On the evening of 18 November 1976 the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976 passed through both Houses of Federal Parliament in less than three hours. The Federal Government claimed that the Act was urgently needed to protect the Australian national interest, which was said generally to be threatened by attempts being made to gather evidence in Australia for use in large-scale litigation in the United States of America arising put of an international uranium cartel The Parliamentary debate did little credit either to the Government or the Opposition. It is necessary to go beyond the Parliamentary Debates to make an informed assessment of the Act. When the facts are examined it becomes clear that the Government's claim that the situation was urgent was unfounded, that the appeal to the national interest was at best highly questionable and that, because of the availability of appropriate judicial process, legislative action was unnecessary. The Act is alarmingly vague and reposes wide discretionary powers in the Attorney-General. Its passage and operation have quite disturbing implications for parliamentary democracy and the principle of open government. Where uranium is concerned the Federal Government is showing an increasing tendency to use the Parliament as a cipher.

During 1978, the High Court of Australia and the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down decisions which announce a departure from the long-standing rule that decisions of the Privy Council bind all Australian Courts. In this article, Mr Geddes analyses these decisions and considers their future impact on the authority of Privy Council decisions in the various courts which make up the Australian judicial hierarchy.

In this article, Mr Rumble examines the 1977 amendments to the Trade Practices Act’s definitions of the words “supply”, “corporation” and “consumer” and their relationship to that part of the Act which gives contractual protection to consumers. The definition sections are tested against the policy goals identified by the Swanson Committee and against the general need for simplicity in consumer protection legislation. The verdict is unfavourable. It is demonstrated that the definition sections have some anomalous results. Mr Rumble argues, further, that the definition sections are a quag of ambiguity and specific areas of uncertainty are discussed to illustrate this argument.

Mr Rumble suggests that contract protection be taken out of the Trade Practices Act and incorporated in its own legislative framework.