² Kocka, J., ‘Entrepreneurs and managers in German industrialization’, in Mathas, P. and Postan, M. M. (eds), Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 7.1, The Industrial Economies: Capital, Labour and Enterprise (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 565–6.Google Scholar

³ Lindgren, H., ‘Introduction: the research agenda’, and Teichova, A., ‘Rivals and partners: reflections on banking and industry in Europe, 1880–1938’, both in Cottrell, P. L., Lindgren, H. and Teichova, A. (eds), European Industry and Banking 1920–1939. A Review of Bank-Industry Relations (Leicester, 1992)Google Scholar; Teichova, A., Gourvish, T. and Pogány, Á., ‘Introduction’, in Teichova, A., Gourvish, T. and Á., Pogány (eds), Universal Banking in the Twentieth Century (Aldershot, 1994)Google Scholar; and Olsson, U., ‘Comparing the interwar banking history of five small countries in north-west Europe’, in James, H., Lindgren, H. and Teichova, A. (eds), The Role of Banks in the Interwar Economy (Cambridge, 1991).Google Scholar

⁴ Lindgren, H., ‘Long-term contracts in financial markets: bank-industry connections in Sweden, illustrated by the operations of Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 1900–1970’, in Aoki, M., Gustafsson, B. and Williamson, O. E. (eds), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London, 1990)Google Scholar; Sjögren, H., Banker och näringsliv. Tvärsnittsanalyser och longitudinella studier av relationen mellan svenska företag och affärsbanker inom det bankorienterade finansiella systemet 1916–1947, Ph.D. thesis, Acta Universitates Upsaliensis, 27 (Uppsala, 1991)Google Scholar; and Dahmén, E., ‘Entrepreneurial activity, banking and finance, historical aspects and theoretical suggestions’, Working Paper, Industriens utredningsinstitut (IUI), No. 209 (Stockholm, 1988)Google Scholar. For Greece, see Dritsas, M., Viomihania kai Trapezes stin Ellada tou Mesopolemou [Industry and Banking in Interwar Greece] (Athens 1990)Google Scholar; and for Austria, see Eigner, P., ‘Interlocking directorships between commercial banks and industry in interwar Vienna’, in Teichova, Gourvish and Pogány, Universal Banking.Google Scholar

⁵ Teichova, , ‘Rivals and partners’, pp. 17–26.Google Scholar

⁶ Dritsas, M., ‘The structure of the Greek commercial banking system, 1840–1980’, in Pohl, M. (ed.), Handbook on the History of European Banks (Aldershot, 1994), p. 497.Google Scholar

⁷ Fennema, M. and Schijf, H., ‘Analysing interlocking directorates: theory and methods’, Social Networks, 1 (1979).Google Scholar

⁸ There are some exceptions; see, Ottosson, J., ‘Network analysis and interlocking directorates in interwar Sweden’, in Cottrell et al., European Industry.Google Scholar

⁹ Stokman, F. M., Ziegler, R. and Scott, J. (eds), Networks of Corporate Power (Cambridge, 1985)Google Scholar; Fennema, and Schijf, , ‘Analysing interlocking directorates’;Google ScholarBunting, D., ‘Origins of the American corporate network’, Social Science History, 7 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bunting, D. and Barbour, J., ‘Interlocking directorates in large American corporations, 1896–1964’, Business History Review, 45 (1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Mizruchi, M. S., The American Corporate Network 1904–1974 (London, 1982)Google Scholar; and Scott, J. and Griff, C., Directors of Industry. The British Corporate Network 1904–1976 (Oxford, 1984), p. 155.Google Scholar

¹¹ Stokman, et al. , NetworksGoogle Scholar. The computer package GRADAP, version 2.1 has been used in this study. See also Scott, J., Social Network Analysis. A Handbook (London, 1991).Google Scholar

¹² Scott, J., ‘Intercorporate structures in Western Europe: a comparative historical analysis’, in Mizruchi, M. S. and Schwartz, M. (eds), Intercorporate Relations. The Structural Analysis of Business (Cambridge, 1987).Google Scholar

¹³ Weber, F., ‘Universal banking in interwar central Europe’, p. 24Google Scholar, and Mosser, A. and Teichova, A., ‘Investment behaviour of industrial joint stock companies and industrial shareholding by the Österreichische Creditanstalt’, pp. 151–2Google Scholar, both in James, et al. , The Role of Banks.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Overy, R. J., ‘Göring's “multinational empire”’, in Teichova, A. and Cottrell, P. L. (eds), International Business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester, 1983), pp. 273–98.Google Scholar

¹⁵ British Library of Political and Economic Science, London [hereafter BLPES]: Collection Miscellaneous, 324; Royal Institute of International Affairs [hereafter RIIA], Reports on Economic Reconstruction of Central and South East Europe.

¹⁶ BLPES: Coll. Misc., 324V; RIIA, Economic Research Group, memorandum VI, ‘The problem of financing development in central and south eastern Europe’; Teichova, A., ‘Interwar capital markets in central southeastern Europe’, in Lampe, J. (ed.), Creating Capital Markets in Eastern Europe (Washington, DC and Baltimore, 1992).Google Scholar Finance through stock exchanges faciliated less than 10% of all investment in the Balkans.

¹⁷ In 1930 the National Bank of Greece [hereafter NBG] compiled a series of reports on several branches of industry recommending mergers and the formation of cartels [hereafter HANBG], XXXIV, N44.

¹⁸ The core of the description of the Swedish case can be found in Ottosson, J., Stabilitet och förändring i personliga nätverk. Gemensamma styrelseledamöter i bank och näringsliv 1903–1939 [Stability and change in personal networks. Interlocking directorates in banks and industry 1903–1939], Ph.D. thesis (University of Uppsala, 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Lindgren, H., ‘Bankrelationer under 1900-talet’, in Bjuggren, P.-O. and Skogh, G. (eds), Företaget – En kontraktsekonomisk ansats (Stockholm, 1989), p. 13Google Scholar; Larsson, M. and Lindgren, H., ‘Risktagandets gränser. Utvecklingen av det svenska bankväsendet 1850–1980’, in Thunman, C. G. and Eriksson, K., Bankmarknader i förvandling (Lund, 1990).Google Scholar

²⁰ Larsson, M., ‘Public control of commercial banks and their activities - the Swedish example 1910–1970’, in Fritz, S., Kastner, W. and Larsson, M., Banking and Bank Legislation in Europe 1880–1970, Three Studies, Working Papers No. 2, Uppsala Papers in Economic History (Uppsala, 1989).Google Scholar

²¹ Enderle-Burcel, G., ‘The failure of crisis managements: banking laws in interwar Austria’, in Teichova et al., Universal Banking.Google Scholar

²² Yamagishi, T., Gillmore, M. R. and Cook, K. S., ‘Network connections and the distribution of power in exchange networks’, American Journal of Sociology, 93 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roy, W. G. and Bonacich, P., ‘Interlocking directorates and communities of interest among American railroad companies, 1905’, American Sociological Review, 53 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mizruchi, M. S. and Bunting, D., ‘Influence in corporate networks: an examination of four measures’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 26 (1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Bolland, J. M., ‘Sorting out centrality: an analysis of the performance of four centrality models in real and simulated networks’, Social Networks, 10 (1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Sprenger, C. J. A. and Stokman, F. N. (eds), Gradap, Graph Definition and Analysis Package, version 2.1, User's manual (Groningen, 1989).Google Scholar

²⁵ Scott, , Social Network Analysis.Google Scholar

²⁶ One industry – electrical – a growth point during the 1920s, was identified as having a dominant position in the sample with 16 representatives. Engineering and metalworking together with mining and metallurgy had 11 and 9 representatives, respectively.

²⁷ Foreign banks and insurance companies included within the Austrian database were those undertakings described in Compass (Österreich) (1938) as having a ‘strong interest in the Austrian economy’, e.g. the Société Générale de Belgique, the Anglo-International Bank or the Dresdner Bank. Foreign industrial companies, belonging to the combines of Austrian banks or industrial joint stock companies, but situated outside Austria, were not taken into account.

²⁸ Stiefel, D., ‘Reconstruction of the Credit-Anstalt’, in Teichova and Cottrell, International Business, p. 426.Google Scholar

²⁹ Mathis, F., Big Business in Österreich. Österreichische Grossuntemehmen in Kurzdarstellungen (Vienna, 1987), p. 380.Google Scholar

³⁰ Matis, H. and Weber, F., ‘Economic Anschluss and German Grossmachtpolitik: the take-over of the Austrian Credit-Anstalt in 1938’, in Cottrell et al., European Industry, p. 109.Google Scholar

³¹ The number of board members constituting a link was also reflected in the multiplicity value. Strong links in this respect connected CABV with Gesco; Berndorfer Metallwaren Krupp AG; Hanf-, Jute-und Textilitindustrie AG; Pulverfabrik Skodawerke-Wetzler AG; and ÖIKAG.

³² Hirmer Zuckerfabrik AG, belonging to the Länderbank [hereafter LB] concern, was the most ‘central’ company that did not belong to the CABV network (degree of centrality: 21). The only other bank with a relatively ‘central’ position was ÖIKAG with a degree of centrality of 21 (and thus among the 20 most ‘central’ companies). The position of the French-owned LB (degree of centrality: 15) had been expected to be more ‘central’ as this bank controlled an impressive industrial ‘concern’. But there are indications that LB's business interest was more directed towards industrial combines situated in the successor states. The German-owned Mercurbank [hereafter MB] (degree of centrality: 12) and the Österreichisches Credit-Institut [hereafter ÖCI] (degree of centrality: 10) cannot be called very central actors in the network.

³³ Its centrality (degree of Generality: 46) can be explained by 8 Austrian CABV directors sitting on the board of Gesco (degree of centrality: 46).

³⁴ Klambauer, O., ‘Die Frage des deutschen Eigentums in Österreich’, and Weber, F. and Haas, K., ‘Deutsches Kapital in Österreich’, both in Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte (Vienna, 1978)Google Scholar; Wittek-Saltzberg, L., Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Okkupation, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Vienna, 1970)Google Scholar; Kernbauer, H. and Weber, F., ‘Österreichs Wirtschaft 1938–1945’, in Tálos, E., Hainisch, E. and Neugebauer, W. (eds), NS-Henschaft in Österreich 1938–1945 (Vienna, 1988)Google Scholar; ‘Rot-Weiss-Rot-Buch’, in Gerechtigkeit für Österreich (Vienna, 1946);Google Scholar and Maris, and Weber, , ‘Economic Anschluss’.Google Scholar

³⁵ Words of a British diplomat in Vienna, quoted in ibid., p. 121.

³⁶ Wittek-Saltzberg, , Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, pp. 139–53Google Scholar; and Matis, and Weber, , ‘Economic Anschluss’, p. 110.Google Scholar

³⁷ Wittek-Saltzberg, , Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, pp. 168–204Google Scholar; Overy, , ‘Göring's “multinational empire”’, pp. 269–98.Google Scholar

³⁸ Clare, G., Last Waltz in Vienna (London, 1982), p. 240.Google Scholar Ernst Klaar, an officer (a Prokurist) of LB, received his letter of dismissal on 30 Jul. 1938, – a circular saying ‘Consequent upon the re-organisation in the Land of Austria we have cause to terminate your employment’. Ibid., pp. 206–7. Henry Reuter, LB's French general manager, was able to bring no less than 22 Jewish employees of the Austrian branch to France, who all received his financial support.

³⁹ Overy, , ‘Göring's “multinational empire”’, pp. 271–2.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Wittek-Saltzberg, , Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, pp. 141–2.Google Scholar

⁴¹ ibid., p. 141; Matis, and Weber, , ‘Economic Anschluss’, p. 111.Google Scholar

⁴² On 18 Jul. 1938 MB – Länderbank Wien AG – took over the Viennese branches, involving the acquisition of the Austrian business, of both the Zentral-Europäische Länderbank and the Czech Živnostenská banka. Rasche was the official responsible for carrying out negotiations between the other banks and businesses, along with Paul Körner, head of the Reichswerke. Among new board members were Eduard Veesenmayer (closely connected with Keppler), who together with Hermann Göring, had been key figures in the preparations for the Anschluß, and Heinz Adolf Birthelmer, the economic consultant of the Gauleitung Niederdonau: Overy, , ‘Göring's “multinational empire”‘, pp. 271–2.Google Scholar

⁴³ Matis, and Weber, , ‘Economic Anschluss’, pp. 109–26.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ ibid., p. 114.

⁴⁵ Many former ‘multi-functionaries’ disappeared and so were not listed in the Personenverzeichnis of Compass (1939).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Compass (Deutsches Reich: Land Österreich-Sudetenland) (1940).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Two other banks were Jewish institutions and mostly undertook business with Jewish firms; they were not among the largest companies and so were excluded from the sample. The results suggest the minimal, if not non-existent, interaction between Jewish and Greek firms and networks.

⁴⁸ In the case of the S.A. Chemical and Fertilisers, interlocking with a mining firm had a multiplicity of 4.

⁴⁹ HANBG, XXXIV, 25393; Report on the role of the National Bank of Greece as a source of credit for the Greek economy (18 05 1948), pp. 8–10.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Several banks, especially NBG, maintained both ownership and credit relations with several textile firms during the 1920s. In the 1930s, however, a reorientation occurred and, although credit functions were still operating, supervision took place at lower levels of the hierarchy: Dritsas, , Viomihania kai Trapezes.Google Scholar

⁵¹ This was formed at the beginning of the century by a group of middle-class science students studying chemistry and engineering at Zürich Polytechnic. When they returned home, they jointly founded a series of modern industries. Most of the directors of these boards (A. Zachariou, D. Galanopoulos, the Kanellopoulos brothers, the Oeconomides brothers, E. Charilaos, and many others) belonged to the original inner core: Dritsas, M., ‘Networks of bankers and industrialists in Greece during the interwar period’, in Teichova et al., Universal Banking.Google Scholar

⁵² Dritsas, , ‘Networks of bankers’.Google Scholar

⁵³ This was not a practice restricted to Greece or concurrent with the less developed state of the economy. Compare in this respect the American experience where intercorporate directorships had existed since the early days of corporate capitalism. Dooley, P. C., ‘The interlocking directorates’, American Economic Review, 59 (1969), pp. 314–23.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ This hypothesis is supported by reports in the contemporary press, which indicated that an inner circle of directors was all powerful.

⁵⁵ Most of the large firms received credits in various forms from NBG. This bank preferred to have exclusive relations, but firms preferred to borrow from more than one bank: Dritsas, , Viomihania kai Trapezes.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Developments in the cement industry well illustrate this point. It consisted of four companies: the biggest, Titan S.A., was founded by the same early network already mentioned; the second largest, A.G.E.T. Heracles, emerged as a result of a breakup in the group. The latter was included in the sample but showed a lower degree of centrality. Since the initial breakup, competition characterised their relations which extended to the choice of banks.

⁵⁷ Larsson, M., ‘Aktörer, marknad och regleringar. Sveriges finansiella system under 1900-talet’, in Basic Reading, Uppsala Papers in Economic History (Uppsala, 1993) for similar results.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Lönnborg-Andersson, M., Skandinavbankgruppens ägande 1920–1944 – organisation och utveckling (Stockholm, 1993).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Ottosson, , ‘Network analysis’;Google Scholar and idem, ‘Stabilitet och förändring i personliga nätverk’.

⁶⁰ Ottosson, , ‘Network analysis’.Google Scholar These findings were based on the four largest banks' personal relations with companies in 1924 and 1939.

⁶¹ In the first years of the century, this network was rather loose in its structure. See Ottosson, , Stabilitet och förändring i personliga nätverk.Google Scholar

⁶² Larsson, M., ‘Overcoming institutional barriers: financial networks in Sweden, 1910–90’, in Cassis, Y., Feldman, G. D. and Olsson, U. (eds), The Evolution of Financial Institutions and Markets in Twentieth-century Europe (Aldershot, 1994)Google Scholar; and Lindgren, H., Aktivt ägande. Investor under växlande konjunkturer (Stockholm, 1994).Google Scholar

⁶³ North, D. C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁴ Grabher, G., ‘Rediscovering the social in the economies’, in Grabher, G. (ed.), The Embedded Firm. On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London and New York, 1993), p. 15.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ottosson, , Stabilitet och förändring i personliga nätverkGoogle Scholar; Eigner, , ‘Interlocking directorships’;Google Scholar while Dritsas, , ‘Networks of bankers’, also discusses personal networks in Greece at the turn of the century and maintains that they were not uncommon.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Magnusson, L. and Ottosson, J., ‘Transaction costs and institutional change’, in Groenewegen, J. (ed.), Transaction Costs and Beyond (Doordrecht and Boston, Mass., 1996).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Pollard, S., ‘Commentaries: bank-industry relations; the moving target; part two’, in Cottrell, et al. , European Industry, p. 224Google Scholar; and Lindgren, H., ‘Swedish historical research on banking during the 1980s’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 39 (1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁸ James, H., ‘Introduction’, in James et al., The Rote of Banks.Google Scholar His argument that networks reduce risk by their information-spreading function is not altogether convincing. Critics have pointed to the importance of the nature of information eventually disseminated through interlocking directorships. In periods of crisis, risk may to a certain extent even increase, if information, distorted by panic-induced reactions, starts to flow through the network. Rather, networks should be seen as channels for information.