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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2024
We consider the debut of a new monetary instrument, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Drawing on examples from monetary history, we argue that a successful monetary transformation must combine microeconomic efficiency with macroeconomic credibility. A paradoxical feature of these transformations is that success in the micro dimension can encourage macro failure. Overcoming this paradox may require politically uncomfortable compromises. We propose that such compromises will be necessary for the success of CBDCs.
An earlier version of this article was prepared for a conference held in honor of Angela Redish at the University of British Columbia, 14 October 2022. The authors are grateful to conference participants and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and corrections. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and not of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or of the Federal Reserve System.