See also Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application 35 (1993).Google Scholar

²¹ See inter alia, supra, note 1, Peczenik, 142 on the conceptual difference between valid norms and their validity as acts performed.Google Scholar

²² See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 217. Habermas seems to suggest that in modern legal systems courts need to engage in both discourses of justification and application, since the political process does not alone justify norms sufficiently from a communicative perspective.Google Scholar

²³ Id., 218.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id., 220.Google Scholar

²⁵ See inter alia, Case 238/84, Criminal proceedings against Hans Röser, 1986 E.C.R. 795; Case 173/88, Skatteministeriet v. Henriksen, 1989 E.C.R. 2763; Case C-64/95, Konservenfabrik Lubella Friedrich Büker GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Cottbus, 1996 E.C.R. I-5105; Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux s.r.o. v. Celní ředitelství Olomouc, 2007 E.C.R. I-10841.Google Scholar

²⁶ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 220.Google Scholar

²⁷ Id., 388.Google Scholar

²⁸ See e.g. Case C-240/83, Association de défense des brûleurs d'huiles usages, 1985 E.C.R. 531 and C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1990 E.C.R. I-4431.Google Scholar

²⁹ See, supra, note 20, Günther, 163. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 275–290 (1990).Google Scholar

³⁰ See, supra, note 10, Dworkin, 239–240. For Dworkin, intersubjectivity is expressed by the political morality of the legal community, which guides adjudication.Google Scholar

³¹ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 221. Cf. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The new rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation (1971); Chaïm Perelman, Justice et raison (1963), whose notion of an ideal audience and its role from the viewpoint of acceptability of argumentation is connected with Habermas’ views.Google Scholar

³² Illustrative examples include the so-called Viking Line and Laval cases: Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen's Union, v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767. These have raised a discussion concerning the relationship between free movement provisions and the right to collective action. The question is whether the ECJ should follow a paradigm of law that is based on the supremacy of free movement principles over fundamental rights. It might be argued that the ECJ decided the cases in accordance with the prevailing paradigm of EU law, i.e. that of supremacy of free movement. However, an entirely different question is whether the arguments presented convinced the legal community of the ECJ's interpretation.Google Scholar

³³ See e.g. Thomas Wilhelmsson, Yleiset opit ja pienet kertomukset ennakoitavuuden ja yhdenvertaisuuden näkökulmasta, 102 Lakimies 199, 220 (2004) on predictability of argumentation.Google Scholar

³⁴ Here the concept of a legal community is understood in the strict sense: that is, as primarily encompassing the juristic community operating in the EU legal system, both on national and EU levels.Google Scholar

³⁵ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 222–223. Habermas tries to develop Dworkin's One Single Right Answer thesis beyond the monological, judge-centered view that seems to be at the centre of Dworkin's theory. Indeed, Dworkin does not address the issue of different legal paradigms that are simultaneously present in a given community. See also, supra, note 10, Dworkin, 225.Google Scholar

³⁶ See inter alia Case C-219/07, Nationale Raad van Dierenkwekers en Liefhebbers VZW and Andibel VZW v. Belgische Staat, 2008 E.C.R. I-4475, para. 41. See also Case C-510/99, Criminal proceedings against Xavier Tridon, 2001 E.C.R. I-7777, para. 58.Google Scholar

³⁷ See, supra, note 9, 22–42.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 227.Google Scholar

³⁹ Id., 230. See in more detail Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation – The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (1989). Habermas discusses at length Alexy's thesis of legal argumentation as a special case of practical argumentation. Although the relationship between moral and legal argumentation cannot be discussed here in detail, suffice it to mention that Habermas does not agree with Alexy in that for him legal discourse cannot be defined as a special case of moral-practical discourses.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 233–234.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Id. Habermas argues that courts should not be concerned with essentially political or moral questions but, rather, they should primarily be concerned with securing the system of rights.Google Scholar

⁴² See, supra, note 29, 317, on the dialectical relation between question and answer in the process of understanding. However, it should be observed that Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy is based on analysis of individuals, not on analysis of collective groups such as courts and their interpretative processes.Google Scholar

⁴³ Jarkko Tontti, Right and Prejudice – Prolegomena to a Hermeneutical Philosophy of Law 35 (2004). Tontti describes adjudication fittingly as a forum where different interpretations compete: legal interpretation includes a continuous conflict between interpretations.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Allan Rosas, The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue, 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1, 4 (2007).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ However, in other cases, too, the dialogue has taken a different path in that national courts have not fully agreed on the ECJ's interpretation on certain questions of a principled nature: see, inter alia the cases related to human rights, for example the so-called Solange decisions as well as the Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 37, 271, BVerfGE 73, 339, and BVerfGE 89, 155. See also the recent German Constitutional Court judgment concerning the Lisbon Treaty of June 30, 2009, BVerfG, cases 2 BvE 2/08, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See, supra note 20, Günther, 155.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Cass Sunstein, One Care at a Time (1999).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Jan Engberg, Statutory Texts as Instances of Language(s): Consequences and Limitations on Interpretation, 29 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1135, 1165 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See, supra, note 44, 1.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Id. Google Scholar

⁵¹ Id., 15.Google Scholar

⁵² See, supra, note 31, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca; see, supra, note 31, Perelman.Google Scholar

⁵³ See, supra, note 1, Aarnio, 226–227.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ This universal audience in fact corresponds to Habermas’ “ideal speech-situation” where the possibility of manipulation and persuasion has been eliminated and therefore all participants are in the same position. See, supra, note 9.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See for a critical account of dialectics of legal interpretation, see, supra, note 44, 125. He essentially argues that dialectical legal interpretation is characterized by conflict, power, and normativity.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ In Wittgensteinian terminology, this audience is tied to a certain form of life that is defined culturally and socially.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See also supra, note 10, Dworkin, 255.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Kelsen, Hans, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen 40–41 (1979). See also Mark Van Hoecke, Law As Communiction 86–87 (2002).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Mirjami Paso, Viimeisellä tuomiolla. Suomen korkeimman oikeuden ja Euroopan yhteisöjen tuomioistuimen retoriikka 353 (2009).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See, supra, note 1, Aarnio, 185–195. The requirement of rationality consists of L-rationality and D-rationality.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See, supra, note 59, 352.Google Scholar

⁶² Id., 195–280, on categorizing ECJ arguments in accordance with the Aristotelian logos, ethos, pathos distinction.Google Scholar

⁶³ Mitchel Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy 211–229 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See, supra, note 59, 353.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ John Ramage and John Bean, The Guide to Writing 81–82 (1998).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See, supra, note 1, Aarnio, 189–195.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See in more detail Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice 218–270 (1993).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Case 36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich, 2003 E.C.R. I-5659.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Case 36/2002, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609, para. 34.Google Scholar

⁷² Case 36/2002, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609, paras. 33–34.Google Scholar

⁷³ See, supra, note 59, 364. The ECJ also often only refers to relevant legal sources, principles, and legislation, without opening these arguments by explaining why they are relevant and what their content is.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See e.g. Katharina Sobotà, Logos, Ethos, Pathos – A Quantitative Analysis on Arguments and Emotions in Law, in Retorik och rätt: sett genom tio författares ögon 155, 170–171 (Mikael Mellqvist and Mikael Persson eds., 1994).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See, supra, note 59, 256. See also Rosas (note 44), who sees values and principles as constituting a means of judicial dialogue.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See, supra, note 59, 254.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Id., 362. Paso notes that arguments from comparative law may prove useful for the ECJ in convincing the audience in this dialogue. In that sense, she suggests that using a greater number of arguments from comparative law could result in a more nuanced dialogue and open ECJ legal reasoning to a critical balancing of different arguments and views. Cf. supra note 12, 6. Maduro argues that the ECJ should not use comparative law as a means of identifying what it believes to be the best legal solution in the abstract. The “bottom up” construction and legitimacy of EU law, in which the ECJ enjoys a key role, requires that the ECJ respects common national legal traditions and does not simply use comparative law to search for its preferred legal solution among different national legal systems. See also Jan Smits, Comparative Law and its Influence on National Legal Systems, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 513, 537 (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Id., 340. Appealing to emotion is generally associated with political, not legal argumentation.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See, supra, note 43, 177. Tontti bases his notion of tradition in legal interpretation on the Gadamerian idea of prejudices that condition all understanding and, consequently, interpretation. See, in this respect, supra, note 29, 275–290.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See, supra, note 74, 170–171.Google Scholar

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⁸² See, supra, note 43, 131.Google Scholar

⁸³ See, supra, note 48, 1152–1155.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Id., 1155. See also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 New York University Law Review 1109, 1123 (2008).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See, supra, note 44, 15.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See, supra, note 4, 225–226. Tuori warns that a risk exists that concepts such as the rule of law and legal certainty are “pumped up” with everything that is perceived as positive. What happens, then, is that these concepts lose their status, instead becoming “rhetorical balloons”. See also supra, note 33, 220. One could argue that through such argumentation it would be possible to reach a greater level of predictability in legal decision-making too, since transparency opens the interpretative process to critique and to a real dialogue between legal actors in the EU legal community.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See, supra, note 10, Dworkin, 104.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See, supra, note 10, Habermas, 386.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ This is based on Habermas’ own view on European integration. A European constitution does not work due to the lack of a shared culture (“Lebenswelt“) on the EU level. In this sense, he could be seen as being in favor of a “bottom-up” approach to European integration.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory 492–563 (1992).Google Scholar

⁹¹ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 364 (1971).Google Scholar

⁹² See, supra, note 47. See also supra, note 12, 9.Google Scholar

⁹³ Kaisa Koskinen, Beyond Ambivalence. Postmodernity and the Ethics of Translation 86 (2000).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Id. See also supra, note 12, 9. Although the problems of political bargaining are particularly important in the EU where 27 Member States with widely differing national interests participate in the legislative process, the incompleteness of lawmaking is not as such an unknown phenomenon in national settings either. Collective labor agreements are a case in point: they are often left intentionally vague so that the negotiating parties can reach agreement, at least in principle: the problem of defining the actual content of the agreement is left to the courts.Google Scholar