It is a real pleasure for Mrs Seitz and me to come to Melbourne, one of the truly great cities of the world. I am especially gratified to be speaking in the city where Prime Minister Robert Menzies resided.

I express my gratitude to the University of Virginia for affording me the opportunity and honour of delivering the first Menzies lectures in Australia. By the same token, I thank the Australian National University and the Sir Robert Menzies Memorial Trust for their support of a lecture program designed to further enhance the understanding of our legal systems.

I have read a good deal of material about your country over the past few months. Much of it stressed that we share the English language. That is certainly true but, if Australia is anything like the United States, while we share the same general vocabulary, the younger generation has its own unique language. Fortunately, our legal language is largely interchangeable.

In 1971, FA Trindade argued that the doctrine of extraterritorial legislative incompetence (hereafter the doctrine of extraterritoriality) no longer applied to Australian State Parliaments. His general thesis was that the doctrine no longer applied, either because it had virtually ceased to exist at common law after the Privy Council decision in Croft v Dunphy in 1933, or because the doctrine had been impliedly repealed so far as the States were concerned by s 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (UK) (CLVA). Since 1971, the High Court of Australia has had occasion to consider the extraterritoriality rule several times, and now the topic has received express legislative provision in the Australian Commonwealth and United Kingdom statutes that are collectively known as the Australia Acts 1986. The overall purpose of these statutes is to eliminate any residual legislative, executive, or judicial authority of the United Kingdom over Australia and its States. Part of this legislative plan involves the extraterritoriality doctrine as it applied to the Australian States. It is the aim of this article to examine the impact of the Australia Acts upon the extraterritoriality principle.

From the time a Federal Court was first proposed, questions about its jurisdiction, and its relationship with state courts have dominated discussion. While it is not proposed to review this extensive literature in detail, it is apposite to draw on some insights from an article by Sir Garfield Barwick published in 1964 at an early stage of this debate. First, it was suggested that the matters in which a Federal Court should have jurisdiction be in some way special. This special element could, it was said, consist of either a distinctive and separate body of law, a desire for uniformity in the interpretation of Commonwealth law, or the character of a party involved in a matter (eg the Commonwealth or a State). Secondly, and of major importance to the present consideration of the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Barwick stated: