² The Macmillan Report noted that ‘It has been represented to us that great difficulty is experienced by the smaller and medium-sized businesses in raising … capital … even when the security offered is perfectly sound’ ([Macmillan] Committee on Finance and Industry, Report, Cmd. 3897 (1931), para. 404). Although ‘capital’ could be interpreted as not strictly encompassing loan finance, the reference to ‘security’ indicates that the committee was using the word in a broad context. As a Bank of England memorandum noted, ‘resources’, rather than capital, might have more adequately reflected their meaning (Bank of England Archive [hereafter BoE], SMT2/308, ‘Finance for small businesses’, 8 May 1944).

³ Carnevali, F. and Hannah, L., ‘The effects of banking cartels and credit rationing on UK industrial structure and economic performance since World War Two’, in Bordo, M. and Sylla, R. (eds), Anglo-American Financial Systems (Homewood, Ill., 1995).Google Scholar

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¹⁵ ibid., p. 547.

¹⁶ Public Record Office, Kew [hereafter PRO]: Treasury files [hereafter T] 233/1332, E. G. Compton to E. H. D. Skinner, 16 Jun. 1945.

¹⁷ PRO: T233/1333, memorandum by E. A. Shillito, 21 Jun 1948.

¹⁸ PRO: T233/1332, memorandum by E. G. Compton, 12 Jun. 1945.

¹⁹ ibid.

²⁰ PRO: T233/1332, Memorandum of Guidance, 17 Oct. 1945.

²¹ PRO: T233/1332, E. G. Compton to E. H. D. Skinner, 16 Jun. 1945.

²² PRO: T233/1332, note on discussion of Memorandum of Guidance with Sir N. Campbell, 21 Sep. 1945.

²³ PRO: T233/1332, Sir Campbell, N. to Sir Eady, W., 19 Oct. 1945.Google Scholar

²⁴ PRO: T233/1332, note, 16 Oct. 1945.

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²⁶ PRO: T233/1332, letter from S. Cohen, 15 Oct. 1945.

²⁷ PRO: T233/1332, note by J. Hyman, 22 Oct. 1945.

²⁸ ibid.

²⁹ ibid.

³⁰ PRO: T233/1332, note by E. A. Shillito, 23 Oct. 1945.

³¹ ibid.

³² PRO: T233/1332, note by E. A. Shillito, 8 Nov. 1945.

³³ PRO: T233/1333, Memorandum of Guidance, 30 Mar. 1947.

³⁴ PRO: T233/1332, letter to Sir N. Campbell, signed ‘B.T.’, 25 Nov. 1946.

³⁵ PRO, T233/1333, Points for discussion with the Chancellor on D.A.T.A.C. by E. A. Shillito, 13 Jan. 1947.

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⁴³ PRO: T233/1335, Questions on D.A.T.A.C., J. Hyman, 31 Mar. 1958.

⁴⁴ PRO: BT187/58, C. Douglas Campbell, Board of Trade, to J. Hyman, 29 Dec. 1951.

⁴⁵ ibid.

⁴⁶ PRO: BT187/1, DATAC minutes, 18 Jan. 1949.

⁴⁷ Source – based on an analysis of loan applications in PRO: BT187/1, DATAC minutes, vol. 1.

⁴⁸ Ross, D. M., The clearing banks and the finance of British industry, 1930–1959, unpublished. Ph.D. thesis (University of London, 1989), p. 240.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ PRO: BT187/1, DATAC minutes, 25 Oct. 1946.

⁵⁰ PRO: BT187/1, DATAC minutes, 16 Dec. 1946.

⁵¹ PRO: BT187/1, DATAC minutes, 31 Mar. 1947.

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⁵³ BoE: SMT2/7, note showing CFI loans to 30 Jun. 1935, n.d.

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⁶⁰ BPP (1955–56), VII; S. C. on Estimates, pp. 20, 182–3.Google Scholar

⁶¹ PRO: BT187/1, DATAC minutes, 17 Jan. 1951.

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⁶⁶ BoE: Chief Cashier Private Files, C4O/687, meeting between Chief General Managers of the ‘Big Five’ and the Governors of the Bank of England, 19 Oct. 1951.

⁶⁷ ibid., reports by Barclays and Midland.

⁶⁸ BoE: C40/688, reports on Midland, 25 Feb. 1954Google Scholar; Westminster, , 26 Feb. 1954Google Scholar; National Provincial, 11 Mar. 1954Google Scholar; and Barclays, , 16 Mar. 1954.Google Scholar

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⁸⁰ PRO: T234/21, letter from Shillito, E. A., 18 Nov. 1955.Google Scholar

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⁸² BPP (1955–1956), VIIGoogle Scholar; S. C. on Estimates, pp. 22.Google Scholar

⁸³ PRO: BT187/3, DATAC minutes, 9 May 1956.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ PRO: BT187/3, DATAC minutes, 12 Sep. 1956.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Coopey, and Clarke, , 3i, p. 63.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ ibid.

⁸⁷ The Local Employment Act (1960) transferred the provision of financial assistance to Development Area firms from the Treasury to the Board of Trade, DATAC being replaced by the Board of Trade Advisory Committee [BOTAC].

⁸⁸ PRO: BT177/1812, Parliamentary Secretary's Committee on Local Unemployment, Applications for financial assistance under the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act, 1958. Final Report by the Treasury, n.d., c. April 1960.

⁸⁹ Lloyds Bank Archive: Winton File, Sir Oliver Franks, ‘Bank advances as an object of policy’, 1960, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

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