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⁴ Scott earlier rejected the notion of decentralization to describe EU agencification. See Colin Scott, Agencies for European Regulatory Governance: A Regimes Approach, in Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance 70–71 (Damien Geradin, Rodolphe Muñoz & Nicolas Petit eds., 2005).Google Scholar

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⁹ Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C. 306) Art. 17 [hereinafter TFEU Art. 17].Google Scholar

¹⁰ See sources cited infra note 48.Google Scholar

¹¹ Case C-359/92, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-3681, para. 38.Google Scholar

¹² Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18 [hereinafter Short-selling].Google Scholar

¹³ Apart from the English language version, the Bulgarian, Danish, Estonian, Greek, Gaelic, Slovenian, Slovak, Romanian, and Swedish language versions also refer to “agencies.”Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Short-selling, supra note 12.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Case 9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, 1957–1958 E.C.R. 133, 153.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Short-selling, supra note 12“ para. 53.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Even if the Court in Short-selling still confirmed that EU agencies cannot exercise discretionary powers.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Short-selling, supra note 12, at para. 53.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For a discussion of this case and its possible repercussions, see sources cited infra note 110; Chamon, supra note 3. See generally Rob Van Gestel, European Regulatory Agencies Adrift?, 21 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 188 (2014).Google Scholar

²⁰ U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3.Google Scholar

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²² See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878) (confirming the distinction between inferior and principal offers). A clear definition of the constitutional notion of “inferior officers” is still lacking.Google Scholar

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²⁶ Although there is no general consensus on exact terminology in the U.S., three basic groups of agencies are generally distinguished: Cabinet agencies (e.g. the Food and Drug Administration), executive agencies (e.g. the Environmental Protection Agency), and independent agencies (e.g. the Federal Trade Commission). See Abraham Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 Admin. L. Rev. 415, 416 (1976); Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 583 (1984). The cabinet agencies operate under a regular department, whereas the latter two do not. Yet, both the cabinet and executive agencies should be situated within the executive branch.Google Scholar

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²⁸ Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926).Google Scholar

²⁹ Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). A unified “for cause” standard does not exist. The legislator may be more or less specific in its statutes as to the grounds on which an officer may be removed. See Kent Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1349, 1352 (2012).Google Scholar

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³² Davidson, Peter, Chipping Away at the President's Control over His Administration: An Analysis of Morrison v. Olson and Beyond, 6 J. L. & Pol. 205, 217 (1989). As Davidson remarks, this was further confirmed in Wiener. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).Google Scholar

³³ However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens rejected the qualification of the Comptroller General's powers as “executive” in nature. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 757 (1986).Google Scholar

³⁴ Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734. As Stack observes, the Reagan administration hoped that the Court would rule the President may remove the Comptroller General at will, possibly setting a precedent for other independent agencies. See Kevin Stack, Obama's Equivocal Defense of Agency Independence, 26 Const. Comment. 583, 590 (2010).Google Scholar

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³⁷ Id. at 691–92.Google Scholar

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⁴⁰ See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).Google Scholar

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⁴² Id. at 497–498. Huq criticized the Court's opinion arguing that (1) “control” should not be reduced to the power of removal and (2) the link between Presidential control and democratic accountability is not that strong. See Aziz Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2013).Google Scholar

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⁴⁵ Chief Justice Roberts further contemplated the idea of a multiple, rather than a double-layered protection, using the metaphor of a matryoshka doll. See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 496.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See infra Part E.I.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See infra Part E.II.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See generally Geradin, Damien, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the EU Should Learn from the American Experience, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1 (2004); François van der Mensbrugghe, The Danger of Excessive Delegations to Independent Administrative Agencies: The Example of the U.S.A., in European Regulatory Agencies 113 (Giacinto Della Cananea ed., 2005); Christian Stoffaës, Network Regulation on a Federal Scale: Lessons for Europe from the American Perspective, in European Regulatory Agencies 137 (Giacinto Della Cananea ed., 2005); Miroslava Scholten, The Political Accountability of EU Agencies: Learning from the US Experience (2014). Shapiro does take note of this issue. See Martin Shapiro, A Comparison of US and European Independent Agencies, in Comparative Administrative Law 300 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Calabresi, , infra note 94; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See, e.g., Olson, Morrison v., 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constituional Court] Dec. 20, 2007, Hartz IV-Arbeitsgemeinschaften, 119 Entscheidungen Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 331, 365.Google Scholar

⁵² The German Parliament provides an English translation of the Grundgesetz. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0060.Google Scholar

⁵³ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Fisher, Howard, The German Legal System and Legal Language: A General Survey Together with Notes and German Vocabulary 5–6, 11 (4th ed. 2002).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Wentzel, Joachim, Agenturen im deutschen Verwaltungskontext: Nachzügler oder Vorreiter?, 63 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 768 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ A Quango is a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization in the U.K. See Kristian Fischer, Quangos—An Unknown Species in German Public Law? German Report on the Rulemaking Power of Independent Administrative Agencies, in Recent Trends in German and European Constitutional Law 153, 195–60 (Eibe Riedel & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2006). Bach also stresses that the bodies of indirect administration are typically not involved in core public-sector functions. See Tobias Bach, Germany, in Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries 166, 167–69 (Koen Verhoest et al. eds., 2012).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The following are some of the bodies other than ministries, representing Germany in EU agencies: Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin] [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] which is an Anstalt; and Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte [BfArM] [Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices], Eisenbahn-Bundesamt [EBA] [Federal Railway Authority], Bundesnetzagentur [BNetzA] [Federal Network Agency], and Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [BSI] [Federal Office for Information Security] which are selbständige Bundesoberbehörde. Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ziller, Jacques, Multilevel Governance and Executive Federalism: Comparing Germany and the European Union, in The European Union Legal Order After Lisbon 265 (Patrick Birkinshaw & Mike Varney eds., 2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 28, 1961, 1. Rundfunkentscheidung, 12 BVerfGE 205, 229.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 83.Google Scholar

⁶¹ This is the so called Ausführung als eigene Angelegenheit. Google Scholar

⁶² Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 85. For a more elaborate discussion of these two types of Bundesverwaltung, see Ziller, supra note 58, at 268–74.Google Scholar

⁶³ The Bundeseigene Verwaltung therefore is one possible form of Bundesverwaltung, next to the options under Article 84 GG and Article 85 GG.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 87 (3).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 24, 1962, Kreditwesen, 14 BVerfGE 197, 202 [hereinafter Kreditwesen]. Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. at 210.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 73, 74.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Kalkbrenner, Helmut, Zur Errichtung von Bundesoberbehörden nach Art. 87 III GG, 7 Juristenzeitung [JZ] 211 (1963).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Hömig, Dieter, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 515 (2010).Google Scholar

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⁷¹ Hans-Jürgen Papier, Die Regionalisierung der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht, 4 Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialrecht 6, 242 (1995).Google Scholar

⁷² Ibler, Martin, Artikel 87 GG, in Grundgesetz: Kommentar, München, Beck, Ergänzungslieferung 64, 205 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig eds., 2012). In case the matter falls with a concurring competence, the conditions for using such a competence should of course also be met. Focusing on the Erforderlichkeitsklausel, see Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 72 (2).Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ It should be noted that the original draft of the Basic Law prescribed the consent of the Bundesrat for laws establishing Bundesoberbehörden. In the end, this provision did not make it to the final version. Further on this and on the proposed amendment in the 1990's, see id. at 198–201.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Id. at 205.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Ibler, , supra note 72, at 210–11.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Kreditwesen at 213–14.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 80 (1). The Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal Administrative Court] has confirmed that an Anstalt may be empowered either through (1) its establishing law, (2) a subsequent law, or (3) a Rechtsverordnung. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht, [1996] 102 BVerwGE 119, 126. Appel and Eding conclude that Bundesoberbehörden may also be empowered through Rechtsverordnungen. See generally Markus Appel & Annegret Eding, Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Verordnungsermächtigung des § 2 II NABEG, 6 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht [NVwZ] 344 (2012).Google Scholar

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⁸³ Reicherzer specifically takes issue with the Court's “blunt” a contrario reasoning. To Reicherzer, it follows from the exceptional character of Article 87 (3) first sentence that the pouvoir constituant would have intended the provision to be used only when a clear need can be shown, albeit that the threshold required should not be as high as that of Article 87 (3) GG in the second sentence. See Reicherzer, supra note 82.Google Scholar

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⁸⁵ Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385 (1907).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Stranahan, Buttfield v., 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385 (1907) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁹¹ United States v. Chicago, 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931).Google Scholar

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⁹³ N.Y. Central S. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. B. & M. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Sometimes it may be debated whether a delegation problem is at issue or not. For instance, in Clinton v. City of New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held part of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 unconstitutional because it created a new procedure to pass legislation. Calabresi argued that this case was not about legislative procedure but about a delegation of powers from Congress to the President. See Steven Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77, 85–86 (2004). Justice Scalia, writing for the minority indeed argued as such. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 465 (1988).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Id. at 426.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). Justice Cardozo, who dissented in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, wrote a concurring opinion, setting out why he thought the two delegations were different and why the Schechter delegation did not conform to the limits he set out in Panama. See id. at 551–55.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁰ See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 985 (1983).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398–99 (1940).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Yukas v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944).Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁵ United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408–09 (1909).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Cluff, Brigham, American Trucking and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A New Twist on an Old Doctrine, 40 Jurimetrics 485, 491–93 (2000).Google Scholar

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¹¹³ Halberstam also notes that the birth of the Bundesnetzagentur was not the result of an indigenous development but followed from EU law requirements. See Daniel Halberstam, The Promise of Comparative Administrative Law: A Constitutional Perspective on Independent Agencies, in Edward Elgar, Comparative Administrative Law 197 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010).Google Scholar

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¹¹⁶ This is of course relevant to all EU Member States.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-1885, para. 1.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ AG Mazàk further noted that the problem in this case also related to the conflict between the traditional concept of administration and the (more modern) concept based on decentralization. See Opinion of Advocate General Mazák, Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-1885, para. 8; sources cited supra note 6.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Case C-518/07 at para. 42.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ See Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 2009 E.C.R. I-11431.Google Scholar

¹²¹ A number of German authors have therefore criticized Short-selling for its lack of attention to the repercussions on the Demokratieprinzip. See Ohler, supra note 110, at 250–52.Google Scholar

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¹²⁶ According to Ludwigs, if independence is absolutely necessary (zwingend erforderlich) for an authority to achieve its policy objectives, this could also justify a Demokratiedefizit. Id. at 48.Google Scholar

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¹²⁹ In addition, when Congress explicitly delegated the power to interpret or refine the law to an agency, courts deferred under an arbitrary and capricious test of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).Google Scholar

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¹³³ Id. at 140.Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁰ Id. at 840 n.2.Google Scholar

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¹⁴³ Merril, Thomas, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 969–70 (1992). But Merril himself rejects the idea of Chevron as a counter-Marbury. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court also ruled that Chevron deference trumps stare decisis when an agency interprets ambiguous text previously interpreted by a court. See National Cable & Telecommunications Association et al. v. Brand X Internet Services et al., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁵ It is not clear what is to be understood by the force of law and in Christensen, but especially in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Court further complicated the issue. See also Linda Jellum, United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: Has It Mastered Chevron's Step Zero, 3 Veterans L. Rev. 1, 87–97 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ The deference in Chevron was not only based on the agency's expertise, but also on its political accountability, coming under the authority of the President. Evidently this second element applies much less to the independent agencies but the U.S. Supreme Court has still afforded Chevron deference to independent agencies. For a discussion, see Randolph May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 429, 429–53 (2006).Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁸ Id. at 587. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia dismissed Skidmore as an anachronism, arguing that Chevron deference should be applied in this case as well. Justice Scalia still concurred, because he found the interpretation of the Department of Labor unreasonable in any case. Id. at 589–91.Google Scholar

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¹⁵¹ Id. at 229.Google Scholar

¹⁵² Id. at 229–31.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Id. at 245.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ Sunstein, Cass, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 216 (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ See Walton, Barnhart v., 535 U.S. 212 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ In MCI, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that where an agency has the authority to “modify” certain requirements in a section of the basic statute this cannot be understood as granting the power to fundamentally alter that section, because “modifying” is commonly understood as (only) “changing slightly or incrementally.” See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Sunstein proposes to include these questions in Chevron step One, because this would otherwise mean that courts become competent to solve major questions for which they have no superior claim than the executive branch. See Sunstein, supra note 154, at 243.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ See Merril and Hickman, supra note 144.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ A search in the HeinOnline database for the query “Chevron deference” results in hundreds of academic contributions discussing (and generally criticizing) Chevron and the cases which followed it.Google Scholar

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¹⁶⁶ See Wieland, Joachim, Regulierungsermessen im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen deutschem und Unionsrecht, 64 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 705, 706 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Case C-55/06, Arcor AG & Co. KG, 2008 E.C.R. I-2931, para. 39.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Id. at para. 159.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Id. at para. 170.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ Verwaltungsgericht Köln [Cologne Administrative Court], Aug. 27, 2009, 1 K 3427/01, para. 121. See also Ludwigs, supra note 114, at 66.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BverwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Nov. 23, 2011, 6 C 13.10, para. 38.Google Scholar

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¹⁸⁰ Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 2009 E.C.R. I-11431.Google Scholar

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¹⁸⁴ See for example the Court's observation in Mistretta: “[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society … Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power.” See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).Google Scholar

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¹⁸⁶ See Marshall, William, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 505, 507–09 (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ See id. at 509.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ On the new—more permissive—delegation doctrine resulting from Short-selling, see Miroslava Scholten & Marloes Van Rijsbergen, The Limits of Agencification in the European Union, 15 German L.J. 1223, 1249 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ European Commission, European Governance - A White Paper, at 24, COM (2001) 428 final (Mar. 29, 2016).Google Scholar