The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) was the first recognition at law of the traditional ownership of land in Australia by Aborigines. It provides means whereby Aborigines claiming to have a traditional land claim to certain types of land in the Northern Territory can demonstrate that ownership to the Aboriginal Land Commissioner. If he finds that there are traditional Aboriginal owners of the land he reports that finding to the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and may recommend a grant of it to a Land Trust. Sometimes problems in ascertaining which, if any, Aboriginals are the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land claimed arise from the difficulty inherent in expressing the land tenure system of one culture in the language of another. The author illustrates this with examples from one land claim hearing and argues that the use of interpreters is desirable to enable the claimants to put their case clearly and for the Commissioner to understand more fully the intricacies of Aboriginal land tenure systems.

By a review of a series of comparable decisions in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) some of the problems that may arise as the jurisdiction and role of the AAT continues to expand in the review on the merits of Commonwealth administrative decisions are identified. The problems include first, the apparent difficulty for democratic theory of unelected tribunal members (including persons who are also judges) reviewing policy determined by elected Ministers; secondly, the creation of a dichotomy between decisions made by the AAT and decisions of public servants faithfully and more consistently applying Ministerial policy; thirdly, the limitation upon the membership and procedures of the AAT which restrict any truly effective wide-ranging review of government policy; and, fourthly, the potential damage to community confidence in the judiciary, by the involvement of judges in the frank determination of controversial matters of public policy. The role of policy-making in the courts is acknowledged and similarities and differences in the function of the courts and the AAT in the review of policy issues are indicated. It is concluded that the AAT will require all arms of government in Australia to face more precisely the role of policy in adjudicative decision-making.

Considerable confusion and difference of opinion exists as to the precise boundaries of jurisdiction in custody matters between Federal and State courts. This Article examines the main cases in which the scope of the Family Court's custody jurisdiction has been in issue, and reviews suggestions made to remedy the problems resulting from the division of jurisdiction. The authors argue for an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which is consistent with the trend of High Court authority as to the scope of the marriage power (section 51(xxi) of the Constitution), and which would remove much of the uncertainty concerning the Family Court's jurisdiction.

In his 1974 Hamlyn Lectures, Lord Scarman urged:

The theme was taken up in Australia by Mr Justice Brennan in 1979:

The Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth) was modelled closely on the United States Sherman Act. Early United States criminal monopolization cases were not very successful, and the statutory language was read down by a judiciary oriented toward common law contract analysis. The same thing is happening in current Australian cases. One of the finest monopolization opinions ever written is that of Mr Justice Isaacs in the 1911 Coal Vend case. It should be resurrected and used as the foundation for the development of Australian restrictive trade practices law.

Following recent disagreement between the Commonwealth and Victorian Solicitors-General over whether the States have power to employ aliens in public offices in view of section 3 clause 5 of the Act of Settlement 1701 (U.K.), this Article considers whether that clause applies in the States and, if it does, whether they or the Commonwealth can amend or repeal it. These issues are examined in light of the common law on the employment of aliens in public office, the reasons for the enactment of the Act of Settlement, and the question whether, and to what extent, the doctrine of paramount force applies to legislation enacted prior to the establishment of a colony.

The Article concludes that section 3 clause 5 did not apply in Australia, either by reception or by paramount force, although the common law on the employment of aliens applied by reception; and the common law did not disqualify naturalized persons from holding public office. The authors argue that in any event, Commonwealth legislation, validly enacted under the “Naturalization and aliens” power (section 51(xix)) has removed any disabilities the Act of Settlement might have imposed on the employment of naturalized persons. Moreover, pursuant to section 51(xxxviii), the Commonwealth could authorize the States, or any of them, to pass legislation repugnant to Imperial legislation extending to the State by paramount force.

Notwithstanding the inclusion of “Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” within the constitutional grant of federal judicial power, current Admiralty jurisdiction in Australia is based solely on a nineteenth century Imperial statute, the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890. That this has remained the case for so long is regrettable, and reflects in part a traditional deference to Imperial control over international shipping (although lately there have been indications of greater legislative assertiveness over maritime matters generally), and in part a reluctance to interfere with the present allocation of jurisdiction among State courts.

A concerted effort is now under way to lay the foundation for the creation of a modern indigenous Admiralty jurisdiction, and with this in mind, the author sets out to examine the nature and extent of the current colonial jurisdiction, its interrelationship with the federal jurisdiction under section 76(iii) of the Constitution, and the desirability of abandoning the rigid nineteenth century base of the former to realise the full twentieth century promise of the latter.

In his Hamlyn Lectures Lord Scarman ventured to suggest that the common law as developed by the judiciary had, by reason of its preoccupation with the defence of private property and distributive justice as between individuals, and its relative lack of concern with public law (meaning the law governing the rights and obligations of the state), come to play a diminishing role in the governance of society. He condemned what he described as “an influential body of legal opinion which would confine the role of the courts and the general law to the interpretation of the statutes and the statutory instruments which are the legal framework of the system”; and which would exclude those courts “from reviewing the merits of a decision”.

Constitutional law — Law for establishing any religion — Grant of Financial Assistance to States — Validity of Commonwealth legislation providing financial assistance to non-government schools — Constitution ss. 96, 116

Family Law — Property settlements — Companies own matrimonial assets — Interim injunctions — Whether the position of third party shareholders is a relevant consideration — Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s. 114

Constitutional Law—Separation of Judicial Power—Constitution s. 51(xxxv)—Dispute as to classification of employee under Commonwealth Award—Whether dispute extends beyond the limits of any one State