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On the constitutive effects of contingent associations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2023

Matthias Thiemann*
Affiliation:
Sciences Po, France
*
Corresponding author: Matthias Thiemann, SciencesPo, Centre d’études Européens, 27 Rue Saint Guillaume,75007 Paris, France. Email:[email protected]
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Proposing a non-moralistic critique of the changes to neoliberal capitalism post-crisis, Konings provides a refreshing take on the dynamics of financial governance, emphasizing the way linkages between state and finance are structured by a speculative logic internal to neoliberalism. In this essay, I raise a number of questions about this characterization of neoliberalism, focusing on issues of agency and durability. First, does the turn to systems theory allow for a satisfactory account of the role that agency has played in the historical expansion of neoliberalism? And second, is it possible to envisage an end to neoliberalism when neoliberalism is so closely identified with capital dynamics in general?

Type
Forum: Capital and time
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits noncommercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
© 2018 The Author(s)

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