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‘The last acre and sixpence’: views on bank liability regimes in nineteenth-century Britain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2009

John D. Turner
John D. Turner
Affiliation:
Queen's University of [email protected]
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Abstract

In the nineteenth century, British banking had a complete spectrum of shareholder liability regimes, ranging from pure limited to unlimited liability. Although the debate surrounding the US experience with double liability in banking is well documented, we know relatively little about the British experience of and debate about shareholder liability regimes in banking. Consequently, this article traces the development of views on shareholder liability regimes in nineteenth-century British banking. One of the main findings is that the chief argument for limited liability in British banking was based upon the perceived weaknesses of unlimited liability. In addition, it appears that much of the debate concentrated on the depositor-assuring viability of alternatives to unlimited liability.

Résumés

Au dix-neuvième siècle, le système bancaire britannique avait une gamme entière de régimes de responsabilité des actionnaires, s'étendant de la responsabilité limitée pure à la responsabilité illimitée. Bien que le débat autour de l'expérience des Etats-Unis avec la double responsabilité bancaire soit bien documenté, nous connaissons relativement peu de choses sur l'expérience britannique des régimes de responsabilité des actionnaires et le débat sur la question. En conséquence, cet article trace le développement des vues sur les régimes de responsabilité des actionnaires dans le système bancaire britannique du dix-neuvième siècle. Un des résultats principaux est que l'argument principal pour la responsabilité limitée dans le système bancaire britannique était basé sur les faiblesses perçues de la responsabilité illimitée. De plus, il apparaît que la plupart du débat de concentrait sur la viabilité, quant à l'assurance du déposant, des alternatives à la responsabilité illimitée.

Abstrakte

Im 19. Jahrhundert verfügte das britische Bankwesen über ein vollständiges Spektrum an Aktionärshaftungssystemen – die von der reinen beschränkten Haftung bis zur unbeschränkten Haftung reichten. Obwohl die das US-Modell der Nachschusspflicht im Bankwesen umgebende Debatte reichlich belegt ist, wissen wir dennoch relativ wenig über die britische Erfahrung dazu und die Debatte, die Aktionärshaftungssysteme im Bankwesen umgab. Und folglich befasst sich dieser Artikel mit der Herausbildung von verschiedenen Betrachtungsweisen zu Aktionärshaftungssystemen im britischen Bankwesen des 19. Jhd. Zu den wichtigsten Ergebnissen dieser Studie gehört, dass das Hauptargument zur Unterstützung der beschränkten Haftung im britischen Bankwesen auf den anerkannten Schwächen der unbeschränkten Haftung basierte. Des Weiteren scheint es, dass sich die Debatte größtenteils auf die Realisierbarkeit von Alternativen zur unbeschränkten Haftung zur Absicherung von Einlegern konzentrierte.

Resúmenes

En el siglo XIX, la banca británica tenía un espectro completo de regímenes de responsabilidad del accionista, que variaba desde responsabilidad puramente limitada a responsabilidad ilimitada. Aunque el debate sobre la experiencia de EE.UU con doble responsabilidad en la banca está bien documentado, conocemos relativamente poco acerca de la experiencia y el debate de los regímenes de responsabilidad del accionista en la banca británica. Consecuentemente, este artículo detalla el desarrollo de las opiniones sobre el régimen de responsabilidad del accionista en la banca británica del siglo XIX. Una de las conclusiones más importantes es que la razón principal de la responsabilidad limitada en la banca británica estuvo basada en la percibida falta de solidez de la responsabilidad ilimitada. Además, parece que gran parte del debate se concentró en la viabilidad aseguradora del depositante de alternativas a responsabilidad ilimitada.

Type
Articles
Information
Financial History Review , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , October 2009 , pp. 111 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © European Association for Banking and Financial History e.V. 2009

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References

1 This paper has resulted from research conducted during my tenure as the Houblon-Norman Fellow at the Bank of England. Thanks to the trustees of the Houblon-Norman Fund for financial assistance.

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