This article will examine the divergence between law and practice in criminal investigation by police and consider the degree to which it may contribute to an imbalance between the interests of the individual and the public interest in the efficient detection and investigation of crime. It will be argued that the imprecision of the existing law and the failure by the legislature to accord new, tightlydefined, specific-purpose powers to the police have made a major contribution to the pressure on police to misuse existing (and often more intrusive) powers or to exercise de facto powers not authorised by law. It is contended that this pressure often arises from a desire by police to find a more practical means of attaining agreed community objectives than that provided by the artificial standards of the existing law. A strong case can therefore be advanced in favour of refurbishing police powers to accord (more closely) with present conditions, while at the same time strengthening the safeguards cast around those powers. This article will argue that case.

For the purpose of reaching a decision about potentially defective administrative action into which he is conducting an investigation, the Ombudsman may wish to compel people to engage in various sorts of testimonial activity—the furnishing of information in writing, the production of documents, the answering of questions orally. This article examines the Ombudsman’s powers in that regard, pointing to matters which may give rise to difficulties in the exercise of such powers and suggesting a number of changes to the relevant provisions. Some of the matters discussed are relevant to the information-gathering powers of other Commonwealth agencies, for example, the Taxation Commissioner and the Trade Practices Commission. Not discussed in the article is the question of excuses which can be made to avoid complying with a valid request once made, a subject which deserves its own treatment separately.