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Applying Kosovo: Looking to Russia, China, Spain and Beyond After the International Court of Justice Opinion on Unilateral Declarations of Independence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Extract
When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released its advisory opinion regarding the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on 22 July 2010, Serbia was not the only State to express its dissatisfaction with the outcome. The broader significance of the ICJ's finding that Kosovo's UDI in 2008 did not violate international law has profound relevance for other States. The United States and its allies claim that Kosovo's situation is unique and does not serve as precedent, but other nations facing separatist movements within their own borders may have reason to be concerned.
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- Kosovo in the ICJ – The Case
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References
1 Accordance with International Law of the UDI in Respect of Kosovo, No. 2010/25, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (July 22) (finding that (a) Kosovo's declaration of independence does not violate international law, (b) Kosovo's declaration of independence does not violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and (c) independence does not violate the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=4 (last visited 15 Aug. 2010) [hereinafter Kosovo Decision].Google Scholar
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57 See The Hague Portal, ICJ rules on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: The International Court of Justice finds that the declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law, Hague Academic Coalition, July 22, 2010, available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/smartsite.html?id=11906 (also notes that the ICJ initially considered the legality of declarations of the prohibition of the use of force and principle of territorial integrity as confined to the relations between the States, also discusses the contrast of Kosovo's situation to previous ICJ condemnations of UDIs and how those cases were determined illegal in character because of their direct connection with unlawful use of force and other serious violations of international norms of jus cogens character). See also Kosovo Decision, supra note 1.Google Scholar
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60 Id. at 15.Google Scholar
61 Id. Google Scholar
62 Id. Google Scholar
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71 Id. (“So long as the question of status and sovereignty and territorial integrity are clear, I think there are plenty of things these two governments can constructively talk about…”).Google Scholar
72 To view the official statements of the countries who recognize Kosovo, please see Kosovo Thanks You, available at http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited 15 Aug. 2010).Google Scholar
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75 Steven Woehrel, Serbia: Current Issues and UNITED STATES Policy, 7-5700, RS22601 Congressional Research Service (Report for Congress), 2, 7 (12 April 2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142747.pdf (discussing Serbia's path to the EU and how progress of Serbia's integration into the EU has been hindered by a failure to arrest remaining indicted independence of Serbia's Kosovo province).Google Scholar
76 Id. at 7.Google Scholar
77 Id. Google Scholar
78 Id. at 7; see also EU Official Statement, supra note 74.Google Scholar
79 See Goodwin, supra note 45, at 17 (discussing the support for either sovereignty or an independent Kosovo (citing Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple—Order, Justice and the U.N.: A Dialectical View 6 EJIL 334 (1995); Jason A. Beckett, Rebel Without a Cause? Koskenniemi and the Critical Legal Project, 7 German Law Journal 1045 (2006); available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol07No12/PDF_Vol_07_No_12_1045-1088_SI_Beckett.pdf, commenting on Koskenniemi's work in this area).Google Scholar
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81 See Warning Light on Kosovo, supra note 64 (“Current United States policy relies on the unconvincing claim that Kosovo is ‘unique’ and would set no precedent for other troublespots. Of course every conflict has unique characteristics. However, ethnic and religious minorities in other countries already are signaling their intention to follow a Kosovo example.”).Google Scholar
82 Id. (“Recognition of Kosovo's independence without Serbia's consent would set a precedent with far-reaching and unpredictable consequence for many other regions of the world.”).Google Scholar
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