1 To be sure, even when the HS is used, classification of products will frequently be contentious. For example, the dispute between the European Communities on one side and Brazil and Thailand on the other concerning the classification of salted frozen boneless chicken cuts. See EC – Chicken Classification, WT/DS269, 286/R (panel report), WT/DS269, 286/AB/R (Appellate Body Report).Google Scholar

2 The metaphor of the HS as a vocabulary therefore seems more fitting than that of the HS as the language of international trade which is often used. For example, the WCO referring to the HS as a universal economic language. See http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_hsoverviewboxes_overview_hsharmonizedsystem.htm; Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods 73 (2007) (depicting the HS as supplying the common language to describe goods).Google Scholar

3 In the following when I speak of schedules of concessions I mean schedules of concessions with respect to goods which are annexed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and according to Art. II:7 GATT form an integral part of the GATT.Google Scholar

4 For a study that aims at a conceptualization of horizontal cross-linkages, see Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 International Organization 277–309 (2004). Cross-linkages between international dispute settlement organs are relatively well-studied and there have been several attempts to conceptualize them in legal terms. See e.g. Jasper Finke, Die Parallelität internationaler Streitbeilegungsmechanismen. Untersuchung der aus der Stärkung der internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit resultierenden Konflikte (2004); Heiko Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen (2008).Google Scholar

5 Moreover institutional linkage seems to be a more plausible and also a more desirable solution to the perceived dangers of fragmentation than, for example, a hierarchy of norms which does not leave room for politics. For an approach that stresses inter-institutional cooperation, see Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999–1046 (2004).Google Scholar

6 This could provide a principled answer to the question whether in the EC – Chicken Classification the WTO panel or rather the HS Committee of the WCO should have decided the classification question. See (note 1).Google Scholar

7 This could also be characterized as the exercise of public authority. See Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, in this issue (employing a wide definition). Administration as used and defined here, however, is a narrower term since it does not encompass acts taken by the highest political organs that are preceded by processes of inter-state diplomatic bargaining.Google Scholar

8 For example the recent draft guidelines to further the practical implementation of Art. 6 of the SPS which explicitly provide that they shall “not add to nor detract from the existing rights and obligations of Members under […] any […] WTO Agreement” G/SPS/W/218, para. 2 (25 February 2008); on the activities of the FTSC see Joseph Windsor, in this issue.Google Scholar

9 In the form of workshops organized by the secretariat for national administrators.Google Scholar

10 For other works which stress the role of secretariat or chairpersons, see Weiler, Joseph H.H., The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats, 35 Journal of World Trade 191 (2001). On the secretariat's role in dispute settlement, see Shaffer, Gregory, The Role of the Director-General and Secretariat: Chapter IX of the Sutherland Report, 4 World Trade Review 429 (2005); Odell, John S., Chairing a WTO Negotiation, 8 Journal of International Economic Law 425 (2005).Google Scholar

11 On the different ways of modification and development of law under the GATT 1947 and the important role of institutional practices in this respect, see Wolfgang Benedek, Die Rechtsordnung des GATT aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht 115–130 (1990).Google Scholar

12 Art. 1(a) International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Convention). The convention and nomenclature can be found on the WCO's website, at: http://www.wcoomd.org/home_ wco_topics_hsoverviewboxes.htm.Google Scholar

13 The classification under the residual position “Other” results from the fact that the only other sub-position is titled “Chewing gum, whether or not sugar-coated.”Google Scholar

14 The Brussels Convention had replaced the so-called Geneva Nomenclature of 1937.Google Scholar

15 If a country wants to impose a specific customs duty on white chocolate, which according to the HS falls under the residual position “Other,” it needs to create a further (seventh) level of differentiation in order to separate white chocolate from the other products falling under this residual position.Google Scholar

16 The Combined nomenclature (a tariff and statistics nomenclature) of the European Community is established by Regulation 2658/87.Google Scholar

17 See http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_hsoverviewboxes_hsharmonizedsystem.htm. WCO Members are not obliged to become parties to the HS Convention and at the same time parties to the Convention do not necessarily have to be Members of the WCO (Art. 11(c) HS Convention).Google Scholar

18 HS Convention preamble, first recital.Google Scholar

19 See http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_hsoverviewboxes_hsharmonizedsystem.htm.Google Scholar

20 Monitoring is facilitated when the controlled items can be identified by reference to a HS position.Google Scholar

21 Examples are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Basel Convention, The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, or the Montreal Protocol. The trade statistical systems of the UN (e.g. the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) and Central Product Classification (CPC)) are also based on the HS nomenclature.Google Scholar

22 According to the WTO preamble expansion of trade in goods is one of the objectives of the WTO.Google Scholar

23 With respect to rules of origin it is interesting to note that the Technical Committee on Rules of Origin which carries out the main technical work of harmonizing non-preferential rules of origin was established by the WTO and is a WTO body, but operates under the auspices of the WCO with the WCO Council exercising supervision over it (Art. 4:2 Agreement on Rules of Origin).Google Scholar

24 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 379 (2005).Google Scholar

25 As of 31 March 2006, 78 WTO Members (counting the EC-25 as one) were contracting parties to the HS Convention, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_wco_e.htm.Google Scholar

26 See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/tariff_sept07_e.htm.Google Scholar

27 Van den Bossche (note 24), at 401, 419.Google Scholar

28 WT/L/579, Annex B, paragraph 5. That tariff negotiations are conducted on the basis of the HS does not mean that WTO Members are limited by the product differentiations which the HS provides. They may further differentiate and negotiate tariff cuts with respect to only a subgroup of a product group subsumed under a subposition of the HS.Google Scholar

29 The relevance of the HS for the interpretation of concessions has been confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC—Computer Equipment, WT/DS62, 67, 68/AB/R, para. 89 and EC –Chicken Classification (note 1), para. 199.Google Scholar

30 Appellate Body Report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS 8, 10, 11/AB/R, at 21, 22.Google Scholar

31 The HS Convention recognizes in its preamble the “importance of ensuring that the Harmonized System is kept up to date in the light of changes in technology or in patterns of international trade,” recital 11.Google Scholar

32 In 1988 the WCO Council endorsed a conclusion by the HS Committee to review the HS at regular intervals of 3 to 4 years. So far revisions to the HS have entered into force in 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2007, they are referred to as the HS1992, HS1996, HS2002 and HS 2007 changes.Google Scholar

33 The 2007 HS amendments included changes due to technological progress, changes in trade patterns and amendments for social and environmental reasons. The latter entailed i.a. the inclusion of new subheadings to facilitate the monitoring and control of certain species of fish (FAO), pesticides (Rotterdam Convention) or ozone-depleting substances (Montreal Protocol). The HS 2007 changes further take into account the structure of other international agreements, e.g. the WTO's Information Technology Agreement See for a summary of the HS2007 amendments the report of the representative of the WCO to the Committee on Market Access at its meeting on 30 March 2005, G/MA/M/39, paras. 4.9-4.19.Google Scholar

34 Proposals by national governments are often prompted by private sector initiatives that are addressed to the customs or trade ministry and are considered by all agencies which have an interest in the matter; as an example of an international institution proposing a HS change, see Decision 13.37 of the Conference of the Parties of CITES according to which the secretariat shall “liaise with the World Customs Organization to promote the establishment and use of specific headings within the standard classifications of the Harmonized System for tortoises and freshwater turtles and for products thereof.”Google Scholar

35 Rule 2(b) Rules of Procedure of the Review Sub-Committee.Google Scholar

36 The amendment proposals are drafted by the HS Working Party.Google Scholar

37 Art. 6 HS Convention and Rule 19 Rules of Procedure of the HS Committee.Google Scholar

38 Members of the Council are the contracting parties to the Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council. These are not necessarily also all parties to the HS Convention.Google Scholar

39 Up to the HS96 changes correlation tables were prepared by the CCC Secretariat without involvement of the HS Committee.Google Scholar

40 Explanatory notes, classification opinions and other advice on interpretation is presumed to be accepted by the WCO Council unless a contracting party to the HS Convention requests referral of the matter to the Council within a specified time period (Art. 8:2 HS Convention). Some contracting parties have put the explanatory notes into law, see statement of the representative of the WCO to the Committee on Market Access at its meeting on 30 March 2005 (note 33), para. 4.36.Google Scholar

41 Art. 6:4 HS Convention and Rule 19 Rules of Procedure of the HS Committee.Google Scholar

42 The HS nomenclature constitutes a public good in the economic meaning of the term since it is nonexcludable and its consumption is non-rivalrous.Google Scholar

43 In some countries tax laws make reference to HS classification of products.Google Scholar

44 In EC—Chicken Classification (note 1) the AB upheld the panel's finding that the products in question are covered by the EC's tariff commitment of heading 02.10 of its schedule which corresponds to heading 02.10 of the HS nomenclature. The WCO had taken the position that the settlement procedures provided for in the HS Convention should have been followed by the parties to the dispute before the panel took a decision on a violation of WTO law, in this case Art. II GATT (see panel report para. 7.53). Subsequent to the adoption of the AB report, the HS Committee adopted a classification decision with the same result (classification decision No 1, 40th Session, October 2007, available at: http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Harmonized%20System/HS_COMM_Classifications_Decisions/CLHS40Eng.pdf. On this dispute and the question where it should have been adjudicated, see Horn, Hendrik & Howse, Robert L., European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 7 World Trade Review 9, 32 et seq. (2008).Google Scholar

45 GATT panel report in Spain – Unroasted Coffee, BISD 28S/102, para 4.4.Google Scholar

46 A Developing Country contracting party may, according to Art. 4(1) HS convention delay the application of all or some subheadings. Only 45 and 58 % of contracting parties were able to implement the first and second set of amendments on time, http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_hsoverviewboxes_amendinghs.htm.Google Scholar

47 According to Art. 12 regulation 2658/87 the EU Commission publishes annually the complete version of the combined tariff together with the duty rates in form of a regulation.Google Scholar

48 Concessions which are included in the schedules and which may be affected by adaptation to HS changes are not only tariff concessions. However the impact of HS changes is greatest with respect to tariff concessions which shall be the focus of the following observations.Google Scholar

49 For a more detailed analysis of how the adoption or changes of the HS nomenclature can affect tariff concessions, see Dayong Yu, the Harmonized System – Amendments and their Impact on WTO Members’ Schedules, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2008-02, at 12, 13, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200802_e.htm; see also WTO Procedures for Introduction of HS2002 Changes to Schedules of Concessions, WT/L/405, Attachment A, at 3, 4.Google Scholar

50 L/5470/Rev. 1, Annex 1, para 4.2.Google Scholar

51 Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions, Decision of 26 March 1980, L/4962, BISD 27S/25.Google Scholar

52 Decision of 10 November 1980, C/113 and Corr. 1, BISD 27S/26.Google Scholar

53 Members which may participate in Art. XXVIII GATT renegotiations are Members which have an initial negotiation right or a principal supplying interest. On principal supplying interest see also the Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.Google Scholar

54 BISD S 27, 26.Google Scholar

55 L/5470/Rev. 1.Google Scholar

56 L/6905 (aimed at the incorporation of HS1992 changes into GATT schedules as well as any future changes and used for the incorporation of HS1992 and HS1996 changes); WT/L/407 and WT/L/605 (for HS2002 changes); WT/L/673 (for HS2007 changes).Google Scholar

57 WT/L/673, para. 17.Google Scholar

58 WT/L/673, para. 4 and Annex 1.Google Scholar

59 WT/L/673, para. 4.Google Scholar

60 WT/L/673, Annex 2, para. 4.Google Scholar

61 Preferably according to the methods set out above to avoid a negative impact on the value of concessions, see WT/L/673, Annex 2, para. 5.Google Scholar

62 L/5470 Rev. 1 Annex 1, para 1.Google Scholar

63 L/5470 Rev. 1 Annex 1, para 1.4.Google Scholar

64 See WT/L/673, preamble, recital 6.Google Scholar

65 Draft files are the electronic files with the transposed parts of the schedule (WT/L/673, Annex 1). For the timelines in the HS2007 procedure, see WT/L/673, paras. 2, 11, 12.Google Scholar

66 This cooperation is implicit in the procedures which foresee that schedule transposition and preparation of concordance tables by the WTO Secretariat shall be based on information provided by the WCO, WT/L/673, para. 7.Google Scholar

67 An attempt to increase efficiency through electronic verification of schedule changes by the secretariat foreseen in the HS 2002 procedures (WT/L/407) failed due to unforeseen difficulties the secretariat encountered with this exercise.Google Scholar

68 WT/L/673, paras. 13–15.Google Scholar

69 Id. at para. 16.Google Scholar

70 L/6905, para. 1; WT/L/673, Annex 2, para. 5.Google Scholar

71 WT/L/673, paras. 13, 14.Google Scholar

72 WT/L/673, para. 15.Google Scholar

73 WT/L/673, para. 17.Google Scholar

74 L/5470, Rev. 1, Annex 1, para. 4.5.Google Scholar

75 WT/L/407, Attachment B, para. 8.Google Scholar

76 WT/L/605, para. 1; WT/L/673, para. 2 (these HS 2007 procedures foresee that developing country Members may opt for preparing their draft files themselves). The secretariat prepares this documentation by incorporating HS changes into the schedules in the Consolidated Tariff Schedules Database, an electronic database which is not legally binding (WT/L/673, preamble, recital 5). Regarding the transposition the secretariat has to follow a methodology laid out in an annex to the procedures, WT/L/673, para. 5 and Annex 2.Google Scholar

77 WT/L/673, paras. 8–12, 16.Google Scholar

78 For the distinction between the form of a legally binding decision and the mandatory nature of its content, see Benedek (note 11), at 118.Google Scholar

79 Benedek therefore seems to be mistaken when he groups the Procedures for negotiations under Art. XXVIII (note 52) with rules of procedures of the GATT organs and collectively qualifies them as internal rules. Benedek (note 11), at 122.Google Scholar

80 See introductory note to the GATT 1994, para. 1 (the so-called incorporation clause).Google Scholar

81 WT/L/407; WT/L/605; WT/L/673. The legal documents of the GATT 1947 to which the HS procedures are annexed neither refer to a legal basis in the GATT nor are they entitled “decision,” L/5470/Rev.1, L/6905.Google Scholar

82 It is sometimes discussed whether Art. IV:1, cl. 2 WTO Agreement entails a general competence to take legally binding decisions. Kuijper, Pieter J., Some Institutional Issues Presently Before the WTO, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law 81, 82 (D. L. M. Kennedy & J. D. Southwick eds., 2002). On the broad decision-making power under Art. XXV:1 GATT, see Roessler, Frieder, The Competence of GATT, 21 Journal of World Trade Law 73 (1987).Google Scholar

83 Under the GATT 1947 the HS procedures were established by the Committee on Tariff Concessions which had been created in 1980 by the GATT Council; Minutes of the Council meeting on 29 January 1980, C/M/138, at 10.Google Scholar

84 WT/GC/M/1, 11, 12. The terms of reference of the committee are contained in document WT/L/47; the rules of procedure which the committee according to Art. IV:6 WTO Agreement may establish for itself, subject of approval of the Council for Trade in Goods, are based on the rules of procedure for meetings of the General Council and contained in G/L/148. It is interesting to note that it was stated by the chairman at the first committee meeting that until the committee had adopted its rules of procedure, it “would conduct its business on the basis of common sense and GATT practice” (G/MA/M/1, para. 1.1).Google Scholar

85 WT/L/47, para. C.Google Scholar

86 Rule 33 Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Market Access, G/L/148.Google Scholar

87 Rule 33 Rules of Procedure of the Council for Trade in Goods, WT/L/79.Google Scholar

88 Procedures for an Annual Overview of WTO Activities and for Reporting Under the WTO, adopted by the General Council on 15 November 1995, WT/L/105, para. 1.Google Scholar

89 Id. at para. 1.Google Scholar

90 According to the Procedures the Council for Trade in Goods and the General Council “take note of reports.” Id. at para. 4.Google Scholar

91 On customary law under the GATT 1947 and its importance for the evolution of the GATT, see Benedek (note 11), at 126–130.Google Scholar

92 The proposal by the Chairman of the Committee on Market Access with respect to the HS2007 procedures, G/MA/M42, para. 4.4.Google Scholar

93 G/MA/M/26, para. 3.1.Google Scholar

94 G/MA/M/38, Add. 1, para. 1.2.Google Scholar

95 While the first 2002 HS procedures and the 2007HS procedures were approved in formal meetings, the second procedures on the transposition of HS 2002 changes were only agreed upon by the committee during an informal meeting, see statement of the chairperson in the minutes of the meeting of 30 March 2005, G/MA/M/38, Add.1, para. 1.2. The first procedures for the introduction of HS2002 changes were approved by the committee ad referendum, G/MA/M/29, para. 2.18.Google Scholar

96 The second HS2002 procedures were directly submitted by the committee to the General Council, G/MA/M/38, Add.1, para. 1.2.Google Scholar

97 With respect to the first GATT HS procedures concerning the adoption by contracting parties of the HS nomenclature, there was some discussion in the Committee on Tariff Concessions on the procedure for adopting the procedures. It was finally proposed by the chairman that the committee adopt the procedures and that they would be transmitted to the Council for approval (TAR/M/10 paras. 3.1 et seq.).Google Scholar

98 The information notes of the GATT Secretariat, TAR/W/22, TAR/W/81, TAR/W/89.Google Scholar

99 G/MA/M/37, paras. 3.2-3.6 and G/MA/M/45, para. 6.4.Google Scholar

100 The chairperson of the committee is appointed for one year after informal consultations among Members on the distribution of chairperson posts for the different WTO organs; on the practice of chairperson appointments see: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/current_chairs_e.htm.Google Scholar

101 G/MA/M/37, para. 3.2.Google Scholar

102 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm.Google Scholar

103 G/MA/M/39, paras. 4.9-4.19.Google Scholar

104 The HS 2007 procedures have only been adopted by the General Council on 15 December 2006.Google Scholar

105 One example of the crucial role of the chairpersons in the implementation process has been the engagement of one chairman in getting Members to approve their HS2002 schedules after multilateral review. To induce Members to give their approval – which is a prerequisite for the certification of schedules – this chairman wrote letters to and successfully initiated bilateral meetings with the respective delegations, G/MA/M/44, para. 3.1.; G/MA/M/45, paras. 6.5., 6.6.Google Scholar

106 G/MA//TAR/2/Rev. 40 on the submission of HS96 documentation and G/MA/W/23/Rev. 4 on the situation of schedules.Google Scholar

107 G/MA/M/38 Add. 1, para. 1.1.Google Scholar

108 Procedures for Negotiations under Art. XXVIII, BISD 27S/26, 27, para. 4.Google Scholar

109 TAR/W/61.Google Scholar

110 TAR/M/21, para. 2.9.Google Scholar

111 C/M/205, P. 13 (see statements by the US and EC delegates).Google Scholar

112 An initiative by a group of developing countries for a formal amendment extending the 90 days time limit did not achieve consensus. Since there was no consensus in the committee the matter was taken to the Council and the CONTRACTING PARTIES where consensus could also not be reached due to objections by some contracting parties that such an amendment might delay the transposition process too much. The CONTRACTING PARTIES consequently referred the matter back to the Committee on Tariff Concessions for an appropriate solution (SR.42/5, at 5).Google Scholar

113 G/C/M/23, para. 2.5.Google Scholar

114 G/C/M/23, para. 2.9.Google Scholar

115 G/MA/M/14, para. 3.2.Google Scholar

116 G/M/MA/23, para. 2.5.Google Scholar

117 G/M//MA/26, para. 23. Due to capacity problems of the secretariat the informal meetings could not take place as often as intended, see e.g. G/M//MA/34, para. 3.2; G/M//MA/35, para. 2.2.Google Scholar

118 TAR/M/28, para. 2.1 referring to the function of HS waivers under the GATT; on WTO Members’ need for a waiver when they are implementing HS2002 changes domestically, but have not yet completed the procedures to introduce these changes into their schedules, see G/MA/M/31, para. 4.1.Google Scholar

119 WT/L/675.Google Scholar

120 According to footnote 4 to Art. IX:3 WTO Agreement, consensus is required for a decision to waive obligations subject to a transition period or a period for staged implementation.Google Scholar

121 On 15 November 1995 the General Council agreed that decisions concerning waivers and accessions would also be taken in accordance with Art. IX:1 WTO by consensus and that only when consensus could not be arrived at, should voting take place in accordance with the relevant provisions. Decision-Making Procedures under Arts. IX and XII of the WTO Agreement, Statement by the Chairman, as agreed by the General Council on 15 November 1995, WT/L/93. The statement also specifies that a Member may request a vote at the time the decision is taken.Google Scholar

122 The legal requirements that waivers may only be of a limited duration and have to be reviewed annually did not exist under the GATT 1947 and were negotiated during the Uruguay Round.Google Scholar

123 H. G. Schermers & N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law § 811 (3rd revised ed., 1995).Google Scholar

124 A Member may however bring a non-violation complaint against a Member which received a waiver, this possibility is acknowledged in the Understanding.Google Scholar

125 This ability to change legal obligations established by primary law distinguishes waiver decisions from other acts of secondary law which usually establish a level of law beneath primary law and thus a hierarchy of norms. Due to these characteristics Benedek characterized the granting of waivers under GATT 1947 as a special form of lawmaking by secondary law (“sekundärrechtliche Rechtsfortbildung”) note 11, 141.Google Scholar

126 Of the 35 waiver decisions (including extension decisions) taken in 2001, 23 were HS waiver decisions; for the waivers granted in 2001 see Note by the WTO Secretariat, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Information on Waivers, IP/C/W/387, at 13.Google Scholar

127 For the collective waivers granted by the General Council for the HS1996, HS2002 and HS2007 transposition exercises see G/MA/W/23/Rev. 4.Google Scholar

128 G/MA/M/6, para 2.1.9 (statement by the Swiss representative).Google Scholar

129 The first collective HS waiver concerning the transposition of HS2007 changes was drafted together with the HS2007 procedures by the Market Access Division with the help of the Legal Affairs Division, the draft waiver is contained in G/MA/W/82.Google Scholar

130 G/MA/M/42, para. 3.11.Google Scholar

131 The decision of 15 June 1999 extended the HS96 collective waiver and was granted with retroactive effect to 30 April 1999, WT/L/303, footnote 1.Google Scholar

132 WT/L/675, para. b(iii).Google Scholar

133 The latest report of 6 May 2008 is contained in G/MA/198.Google Scholar

134 Proposal by Sweden, TAR/W/88 (23 September 1993).Google Scholar

135 This proposal was based on proposals submitted by delegations; for the chairman's proposal see TAR/M/36, Annex, at 3.Google Scholar

136 Developing country Members are further disadvantaged with respect to the renegotiation of concessions due to the transaction costs incurred in such renegotiations and their limited bargaining power.Google Scholar

137 The so-called TRIPS waiver (WT/L/540) was granted to facilitate the importation by Members of generic drugs in case of public health crises, or the Kimberley waiver (WT/L/518) which was granted to legalize trade restrictions implementing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to combat trade in so-called blood diamonds.Google Scholar