¹ For a small sampling, see, eg, Horowitz, Donald L, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 2nd ed, 2000)Google Scholar; Lijphart, Arend, ‘Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links’ (1979) 12(3) Canadian Journal of Political Science 499CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reynolds, Andrew, The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See, eg, Baines, Beverley and Rubio-Marin, Ruth (eds), The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2005)Google Scholar; Williams, Susan H (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baines, Beverley, Barak-Erez, Daphne, and Kahana, Tsvi (eds), Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rubenstein, Kim and Young, Katharine G (eds), The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global (Cambridge University Press, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Irving, Helen (ed), Constitutions and Gender (Edward Elgar, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ For a more detailed assessment of some of the specifics of a federal system in Myanmar that would help promote gender equality, see Christine Mary Forster, ‘Advancing Gender Equality Within a Federal Governance Model in Myanmar’, (Report, UNWomen, 2017) at 35–45 (suggesting specific allocations of particular subject matters to the union or the state levels).

⁴ See Elazar, Daniel, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press, 1987)Google Scholar 34–8 (comparing contrasting models of federalism); see also Hueglin, Thomas, ‘Federalism at the Crossroads: Old Meanings, New Significance’ (2003) 36 Canadian Journal of Political Science 275CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 275 (‘On all counts, federalism has remained a contested concept.’)

⁵ Compare Elazar, above n 4, 34 (‘Federalism is based on a particular kind of constitutional framework.’); Ostrom, Vincent, ‘The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society’ (ICS Press, 1991), 7Google Scholar (‘The standard definition of federalism is a system of government where authority is exercised concurrently by a national government and state or provincial governments.’)

⁶ Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, May 29, 2008, sch 2.

⁷ United States Constitution amend X.

⁸ See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany] art 83, translation at <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html> (‘The Länder shall execute federal laws in their own right insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise provide or permit.’); Gunlicks, Arthur, ‘The Länder and German Federalism’ (Manchester University Press, 2003) 60–1CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘As we have seen above, the federation in fact carries most of the responsibility for legislation, while the Länder are primarily responsible for administration.’).

⁹ See Horowitz, Donald L, ‘The Many Uses of Federalism’ (2007) 55 Drake Law Review 953Google Scholar, 959 (‘Third, federalism can make it possible to mitigate discontent by making special, asymmetric arrangements for regions with special problems or distinctive identities’); Tarlton, Charles D, ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation’ (1965) 27 The Journal of Politics 861CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 869 (‘The ideal asymmetrical federal system would be one composed of political units corresponding to differences of interest, character, and makeup that exist within the whole society’).

¹⁰ For the purposes of brevity, I will, from this point on, use ‘states’ to refer to all forms of subnational units that are constitutionally authorised to exercise powers, whether large or small, symmetrical or asymmetrical.

¹¹ For a discussion of a range of such emergency powers for states, see Susan H Williams, ‘States of Emergency and Federalism: An Exploration of the Implications for Constitutional Design’ (unpublished paper on file with the author).

¹² For views finding federalism has a positive impact, see, eg, Chappell, Louise, ‘Interacting with the State: Feminist Strategies and Political Opportunities’ (2000) 2 International Feminist Journal of Politics 244CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bashevkin, Sylvia, Women on the Defensive: Living Through Conservative Times (University of Chicago Press, 1998)Google Scholar. For views that federalism disadvantages women, see, eg, Resnik, Judith, ‘Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe’ (2001) 619 Yale Law Journal 111Google Scholar; Vickers, Jill, ‘Why Should Women Care About Constitutional Reform?’ in Schneiderman, David (ed), Conversations Among Friends: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference on Women and Constitutional Reform (Centre for Constitutional Studies 1991)Google Scholar; Vickers, Jill, ‘Why Should Women Care About Federalism?’ in Brown, Douglas and Hiebert, Janet (eds), Canada: The State of Federation 1994 (Canadian Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1994)Google Scholar.

¹³ See Huassman, Melissa, Sawer, Marian and Vickers, Jill (eds), Federalism, Feminism and Multilevel Governance (Ashgate, 2010) 229Google Scholar (‘forum shopping … lets women work around a blockage at one governance level and take advantage of an opening at another level’); see also Chappell, Louise, ‘The “Femocrat” Strategy: Expanding the Repertoire of Feminist Activists’ (2002) 55 Parliamentary Affairs 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 92 (‘[F]ederalism has been important to Australian femocrats because they have been able to shift their attention between governments when blocked at one level or another.’); see also Bashevkin, above n 12, 10 (‘federal arrangements with their multiple access points appeared to assist feminist interests, because decision makers in North America could not exert a reliable power of veto over group claims as they could in Britain.’) (internal quotations and footnote omitted).

¹⁴ See Anderson, Alison Grey, ‘The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 813CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 842 (‘Federalism can be seen as in some sense intended to give interest groups two chances.’).

¹⁵ See Simms, Marian, ‘Gender, Globalization and Democratization’ in Kelly, Rita Mae et al (eds), Gender, Globalization, and Democratization (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001)Google Scholar; Fiona Mackay, ‘Devolution and the Multilevel Politics of Gender in the UK’ in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13.

¹⁶ See Jennifer L Lawless and Richard L Fox, ‘Men Rule: The Continued Under-Representation of Women in U.S. Politics’ (American University Women & Politics Institute, 2012) 13–15 (‘What emerges from this analysis of family roles and structures is the fact that women, though no longer directly impeded from thinking about a candidacy just because they have certain familial responsibilities, face a more complex set of choices than do their male counterparts’); see also Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament, ‘Women in Decision-Making: The Role of the New Media for Increased Political Participation’ (2013) 31 (‘The situational explanation emphasises the unequal division of unpaid labour and the higher burden of family responsibilities that women bear which inhibits their engagement in politics.’).

¹⁷ For some evidence supporting the idea that women are more likely to consider themselves qualified to run for office at the local level, see Jennifer L Lawless and Richard L Fox, ‘Why Are Women Still Not running for Public Office?’ (2008) 16 Issues in Governance Studies, Brookings Institute. One result of this difference is that women are much more equally represented on local school boards. See Janie Boschma, ‘Why Women Don't Run for Office’, Politico, 6 December 2017 (‘One arena in which women are willing to run for office—and do seem to feel qualified—is the local school board. A poll of school superintendents estimates that women represented 43 percent of the nation's school board members in the 2014–15 school year.’).

¹⁸ Party gatekeepers are one of the primary barriers to women's political participation. See Cheng, Christine and Tavis, Margit, ‘Informal Influences in Selecting Female Political Candidates’ (2011) 64 Political Research Quarterly 460CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 461 (‘The first mechanism is that gatekeepers are more likely to directly recruit and promote people like themselves.’). The suggestion in text is that this barrier might be lower in the context of local politics, but there is little evidence to document any differences. In terms of fundraising, it is plain that competing in national and state elections is more expensive than in local ones and fundraising is the number one barrier cited by women candidates. See Jena Macgregor, ‘Why More Women Don't Run for Office’, Washington Post, 21 May 2014 (citing a report by Political Parity studying women who ran for legislative positions). For a general description of these barriers, see Judith Warner, Opening the Gates: Clearing the Way for More Women to Hold Political Office (19 May 2017) Center for American Progress <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2017/05/19/427206/opening-the-gates/>.

¹⁹ For an interesting empirical study, see Richard Vengroff, Zsolt Nyiri and Fugiero, Melissa, ‘Electoral System and Gender Representation in Sub-National Legislatures: Is there a National-Sub-National Gender Gap?’ (2003) 56(2) Political Research Quarterly 163Google Scholar, 168 (the rate of women's political participation in sub-national legislatures is higher than in national legislatures in developed countries, but not in less developed countries). In the US, for example, women are 24.9% of all state legislators, see National Conference of State Legislatures: National Conference of State Legislatures, Women in State Legislatures for 2017 (11 July 2017) <http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/women-in-state-legislatures-for-2017.aspx>, and 20% of Congress: Center for American Women and Politics, Women in Elective Office 2018 (2018) <http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office-2018>.

²⁰ For general discussions of such effects, see, eg, Osborne, David, Laboratories of Democracy (Harvard Business School Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Tarr, G Alan, ‘Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Management’ (2001) 31 Publius 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pacheco, Julianna, ‘The Social Contagion Model: Exploring the Role of Public Opinion on the Diffusion of Antismoking Legislation Across the American States’ (2012) 74 Journal of Politics 187CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 188–9.

²¹ See Pierson, Paul, ‘Fragmented Welfare States’ (1995) 8(4) Governance 449CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vickers, Jill, ‘A Two-Way Street: Federalism and Women's Politics in Canada and the United States’ (2010) 40 Publius 412CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² See generally Bednar, Jenna, ‘Nudging Federalism toward Productive Experimentation’ (2011) 21 Regional & Federal Studies 503CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Volden, Craig, ‘States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance Program’ (2006) 50(2) American Journal of Political Science 294CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 310 (‘As used here, this approach uncovers a robust pattern of states acting as policy laboratories’); see also Oates, Wallace E, ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’ (1999) 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1120CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1132 (‘recent legislation that transfers the responsibility for these programs back to the states represents … a recognition of the failure of existing programs and an attempt to make use of the states as “laboratories” to try to find out what make sorts of programs can work’); see Susan-Ackerman, Rose, ‘Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 593CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 594 (‘If state and local governments are supposed to be “laboratories”, then my model predicts that few useful experiments will be carried out in them’).

²³ See Mackay, Fiona, ‘Descriptive and Substantive Representation in New Parliamentary Spaces: The Case of Scotland’ in Sawer, Marian, Tremblay, Manon and Trimble, Linda (eds), Representing Women in Parliament: A Comparative Study (Routledge, 2006)Google Scholar (political participation); see also Fiona Mackay, ‘Devolution and Multilevel Politics of Gender’ in Haussmann, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13; Chappell, above n 13, 251 (gender equality agenda); see also Bashevkin, above n 12, 10 (gender equality agenda).

²⁴ This is the point, of course, in the common strategy of seeking to guarantee women's reproductive rights through the federal Constitution, rather than fight them out in every state legislature. See Haussman, Melissa, Abortion Politics in North America (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Thus, the unified route is possible for some issues in a federal system, but the whole point in federalism is to limit the number and importance of such issues, so as to maintain the ability of subnational units to make policy independently. The point is not that federalism makes a unified approach impossible for everything, but that it makes it less available for many things.

²⁵ For a study of the gap between elite and non-elite attitudes toward gender equality, see Wallace, Claire, Haerpfer, Christian and Abbott, Pamela, ‘Women in Rwandan Politics and Society’ (2008/9) 38(4) International Journal of Sociology 111CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ See Vickers, above n 21, ‘A Two-Way Street: Federalism and Women's Politics in Canada and the United States’, 419 (‘Most English-Canadian feminists favor federal government control of social programs which they fear conservative provincial governments will dismantle’).

²⁷ See Elazar, above n 4, 88 (‘The second face of territorial democracy was that represented by Massachusetts and most of New England, whereby different groups were expected to settle in different territorial entities which they then could use to build polities that would express their separate visions and protect their separate group interests’); see also Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (Yale University Press, 1977)Google Scholar 42 (‘Similarly, federalism can be used as a consociational method when the plural society is a “federal society”: a society in which each segment is territorially concentrated and separated from the other segments, or, to put it differently, a society in which the segmental cleavages coincide with regional cleavages.’); see also Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, above n 1, 613–17 (discussing the concept of ‘homogenous states’ that refers to territorial devolution to geographically concentrated ethnic groups).

²⁸ See, eg, Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 234 (‘Chapters on India, Nigeria, Russia and Canada show how women's entitlement to ‘national’ citizenship rights such as gender equality can be challenged by or made to compete with group rights of ethnic, religious, national or language communities at another level of local government.’)

²⁹ See ibid (‘Leaving welfare provisions to the latter may result in uneven access to programs and services across the country and unequal citizenship entitlements.’); see also (‘[F]ederalism arguably remains an important obstacle to that pan-Canadian goal.’).

³⁰ The Gender Inequality Index was multiplied by 1000 to transform from a three-digit decimal to integers so that the output in the regression would yield a more intuitive result. This transformation is purely aesthetic and does not affect the results. See United Nations Development Programme, Gender Inequality Index (2016) available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii>.

³¹ The Human Development Index was multiplied by 1000 to transform from a three-digit decimal to integers so that the coefficient in the regression would yield a more intuitive result. This transformation is purely aesthetic and does not affect the results. United Nations, Human Development Index (2016) <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.

³² I am very grateful to my research assistant, Cody Vaughn, for doing the calculations for this analysis. His assistance was invaluable.

³³ See Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 229–36 (assessing the impact of federalism, devolution, and multilevel governance on women from the case studies in edited volume and finding a mixed picture on all fronts).

³⁴ Cf Laura Macdonald and Lisa Mills, ‘Gender, Democracy and Federalism in Mexico: Implications for Reproductive Rights and Social Policy’ in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13; Chappell, above n 12; Bashevkin, above n 12 (all providing examples where states are ahead of the federal government on gender equality reforms); Lang, Sabine, ‘Gendering Federalism—Federalizing Gender: Women's Agencies and Policies in German Multilevel Governance’ (2010) 33 German Studies Review 517Google Scholar, 524; Laura Macdonald and Lisa Mills, ‘Gender, Democracy and Federalism in Mexico: Implications for Reproductive Rights and Social Policy’ in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 194–5 (providing examples where states rolled back federal government reforms).

³⁵ For an argument that federalism was only briefly an advantage for women's reproductive rights, see Melissa Haussman, ‘Caught in a Bind: The US Pro-Choice Movement and Federalism’ in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers above n 13, 123 (‘With reference to the questions posed to all authors about federalism and multilevel governance, the answer is that the architecture of federalism only worked briefly to promote women's reproductive freedom in the US, while there was political will to implement it and money to support it.’).

³⁶ And this is, in fact, the question that many gender scholars have come to focus on: see Vickers, above n 21, ‘A Two-Way Street: Federalism and Women's Politics in Canada and the United States’, 419–20 (‘Many contemporary gender scholars (Sawer and Vickers 2001; Chappell 2002; Riedle 2002; Smith 2008; Vickers 2008) adopt a third, “conditional approach” (Gray 2006) that federalism per se has neither positive nor negative consequences for women because federal characteristics and their effects vary between institutions, across institutional arenas, and policy or issue sectors, and with time and space. They claim, therefore, that federalism's effects depend on characteristics of specific federations, at specific times.’).

³⁷ See Sosna v Iowa, 419 US 393, 404 (1975); Ex Parte Burrus, 136 US 586, 593–4 (1890) (‘The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States’; see also Barber v Barber, 60 US 582, 584 (1859). But see generally Resnik, Judith, ‘“Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts’ (1991) 66 New York University Law Review 1682Google Scholar (challenging the limited conception of family law, and noting that other areas of law touch directly on family life); also see generally Estin, Ann Laquer, ‘Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States’ (2009) 18 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 267Google Scholar, 330 (‘Many subjects of national legislation incorporate significant family policy dimensions.’).

³⁸ Constitution Act 1867 (Imp), 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, ss 91–2 (giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over Marriage and Divorce and provincial governments exclusive jurisdiction over solemnisation of marriage, property and civil rights, and ‘[g]enerally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature’); see also Christine Davies, Alastair Bissett-johnson and Julius Grey, Family Law in Canada, (23 February 2015) The Canadian Encyclopaedia <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/family-law/>.

³⁹ See Resnik, ‘“Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts’, above n 37, 1696 (‘What underlies both this lack of interest in and opposition to jurisdiction over gender-related injuries is the usually unstated and widely shared assumption that women are not relevant to the federal courts. This assumption, in turn, is fueled by an association of women with roles traditionally governed by state law (marriage, childbearing, and family care—oversimplified, a “private” world) and a corresponding association of the federal courts not with such “domestic” concerns but rather with commerce, constitutional law, federal statutory enforcement (oversimplified, a “public” world) in which men predominate.’).

⁴⁰ See ibid 1749 (‘Women and the families they sometimes inhabit are not only assumed to be outside the federal courts, they also are assumed not to be related to the “national issues” to which the federal judiciary is to devote its interests. Jurisdictional lines have not been drawn according to the laws of nature but by men, who today are seeking to confirm their prestige as members of the most important judiciary in the country. Individual problems move lower on the federal courts’ agenda. Dealing with women—in and out of families, arguing about federal statutory rights of relatively small value—is not how they want to frame their job.’).

⁴¹ For a description of the development of this phenomenon and a suggestion about dividing up jurisdiction over such issues in ways that defuse it, see Shachar, Ayelet, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴² But it is important to recognise that the exact location and meaning of these dividing lines is never fixed by a constitutional text: most exercises of government power will have implications for multiple subjects, often on both sides of whatever line divides union and state powers. For example, a policy about who counts as married for immigration purposes concerns both the power over immigration and the power over marriage. Because of the uncertainty and malleability of such boundaries, one of the most important issues in federal systems is who will decide on which side of the line a particular exercise of power falls. This is often the role of the Supreme Court or a specialised council. For a discussion of this line drawing issue, see Judith Resnik, ‘Federalism(s) Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations’ in James E Fleming and Jacob T Levy (eds), Federalism and Subsidiarity (New York University Press, 2014) 363.

⁴³ See David C Williams, ‘Constitutional Design for Burma: The First Lecture’ in David C Williams and Lian H Sakhong (eds), Designing Federalism in Burma (2005) 55, 73–90.

⁴⁴ UN Women, Turning Promises into Action: Gender Equality in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2018), 20.

⁴⁵ For similar reasons, women have a particularly strong interest in the inclusion of positive rights to social and economic benefits in the constitution. See Susan Williams, ‘Introduction: Comparative Constitutional Law, Gender Equality, and Constitutional Design’ in Susan H Williams (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law, above n 2, 1.

⁴⁶ Shah, Anwar, ‘Comparative Conclusions on Fiscal Federalism’ in Shah, Anwar (ed) The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007) 370CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 391 (‘In most case study countries, with a few notable exceptions, federal conditional grants use input-based conditionality. Such conditionality impairs state and local autonomy and is a source of conflict.’).

⁴⁷ See Robin Boadway and Shah, Anwar, Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practice of Multiorder Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009)Google Scholar 291–391 (Chapters on Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers); regarding revenue sharing see 295 (‘Standard revenue-sharing systems provide transfers in a lump-sum and unconditional way to the states. The states are left with full discretion over how to spend them.’).

⁴⁸ See Salmond, Rob, ‘Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians’ (2006) 31(2) Legislative Studies Quarterly 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 190–2; (see also Pamela Paxton, Melanie M Hughes and Painter, Matthew A II, ‘Growth in Women's Political Representation: A Longitudinal Exploration of Democracy, Electoral System, and Gender Quotas’ (2010) 49 European Journal of Political Research 25Google Scholar, 43 (‘Compared to plurality-majority systems, countries with PR or mixed-PR systems consistently have significantly higher levels of women's political representation.’).

⁴⁹ See Stina Laserud and Rina Taphorn, Designing for Equality: Best-Fit, Medium-Fit and Non-Favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas (1 March 2007) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance <https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/designing-equality-best-fit-medium-fit-and-non-favourable-combinations>.

⁵⁰ For a full analysis of these issues, see Lolita Cigane and Magnus Ohman, Political Finance and Gender Equality (August 2014) International Foundation for Electoral Systems <https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/political_finance_and_gender_equality.pdf>.

⁵¹ Cf, William M Chandler and Chandler, Marsha A, ‘Federalism and Political Parties’ (1987) 3 European Journal of Political Economy 87CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 87–8 (describing how federalism facilitates the formation and strength of ‘regionalist’ parties). For an interesting description of how federal systems in Asia create a role for ethnic parties at the sub-state level, see Michael G Breen, ‘Federalism and the Role of Multiethnic Political Parties in the Accommodation of Minority Ethnic Groups in Asia’ (Paper presented at IPSA World Congress, Brisbane, Australia, July 2018) <https://www.ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/wc2018/papers/paper-102651-2018-07-16t213946-0400.pdf>.

⁵² Rianne Mahon and Cheryl Collier, ‘Navigating the Shoals of Canadian Federalism: Childcare Advocacy’, in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 51, 65.

⁵³ See McBride, Dorothy E and Mazur, Amy G, ‘Women's Policy Agencies and State Feminism’, in Waylen, Georgina et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2013) 654CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 672 (‘This chapter has shown the various ways women's policy agencies through state feminism are important sites of representation, policy change, and ultimately democratization.’); 669 (‘the analysis confirmed the significant independent influence of agencies on state response to movement demands.’).

⁵⁴ For a comprehensive exposition of the forms and functions of Women's Policy Agencies of 151 countries worldwide, see generally Christine Scheidegger, Institutional Architecture for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality Worldwide (2014) <https://www.academia.edu/9314562/Institutional_architecture_for_womens_empowerment_and_gender_equality_worldwide_Institutional_diversity_in_151_countries>.

⁵⁵ For a good example of such effective networking, see Lang, above n 34, 519 (‘Nearly 1,900 local Women's Equality Offices work in cities and counties, networking through their national association the Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft kommunaler Frauenbüros (BAG). They frequently cooperate with equality officers in parties, universities, and large private businesses.’).

⁵⁶ See McBride and Mazur, above n 53, 669.

⁵⁷ See Government of Canada, Intergovernmental Relations in the Canadian Context (2018) <https://www.canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs/services/relations-canadian-context.html>.

⁵⁸ See Chanchal Sharma, Kumar, ‘Intergovernmental Coordination Mechanisms in India: A Review’ (2011) 15(2) South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies 40Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ See Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders and John Kincaid (eds), Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems (Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁶¹ See Gray, Gwen, ‘Women, Federalism and Woman-Friendly Policies’ (2006) 65 Australian Journal of Public Administration 34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶² For a description of the range of such connections, see Resnik, Judith, ‘Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1564CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1647–52.

⁶³ See Suk, Julie C, ‘An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing Global Constitutionalism Home’ (2017) 28 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 381Google Scholar (discussing the convergence between foreign models of gender equality and US state and local efforts to adopt stronger equal protection models than at the federal level).

⁶⁴ See Christiana Ochoa, ‘Guatemalan Transnational Feminists: How Their Search for Constitutional Equality Interplays with International Law’, in Susan H Williams (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law, above n 2, 248.

⁶⁵ See, Steytler, Nico, ‘Comparative Conclusions’, in Steytler, Nico and Kincaid, John (eds), Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009) 406–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ This could be an important addition to clarify state's capabilities, given that the foreign affairs power is almost always assigned to the central government in federal systems. See, eg, Grundgesetz (Basic Law) ch II art 32 s 3, translation at <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html> (‘Insofar as the Länder have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with the consent of the Federal Government’); see also Bundesverfassungsgesetz [B-VG][Constitution] BGBL No 1/1930, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL I No 102/2014 art 10(3), <https://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.html> (Austria) (‘Before the Federation concludes state treaties which make necessary implementing measures in the sense of art 16 or affect the autonomous sphere of competence of the provinces in another way it must give the provinces the opportunity to give their opinion. If the Federation is in possession of a uniform opinion of the provinces, the Federation is bound thereby when concluding the state treaty. The Federation may depart therefrom only for compelling foreign policy reasons; it shall without delay advise the provinces of these reasons.’).

⁶⁷ As in the South African Constitution, see Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa) art 39(1) (‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum … must consider international law …’), art 233 (‘When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.’).

⁶⁸ As in the Costa Rican Constitution, see art 7 (1949, rev 2011) (‘The public treaties, the international agreements and the concordats, duly approved by the Legislative Assembly, will have from their promulgation or from the day designated by them, authority superior to that of the laws.’), <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en>.

⁶⁹ See David Williams, C, ‘Changing Burma From Without: Political Activism Among the Burmese Diaspora’ (2012) 19 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 121CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 124–7.

⁷⁰ See Bray, John, ‘Ethnic Minorities and the Future of Burma’ (1992) 48 The World Today 144Google Scholar, 144 (‘This year the Burmese army has launched offensives against Karen, Kachin, Naga and Rohingya insurgents … Burma's civil war is an international issue as much as a domestic one … because of the flood of refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.’); see ibid 126–7.

⁷¹ Silverstein, Josef, Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity (Rutgers University Press, 1980)Google Scholar 51 (‘What moved them [the ethnic minorities] were their common fears of Burmanization, loss of cultural identity, interference in their affairs by the national government and a belief that the Burmans were creating an internal colonial system in which they would not share the wealth of the country.’).

⁷² For a description of the history of the peace process, see Myanmar's Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, Briefing Paper #149, International Crisis Group (19 October 2016) at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-s-peace-process-getting-political-dialogue>.

⁷³ See Oliver Slow, ‘Fighting in Kachin Highlights Myanmar Civil War Worries’, Voice of America (online), 26 April 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/kachin-fighting-myanmar-civil-war/4365603.html>; ‘Myanmar: 19 Die in Fresh Clashes Between Army and Rebels in Shan State, The Guardian (online), 12 May 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/myanmar-19-die-in-fresh-clashes-between-army-and-rebels-in-shan-state>.

⁷⁴ For a sampling of the extensive press coverage of the Rohyinga crisis, see ‘Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis’, BBC News (online), 24 April 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561>; ‘The Rohyinga Crisis’, CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/specials/asia/rohingya>; Eleanor Albert, ‘The Rohyinga Crisis’, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 April 2018 <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis>.

⁷⁵ See David C Williams, ‘Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma's Struggle to Build a New Order’, (2009) 87 Texas Law Journal 1657, 1660.

⁷⁶ See Fink, Christina, Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule (Zed Books, 2001)Google Scholar 28 (describing the history of secession claims); David C Williams, ‘Changing Burma From Without: Political Activism Among the Burmese Diaspora’ above n 69, 1673 (describing how some groups still seek secession).

⁷⁷ For a discussion of how the CPA can make constitutional change, see David C Williams, ‘Can the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Be Changed Outside the Legislature and Outside the Normal Amendment Process?’ (unpublished paper on file with the author).

⁷⁸ See eg, Katya Cengel, ‘Rape is a Weapon in Burma's Kachin State, but the Women of Kachin Are Fighting Back’, Time (online), 11 February 2014, <http://time.com/6429/burma-rape-in-kachin/>; Rick Gladstone, ‘Rohingya Were Raped Systematically by Myanmar's Military, Report Says’, New York Times (online), 16 November 2017 <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-rapes.html>.

⁷⁹ While women are actually more likely to have higher education than men in Burma, there is overt discrimination to keep them out of certain subjects in universities. See Samantha Michaels, ‘Suu Kyi Criticizes Gender Bias at Burma Universities’, The Irrawaddy (online), 6 December 2013, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/suu-kyi-criticizes-gender-bias-burma-universities.html>.

⁸⁰ For a comprehensive assessment of the status of women in Myanmar, see Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis (Report by Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund, and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women) (2016) <http://mm.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/myanmar/docs/unct_mm_UNWomen_Report_Gender%20Situation%20Analysis.pdf>.

⁸¹ See statistics on pp 28–9.

⁸² The WLB is an umbrella organisation, bringing together representatives from the many women's groups that are associated with particular ethnicities in Burma. It includes women's groups from both ethnic minority and majority (Burman) communities. It was based in Chiang Mai, Thailand for many years during the military junta, but has recently moved its headquarters inside the country, to Yangon. The WLB, because of its close ties to ethnic groups and its history of refugee leadership, has a special concern for the women impacted by the civil war and sees its role in the peace process as one of its central priorities. For more information about the organisation, see <http://womenofburma.org/aboutus/>.

⁸³ With a female representation of only 17 percent, women accounted for 120 out of the 700 delegates at the most recent UPC, 40 of them being lawmakers or government officials, eight being members of the Tatmadaw, 28 representing the political parties, 31 coming from the EAOs, and 13 acting as civilian representatives. See Nyein Nyein, ‘Women Playing Larger Role at This Year's Peace Conference’, The Irrawaddy (online), 15 July 2018, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/women-playing-larger-role-years-peace-conference.html>. Female underrepresentation has been even more severe on the UPDJC (one of the central decision-making bodies in the peace process), where, at least as of 2017, only eight out of 75 members were women. Roslyn Warren et al, ‘Women's Peacebuilding Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons from Myanmar and Ukraine’ (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 2018) <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Womens-Peacebuilding-Strategies-Amidst-Conflict-1.pdf>.

⁸⁴ The first and third of these goals are not addressed in this paper. For a discussion of these concerns, please see the ‘WLB Response to the Gender Equality Principles Adopted at the UPC in August 2018 (paper on file with the author).

⁸⁵ For an interesting effort offering some of the details about specific divisions of power and reaching similar conclusions on some issues, see Forster, above n 3.

⁸⁶ Cf Myanmar Constitution 2008 sch 1 with sch 2.

⁸⁷ This claim, and others in this section of the paper describing the positions of the EAOs in the peace negotiations, are based on my years of working with these groups on constitutional reform issues. There are few publicly available sources on the positions of the parties in the peace negotiations, but our Center has been talking to the leaders of these groups for over a decade and those conversations are the basis for my descriptions of their positions.

⁸⁸ See Myanmar Constitution 2008 art 37 (‘The Union is the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union …’).

⁸⁹ Myanmar Constitution 2008 sch 1.

⁹⁰ See ibid.

⁹¹ They would also like a greater role in the design and implementation of tax and development schemes, particularly with respect to the natural resources located within their borders. In other words, they do not just want a share of the profits, they also want to be able to ensure that the programs are carried out in ways that respect the customs and community identities of their people. For example, they would like to prevent the government from destroying intact communities and scattering their population in order to build dams. See, eg, ‘Myanmar Urged to Review Hydropower Dam Projects Seen Damaging to Rural Communities’, Radio Free Asia (online), 10 July 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-urged-to-review-hydropower-dam-projects-07102018170207.html>.

⁹² See Myanmar Constitution 2008 arts 141(b) (Upper House), 109(b) (Lower House), 161(d) (state and region legislatures).

⁹³ See Shwe Shwe Sein Latt et al, ‘Women's Political Representation in Myanmar: Experiences of Women Parliamentarians 2011-16’ (Asia Foundation, 2017) vol ii.

⁹⁴ See Myanmar Constitution 2008 arts 109(a), 141n(a)(national), 161(a)(state); ‘Myanmar Election Guide, Democracy Assistance and Election News’ <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-ab&ei=YgrCW6-cEYm6ggfvnJaoCg&q=PR+electoral+system+in+Amyotha+Hluttaw&oq=PR+electoral+system+in+Amyotha+Hluttaw&gs_l=psy-ab.3…28667.33422..34306…0.0..0.134.409.3j1……0….1..gws-wiz…….0i71.MqDcbEX4k3s>.

⁹⁵ Most of these reasons have to do with the differences between the states in terms of size and diversity and their ability to design governing structures that fit their specific characteristics. These reasons would, of course, benefit women in the states along with their male counterparts. The point in text is simply that women have an additional reason to support the ability of states to write their own constitutions: it gives them a chance to create more woman-friendly conditions in the electoral systems of their states than the system required by the current union Constitution.

⁹⁶ See state constitution drafts on file with the author.

⁹⁷ See Nicole Loring, Political Twist: A Combined Electoral System in Myanmar (December 2014), <http://www.academia.edu/9676238/Political_Twist_A_Combined_Electoral_System_in_Myanmar>.

⁹⁸ ‘NLD Won't Support Quota for Women in Political Positions’, The Irrawaddy (online), 3 July 2018, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nld-wont-support-quota-for-women-in-political-positions.html>.

⁹⁹ Devolving power to the states might also give them more control over the structures and electoral rules of local governments. Under current law in Myanmar, Ward and Village Tract Administrators, who are important local officials, are elected not by all citizens, but only by heads of households (who are presumed to be men). As a result, women neither vote for nor hold these positions. See Forster, above n 3, 15.

¹⁰⁰ See Women's League of Burma website <http://womenofburma.org/wlbmembers/>.

¹⁰¹ Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi has appointed no women to cabinet posts since her party won the 2015 elections. See Fiona Macgregor, ‘Myanmar's New Cabinet: National Reconciliation Without Equality, Myanmar Times (online), 25 March 2016 <https://www.mmtimes.com/opinion/19660-myanmar-s-new-cabinet-national-reconciliation-without-equality.html>.

¹⁰² See Sam Yamin Aung, ‘Social Welfare Minister: “I will always campaign for gender equality”’, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2017.

¹⁰³ For the former, see <http://www.mwaf.org.mm/en/about-us>, for the latter, see <http://www.mmcwa-myanmar.org/>.

¹⁰⁴ This observation is based on my own work with state constitution drafters in Shan State and Tanintharyi Region in May and August of 2018.

¹⁰⁵ See Ostrom, Vincent, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society (ICS Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ See Elazar, Daniel J, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press, 1991)Google Scholar 5 (‘In essence, a federal arrangement is one of partnership, established and regulated by a covenant, whose internal relationships reflect the special kind of sharing that must prevail among the partners, based on a mutual recognition of the integrity of each partner and the attempt to foster a special unity among them.’).

¹⁰⁷ This model of character may connect in interesting ways to the ‘second-order diversity’ Heather Gerken has explored. See Gerken, Heather, ‘Second-Order Diversity’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1099Google Scholar. Her analysis is focused on diversity between governance institutions (ie different sorts of institutions that allow different groups within the population to control certain decisions, as opposed to demanding diversity—in the form of mirror representation—within each institution). It may be that such second-order diversity is a good way to encourage the type of citizen character I am describing, or that this type of character is useful to allow second-order diversity to do the work Gerken describes. Her description of federalism as an example of this sort of diversity suggests such a connection. I am grateful to Rosalind Dixon for pointing out the possible connection here.

¹⁰⁸ See Elazar, above n 106, 12 (‘The essence of federalism is not to be found in a particular set of institutions but in the institutionalization of particular relationships among the participants in political life.’).