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Liberal Assumptions in Section 116 Cases and Implications for Religious Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Alex Deagon
Alex Deagon*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology
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Abstract

It is well known that the ‘free exercise’ and ‘establishment’ clauses in Section 116 of the Australian Constitution have been interpreted narrowly by the High Court of Australia. However, there has been limited examination of theoretical assumptions or perspectives which may have consciously or unconsciously informed this interpretation. This article argues the High Court has adopted liberal assumptions about the nature of religion and its relationship to the state in the Section 116 cases. These liberal assumptions are a sharp distinction between ‘private’ religious and ‘public’ non-religious exercise, that religious freedom is subject to state determinations of what is required for neutrality between religions, and religious freedom is subject to state determinations of what is required for social order. The article proceeds to consider the implications of these assumptions for Section 116 cases in terms of a narrowing of religious freedom and a broadening of state power, and suggests awareness of these issues may produce a more nuanced approach to Section 116 in the future.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 113 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

I wish to thank Professor Nicholas Aroney for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article, and the anonymous reviewers for their generous engagement.

References

1 See, eg, Ahdar, Rex and Leigh, Ian, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 51–87Google Scholar. The ‘liberal’ idea is discussed further in Section II.

2 (1981) 146 CLR 559, 610–12 (‘DOGS’).

3 Beck, Luke, ‘Clear and Emphatic: The Separation of Church and State Under the Australian Constitution’ (2008) 27(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 161, 164Google Scholar.

4 Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366 (‘Krygger’); Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 (‘Jehovah's Witnesses’); DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 (‘Church of the New Faith’) (which considers the definition of religion in a way which is applicable to the free exercise clause); Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 (‘Kruger’).

5 For detailed discussions surrounding the validity of such liberal assumptions see, eg, Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1; D’Costa, Gavin et al (eds), Religion in a Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Smith, Steven, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McGraw, Bryan, Faith in Politics: Religion and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McConnell, Michael, ‘Why Protect Religious Freedom’ (2013) 123(3) Yale Law Journal 770Google Scholar; Eberle, Christopher, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Deagon, Alex, ‘Liberal Secularism and Religious Freedom in the Public Space: Reforming Political Discourse’ (2018) 41(3) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (forthcoming)Google Scholar.

6 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 127.

7 Ibid.

8 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 126 (Latham CJ); Church of the New Faith (1983) 154 CLR 120, 136 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J).

9 (1943) 67 CLR 116, 122–5.

10 Ibid [2].

11 Ibid [3].

12 See especially Krygger (1912) 15 CLR 366, 369 (Griffith CJ); Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 149–50 (Rich J); DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559, 582 (Barwick CJ), 604 (Gibbs J), 612 (Mason J), 653 (Wilson J); Church of the New Faith (1983) 154 CLR 120, 135–6 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). See also Deagon, Alex, ‘Defining the Interface of Freedom and Discrimination: Exercising Religion, Democracy and Same-Sex Marriage’ (2017) 20 International Trade and Business Law Review 239–86Google Scholar; Evans, Carolyn, ‘Religion as Politics not law: the Religion Clauses in the Australian Constitution’ (2008) 36(3) Religion, State and Society 283, 284CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Mortensen acknowledges that questions over the applicability of s 116 to the Territories and the fact that it only applies to Commonwealth legislation have also contributed to its restricted operation. See Mortensen, Reid, ‘The Unfinished Experiment: A Report on Religious Freedom in Australia’ (2007) 21 Emory International Law Review 167, 170–1Google Scholar.

13 (1997) 190 CLR 1.

14 Ibid 40 (Brennan CJ), 161 (Gummow J). See Beck's critique of this line of interpretation in Beck, Luke, ‘The Case Against Improper Purpose as the Touchstone for Invalidity Under Section 116 of the Australian Constitution’ (2016) 44(3) Federal Law Review 505–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 (1912) 15 CLR 366, 369.

16 Ibid.

17 See also Puls, Joshua, ‘The Wall of Separation: Section 116, the First Amendment and Constitutional Religious Guarantees’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 139, 142CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘religion began and ended at the church door’.

18 (1943) 67 CLR 116, 124–5 (Latham CJ). This follows Griffith CJ in Krygger, indicating that s 116 not only protects religious belief/opinion or the private holding of faith, but also protects acts done in the practice of religion. For further discussion and questions regarding the current applicability of this ‘action-belief dichotomy’, see Moens, Gabriel, ‘Action-Belief Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 195Google Scholar.

19 (1983) 154 CLR 120, 135–6.

20 Deagon, above n 12, 246.

21 Valerie Kerruish, ‘Responding to Kruger: The Constitutionality of Genocide’ (1998) 11(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 65, 67–8.

22 Joseph, Sarah, ‘Kruger v Commonwealth: Constitutional Rights and Stolen Generations’ (1998) 24 Monash University Law Review 486, 496Google Scholar.

23 Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 161.

24 (1943) 67 CLR 116.

25 Ibid 149–50.

26 Ibid 132.

27 Ibid 126.

28 Ibid 149 (Rich J).

29 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 17–18.

30 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 155 (Starke J).

31 Church of the New Faith (1983) 154 CLR 120, 130 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J).

32 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (Columbia University Press, 2011) 16–17Google Scholar.

33 Audi, Robert, ‘The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society’ (1993) 30 San Diego Law Review 677, 687Google Scholar.

34 Audi, Robert, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Ibid 34.

36 Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument’, above n 33, 691. Of course, this is not necessarily to say any judges rely on any particular liberal theorists directly. The point is to show these assumptions are liberal in nature.

37 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 126.

38 Mortensen, Reid, The Secular Commonwealth: Constitutional Government, Law and Religion (PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 1995) 194Google Scholar.

39 Blackshield, Tony, ‘Religion and Australian Constitutional Law’ in Radan, Peter et al (eds), Law and Religion (Routledge, 2005) 89, 89Google Scholar.

40 Mortensen, Reid, ‘Blasphemy in a Secular State: A Pardonable Sin?’ (1994) 17(2) UNSW Law Journal 409, 426–7Google Scholar.

41 Ibid.

42 Blackshield, above n 39, 92.

43 Ibid 89–92; Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 123–6.

44 Audi, Religious Commitment, above n 34, 34.

45 Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument’, above n 33, 690.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid 690–1. The point of this illustration is not to engage in the ‘secular reason’ debate, but to give context to the liberal principles which the High Court implicitly adopt in the free exercise context, as identified by Blackshield.

48 (1981) 146 CLR 559.

49 Ibid 653 (Wilson J).

50 DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559, 582 (Barwick CJ), 604 (Gibbs J), 612 (Mason J), 653 (Wilson J).

51 Ibid 603 (Gibbs J), 605 (Stephen J). Cf freedom of religion as not just an individual right but also a group right in Aroney, Nicholas, ‘Freedom of Religion as an Associational Right’ (2014) 33 University of Queensland Law Journal 153Google Scholar.

52 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 148–9 (Rich J).

53 If s 116 is a limit on Commonwealth power, equating ‘governmental powers’ (Commonwealth power) with establishment seems problematic, because then establishment is a function of Commonwealth power rather than a limit on it. This will be more fully considered in the final section.

54 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 159–60 (Williams J).

55 (1981) 146 CLR 559, 616 (Mason J).

56 Ibid 617 (Mason J).

57 Ibid 655 (Wilson J).

58 Ibid 651 (Wilson J).

59 Mortensen, ‘Blasphemy in a Secular State’, above n 40, 427.

60 Ahdar, Rex and Leigh, Ian, ‘Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom’ (2004) 49 McGill Law Journal 635, 638–9, 649Google Scholar. See, eg, Moore, John Norton, ‘The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the “Establishment” and “Free Exercise Clauses”’ (1964) 42 Texas Law Review 142Google Scholar, 146–9; Choper, Jesse, ‘The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict’ (1980) 41 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 673, 673–4Google Scholar. See generally Greenawalt, Kent, Religion and the Constitution, Volume 2: Establishment and Fairness (Princeton, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The distinction might seem artificial at first glance and there is clearly overlap, but there might well be situations where non-establishment is applicable but religious freedom is not (e.g. a law requiring public schools to teach biblical creation alongside evolution, which may infringe non-establishment but does not directly restrict the religious freedom of others).

61 See Laborde, Cecile, ‘Political Liberalism and Religion: On Separation and Establishment’ (2013) 21(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 67–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 Rawls, above n 32, 344; Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument’, above n 33, 700.

63 Rawls, above n 32, 187–8.

64 Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument’ above n 33, 690–1.

65 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 124 (Latham CJ).

66 Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument’, above n 33, 700.

67 Ibid 694.

68 DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559, 617 (Mason J).

69 Audi, Religious Commitment, above n 34, 36.

70 (1983) 154 CLR 120, 136.

71 Interestingly, the second effect was not borne out in DOGS, with the High Court allowing state funding of religious schools. This will be explored more in the final section.

72 Beck, Luke, ‘The Case Against Improper Purpose as the Touchstone for Invalidity under Section 116 of the Australian Constitution’ (2016) 44(3) Federal Law Review 505–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Ibid 505–6.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid 529.

76 Deagon, above n 12, 249–50.

77 Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 131–2 (Gaudron J); Deagon, above n 12, 242.

78 Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 131–2 (Gaudron J).

79 Ibid; Deagon, above n 12, 249–50.

80 Beck virtually acknowledges this: See Beck, above n 70, 525–526.

81 Hogan, Michael, ‘Separation of Church and State: Section 116 of the Australian Constitution’ (1981) 53(2) The Australian Quarterly 214, 219–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 Beck, above n 72, 505–6.

83 See Deagon, above n 12, 278; cf Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 131–32 (Gaudron J); Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 130 (Latham CJ).

84 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 16–17.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid 17.

87 Ibid 17–18; cf Mortensen, Reid, ‘The Establishment Clause: A Search for Meaning’ (2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 109, 124–5Google Scholar.

88 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 16–17.

89 See Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council (No 2) (2011) 256 FLR 156, 166 [32]; Beck, Luke, ‘Dead DOGS? Towards a Less Restrictive Interpretation of the Establishment Clause: Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council (No 2)’ (2014) 37 University of Western Australia Law Review 59, 65Google Scholar.

90 Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council [2016] NSWCA 157 (5 July 2016) [279] (Basten JA).

91 Ibid [249].

92 Ibid [253].

93 Ibid [279].

94 Beck, ‘Dead DOGS?’, above n 89, 66–8; Beck, Luke, ‘The Establishment Clause of the Australian Constitution: Three Propositions and a Case Study’ (2014) 35 Adelaide Law Review 225, 227–30Google Scholar. See also Mortensen, above n 87, 119–20. Beck also argues for a broader interpretation of the establishment clause because the strict ‘for the purpose of’ approach is unsound and inconsistent with more recent High Court authority in Beck, above n 72, 521–3.

95 Beck, ‘Dead DOGS?’, above n 89, 70–1.

96 Beck, ‘The Establishment Clause’ above n 94, 234–5.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid 240.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid 250.

101 Ibid 240.

102 Ibid 250.

103 DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559, 622 (Murphy J).

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid 623.

106 Ibid 632.

107 Ibid 622, 632.

108 Ibid 632.

109 See Ibid 622–4.

110 See Ibid 624–5. Murphy J refers to this as the rationale behind the US establishment clause, which he says at 630–2 is the same as the Australian one. He argues that the Australian establishment clause should therefore receive the same strict separationist interpretation as the US establishment clause. Oddly, he premises this on the intentions of the framers without explicitly using the convention debates (which at that point was not allowed)! This begs the further question of possible liberal assumptions on the parts of the framers as they drafted s 116. Such a study is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Beck, Luke, ‘”Higgins” argument for section 116 of the constitution’ (2013) 41(1) Federal Law Review 393–415CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a detailed study of some of the competing ideas underpinning the drafting process.

111 Jehovah's Witnesses (1943) 67 CLR 116, 148–9 (Rich J).

112 DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559, 622 (Murphy J).

113 See, eg, Locke v Davey (2004) 540 U.S. 712.

114 Ibid.

115 Mortensen, Reid, ‘Rendering to God and Caesar: Religion in Australian Discrimination Law’ (1995) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 208, 231Google Scholar.

116 DOGS (1981) 146 CLR 559, 632 (Murphy J).

117 See, eg, Deagon, above n 12, 265–78.

118 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, GA Res 36/55, UN GAOR, 3rd Committee, 36th session, 73rd plenary meeting, Agenda Item 75, Supp No 51, UN Doc A/RES/36/55 (25 November 1981).

119 For an example of such a test in relation to religious freedom and anti-discrimination law, see Deagon, above n 12, 278–86.